REASONS Most humbly offer'd to the Honorable House of Commons, &c.
&Oic;NE of the greatest felici&rehy;ties of a free country, is, that the Laws are a com&rehy;mon measure and standard of all men's actions, bind&rehy;ing as well the Governors as the Governed, in their respective capa&rehy;cities; while in countries, groaning under arbitrary power, the rule of men's acti&rehy;ons is unconstant, and therfore properly unknown: the Prince abolishing to day what was establish'd yesterday, and no body being sure what will or will not be decreed to-morrow; whence all security for Property is render'd precarious, and other infinite disorders unavoidably ensue. But as every thing is in perpetual motion, and that many things, which at certain times were not only desireable but even neces&rehy;sary, do, at other times, by a change of circumstances, become burthensom and very often intolerable; so the Legislative Power can apply a seasonable remedy, by explaining, amending, or repealing such Laws as are found to be either defective, or contrary to the good of the Community. In making of Laws, among all the Free Governments of Europe, the deliberations in our own are the most equitable and ma&rehy;ture. There is nothing precipitant or clandestin; all things, on the contrary, are public and solemn: for by the usual forms of reading and passing Bills in both Houses, before they are offer'd to the Royal Assent for being enacted into Laws, there is due time given for thorowly considering the nature of the things propos'd; and for one House to correct the mistakes, or to supply the omissions of the other; as there is room for the King to stop and bet&rehy;ter advise; upon what may have unwarily or thro heat escap'd them both. On such occasions every man may be freely heard for or against the Law under debate, as it is every man's duty to assist his country no less by his advice, than by his arm or his purse. He may represent what he ap&rehy;prehends to be a Grievance, without fear&rehy;ing to be counted factious; and may expect redress, without being thought to claim more than his due.
THIS, I say, is none of the least bene&rehy;fits, which every Subject of the British Em&rehy;pire enjoys as his Inheritance; and by vir&rehy;tue of this Birthright (which makes it no less than my duty) I take the liberty, with all deference to your Judgments, to lay be&rehy;fore your Honors some few of those Rea&rehy;sons I have to offer, why the Bill sent down to you from the House of Lords, Entitul'd, An act for the better securing the Depen&rehy;dency of the Kingdom of Ireland, upon the Crown of Great-Britain, shou'd not pass into a Law. Tis impossible for any man to entertain a more glorious Idea of our unvaluable Constitution, than I have ever done; and shou'd be very sorry in particu&rehy;lar, that any one cou'd exceed my venera&rehy;tion for the Peerage, which is a most es&rehy;sential part of the same. But the Lords are Men no less than the Commons, and even Kings themselves, tho God's Vicege&rehy;rents, are subject to human errors and frail&rehy;ties: which makes it necessary that the se&rehy;veral Estates shou'd be mutual checks on each other, as it has very frequently hap&rehy;pen'd; to the immense benefit, if not som&rehy;times the preservation of the whole frame. Nay, when any of our Kings invaded Law or Liberty, there wanted not private Persons (besides the interposition of the two Houses of Parliament) who gave loud warn&rehy;ing of the danger; and were by all good men applauded, for postponing their own safety to that of their Country.
I SHALL be careful not to take up too much of your time, with mustering all the Observations that may be justly made upon the Bill you have before you: but of the few Objections I intend to make, the first that naturally offers it self, is taken from the Preamble, which asserts, That attempts have been lately made to shake off the sub&rehy;jection of Ireland unto, and dependance upon, the Imperial Crown of this Realm, which will be of dangerous consequence to Great Britain and Ireland.
