THE CASE OF THE HESSIAN Forces, In the PAY of Great-Britain, Impartially and Freely Examin'd; WITH SOME REFLECTIONS on the present Conjuncture of AFFAIRS. IN ANSWER To a late Pamphlet, intitled, Considerations on the present State of Affairs, &c. ― ― ― LONDON: Printed for R. Francklin, in Russel-Street, Covent-Garden. 1731 THE CASE OF THE HESSIAN Forces, In the PAY of GREAT-BRITAIN, &c.

&Tic;HERE is nothing more remark&rehy;able in the Conduct of the Wri&rehy;ters against their Country, than re&rehy;peating the same Things, and in&rehy;sisting on the same Points, after They have been often confu&rehy;ted and expos'd. There is, perhaps, some little Policy in this manner of Writing, which may prove of Advantage to their Patron. It may serve his Purpose, for want of other Expedients, at a critical Point of Time. It may divert the Attention of the Publick from fresh Inquiries, by engaging their thoughts on the same exploded Topicks. It may give a Cue to his Creatures what is expected from them, and fur&rehy;nish them with Arguments, such as They are, for answering those Expectations and supporting Him in his Measures.

This Winter hath been very fruitful of ministe&rehy;rial Apologies. We have had Observations on the Writings of the Craftsman; a Sequel to the Observa&rehy;tions; farther Observations; Sedition and Defama&rehy;tion display'd; the Crisis; a Defence of the Mea&rehy;sures of the present Administration; and Considerati&rehy;ons on the present State of Affairs; besides the weekly Artillery of those regular, standing Troops, the Authors of the London Journal, the Free Bri&rehy;ton, the Flying-Post, and their auxiliary the Daily Courant.

But as the chief Stress, in Point of Argument, seems to be laid on the Considerations, I shall con&rehy;fine my Remarks to that Piece, though it contains only a confident Repetition of Assertions, which have been often proved false, and of Reasonings upon them, which have been as often refuted. It is, in the main, only a Re-publication of the En&rehy;quiry, long since neglected and despised, but new&rehy;modell'd indeed, in some Parts, according to the Circumstances of the Times, and accommodated to the present Scheme of Affairs. I shall therefore be very short in my Observations on these Heads.

That the Treaty of Vienna, says our Author, was the only Source and Foundation of all the Troubles, that have distracted Europe for some Years past, must be allow'd by all; though He knows very well that This hath long been a Point in Dispute, very strongly controverted; and He cannot be ignorant that, in the general Opinion of Mankind, it hath been determin'd against Those, who ad&rehy;vanc'd it. Did He never read John Trot's Let&rehy;ters upon this Subject; or, does He think that no Body else hath read them? Other Reasons may be there found for the Troubles of Europe, especi&rehy;ally with Relation to Great Britain, than the Trea&rehy;ty of Vienna; but there is no End of repeating the same Things. I must therefore refer the Rea&rehy;der to those excellent Pieces; and shall only ob&rehy;serve, in general, that it is far from being allow'd by all that the Treaty of Vienna was the only Source of all our Troubles, as this Writer asserts; or that the Union of the two Families, which He men&rehy;tions, was ever design'd; for all the Endeavours of France, England and Holland have not been since able to prevail upon the Emperor to consent to a Measure, which tends most effectually, in the pre&rehy;sent Circumstances of the two Families, to unite them; I mean to produce a Reunion of their Do&rehy;minions; but not in the House of Austria, as He supposes; for I take Don Carlos to be a Branch of the House of Bourbon; and therefore if the Contingency, which He mentions, should happen, and the Marriage, with which We have been so often threaten'd, should take Place, the Dominions of Spain and the Empire might be united in that Family.

The Assertion of secret Engagements, in the Treaty of Vienna, to deprive us of some of our Possessions and most valuable Privileges of Trade, is likewise repeated by this Writer; though the Course of so many Years as have pass'd since the Conclusion of that Treaty, and even our Reconci&rehy;liation with Spain have not yet brought any of those Engagements to Light. &horfill; Did the Design of the Ostend Company proceed from the Treaty of Vienna; or was not that Charter granted long before, upon the Pretension of a natural Right, not alienated by any Treaties? &horfill; How does it appear that the Demand, which Spain made, of the Restitution of Gibraltar was a Consequence of any Engagement in this Treaty? &horfill; Hath it not been fully proved, on the contrary, that their Pretensions to this Place, whether just or not, were always found&rehy;ed on a Letter, written by his late Majesty, now publick? &horfill; How does it appear that the Emperor ever concurred with the Court of Spain in any Design to deprive us of that inestimable Possession; or gave them any Assistance, when They actually besieged it? &horfill; Lastly, how does it appear that ei&rehy;ther Spain or the Emperor had concerted any ProLject, in Favour of the Pretender? &horfill; Did not his Imperial Majesty disown any such Design in the most solemn Manner; and hath not the King of Spain confirm'd his Asseveration, even since their Disunion, by a particular Clause in the Treaty of Seville, in which that Charge is call'd a Pretence only?

In short, the Treaty of Vienna, according to my Apprehension, hath never yet been proved to be any Thing more than an Accommodation of Differences between those two Courts, not in the least dangerous to us, after they had thought Them&rehy;selves very ill used by the Mediators, on whom they relyed. Sending back the Infanta from France was such an Indignity as the Court of Spain must cer&rehy;tainly resent; and though our Author is pleas'd to assert that the Conduct of Great Britain gave neither the Emperor nor Spain the least Pretence for a Complaint; I must take the Liberty to con&rehy;tradict Him, and can look upon such an Assertion in no other Light than as a shameless Insult on the common Sense and Knowledge of Mankind; for without insisting on the Refusal of the sole Me&rehy;diation, hath it not been often urg'd by these Writers Themselves that our Defeat of the Spanish Fleet in the Mediterranean lay still at their Hearts; and hath it not been as often proved that the Con&rehy;clusion of a private Treaty at Madrid, without the Knowledge of the Emperor, whilst He continued under our Mediation, gave Him some Reason to be offended, and to call our Impartiality a little in Question?

