<B CEBOETH1>
<Q E1 XX PHILO BOETHCO> 
<N BOETH1 COLVILLE> 
<A COLVILLE GEORGE> 
<C E1> 
<O 1500-1570> 
<M X> 
<K X> 
<D ENGLISH> 
<V PROSE> 
<T PHILOSOPHY> 
<G TRANSL> 
<F LATIN>
<W WRITTEN>
<X MALE>
<Y X>
<H X>
<U X>
<E X>
<J INTERACTIVE>
<I X>
<Z X>
<S SAMPLE X>

 
[^COLVILLE, GEORGE.
TEXT:  BOETHIUS.
BOETHIUS' CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY,
TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN BY
GEORGE COLVILLE, 1556.
THE TUDOR LIBRARY, V.
ED. E. B. BAX.
LONDON: DAVID NUTT, 1897.
PP. 68.13  - 71.30       (SAMPLE 1)
PP. 73.12  - 77.18       (SAMPLE 2)
PP. 78.3   - 81.31       (SAMPLE 3)
PP. 98.25  - 103.17      (SAMPLE 4)
PP. 105.19 - 106.7       (SAMPLE 5)^]

<S SAMPLE 1> 
<P 68> 
[}PHILOSOPHY.}] 
   Hetherto it suffyseth that I haue shewed the maner and 
forme, of false felicite or blessednes, which if thou           #
beholdeste 
perfetlye, it restythe to declare from henceforthe, whyche is   #
the 
very true felicitie. 
   BOE: Truelye I do se, that ryches cannot be satisfied with 
suffysaunce, nor power wyth kyngedomes, nor reuerence with 
dygnities, not glory with nobilitie or ge~tles, nor myrth with 
pleasures. PHIL: And hast thou perceyued the causes why it 
is so? BO: Certes me semeth that I see them as it were 
thorowe a thynne or narrowe chyn or clyfte, that is to saye:    #
not 
very perfytlye, but I had leuer knowe them more apparauntly 
of the. PHIL: Truely the redye waye to knowe them is very 
perfytte. For that thinge, that by nature is symple plaine and 
inseperable, mans errour deuideth and separatith the same, and 
leadethe it from the true and perfyt good or felicitie, vnto    #
false 
and vnperfyt good, and infelicitie. But thynkest thou thys,     #
that 
a man hath nede of nothinge, that nedeth power? 
   BOE: I say nay. 
   PH: Trulye thou sayest well, for if there be anye thing that #
in 
any matter is of weke power, in that behalfe, it is nedefull 
that it wanteth and lacketh the helpe of som other. 
   BOE: I saye it is euen so. 
   PHIL: Therefore suffysaunce and power be both one and lyke 
by nature and kynde. 
   BOE: So it semethe. PHIL: And doest thou think that such 
thynges as suffisaunce, and power be, are to be dispysed, or 
<P 69> 
contrarye wyse, that they be most worthy reuerence aboue all 
thinges. BOE: I saye it is worthy reuerence and it may be no 
doute thereof. 
   PHIL: Let vs therefore conferre reuerence, to suffysaunce    #
and 
power, that we may iudge these three thynges, all one thynge. 
BOE: Let vs adde them together as one thynge, yf we wyll 
confesse the truthe. PHIL: What thynkest thou than, dooste 
thou iudge that to be an obscure and ignoble thynge, that is 
suffyasunt, myghty and reuerend, or els right clere and         #
excellent 
by al fame and renoune? And consider also whether that 
thinge, that hath nede of nothynge, that is moste myghtye, that 
is most worthy honor (as it is afore grau~ted) and hath nede    #
yet 
of fame and renoune, whyche it cannot geue vnto it selfe, 
shoulde it seeme for that moore abiecte or lesse estemed of any 
parte? 
   BOE: I can not denye it, but I muste nedes confesse it, as   #
it is 
in dede, ryght famous of renoune and noblenes. 
   PHIL: Then it is a consequence, that we confesse and graunt 
that glory and renoune nothynge differethe from the other       #
three, 
that is to say, from ryches, suffysaunce and power. 