Now this is a suggestion of such a Nature (but why do I call it a suggestion, when it sounds like a peremptory accusation?) that a whole Kingdom, without any the least exception, being involv'd in it; one wou'd reasonably expect, flagrant proofs of such Attempts shou'd be alledg'd, as the most proper Con&rehy;siderations for your passing the Bill. But no color of such a proof has been offer'd, nor indeed possibly can be. The Protestant inhabitants of Ireland abhorr from their hearts the thoughts of such Attempts. They count it their chief happiness, to be inseparably united and annex'd to the Crown of England, now of Great Britain. They readily acknowlege, that all the rightful and lawful Kings of Great-Britain become ipso facto Kings of Ireland 28 Hen. 8. cap. 2.: tho to take away ambiguity of Titles, contrary to the right legality of the succession and poste&rehy;rity of the lawful Kings and Emperors of the said Realm of England, as this Land of Ireland (to use their own words) they do from time to time make Acts of Recog&rehy;nition; as in the case of King Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth, King James I, King Charles II, King William and Queen Mary, and his present Maje&rehy;sty. The Protestants have on all occasions no less vigilantly asserted than valiantly maintain'd the rights of the Crown of Eng&rehy;land; and very lately have been as forward as successful in suppressing Rebellions against his present Majesty, both in England and Scotland: while they kept all things quiet at home, not one Protestant refusing allegiance to King George, much less questioning the right of the Kings of Great-Britain to be Kings of Ireland. All sorts of Prote&rehy;stants were so much of one mind in this par&rehy;ticular, that the Troops having been drawn out of the nation, the Dissenters, notwith&rehy;standing their legal incapacity, took arms at their own charge for the common interest; to the great joy of all good Churchmen, tho they stand in need of a pardon to this hour, for so seasonably obeying the call of the so&rehy;verein Law, Salus Populi. 33 Hen. 8. cap. 1. The knitting of Ireland to the Crown of England (which they hope will prove an indissoluble knot) was their own act and deed in King Henry VIII's time; as by the Act that the King and his Successors be Kings of Ireland, plainly appears, wherin it is made High Treason by word or deed to affirm the contrary: not to speak of ma&rehy;ny provisions made by their ancestors to the same purpose, when our Kings us'd the stile of Lords of Ireland. The suggestion therfore in the Bill now before your honors, that attempts have been lately made to shake off the dependance of Ireland upon the Crown of Great Britain, the Protestants of Ireland conceive to be most injurious, as they know it to be altogether ungrounded; and cannot persuade themselves that you'll pass any Bill, which without, nay against all proof, lays them under so unjust and so heinous an imputation.
THE next thing, wherof his Majesties faithful subjects of Ireland think they have reason to complain is, that the said Bill sug&rehy;gests the Lords of Ireland, in order to shake off the dependance of that Kingdom upon the Crown of Great Britain, have of late against Law assum'd to themselves a Power and Jurisdiction to examine, correct, and amend the Judgments and Decrees of the Courts of Justice in the Kingdom of Ire&rehy;land.
It seems very strange that the Law or Laws are not recited, or at least that they are not referr'd to, against which the Lords of Ireland have assum'd a Judicial power. This is no more done, than the Attempts specify'd, whereby the Irish wou'd shake off their dependance upon the Crown of Great-Britain; and I am convinc'd that no Law can be produc'd to this purpose, which will not equally affect the Judicature of o&rehy;ther Lords. But be the Judicature of the Peers in it self lawful or unlawful (which is a point wherein I shall not presume to deli&rehy;ver any opinion of my own ) tis neverthe&rehy;less a thing certain and undeniable, that it is not only of late, as the Bill suggests, that the Lords of Ireland have exercised a Judi&rehy;cial power, but from the very first establish&rehy;ment of Parliaments there. Notwithstand&rehy;ing the destruction brought upon the Re&rehy;cords of the Kingdom by frequent Warrs, yet it evidently appears by such as are left, and particularly by the Rolls of Parliament, that abundance of causes have been judici&rehy;ally determin'd by Parliament, especially from the Chancery side of the Exchequer. So that supposing you did admit a Judicial power in the Lords here (for making which supposition I shall presently bring my rea&rehy;sons) you shou'd not in common justice conclude any thing to the disadvantage of the Lords of Ireland, till the collection that is making of those Causes be sent over hither; which can't well be done till the Parliament sits there, and the Irish Lords appoint Com&rehy;missioners to manage this affair. If what I affirm'd be on the one hand, matter of fact, as unquestionably it is; and that, on the other hand, such a power has never been questi&rehy;on'd during so many reigns: it is certainly more than a presumtion in favor of the Irish Lords, nay, it is in my opinion a very strong argument; wheras there is no instance of an Appeal from the Chancery of Ireland to the Lords here, before the Year 1670, when there was no Parliament sitting in Ireland, and therefore no opposition cou'd be made to this innovation.