As these Reasons have been repeated in all our anniversary Pamphlets, to justify the Expediency of the Treaty of Hanover; so our Author is not ashamed to speak in the same Manner concerning the Accession of other States to this Treaty; though every Body knows that Holland acceded to it, un&rehy;der very large Restrictions; (not to say any Thing of the Peace, which was made for them with the Algerines) and it cannot be forgot that one of the Reasons, urg'd by Count Horn to the States of Sweden for their Accession, was that the Treaty of Hanover did not lay them under so many Obli&rehy;gations as former Treaties; though they had a Sub&rehy;sidy of fifty thousand Pounds a Year, for three Years; both from England and France, as a Con&rehy;sideration for acceding to it. I shall say nothing of the Convention of Denmark; because it does not appear that We paid any Thing for it; and I am at a Loss to think what Reason there can be for any new Convention with that Court, as We have been lately inform'd there is, which may be the Occasion of new Expences to this Nation; but it is plain, from this Account, that the formidable Union of Spain and the Emperor gave these two Courts no Alarm. They took Occasion to make a Penny of it, and were well paid for being ready to muster; that is, They have hitherto received their Money for being Faggots.

Let us now see whether the Consequences of the Treaty of Hanover will not justify our Account of these Accessions. It was said, at first, to be a defensive Treaty only; and, indeed, it contain'd no offensive Stipulations, any more than the Treaty of Vienna. Holland would not have enter'd into it, even under the Limitations, upon which she acceded at last, if it had been an offensive Treaty; and neither Holland nor France did any Thing more, than prepare Themselves against Attacks; but England hath been charg'd with acting offensively, by sending two Fleets of Ships of War, one to the West-Indies, and the other to the Mediterranean. The former of These block'd up the Merchant Ships of Spain in their Port and lay in the most unwholsome Cli&rehy;mate in the Universe till the Ships were almost destroy'd, and scarce Men enough were left alive to bring them back in that ruinous Condition. The Consequence of This was, that Spain interrupted the British Commerce in all Parts, and plundered our Merchants without any Reprizals; for though the Considerer speaks of Hostilities between the Crown of England and of Spain, I do not remember any Hostilities that We have been guilty of towards Them, since the blocking up their Galleons. The War between Us and Spain seems to have been carried on in much the same Manner with That, mentioned in Terence, &horfill; nunquam vidi iniquius Certationem comparatam, quam hæc hodie inter nos fuit. Ego vapulando, Ille verberando, usque ambo defessi sumus.

In the mean Time, France and Holland were permitted to carry on their Trade, without Molestation; as They suffer'd the Spani&rehy;ards, in Return, to besiege Gibraltar, without furnishing any Quota of Men, Ships, or Money, for the Defence of it; and indeed England, being thus charg'd with beginning Hostilities, was in a manner left without any Ally; engaged by the Treaty of Hanover to assist the other contracting Parties, in case They had been attack'd; but not intitled to their Assistance, when her own Posses&rehy;sions were attack'd; because she stood charg'd with being the Aggressor. &horfill; How this Step was under&rehy;stood by Spain, appears from the Marquis de Poz&rehy;zobueno's See Rousset's Collection, Tom. 3. p. 368. Letter to the Duke of Newcastle, the 1st of January, 1726-7; and surely, it could ne&rehy;ver be imagin'd that any other Interpretation could be given to such a Measure!

The Considerer having laid it down as an Axiom, which must be allow'd by all, and supported by undoubted Evidences in Facts, as He speaks in ano&rehy;ther Place, that the Treaty of Vienna made Coun&rehy;ter-Allyances necessary on our Part, proceeds to shew that an Allyance with France was the most proper Allyance in this Cafe.

He allows, indeed, that an Allyance with Hol&rehy;land, whose Interests in most Respects is inseparable from That of England, was certainly the most na&rehy;tural and obvious on this Occasion; but, it seems, the Constitution of that Republick makes it almost impossible to keep a Negotiation secret there. &horfill; Now, I cannot see any Reason why a Negotiation may not be kept as secret there as in any other Court. I confess, indeed, that when a Negotiation is form'd into a Treaty, it cannot be kept secret; because it must be brought before the States for their Con&rehy;sent; and I should be glad to know what good Purpose it can serve to keep any Treaty secret, after it is once concluded. I am sure, such clandestine Treaties have serv'd many a bad Purpose in our own Memory.

Another Reason, given by our Author, for not treating with Holland, upon this Occasion, is that We are farther remov'd from any sudden Resentment; and therefore it was thought the most adviseable Step, for the common good of both Nations, that Eng&rehy;land should first strengthen herself by an Allyance with some other considerable Powers, whose Interest it is to check the Imperial Power; and as the Oppo&rehy;sition between the Emperor and France must be con&rehy;stant in all Junctures and Events, and Allyance with France was certainly the most natural Allyance England could have, in this Case.

I have put the Author's Argument in its full Strength, as He hath stated it, that He may have no Reason to complain of Misrepresentation; and I will leave the World to judge whether it can do his Cause any Service; for if England is farther remov'd from the Effects of any sudden Resentment, why should she be the first to provide against Dan&rehy;ger, and to strengthen Herself with any Allyances? Why did not France lead the Way; since the Con&rehy;sequences of the Vienna Treaty were so formida&rehy;ble to that Crown? Or what Danger could We ap&rehy;prehend from that Treaty, when the Opposition of France to the Emperor was so certain, and the In&rehy;terest of Holland made it so necessary for Her to court our Allyance, without any private Restriction, or preliminary Services? May it not likewise be ask'd, whether there is not as constant a Jealousy and secret Rivalship between France and England, as between France and the Emperor?

The Considerer seems to allow that France ab&rehy;stractedly hath no great Concern for the Rights and Possessions of Great-Britain; but then We are told that the Union of Spain and the Emperor, which must create the greatest Alarm and Uneasiness to France, would keep her faithful to her Engagements in Point of Interest, as long as that Union subsisted. &horfill; If so, was it our Interest to dissolve that U&rehy;nion; or can We rely on the Fidelity of France with the same Confidence, after the Cause of her Apprehensions, by the Dissolution of the Vienna Treaty, is remov'd? May not this Separation of Spain and the Emperor be follow'd by a new Union between France and Spain, more formidable to Us than That, which We have dissolv'd? &horfill; Or, may it not be ask'd, why We converted the defen&rehy;sive Treaty of Hanover, which was so wisely pro&rehy;jected for the Peace of Europe, and the Interest of Great-Britain, into the offensive Treaty of Seville? For the Stipulation of Spanish Troops, in Contra&rehy;vention to the Quadruple Allyance, is certainly an offensive Stipulation, whether it should be ever exe&rehy;cuted or not; and We see that it hath already put Europe in Arms.