   BOE: I saye it foloweth. 
   PHIL: Than the thinge that hath no nede of any other, that 
canne do all thinges of his owne myght, that is clere noble and 
reuerend: do not this truely appere to be a thynge moste 
ioyfull. 
   BOE: I saye I cannot certaynelye tell or thynke from whence 
any sorow maye happen to any such thynge. 
   PHIL: Then it is nede that we muste graunt this thinge to be 
full of gladenes, if the foresayd thynges remayne true. And     #
also 
we must nedes graunte that the names of suffisaunce, power, 
noblesse reuerence and gladnes, be dyuers and sondry thynges, 
but ther substaunce is all one, without any dyuersitie. 
   BOE: I saye it must nedes be euen so. 
   PHIL: Then the selfe same thynge that is all one and symple 
or pure of nature, and cannot be deuyded, the wyckednes of men 
deuydeth it, and when they labour to get part of a thyng that 
hath no partes, they nether gette anye porcion of the thynge, 
nor yet the selfe same thynge that they desyre. BOE: I saye 
after what maner do men deuyde the thynges. PHI: He that 
seketh ryches, to auoyde and defende pouertie, he laboureth not 
<P 70> 
to get power, but had leuer be accounted nedy vyle and pore, 
and also forgo and lose many naturall pleasures, then he wold 
lose the mony that he hath gotten. But by this meanes he that 
lacketh power, he that is greued, he that is vile or out cast,  #
and 
he that is of noo fame or of no reputation, hath no             #
suffysaunce. 
And truelye he that onely desyreth power, spendeth and 
wasteth riches, dispiseth pleasures and honoure wythoute power, 
and setteth not by glorye. But certes thou seyst that he        #
wanteth 
many thynges, and yet happethe that he hath sometyme nede 
of thynges necessarye, and is bitten or greued wyth care and 
anguyshe. And when he cannot put awaye these thyngs, he 
cesseth and is not myghtye, whych is y=e= thing that he mooste 
cheyfely desyred. And lykewyse a man may reson and speake 
of honors, glorye, and pleasuers, as of power, and suffysaunce. 
For when euerye one of them is the selfe same, and lyke the     #
other, 
whosoeuer seketh to get any one of them w=t=out the others,     #
certes 
he hath not that he desyrethe. BOE. I saye what than, yf a 
man coueteth to gette all the~ to gether. PHIL. Certes I wolde 
say that he woulde get hym soueraigne felicitie and blessednes. 
But shoulde he fynde the same soueraygne felicitie, in thynges, 
that I haue shewed that cannot geue and performe that thing 
that they do promes? 
   BOE: I saye they cannot.
   PHIL: Therefore blessednes or perfyt felicitie should be     #
sought 
for, in noo wyse in the thynges that are thoughte to geue but   #
one 
thing singulerly, of all thynges that are to be desyred. 
   BO: I saye I confesse the same and nothynge can be sayde 
more true then that. 
   PHIL: Therefore haste thou bothe the forme and the causes of 
false felicitie. Nowe turne the inwarde thoughte of thy mynde, 
vnto the contrary, for there thou shalt see anone the same true 
and perfyt felicitie and blessednes, that I haue promysed. 
   B: Truly I say this is very playne and euident, and it were 
to a blyndman, and thou dyddyst shew the same trewe and perfyt 
felicitie a lytell before, when thou dyddyste laboure to shewe 
me the causes of false felicitie. For (except I be deceyued) 
the same is the treue and perfyt felicitie or blessednes that 
perfourmeth in ma~ suffisance power, reuerence, noblesse, and 
gladnes. And that thou mayste knowe that I do perceyue the 
same inwardely I do confesse vndoutedlye that the same is the 
<P 71> 
full and perfyt felicitie or blessednes, that maye truely       #
perfourme 
one of the sayd thynges, for by cause they all be one, and 
the selfe same thynge, and not dyuers thynges in substaunce,    #
that 
is to say, suffysaunce, power, reuerence, noblesse, and ioye or 
gladnes. PHYL: O my chyld Boece I perceue thou art happye 
or blessed in thys opinion, yf thou wylte put thereto this,     #
that 
I shal say. 