LOWER in the said Bill the Lords of Great-Britain desire it to be enacted and declar'd, that the House of Lords of Ireland have not, nor of right ought to have any Ju&rehy;risdiction to judge of, affirm, or reverse any Judgment, Sentence, or Decree, given or made in any Court within the said Kingdom: and that all Proceedings before the said House of Lords, upon any such Judgment, Sentence, or Decree, are, and are hereby declar'd to be utterly null and void, to all intents and purposes whatsoever.
To this Clause alone I shall in a manner confine my self in this humble address, as being a thing I can never be brought to believe that any one of your number will approve, much less that you will give it the sanction of your honorable House: for as to other matters contain'd in this Bill, particularly the binding of Ireland by Laws made in Great-Britain, they are Arcana Imperii, which I am strongly of opinion ought still to continue so, and not be made the subject of public debates or writings. I shall on&rehy;ly remark, that the truest sign of the love of Liberty in ourselves, is our loving it in others, and grudging it to none: much less to envy such a blessing to our fellow-citizens or fellow-subjects, to our own flesh and blood. The first objection which I offer against the said Clause, is the Retrospect it has; wherby all the Decrees past by the Lords of Ire&rehy;land, during several Centuries, are, with&rehy;out any saving or exception, declar'd to be null and void. Innumerable wou'd be the dismal consequences, shou'd this pass into a Law. Most of the estates and purchases in the Kingdom, in the common opinion wou'd be unsettl'd at one stroke; and a world of families wou'd apprehend them&rehy;selves to be utterly ruin'd, notwithstanding it be receiv'd for Law, that threescore year's possession makes a good Title. Who knows how soon it may be disputed, whether this time be equivalent to time immemorial? The strange face that this Retrospect carries with it is so manifest at first sight; that to men of your known equity, no words are necessary to move your compassion. Nor is it a consideration less moving against this Clause, without needing the help of any art, that whereas the People of Ireland were wont to have justice near at hand and even at their own doors, they must hereafter (if such a Law shou'd pass) be forc'd, to their unspeakable loss of time and expence, besides the danger of the Seas, to come over hither, whenever they conceive themselves aggriev'd by the Chancery there. This wou'd soon impoverish the richer part of that Nation, while the poorer sort must be totally depriv'd of Justice, as not being able to come and sue for it in England. The pravity of human nature consider'd, Ireland wou'd thus become, and partly by your means (shou'd you pass this Bill) the most deplorable scene of wrongs in the Universe; as indeed it wou'd be the fate of any other country under the like circumstances, where the stronger under color of Law might oppress the weaker: and we know tis a receiv'd maxim in Politics, that no Tyranny is more grievous than a Legal Tyranny.
ANOTHER objection against the Clause, not less important than those I have mention'd, is, that the Lords will thus come to have the disposal of all the Property in Ireland, and the King's Prerogative be taken from him of having a Judicial power in that Kingdom, which all former Kings have hitherto enjoy'd. This looks to be no very obliging way of distinguishing King George: and, in effect, shou'd this Clause pass into a Law, the King wou'd soon find, that the Lords had drawn Ireland from him to themselves (tho they shou'd intend no such thing) by the court which wou'd be then made to them that had the power; and not to him, who cou'd no longer be able to protect his Subjects. This alone appears to me a matter of so great weight, that I cannot suppose the King will ever give his assent to such a Law; or that any Minister will hazard advising him to do so, shou'd even the Bill pass your House: which (all things consider'd) tis no way probable it shou'd, or at this present time or ever herafter. For either there is some Law extant for what the Lords suggest, or there is none. If any such there be (which I wonder is not nam'd by some of the learned in the Laws in that most honourable assembly) then the making of any new Law seems wholly needless: and if there be none, as people must reasonably imagine till they see the contrary, I doubt not but you'll take suf&rehy;ficient time before you make a new one. And truly many will be apt to suspect, that the Law at present propos'd, is not superflu&rehy;ously doing what is already done; but doing indirectly, what has never yet been done: namely, getting a Law enacted, tho tis not so exprest, to draw Appeals from Ireland to themselves; and so hooking in the Commons by specious pretences to grant 'em that, which all your predecessors have constantly deny'd.