Yet this Separation of the two Courts, of Vienna and Madrid, hath been extoll'd as the greatest Master-piece of Politicks that any Minister ever performed; though one would think it did not re&rehy;quire any extraordinary Address to dissolve an Union between two Crowns, which hath been so often represented unnatural and unaccountable in the ve&rehy;ry Foundation of it. Did not the Emperor's Mi&rehy;nisters shew more Dexterity in cultivating such an Union; the same Ministers, who likewise found Means to detach the King of Prussia from the Ha&rehy;nover Allyance; though the Interest of the two Families of Brandenburg and Austria were incom&rehy;patible? &horfill; But this Author, it seems, is of ano&rehy;ther Opinion; and We are given to understand that nobody but a Machiavel could have negoti&rehy;ated Spain into such a Temper, as to abandon intirely the Imperial Court; to quit her vast Expecta&rehy;tions from thence; and to enter into a strict Union with the Hanover Allies. &horfill; Pray, Sir, what vast Expectations do you mean? The great Advanta&rehy;ges of the Vienna Treaty were formerly supposed to lye on the Side of the Emperor; and if Spain had any Expectations of establishing the Succession of Don Carlos by an Union with the Emperor, They found Themselves disappointed; for as be&rehy;neficial as this Allyance was to Him, He would never consent to that Succession, upon their Terms. Nay, if We may believe the Considerer, Spain was so far from having any reasonable Expectations of this Nature, that one Design of the Vienna Treaty was to defeat the Succession of Don Carlos. As This is a very extraordinary Argument, in Justification of the Treaty of Seville, I will quote it at length. &horfill; The Conduct of the Emperor, in endeavouring to delay and disappoint the Introduction of neutral Gar&rehy;risons and the Succession of Don Carlos; and the Steps taken with That View, in the Vienna Treaty, without the Consent of England and France, contracting Parties to the Quadruple Al&rehy;liance, sufficiently justified England and France in making this Variation, without the Consent of the Emperor. &horfill; Is it not very surprizing that Spain should pay so dear for a Treaty, which was cal&rehy;culated to disappoint her most favourite View? &horfill; Is it not very mysterious that in a Treaty, which was projected with a Design of uniting the two Fa&rehy;milies by Marriages, and laying the Foundation of an universal Monarchy in Europe, any Steps should be taken to defeat the Succession of a Prince, in whose Person this formidable Conjunction of Dominions was to take Place? &horfill; If This was one of the Designs of the Vienna Treaty, it must indeed be confessed a very unaccountable Allyance; and the Merit of having dissolv'd it will be great&rehy;ly diminish'd. Neither can We wonder at the Conduct of the Emperor in this Case; for how can We think it strange that He should endeavour to defeat the Succession of Don Carlos, by the In&rehy;troduction of Spanish Troops into Italy, when Spain herself had concurred in taking Steps, with that View, in the Treaty of Vienna? &horfill; But the Au&rehy;thor must have certainly been half asleep and nod&rehy;ding over his Treaties, when He let such Stuff fall from his Pen. I shall therefore consider this Affair a little farther, as if no such egregious Blunder had been committed.

At the Time of making the Hanover Treaty, the Emperor's Conduct, with respect to the Suc&rehy;cession of Don Carlos, was not thought a sufficient Reason for violating that Part of the Quadruple Allyance, which related to it. The Proposition of 6000 Spaniards, instead of 6000 Neutrals, seems to have been disapproved by England at the Congress of Soissons; and never relish'd, till some short Time before it was made a Stipulation of the Seville Treaty; that is, some Time before the Meeting of Parliament, last Year. The Consent of the Empire was obtain'd, and the Letters ex&rehy;pectative deliver'd before the Differences between the Empire and Spain were adjusted; so that the Emperor had made all his Engagements good; and Spain ought to have call'd on the Neutral Powers, who were to garrison the Places, at their own Expence, to perform their Engagements, as well as the Emperor. None of the Parties seem'd to think that there had been any affected Delay at Vienna in that Matter; but though the Qua&rehy;druple Treaty says that 6000 Neutrals are to be introduc'd, it does not say when. The Consent of the Duke of Tuscany was sought; whether ever obtain'd, I know not; but in the Year 1723, (Octob. 25,) He protested, by a solemn Act at Cam&rehy;bray, against the Stipulations of the Quadruple Allyance, relating to his Dominions; which Rousset, Tom IV. p. 146. Act was repeated and confirm'd the 26th of January following. Spain never liked this Stipulation; and before and at the Congress of Cambray desired 6000 Spaniards; but the French, at that Time, did not care to risque and Accession of Power to the Crown of Spain, any more than the English. Both apprehended the King of Spain, at that Time, to have a Design of setting aside the Renunciations, founded on the Treaty of Utrecht, and of uniting France and Spain. The Persons in Power, in France since the Duke of Bourbon's Removal, have been thought to wish for such an Union; but as the French King hath Sons, those Designs must be laid aside; and as France hath now no Reason to fear such an Accession of Power as Tuscany would be to the Crown of Spain, it is her Interest to promote the Introduction of Spanish Troops; which may oblige the Emperor to keep a greater Body of Forces than formerly in Italy; by which Means France will meet with less Opposition, if ever They attack Him in Germany; as Spain will have a favourable Opportunity of enlarging their Territories in Italy; and This will be a Founda&rehy;tion of Friendship between those Crowns.

The Queen of Spain could not have desir'd the Change from neutral to Spanish Troops, but upon the Hopes that her Son may be King of Spain; the Prince of Asturias being very sickly and not likely to have Children.

It is said that France and England are Guaran&rehy;ties for the Emperor's Dominions in Italy against any Encroachments, which Spain may attempt to make upon them.

I answer, that the Purposes of the Quadruple Allyance would have been effectually secur'd by neutral Troops; but it is extremely probable that the Introduction of Spaniards will be follow'd by Invasions on the Emperor's Dominions; for though the Introduction of only 6000 Spaniards is stipu&rehy;lated, yet if They are put in Possession of Leghorn, They may admit as many more as They please by the Help of their Fleet, which is large enough for that Purpose, and will be as good as a Bridge be&rehy;tween Italy and Spain. In this Case, France will not be very forward, to execute their Engage&rehy;ments of Guaranty in the Emperor's behalf; and if England does, she must lose her Trade to Spain and to Leghorn. If France should think fit to quarrel with the Emperor, she will encourage Spain to invade his Italian Dominions; and when the Emperor complains of it, They will, without much Difficulty (according to the modern Way of interpreting the Obligations of Treaties) find out some Act or other of the Emperor, which They will alledge as a Reason for his having forfeited a Right to that Guaranty. But surely Princes should endeavour to concert their Treaties in such a Manner, that there may be Reason to hope their Guaranty will not be wanted, and not so as to be almost sure that it will! &horfill; In this latter Case, a Foundation is laid for a War; and as it will be the Interest both of France and England not to quarrel too easily with Spain, on Account of the Benefits of trading with Them; so the Emperor will not trust very readily to their Guaranty.