   BOE: I saye what is that. 
   PHI: Thynkest thou that there be anye thynge in these 
worldly and transitorye thynges y=t= may bring in or shew any 
such state. 
   BOE: I say I thinke not. For thou hast shewed that nothynge 
can be desyred, aboue perfytte felicitie. 
   PHIL: Therfore these worldlye thynges, that is to saye 
worldelye suffisaunce, power reuere~ce nobles and pleasures, 
semethe to geue vnto men the symylitudes or lykenes, of true 
good, or ells to geue certaine vnperfit and fained goodes: for 
truly they cannot geue the true and perfyt good. 
   BOE: I say I graunt the same. 
   PHIL: Now for bycause thou hast knowen whyche is the 
same verye true and perfytte felicitie, and whyche fayneth, or  #
dissymulythe 
the same, that is to saye, that shewethe the false felicitie, 
then nowe it resteth that thou mayst knowe where thou 
mayste seke for this trewe felicitie. 
   BOECIUS: Certes that thynge I saye, I greately loked for     #
nowe 
of late. PHYLOSOPHY: But forsomuch as it pleseth my scoler 
Plato, in his boke, named Thimeo, he saith that in the lest 
thynges of all, the helpe of God, ought to be required. What 
thynkest y=u= now to be done, that we maye deserue to fynde the 
sete or place of the same soueraygne good? 

<S SAMPLE 2> 
<P 73> 
[}PHILOSOPHY.}] 
   For by cause thou hast sene whiche is the forme of perfytte 
good, and whych also is the forme of imperfette good. Nowe I 
thynke it mete to declare wherein thys perfytte good or         #
felicitie 
is set. In the which I do iudge to inquyre fyrste, whether anye 
suche perfit good (as the same that thou a litel before dyddyst 
defyne or determine) myght be in the nature of thyngs, that no 
vayne imaginacion or shadowe deceyue vs, and put vs out of the 
trewth of the thynge or matter, that we be aboute to talke of. 
And it cannot be denyed, but that there is parfytte good: And 
the same good is the fountayne of al good. For why? euery 
thyng that is called vnparfytte, the same is taken vnperfit by 
diminishing of y=e= thing that is perfytte. Whereby it commethe 
to passe, that yf (in any kynde of thynge) any thing is sene to 
be vnperfytte, therin, it is necessary that somthyng be also 
parfytte. For yf parfection be taken awaye, certes it cannot be 
imagyned from whence that thynge is, that is adiudged           #
vnparfytte. 
For the nature of thynges toke neuer any begynnynge 
of thynges dymynished and vnparfitte but procedynge from 
hole and parfytte thynges, came downe or descended into these 
lower and baren thynges. And (as I haue shewed a litel before) 
if ther be any felicitie or blessednes vnperfyte vayne or       #
frayle, 
it may not be doubted but that there is some felicitie and 
blessednes that is hole and perfyt. BOE: I saye it is fyrmely 
and truely concluded. PHIL. But consider after this maner, 
wherein perfytte felicitie dwellethe. 
   The common conceyte of mans minde do proue, that God is 
<P 74> 
the soueraygne and cheyfe good of al things. For whe~ nothyng 
maye be thought better then God, what man doutyth that 
thinge to be good when nothynge is better than it. Euen soo 
truelye, reason declareth that GOD is good, that it maye        #
conclude 
also, that perfyt good is in him. For except it were soo, he 
canne not be prynce and soueraynge of all thynges. For          #
somethyng 
hauing perfytte good, shoulde be better then he, and it 
shulde seme that that same thing were before and of more 
antiquitie or elder then God. For all thynges perfytte, are 
manyfest and do appere to be fyrst, before things that be 
vnperfyt. Wherefore, that my reason goeth not fourth            #
infynytely, 
or wythoute ende, we muste graunte the hyghe God 
to be full of soueraygne and perfytte good. And we haue         #
confyrmed 
and establyshed before, that perfit good is true felicitie 
or blessednes. Therfore it muste nedes be, that trewe           #
felycitie, 
or blissednes: is set in the high God. BOE: I do graunt it, and 
it maye not be denyed by any meanes. 