THIS leads me of course to put your Honors in mind, that your House is almost as much affected by this Clause as the Peo&rehy;ple of Ireland: for tho the Lords do not, as I just now said, declare in express terms that Appeals shall be brought to them from Ireland; yet considering that, since the year 1670, they have receiv'd several such Appeals, and that if there be no final Judi&rehy;catory in Ireland, there must be one som&rehy;where: considering all this, I repeat it, they do effectually bring those Appeals be&rehy;fore themselves by a side-wind; for where can we think they'll own the dernier res&rehy;sort to be, but in themselves? Farr be it from me to deny, that the Lords have not a right to that Judicial power, which they do actually exercise. This is not a matter for private persons to determine. But I know historically, and your own Journals (which are public Records) do prove beyond dis&rehy;pute, that the Commons your Predeces&rehy;sors, to whose right you succeed, have more than once actually deny'd, but never once allow'd this power. In May 1675, the House of Commons resolv'd that there lay no Appeal to the Judicature of the Lords from Courts of Equity; and that no Member of the House should prosecute any Appeal, from any Courts of Equity, before the House of Lords.
In consequence of this vote Ser&rehy;jeant Pemberton, Serjeant Peck, Sir John Churchill, and Charles Porter Esq; were committed to the custody of the Ser&rehy;jeant at arms for a breach of privilege, in having been of Council at the Barr of the House of Lords, in the prosecution of a Cause depending upon an Appeal. To come nearer our own time, at several conferences with the Lords, in March 1704, the Com&rehy;mittee appointed by the House of Com&rehy;mons, following their Instructions, call'd the Judicial power of the Lords an unwar&rehy;rantable Judicature, an Encroachment late&rehy;ly assum'd, unaccountable in its foundation, inconsistent with the Constitution, an Usur&rehy;pation, a bottomless and insatiable Gulf, which wou'd swallow up both the Prero&rehy;gatives of the Crown, and the Rights and Liberties of the People.
These, and many more such expressions, may be read in the Quotations, annext by way of Appendix, out of The proceedings in relation to the Aylesbury-men committed by the House of Commons, and the Report of the Lord's Journal, &c. printed by authority of the House, in the said year, 1704.
GOD forbid, as I said before, that I shou'd ever question the Judicature of their Lordships; which, in one of those Confe&rehy;rences, they affirm is too sacred a thing to be touch'd: Pag. 48. but if things have not since chang'd their Nature, and that you succeed to the Maxims of your predecessors, as their Committee then said, that the Designs, as well as Honors of the Lords, may be hereditary; Pag. 48. you will not I conceive pass the Clause in question, which brings that about indirect&rehy;ly (as above hinted) which the Commons have directly deny'd. But if Appeals are af&rehy;ter all to be brought from Ireland, a thing however I hardly imagine you'll consent to be past into a Law: If such a thing for sup&rehy;position sake, shou'd possibly happen; then tis not to be doubted, but you'll be for ha&rehy;ving those Appeals and Writs of Error determin'd by a Committee of Lords and Commons, which was the antient primi&rehy;tive way, and is prescrib'd in the Modus te&rehy;nendi Parliamentum. This among other things, is explain'd with no less perspicuity than brevity in a Letter from a Member of the House of Commons in Ireland, to a Gentleman of the long Robe in England, lately publish'd. To what the author has excellently said, I add after good vouchers, that the very form of Writs of Error in Parliament is alter'd in a most material point, by whose consent or contrivance I am perfectly ignorant. It is still returna&rehy;ble into Parliament generally, and the Judgment is enter'd per Cur' Parlimenti. But where the antient form, which appears in Rastall's Entries, folio 302, was Ut de concilio & advisamento Dominorum spi&rehy;ritualium & temporalium, ac Communita&rehy;tum, in Parliamento nostro existentium, ulter&rehy;iùs pro errore corrigendo fieri faciamus quod de jure
, &c; of late, as appears by a Writ of Error, printed in the Lord chief&rehy;Justice Saunder's second Report, folio 228 (and agreeable to that are all the modern ones) the word Communitatum is left out. If the contest be therfore about power, there is no reason you shou'd not have your share of it.