The Quadruple Allyance directed that when Don Carlos was in Possession, Spain should yield up to Him Porto Longone, which is now in the Hands of that Crown. The Reason of This was, that They might have no Place to land Troops at, to disturb him at their Pleasure. &horfill; I don't remember that the Seville Treaty takes any Notice of This.

How can this Author say, p. 40. that the In&rehy;troduction of Spaniards was necessary for the effec&rehy;tual Security of that Sucession? The Treaty of Seville it self expresses an Apprehension of Dan&rehy;ger to that Sucession from Spanish Troops; and stipulates that when Don Carlos is in quiet Possession, those Troops shall withdraw; that thereby it may be secure from all Events. The Provisions, in the Quadruple Allyance, against the Introduction of Spaniards, are founded on the same Apprehen&rehy;sion; and though the Treaty of Seville says that They shall withdraw, when Don Carlos is in quiet Pos&rehy;session; yet who is to be Judge when that Possession may be said to be quiet and free from Dan&rehy;ger of being disturb'd? Will not the King of Spain take the Decision of that Question upon himself, and give his Troops Orders to keep Possession of those Dominions, if He finds it his Interest? It cannot surely be doubted whether 6000 Neutrals are more proper for the effectual Security of that Succession than 6000 Spaniards, unless upon the Supposition that Don Carlos should be King of Spain, with which Crown the Possession of these Dominions was made incompatible by the Quadru&rehy;ple Allyance. Neutral Troops would oppose all At&rehy;tempts from the Emperor, or from Spain in Prejudice of this Succession; and Time and Experience have fully shewn that they may be more readily intro&rehy;duc'd; the Emperor having long since declared that He is willing to consent to their Introduction, and that he will not consent to the Introduction of Spaniards.

But if the Emperor's Conduct justifies the Mea&rehy;sures of the Seville Allies, what have the States of the Empire done to deserve this Treatment? Why should the Parties to the Quadruple Allyance engage, by the Treaty of Seville, to introduce Spanish Garrisons into their Fiefs, without their Con&rehy;sent, when the same Parties have declared that the Dominions in question cannot be dispos'd of with&rehy;out their Consent; nay, have engaged Themselves in a Guaranty of this very Provision? If the Em&rehy;peror consents to this Variation, as it is call'd, with&rehy;out their Concurrence, He will involve Himself in the Guilt of violating the Oath, taken at his Elec&rehy;tion, and be liable to the divested of the Imperial Dignity. The Imperial Ministers have declar'd This in very strong Terms in a Paper, handed a&rehy;bout at Ratisbon, in answer to another Paper, said to have been written by Monsieur de Chavigny, the French Minister there; and in that Paper They assert that, by a secret Article of the Treaty of Madrid, in 1721, between France, Spain and Eng&rehy;land, the Introduction of Spanish Troops was sti&rehy;pulated. If This is true, it is very astonishing; and I hope the Considerer will allow that it might give the Emperor some little Pretence to complain of our Conduct, whilst He looked upon us as his Friend, and We were acting the Part of a Mediator. But certain it is that, in the Year 1721, a defensive Treaty was made between those three Powers (be&rehy;sides the Treaty of Commerce between Spain and England) and the Number of Troops to be furnish'd by each was specify'd. This Treaty was carry'd on so privately, that neither Count Windis&rehy;gratz, nor Baron Pentenrieder were able to pene&rehy;trate into the Secret of it. This Treaty is printed in Rousset, (Tom. 4. p. 101.) though a certain Gentle&rehy;man asserted that the Treaty of 1721 was only a Treaty of Commerce, at which the Emperor could take no Offence.

It is said expressly in that Paper, agreeably to what was always said by the Publick, that the Plan of the Quadruple Allyance was settled by France and England, and by Them sent to Vienna; and that these two Powers offer'd Sicily to the Emperor, before Tuscany and Parma were brought into Que&rehy;stion; and indeed there are not any Words, in the Quadruple Allyance, which can lead one to imagine that Sicily was the Equivalent given to the Emperor for the Successions of Tuscany and Parma.

If the present Scheme of Negotiations is to bring the Emperor into the Treaty of Seville, in Case the States of the Empire will consent to the Intro&rehy;duction of Spanish Troops, and to promise his En&rehy;deavours to obtain their Consent, Affairs will be in a worse Situation than they were in at the Time of the Quadruple Allyance; and if the Emperor should be secure against any Danger from the Turks, He would certainly do what lies in his Power to prevent them from giving their Consent.

Thus stands our Case at present, and such are the Consequences of the happy Conclusion of the Treaty of Seville; which our Author calls, in seve&rehy;ral Places, a perfect and absolute Peace with Spain; though He drops an Observation, in one Place, that a War in Italy (which is the natural Consequence of this Treaty, unless prevented by some lucky Incident) must affect the whole Confederacy on each Side; that is, involve all Europe in a War. He tells us likewise that, by this absolute Peace with Spain, all our Rights, Privileges and Posses&rehy;sions are renew'd and confirm'd; reasonable Stipula&rehy;tions are made for Reparations of past Damages; and the strongest Obligations given for putting our Trade on the Foot of former Treaties. &horfill; Such gross Assertions as These, the dull Crambe repetita of every Court Scribbler, require no Answer. They deserve only our Contempt. &horfill; I shall therefore pass over all his trite Panegyrick on prudent and steady Measures; (which He afterwards calls, some&rehy;what more properly, an Appearance of Steadiness and Force;) successful Negotiations; unwilling&rehy;ness to put the Nation to an extraordinary Expence, by any unnecessary Precautions; the happy Effects of the Treaty of Hanover; and the happy Conclusion of the Treaty of Seville! &horfill; I will not, I say, en&rehy;deavour to rob any Persons of the secret Pleasure and Gratification, which such Incense may give them.

But as this whole Deduction of Arguments is evidently made to recommend the Continuance of twelve Thousand Hessian Troops in our Pay; I will consider that Affair, as it deserves, in a manner partly serious and partly ludicrous; for though the Case of these Troops is become a Point of very so&rehy;ber Consequence to Great-Britain; yet the Rea&rehy;soning of this Author, in their Behalf, is so ridicu&rehy;lous, that it is impossible for the gravest Man to preserve his Temper, and forbear bursting out, now and them, into a Fit of Laughter.