   PHYLO: But I beseche the, se howe fyrmelye, and howe holy 
thou mayst proue, that we haue sayde, that the hyghe almyghty 
God, is full of soueraygne good. BOE: Howe should I proue it. 
   P: Dost thou thinke that the father of al things hath taken 
from any outwarde thinge the same soueraygne good, whereof 
it is sayde he is ful, or els thynkest thou that he hath it 
naturallye of hymselfe? As thoughe thou shouldyst thinke that 
God hymselfe and the blessednes of God be of dyuers distyncte 
substaunce and not vnite all in one or of one onely substaunce? 
For yf thou thynkest that God hath receyued the sayde good 
outwardlye of any other, thou mayst iudge and esteme the same 
that gaue it hym, better and more excellent then he that 
receyueth it. But I do confesse that God is ryght worthylye 
mooste soueraygne and excellent of all thynges. And truely 
yf soueraygne good be in GOD by nature, but yet by reason 
dyueres, when we speke of God the soueraygne prynce of all 
thyng, let hym faine that can, who hath ioyned together these 
diuers thynges, that is to say, God and soueraygne good.        #
Farthermore 
the thinge that differeth from euery thing, the same is not 
the verye same thynge, that it differeth from. So that the      #
thing 
that diffreth from soueraygne good, is not by nature of it      #
selfe, 
the same soueraygne good. But it were a wycked thynge or 
wronge so to thynke of that thinge, that is to say: of God,     #
that 
<P 75> 
excelleth and passethe all other in goodnes. For alwayes the 
nature of nothynge maye be thought to be better then the 
begynnyng of the same thyng. Wherefore I shall conclude by 
good reason, that the thynge, that is, the begynning of all 
thynges is of hys owne substau~ce soueraygne good. 
   BOE: I saye it is wel concluded. 
   PHIL: But it is graunted before that soueraygne good, is     #
perfytte 
felycitie and blessednes. 
   B: I saye no lesse but it is euen soo. 
   PHIL: Therfor it behoueth to confesse that God is the same 
soueraygne good. B: I saye I can not auoyde, the resons 
before alledged. And I do perceyue that thys thyng shewed of 
them, is a very consequence to the thyngs. PHIL: Beholde now 
whether thys thynge maye be proued hereafter more firmely, that 
two soueraign good thynges that dyffer one from another, may 
not be. For it apperethe that the goodes that dyffer of them 
selfe, can not be all one thynge: Therefore nether of them      #
canne 
be perfytte when that one of them hath nede of the other. But 
it is manyfest that the same, that is vnperfytte, is not        #
soueraygne 
and perfytte. Therefore the goodes that be soueraygne, by no 
meanes may be dyuers or dyffer one from another. Soo then I 
have proued and gathered that both blessednes and God, be 
soueraigne good. Wherefore it behoueth that the soueraygne 
dyuinitie, is the same lyke thyng, as soueraygne blessednes 
or felicitie. BOE: I saye that by thys meanes nothyng may be 
concluded more true, nor more firme by reasoning, nor more 
worthy, then God. PHI: Therefore vpon these thynges, (as the 
Geometricians are wonte to brynge in thynges, that they call 
apparaunces after they haue shewed their propositions) eue~ so 
wyll I geue the as a correlary or conclusyon, for bycause that  #
men 
be made blessed by obteyning of blessednes, and that blessednes 
is the same dyuinitie, it is manyfest y=t= men be made blessed  #
by 
optaining of the diuinitie. And as men be made iuste by 
obtaynyng of Iustice, and wyse by obteynyng of wysedome: So 
by lyke reson it behoueth that men y=t= haue gotten diuinitie,  #
be 
made gods. Then is euery blessyd man a God: But certes by 
nature, there is but one God, albeit by participacion of        #
dyuynitie, 
no thyng letteth, or prohibyteth, but there be many Goddes. 