AND most certainly, whether the Lords intend such a thing or not, it will by mul&rehy;titudes be vehemently suspected, that it is merely out of a view to enlarge their own power, and not in reality to secure the Dependency of Ireland upon the Crown of Great-Britain, that they have brought in such a Bill, as they have now sent down to you; since the wit of man cannot bet&rehy;ter secure that dependence, than it is done already by Poyning's Act, and such others as explain or confirm it. 10 Hen. 7. cap. 4. 28 Hen. 8. cap. 20. 3 & 4. Mar. cap. 4. 11 Eliz. Sess. 3. cap. 8 &c.
Therby it is provided, that all Acts of Parliament, with their causes, considerations, and articles, shall be transmitted into England, in order to be perus'd by the King and his Council; and if found good and expedient, to be approv'd and sent back, with his Majesty's Licence under the Great Seal of England, now of Great Britain, for passing the same: or if not approv'd by the King and Council, to be by them in that case alter'd, or chang'd, in whole or in part, or be quite rejected; and when any Acts are finally approv'd and sent back to Ireland, then to be past in the Parliament there without the least variation, even to a syllable, or else to be wholly refus'd. What can more effectu&rehy;ally secure the dependency of Ireland on the Crown of Great-Britain? Who goes about to change or lessen this security? And is not the tendency of the Bill before you, to take off this dependency on the Crown, and to place it on the House of Lords? I don't assert that the Lords mean this; for all consequences, tho ever so just&rehy;ly deduc'd, are not to be charg'd as ori&rehy;ginally intended: Yet since their Designs, as well as their Honors may be hereditary, People will be apt to sur&rehy;mise the worst. ubi supra Nay, they'll be more jealous than ever, after the late repeated attempt of the Peerage Bill, which so justly alarm'd the whole nation; tho all has not been said against it, that may be urg'd, if it should ever appear again on the stage.
BUT, with perfect submission to your Honors, I apprehend another consequence, very dangerous indeed both to the King and his Government, from the passing of such a Bill. The hardships I have enu&rehy;merated, and God knows how many more necessarily resulting from it, cannot but bear extremely hard on the Protestants of Ire&rehy;land, who (their enemies themselves being Judges) have deserv'd much better usage. Besides their inviolable attachment to the Crown of Great Britain, which is a stronger hold than twice the number of any Army that ever was there; they have in a most distinguishing manner signa&rehy;liz'd their zeal for the present Royal Fa&rehy;mily, and in favor of all the Laws made to secure their Succession. No body of Pro&rehy;testants (without envy be it spoken) have been more unanimous in this respect. They were the first that set a Price on the Pretender's head, and this under the most perillous circumstances to themselves, but giving in the mean time a gallant example to others. Surely this was not done, to shake off the dependency of Ireland upon the Crown of Great-Britain. Or does not this conduct, join'd to their vigorous assist&rehy;ance in suppressing the late Rebellions in England and Scotland, for ever destroy all such suggestions? But hinc illæ lachrymæ! Let me not however be mistaken. I shall be the last in the Nation so much as to dream, that any person of good sense or honesty shou'd harbor the thought of alie&rehy;nating from his Majesty, these good, these loyal people; who are most sincere as&rehy;sertors of his Cause, and on whom, in case of need, he may absolutely depend. But as ill men make an ill use of every thing, so tis observed of those without doors, that none express half the ardor for passing this Bill, as they who are disaffected to the King's Title, Person, and Family: a thing very remote from the intention of the Lords. For this reason, the hottest among those wou'd gladly distress his tru&rehy;est Friends, whom they can never forgive: while the cooler sort wou'd be content to separate them from his Interest, as much as they are themselves. Even Indifference in this case (for oppression makes wise men mad) is by all possible means to be prevented; for nothing is truer, than that they who are not for us, are against us: for which, and diverse other considerati&rehy;ons, tis hop'd by all true lovers of his Majesty, and especially by those who have the dependency of Ireland on the Crown of Great-Britain really at heart, that you will never give your consent to this Bill.