In order to obviate the Clamours industriously raised against the Hessian Troops, which this Nation hath of late Years, been oblig'd to maintain, (for I shall not enter into any Debate, at present, concerning the Number of our Forces at home) He engages to prove that They were first taken into our Pay, and since continued, in Consequence of Treaties, made for the Interest of Great-Britain, and the Pre&rehy;servation of the Peace and Ballance of Europe, in&rehy;dependent of any other Interest and Consideration whatsoever.

If He had succeeded in this Undertaking, it would have saved me the Trouble of any Remarks; but I think it demonstrable that He hath not brought one tolerable Argument to support his Pro&rehy;position. That the Hessian Troops were taken in&rehy;to our Pay, in Consequence of Treaties, I shall not deny. Whether those Treaties were made solely for the Interest of Great Britain, and the Preser&rehy;vation of the Peace and Ballance of Europe; ap&rehy;pears in some Measure already by the happy Ef&rehy;fects of them, and my preceding Observations. But let us now examine a little more particularly how the Interest of Great Britain, as well as the Peace and Ballance of Europe, makes the Continuation of this great Expence necessary to us.

The Considerer tells us, that immediately after the Conclusion of the Treaty of Hanover, the Con&rehy;sequences of the Vienna Treaty began to shew them&rehy;selves openly, and obliged his late Majesty to ap&rehy;ply to his Parliament for extraordinary Assistance; which was agreed to, says he, by an Address of the House of Commons, on the 25th of March, 1726, who desired Him "not only to encrease his Num&rehy;ber of Seamen, but to concert such other Measures as would best conduce to the Security of the Trade and Navigation of this Kingdom and the Preservation of the Peace of Europe; with Assurances that They would effectually make good All Such Expences and Engagements, as should be made for obtaining those great and desireable Ends &horfill; A most ample Vote of Credit indeed! I hope it is not quoted by Way of Precedent, or to prepare the Nation for one of the same Nature this Year.

At this Juncture, says the Considerer, and in Consequence of the Measures, concerted between his Majesty and his Allies, the late King agreed with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel for a Body of twelve thousand Hessians, to be ready to march for his Majesty's Service upon Demand.

We are told that France likewise increas'd their Forces very considerably, for the Sake of the common Cause; and that the Dutch, having acce&rehy;ded to the Treaty of Hanover, immediately pro&rehy;ceeded to an Augmentation of their Troops; re&rehy;quiring at the same Time that England and France would have their respective Quotas of twelve thousand Men in readiness and at Hand for the Defence of the Republick, in Case of an im&rehy;mediate Attack; which They had more Reason to apprehend than any of the Allies, on Account of their Situation, with Respect to the Imperial Gar&rehy;risons in the low Countries, on one Side, and their being exposed, on the other, to the Forces of the King of Prussia, who had been lately gained by the Emperor &horfill; From hence it appears very plain&rehy;ly that England need not have courted Holland in&rehy;to an Allyance, which was so necessary to her De&rehy;fence against immediate Attacks, whilst England was far removed from the Danger; and I have shewn before that France was still more concern'd in Point of particular Interest, to oppose the De&rehy;signs of the Vienna Treaty; though I hope it will prove at last, that she had some Regard to the common Cause in the Augmentation of her Forces; but it is certain, from this very State of the Case, that England, being thus remotely concern'd in the Consequences of that Treaty might have hold a slower Pace and involv'd her self in fewer Incon&rehy;veniences than she hath felt, as well as procur'd more Advantages than she hath gain'd &horfill; But let us hear the Considerer a little farther.

This equitable Demand, says He, on the Part of the States could hardly have been answer'd by the King, if He had rais'd no Troops but in England. &horfill; Why? &horfill; Because the Dutch, it seems, are too well acquainted with the Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties and Delays, which attend the Transport&rehy;ing great Bodies of Troops, to depend upon such Help in a Case, which if it happen'd at all, would be sudden and too quick to be withstood by slow Move&rehy;ments. &horfill; Therefore it is necessary to keep twelve thousand foreign Troops in constant Readi&rehy;ness, at the Expence of Great-Britain, to march to their Assistance.

This is surely one of the most frivolous Argu&rehy;ments that was ever advanc'd in a Point of such Consequence. Will any Man, except this Author, pretend to say, that the Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties of transporting Troops from England to Holland, are a sufficient Reason for the Expence of maintaining such a Body of foreign Troops? What Power could intercept them? France was an original Ally in the Treaty of Hanover; and surely Spain was not able to cope with the Fleets of England and Holland! Nothing therefore but the common Accidents of the Sea could interrupt our Succours; and are We to avoid them, by such a constant Burthen of Expence, as a Land Tax of six Pence in the Pound, and, what is still worse, carried out of the Kingdom? But even allowing That to be true, against the Evidence of common Sense, will it be said that these Troops are the most pro&rehy;perly plac'd for this Purpose in case of Need? Can We suppose that the Landgrave of Hesse would leave his own Dominions in a defenceless Condi&rehy;tion, in case of any sudden Attempt from the Vi&rehy;enna Allies, and march immediately to the Assistance of Holland? &horfill; Or, even supposing Him so ho&rehy;nourably regardless of his own Safety, as to run any Hazards in the Execution of his Engagements; might not the March of these Troops into Hol&rehy;land be attended with many more Accidents, Diffi&rehy;culties and Delays, than the Transportation of Suc&rehy;cours from England ?

But there is another Consideration, which ren&rehy;ders this Argument still more ridiculous. The Consi&rehy;derer seems to allude to the Case of Embden, when He speaks of our Obligations to support Holland against the Attacks of the King of Prussia; where&rehy;as the Troops of Hesse Cassel can never be employ'd to assist the Dutch to protect that Place against the Execution of a Decree of the Aulick Council. It appears from the Papers in Rousset (Tom. 4.) that the States of Holland don't pretend to dispute the Authority of that Court of Justice. They only sollicited the Court of Vienna to suspend the Exe&rehy;cution of that Decree, in hopes that Matters might be amicably made up between the Prince and the States of East Friesland. They exhorted the Prince to desist from the Rigour of that Decree in his Fa&rehy;vour, and say that They are interested in the Con&rehy;sequence of the Execution of it, as it may be the Expulsion of their Garrison, which They have kept there 120 Years, to secure the Observation of Con&rehy;ventions between the Prince and States of East Fries&rehy;land. They say likewise that the Money lent by their Subjects to the States of East Friesland will be in Danger of being lost, if the Form of Government, establish'd in that Country, should be chang'd; and farther, They have always desired their Allies to support their Instances at the Court of Vienna for the Mitigation of this Decree. They at length say (July 9, 1728.) that They hope the Allies will consider This as Casus Fœderis. They desire it may be carried to the Congress. Count Zinzen&rehy;dorf denies it to be a Matter, that can be consider&rehy;ed there, because the Decree of the Aulick Council regarded only the Administration of Justice in the Empire. When France was call'd upon to back the Instances of the States at Vienna, she said that she would, from Affection for their Interests; insinuating that she was not oblig'd. Let any one therefore judge whether in a Matter, thus circumstanc'd, and thus thought of by one of the Allies of Hanover, a Prince of the Empire would run the Hazard of being put to the Ban of the Empire for opposing, by his Troops, the Execution of a Decree of a Court of Justice of the Empire. &horfill; See Rousset, Tom. 4. p. 498, &c.

Nor can these Troops, or the Troops of Hanover (which are said likewise to be considerably augment&rehy;ed upon the Hanover Treaty) be employ'd, for the same Reason, to make a Diversion in Germany, by attacking the Emperor's hereditary Dominion, or otherwise acting offensively in the Empire, without offending against the Laws of the Empire. The Elector of Hanover, and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel are oblig'd, as Members of the Germanick Body, to assist the Emperor to protect the Rights and Privileges of the Empire, when invaded by any Attempts to introduce Troops into their Fiefs with&rehy;out their Consent; which Consent the contracting Parties to the Seville Treaty have declar'd, by the Treaty of Quadruple Allyance, to be necessary; and unless there is some other Treaty besides That sign'd by Lord Townshend and General Diemar (for That refers only to the Case of the Hanover Trea&rehy;ty) there can arise no Case upon the Seville Treaty, which will oblige those Troops to act either offen&rehy;sively or defensively.

Our Author proceeds in the following sagacious Manner. &horfill; But here, perhaps, it will be ask'd what hath Great-Britain to do with this String of foreign Troops? What have We to apprehend from the Forces of Prussia, Moscovy, or the Emperor? What Good can the Swedes, the Danes, the Hes&rehy;sians, or the Hanoverians do us? &horfill; Aye, what indeed? Our Author would do well to give a bet&rehy;ter Answer to these Queries. But He goes on with the same judicious Observations. &horfill; It was our Business to lie by; to wait; and see the Conse&rehy;quences and Events of the Vienna Treaty, and to take our Measures accordingly, at a proper Season. &horfill; No Doubt on't, Mr. Considerer; but you seem to think that you have cut us quite down in what follows. It would be unfair therefore not to quote it. &horfill; This indeed, say you, would have been a prudent Step, if the Terms of the Vienna Treaty, and the Measures taken, and the Forces rais'd in Consequence of it, by the contracting Parties, had not been directly levell'd at the Interest of Great&rehy;Britain. This would be a very plausible Doctrine, if the Possessions of Gibraltar and Port-Mahon; if the Trade to Italy and Spain, to the East and West-In&rehy;dies, and the Baltick; if the Ballance of Europe, and the present, happy Establishment were become indifferent Things to this Nation; as indeed, one would think, They were, especially the last, by the weekly licentious Writings of some Gentlemen, who would be thought to be Men of no little Consequence. &horfill; I have but a single Objection to all this Vein of shrewd Reasoning; which is, that every one of the Points, mention'd by the Author, remains to be prov'd, as I have observ'd before; and if They cannot be proved, He plainly owns the Folly of our Conduct. As to the last Point, I shall have Occasion to consider that Charge in a&rehy;nother Place; and will only observe, at present, that those Gentlemen, to whom He alludes, cannot have discover'd a greater Indifference to the present, hap&rehy;py Establishment, in their weekly, licentious Writings, than some other Gentlemen have discover'd, by their extraordinary Measures, to the Trade of this King&rehy;dom and the Ballance of Europe; the former of which is, I am afraid, too manifestly negotiated into French Hands, and the latter very much im&rehy;pair'd, in its most beneficial Branches, by some late wise Treaties.

Having given us these exquisite Reasons for taking the Hessian Troops into our Pay, He pro&rehy;duces a Muster-Roll of the Forces on both Sides, as They stood in the Year 1727; which I shall draw up in opposite Columns, or (to use the Author's Words) in Battle Array, against each other.

To Hanover Allyance. To Vienna Allyance.Land Forces. Land Forces.English, &horfill; 26,000. Imperial, &horfill; 227,000.French, &horfill; 160,000. Prussian, &horfill; 70,000.Dutch, &horfill; 50,000. Spanish, &horfill; 60,000.Hanoverians, &horfill; 22,000. Muscovite, &horfill; 30,000,Danes, &horfill; 24,000. Hessians, &horfill; 12,000. Swedes, &horfill; 10,000. Sum total &horfill; 304,000. Sum total &horfill; 387,000, Deduct &horfill; 304,000. To Ballance. &horfill; 83,000.

I wonder the Considerer, when He was giving us a List of the confederate Forces, (as He ex&rehy;presses it) on both Sides, should forget our great Ally, the Duke of Wolfenbuttle; who enter'd into a Guaranty of all the British Dominions; and sti&rehy;pulated, I think, to furnish a Body of 5000 Men, in Case of need; but perhaps, He consider'd the secret Articles of that Allyance; by which it is pro&rehy;vided that these Troops are not to move out of Germany in our Defence. &horfill; Let us therefore return to the State of two Allyances of Hanover and Vienna, as They stood in the Year 1727; upon which our Author makes the following Remark. &horfill; Thus Matters stood in 1727, when almost all the Powers of Europe were, directly or indirectly, engaged and ranged on the Side of the Treaty of Vienna or Hanover.

I hope He will give me Leave to add my Opi&rehy;nion that this Arrangement of the Forces, in regular Battalia, on both Sides, shews the busy Ge&rehy;nius of some Gentlemen, who have taken great Pains to arm all Europe, at the Expence of their own Country; and if They should be able to dis&rehy;arm it again, at an equal Expence, what other Merit will They have, than That of conjuring down a Spirit of their own raising? &horfill; But the Reader will perceive that the Considerer grows quite ludicrous, towards the latter End of his Performance; and the Laugh would be justly turn'd upon us, if We should enter into a grave Confutation of his Ar&rehy;guments.

He seems to insunate, by this List of the Forces on both Sides, that instead of 12,000 Hessians our excellent Ministers ought to have demanded 83,000; and that it is owing to their extreme Modera&rehy;tion, that the desireable Work of a Peace hath not been yet accomplished; for, according to the Rule of Three, if 12,000 Hessians can procure us a Peace in five Years, 83,000 Hessians would have done it in about the seventh Part of that Time.