UPON the whole you'll make no dif&rehy;ficulty of acknowledging, that there is a vast difference between Ireland's being annext to the Crown of Great-Britain, and being subject to the Lords of Great Britain. These possess already as much power as they can reasonably desire, with&rehy;out any need of grasping at more, to the entire undoing of their innocent neigh&rehy;bors. Nothing shou'd be attempted that might bring about the possibility of a Uni&rehy;on of civil interests between the Prote&rehy;stants and Papists of Ireland, whose an&rehy;tipathies and animosities all sound Poli&rehy;ticians will ever labor to keep alive. I know certain folks have it much in their mouths, that the Out-provinces of a Government, can never be held under too severe a rein, when the very contrary of this is true. History cannot afford one example, where any Out-province or re&rehy;mote Colony, ever rebell'd against the mother country, or chief seat of Govern&rehy;ment, but thro insupportable rigor and oppression. Thus Tacitus judiciously observes, that the Roman Commonwealth fell under the power of the Emperors, from the Out-provinces not being longer able to endure the tyranny of the Senate. Cicero does somewhere paint those injusti&rehy;ces of the degenerate Senate to the life: nor are we to forget, that the greatest ene&rehy;mies are reconcil'd on such occasions. Tho Cesar for ten years together had been butchering and enslaving the Gauls, yet the miserable remains of that nation gladly follow'd him, to have the satisfa&rehy;ction of repaying Rome in the same coin of rapine and murder. That, in short, will be found true in all Governments, which the Privernates answer'd the Ro&rehy;mans, that if they granted 'em good con&rehy;ditions their Union wou'd perpetually hold; but if unjust, it cou'd not be very lasting. In that time of Virtue, this De&rehy;claration made 'em thought worthy to be&rehy;come Romans.
A MAN or two, who wou'd be thought profoundly wise, whisper about in a very my&rehy;sterious manner, that this Bill is only a Preliminary to an Union with Ireland on equal terms, as has been not many Years since effected, with relation to North Bri&rehy;tain. These are persons us'd to catching of Gudgeons, and so think it will be no diffi&rehy;cult task to impose on Irish understandings. But the best-natur'd, that is, the silliest among 'em will be apt to ask, what need of so much ceremony? when the thing, if really intended, may, instead of this Bill, be fairly propos'd, and transacted above&rehy;board. I say, instead of this Bill, the te&rehy;nor of which (as the Irish Lords, long be&rehy;fore it was broach'd, have, in their Repre&rehy;sentation, which great strength of argument and fact demonstrated) tends to the alter&rehy;ing of a Constitution, which has lasted above five hundred Years; ay, subverting of it, to the no small injury, if not imminent dan&rehy;ger, both of the King and his subjects. The Parliament of Ireland is as good as annull'd by it, since the Lords are not only declar'd to have no Judicial power in Civil Causes; but have none expresly reserv'd to them in Criminal Causes, by Impeachments from the Commons. Now, if they are any other than nominal, than mock Lords, and yet are non Judices; will it not be a natural Question to ask, how other Lords come to be Judices? Your Honors, in the mean while, by dropping or rejecting the Bill, neither assert the Judicial power of the Lords there, nor condemn that of the Lords here, but leave things in statu quo; be&rehy;sides that, you'll by this procedure, keep a just curb on ill dispos'd persons: for some men, in that very Kingdom, are known e&rehy;nemies to Parliaments; men in Employ&rehy;ments and certain Lawyers, who are strong&rehy;ly inclin'd to be arbitrary, tho pretending to a greater knowledge of Equity than others. These, as a truly great man ob&rehy;serves, are averse to Parliaments, for the same reasons that Monasteries and Fryeries desire to be exempted from their Bishops; they wou'd not have an Inspector of their actions so near them.