To shew that the Hanover Allies went on, Hand in Hand together, He tells us that the Dutch not only augmented their Land Forces, but had like&rehy;wise made Preparations to fit out eighteen Men of War. Nay, He might have added that They ac&rehy;tually shew'd out a Fleet, at Spithead, for several Months together; and though it might not, per&rehy;haps, be victuall'd and provided for any farther Voyage; yet it must be confess'd to be an Appearance of Steadiness and Force, at least; and considering the great Advantages, which England hath reap'd from the Hanover Allyance, it may be put in Bal&rehy;lance against the several great Squadrons, which she hath been at the Expence of sending to all Parts of the World.

As to the French, the same Author tells us that They had got every Thing ready for taking the Field. The only Question was Where They should take the Field; and at last a very wise Thought jump'd into the Head of a certain Gentleman, viz. to whose Advantage the Events even of a successful War might turn; which hath hitherto prevented them from taking the Field any where.

However, this equal Co-operation of the Hano&rehy;ver Allies, with our Hessian Auxiliaries, made the Emperor look about Him, and consent to a Plan of Preliminaries; which would certainly have produc'd an absolute Peace, long before the Treaty of Seville effected it; had not Spain been provok'd at these Steps, taken without her Approbation, and entertain'd some small Hopes of Disturbances in England, on Account of the late King's Death. &horfill; It may be ask'd, per&rehy;haps, what Hopes, of this Nature, Spain could pos&rehy;sibly entertain upon his present Majesty's Accession to the Throne with the general Acclamations of all Parties? I answer, from the Change of the Ministry; which would have occasion'd Disturbances, no Doubt, of the utmost Consequence to all Europe.

However, these separate Negotiations with the Emperor (which his Ministers were artfully drawn into) gave such Umbrage to Spain, that They like&rehy;wise came into separate Negotiations with us and concluded that absolute Peace, call'd the Treaty of Seville, which gave the Emperor Umbrage, in his Turn; and This is the Foot, which We stand up&rehy;on at present.

Here the Considerer asks another wise Question; or, which is much the same Thing, puts it into the Mouth of an Adversary.

But of what Use, says He, can the Hessians be for the Execution of the Treaty of Seville; and particularly for the Introduction of Spanish Garri&rehy;sons into Tuscany and Parma?

In Answer to This, the Considerer gives us many weighty Arguments, to shew that these Troops are of the utmost Use, not only upon this Occa&rehy;sion, but likewise upon all Occasions, that can pos&rehy;sibly happen in Europe.

In order to set this Matter in the clearest Light, I must desire the Reader to recollect that it ap&rehy;pears by the Account of the two Allyances, as it stood when Spain and the Emperor were toge&rehy;ther, that the Land Forces on the Vienna Side over-ballanc'd Those of the Hanover Allies by 83,000 Men; but the Forces of Spain, (viz. 60,000) being taken from one Side and plac'd to the other, will make the Confederates of Hanover more numerous than Those of Vienna by 37,000; from whence it may be inferr'd, perhaps, that there is not so great a Necessity of the 12000 Hessians; which would be true, if it were fix'd on which Side the Hessians are to be; but as it is yet impossible to know which of the two Pow&rehy;ers (Spain or the Emperor) will be most refracto&rehy;ry; and as Care must be always taken of the Ballance of Europe; it follows, according to this Gentleman's incomparable Reasoning, that there will always be a Necessity of keeping up the Hes&rehy;sians, whether the Emperor or Spain stands out, or both, in order to maintain the Ballance of Eu&rehy;rope.

In short, I cannot compare the Author's Rea&rehy;soning, in this most excellent Dissertation, to any Thing, but a strong Chain, consisting of several Links; each of which, as it is infrangible in its self, so is it inseparable from any of the rest. It is necessary therefore to lay it out at its full Length, in order to form a true Judgment of it, and then observe how the whole is connected for the Interest of Great Britain.

In demonstrating the Necessity of keeping up the Hessians, the Author proceeds in the follow&rehy;ing Manner; and the first Joint of his Sorites, or Rat's Tail, is a Postulatum, which nobody must deny, viz.

p. 6 It must be allow'd by all that the Trea&rehy;ty of Vienna laid the Foundation of a formidable Power in Europe, by the Union of the two Fa&rehy;milies, of Spain and Austria. p. 8. The Vienna Treaty made the Coun&rehy;ter-Allyance of Hanover absolutely necessary. p. 14. The Treaty of Hanover made it ne&rehy;cessary to take 12,000 Hessians into our Pay. p. 15. That the Accidents of the Sea made it necessary to keep up the Hessians, for the Protection of Holland. p. 27. The Jealousy of the French and Dutch of the Advantages to Great Britain, by the Assiento Trade, made it necessary to keep up the Hessians. p. 28. The Peace not being yet concluded, at the Congress of Soissons, made it necessary to continue the Hessians. P. 29. If We had appear'd at the Congress in a naked Posture, by disbanding the Hessians, the French would not have stood by us in Defence of Gibraltar or Port-Mahon. Therefore it was neces&rehy;sary to keep up the Hessians, that We might be in a Readiness to assist France, in order to make France ready to assist us. p. 32. The Treaty of Seville could never have been accomplished without the Hessians; and therefore the Security of our Possessions and the full Enjoyment of our Commerce, as well as the Separa&rehy;tion of Spain from the Emperor are intirely owing to the Hessians. p. 34. As the Hessians were necessary to make the Emperor and Spain quarrel, so they are no less necessary to make them agree; and consequently it is necessary to keep up the Hessians, till the Peace of Europe is absolutely concluded. p. 36. As there are now but small Hopes of gaining the Emperor's Consent to the Introduction of Spanish Troops, by Way of Negotiation; and as it is impossible to do it by Force, without the Hessians; Spain hath a Right, by the Treaty of Seville, to demand the Hessians; for why should England expect to reap the Fruits of successful Nego&rehy;tiations, without Expence? P. 42. The Emperor having, at present, a large Body of Forces in Italy, makes it neces&rehy;sary to keep up the Hessians. Ib. France being both unable and unwilling to make a Diversion upon the Rhine or in Flanders, it is necessary to keep up the Hessians, for this Purpose likewise. P 45. The Weakness of the Emperor is as good a Reason as his Strength for keeping up the Hessians. P. 47. It is plain that the Hessians are not kept up, for the Sake of the King's foreign Dominions; and yet his Majesty hath a Right to demand the Hessians, for the Defence of those Dominions. P. 51, 52. The Distress of Trade, the Loss of Gibraltar and Portmahon, the Reparation of Dunkirk, the Violation of all our Treaties, the total Subversion of the Protestant Establishment in the House of Hanover, and throwing the whole World into Confusion, will be the fatal Consequences of &horfill; disbanding the Hessians.

From whence it follows that it is a most abo&rehy;minable Practice to talk of the Debts of the Na&rehy;tion, and sending Money abroad to pay foreign Troops in a Point of such publick Utility &horfill; as the Hessians. The Hessians! who are the Triarii of Great Britain; her last Resort in all Cases, both in Peace and War; both at Home and Abroad; howsoever ally'd, or wheresoever distress'd!

But we must now be a little serious again; for the Subject requires it, though not the Author of his Manner of Reasoning.

Although this Deduction, says He, is gone into so great a Length; yet it seems necessary, before I conclude, to remove some Insinuations, industriously spread against the Hessian Troops; as if they were not hired, or continued in our Pay, for the Sake and Interest of Great Britain.

I think the Author Himself hath pretty plainly confirm'd the Truth of such Insinuations; but He prudently lays them to the Charge of the Enemies of the Government; (that is of the Ministry;) who are, in a Manner, defy'd to produce one Reason or Fact, during the Negotiations and Transactions of so many Years, to shew the Probability of such an Imputa&rehy;tion; and if the Author is rightly inform'd, not one Word had pass'd for some Years, before the Conclu&rehy;sion of the Treaty of Vienna, about Bremen and Verhden. &horfill; Though I am no Enemy of the Go&rehy;vernment, I very much suspect the Truth of this Information, and think myself able to prove the Falshood of it; but as I have not Room to enter into such a Deduction, at present, I shall content myself with presenting the Considerer with a Pas&rehy;sage out of the Works of one of his Fellow-La&rehy;bourers in the Ministry; by Name Francis Walsingham, Esq; who, in Order to shew the superior Fidelity of the French to the Germans, gave us the following judicious Intimation, in his Free Briton of Thursday November the 26th, 1730, N&osup;. 52; &horfill; Had the antient Proverb of German Faith been infallible, a certain great Prince had granted an Investiture; which He once so&rehy;lemnly promised, on a very valuable Consideration; nor would He have expected a Million Sterling, as a refreshing Fee. &horfill; I do not quote this low Fellow, by Way of Authority, but only for the Sake of Information; for as contemptible a Writer as He is in Himself, He sometimes blabs out Se&rehy;crets, which are intrusted to Him, in Confidence, by his Pay-master. &horfill; I wish therefore He would let us know, who this certain Prince is, what In&rehy;vestiture He means; what valuable Consideration was paid for it; and from Whom that Prince hath expected a Million Sterling, as a refreshing Fee &horfill; The Resolution of these Questions might, perhaps, clear up the Dispute, whether Sicily was granted as an Equivalent to the Emperor for his Consent to the Disposition of the Italian Dominions, in Favour of Don Carlos.

The Votes of Parliament, which the Author quotes in Justification of the Hessians, and for the Sup&rehy;port of his Majesty's foreign Dominions, are very little to the Purpose; because what is prudent at one Time may not be prudent at all Times. &horfill; Besides, I presume, this Author will not insist upon a Vote of Parliament as an unanswerable Argument in it self for the Wisdom, or Reasonableness of any Measure. The Defeat of the Spanish Fleet in the Mediterranean, if I mistake not, was voted by Parliament a wise and just Action; and yet our Ministers seem to have quite different Sentiments of it, at present.

The Considerer puts the Dominions of Hanover upon the same Foot with all other Dominions in Allyance with us; and from thenc argues that they have an equal Right to our Protection; espe&rehy;cially if they were attack'd out of Resentment for his Majesty's Conduct as King of Great Britain. But, even supposing This to be the Case, are they not a Weight upon the Strength of England? Are they not a constant Pledge, as it were, in the Em&rehy;peror's Hands; which may tempt Him, at any Time, to insist upon high Terms? Or would it be in his Power to molest us at all, if it were not for these Dominions?

The Author speaks out at last, and tells us very plainly that though there is no formal Allyance be&rehy;tween Great Britain and Hanover (the Quality of King and Elector residing in the same Person) yet the Union between the two Governments, and the Obligations of mutual Defence and Guaranty are as strongly and necessarily imply'd, as the most for&rehy;mal Treaties and Conventions could possibly make them.

What Union of the two Governments can the Author possibly mean? Though We have the Hap&rehy;piness of living under the same Prince, I thank God, We do not live under the same Form of Go&rehy;vernment. Ours is limited; theirs is absolute; and whilst this Difference subsists, there can be no Union between them. But if the Obligations of mutual Defence and Guaranty are as strongly and necessarily imply'd as the most formal Treaties and Conventions could possibly make them; I should be glad to be inform'd what Effect that excellent Provi&rehy;sion in the Act of Settlement can ever have, which was made to secure us from the Danger and Ex&rehy;pence of Wars, on Account of any Dominions, not belonging to the Imperial Crown of these Kingdoms.

The single Question is (as our Author states it Himself) whether the Continuance of the Hessian Troops, in the Pay of Great Britain, be for the Ho&rehy;nour and Interest of the King and this Kingdom; which, I hope, hath been fairly examined in the preceding Pages.

The only Observation, that I shall make farther, is, that though our Author desires this Controversy may be confin'd to the true Merits of the Question, without any Misrepresentations; yet He concludes with the basest Reflection on those Gentlemen, who differ from Him in this Measure, as Persons, who are really grieved, not that We have any Thing to do with Hanover Dominions, but that We have any Thing to do with the Elector of Hanover.

As infamous as the Design of this Reflection is, I will venture to say there are multitudes of Persons, in this Kingdom, zealously affected to the Elector of Hanover, who heartily wish that We had nothing to do with the Hanover Dominions; but We must al&rehy;ways expect these mean Arts from Men, who want better Arguments; for as no Bishop, no King was the Cant-Expression of one Reign; it is now turn'd into no W&horfill;le, no House of Hanover!

But We trust in his Majesty's Wisdom, that He will not only separate the Royal Character from the Minister, but likewise consider Himself in a double Capacity, as King of Great Britain and Elector of Hanover. He will have the Goodness to excuse the laudable Partiality of Englishmen to&rehy;wards their own Country, and not make the Case of Twelve Thousand Hessians (which They may appre&rehy;hend to be an useless Burthen upon them) the only Criterion of Loyalty to his Person and Affection to his Government.

FINIS.