THE Premisses duly consider'd, with other better Reasons, easily furnish'd by your own superior wisdoms, no man can be apprehensive that you will pass the Bill sent down to you by the Lords; or lend a helping hand to in&rehy;crease the power of the Peerage, which in the end, may destroy the Balance of the Legislature, and subject these Nations to an Aristocracy, the natural passage to an Oligarchy, as that is to the Tyran&rehy;ny of one Person,
Quod procul a nobis flectat Fortuna gubernans.
QUOTATIONS OUT OF All the Proceedings, In relation to the Aylesbury-Men, Committed to the House of Com&rehy;mons: and the Report of the Lords Journal, &c. Printed by Order of the House of Commons, for Edward Jones and Timothy Good&rehy;win, 1704.
PAGE 26.
&Tic;HIS would effectually put an end to that encroachment in Ju&rehy;dicature, so lately assum'd by your Lordships, and so often complain'd of by the Commons; we mean the hearing of Appeals from Courts of Equity in your Lordship's House. This would have hinder'd the bringing of Original Causes before your Lordships, and your unwarrantable proceedings upon the Petition,
&c.
PAGE 27.
HOWEVER, the Commons conceive it no wonder, your Lordships should favour the universal Proposition, that all rights whatsoever are to be redressed by actions at Law, when your Lordships pretend to have the last resort in Cases of Judicature by writs of Error; so that your Lordships are in this onely extending your own Judicature, un&rehy;der the colour of a regard and tenderness for the Rights of the People, and Liberties of their Persons.
PAGE 37.
AND when your Lordship's exercise of Judicature upon writs of Error is consi&rehy;der'd; how unaccountable in its foundation, how inconsistent it is with our Constitution, which, in all other respects, is the wisest and happiest in the world, to suppose the last resort in Judicature and the Legislature to be differently plac'd: And when it is consider'd, how that Usurpation in hearing of Appeals from Courts of Equity, so easily trac'd, tho often deny'd and protested against, yet still exercis'd, and almost every Sessions of Parliament extended, it is not to be wonder'd,
&c.
Ibid. AND the Commons cannot but see how your Lordships are contriving by all methods, to bring the determination of Liberty and Property into the bottomless and insatiable Gulf of your Lordship's Judicature, which would swallow up both the Preroga&rehy;tives of the Crown, and the Rights and Li&rehy;berties of the People,
&c.
PAGE 43.
AND therefore the Commons could not but take notice how far their Lordships had transgressed in the exercise of an un&rehy;warrantable Judicature,
&c.
PAGE 46.
AND if a writ of Error cannot be deny'd in any case, and the Lords alone are to judge whether the case be proper for a writ of Error, then all the Queens Revenue, all her Prerogatives, and all the Lives and Liberties of the People of England, will be in the hands of the Lords; for every Felon, Burglar and Traitor, will be entituled to a writ of Error before the Lords, and they will have even Power of Life and Death. And by writs of Error and Appeals, as already exercis'd, they will have all our Pro&rehy;perties,
&c.
PAGE 52
THE Commons hope their Lordships will consider what the Constitution is, and think it not reasonable that any part should exceed its due bounds. But there have been great Invasions made upon it by their Lordships, and some instances of that kind have been delivered at the last Conference: and it would be easy to show, that the Judicature, which of late has been assumed by the Lords, is not consistent with the Constitution.
PAGE 57
THIS Petition to the Queen for a writ of Error in Parliament, is proper&rehy;ly a Parliamentary Case, and is the same, when the Queen is party or not: and seems some remnant of our ancient Constitution, where all Petitions were to the King in Parliament, or to the King and his great Council, which was distinct from the House of Peers, and were examin'd by Tryers, whether fit for the Parliament to proceed upon or not.
FINIS.