   BOE: I saye this is a gaye, and a precious thynge, whether 
thou woldest call it apparens, or a conclusion. PH: And certes 
<P 76> 
nothyng is fayrer, or more goodly then this thyng, that reason 
perswaded shulde be added to these forsayde thynges. BOE: I 
saye what thyng is it. PHY: When blyssednes semeth to contayne 
many thyngs, it is to doubte, whether all these thynges do 
ioyne togyther, as it were one body of blyssednes, by certayne 
diuersytie, or varyete of partes, or membres, or whether there  #
be 
any one thynge, of them that of it self acco~plisheth the       #
substaunce 
of blyssednes, vnto the whiche all the other be referred. BOE: 
I saye, I wolde thou woldest open the same vnto me, by example 
of the same thynges. PHI: Haue I not iudged that blissednes 
is good. BOE: I say we haue thought it souerayne good. PHIL: 
It behoueth that thou adde souerayne good to all these thinges 
that folowe. [^A FULL STOP ADDED^] For blissednes, is           #
sufferayne suffysaunce, the same 
is soueraygne power, the same is soueraygne reuerence, the      #
same is 
soueraigne clerenes, and the same is demed to be soueraygne 
pleasure. BOE: What then? PHIL: Be all these thynges, that 
is to saye: suffysaunce, power, and the other thynges, as it    #
were 
membres of blissednes? or whether be they all referred vnto 
good, as vnto the chyefe of them. BO: I say, I perceiue well 
what thou preposyst to serch out, but I desyre to here what     #
thou 
defynest or dost determyne. PHY: Vnderstande thou the solucion 
of the questyon thus. If all these thynges, were membres of     #
blyssednes: 
then shoulde they dyffer one from another. For suche is 
the nature of partes, that dyuers partes or me~bres do make one 
bodye. BOE: Truely, all these thinges haue ben shewed before, 
to be all one thinge. PHI: Then be they no membres, or els 
it shoulde seme, that blyssednes were ioyned, or made al of one 
me~bre, which can not be. BOE: I say it is, no doute, but I     #
loke 
for the resydue of thy question that remaineth. P: Truelye 
it is manyfest that all other things be referred vnto good. For 
therefore suffysaunce is requyred, by cause it is thought to be #
good. 
Therefore power, is desired, for it is thoughte also to be      #
good. 
And lykewyse a man may coniecture of reuerence, noblesse, and 
plesure or delyghte. Then is soueraygne good the effecte and 
cause of all thynges that are to be desyred. For that thinge    #
that 
hath no good in it self not symylytude or likenes of good, by   #
no 
meanes ought to be desyred. And on the contrary wise those 
thynges also, that by nature be not good, yet yf they seeme to 
be as they were verye good, they be desyred: whereby it         #
happethe 
that bountye or goodnes, is thought ryghtfully the verye 
<P 77> 
effecte and cause of all thynges to be desyred or loked for.    #
For 
that thyng semeth cheyfly to be desyred or wished, for the      #
cause 
or loue, wherof any thing is desyred. As yf a man would ryde 
for cause of helth, he desyreth not so much the mouing to ryde, 
as the effect of his helth. Therfore when that all thyngs be 
desyred, for the cause and loue of good, they be not desyred 
rather of al me~, the~ the same good. But we haue graunted that 
felicitie or blessednes is the thinge for the whyche all other 
thynges be desyred: wherefore onely felicitie or blessednes is 
sought for. Whereby it appereth clerely, that there is but one 
substaunce of the same good, and of blessednes or felicitie. 
   BOE: I se nothyng why any man may conte~de or say any thing 
to the contrarye 
   PHIL: But we haue shewed before that God and perfet          #
blessednes 
or felicitie, is all one, and the selfe same thing. BOE: I 
say the same. PHIL: Therefore it is lawefull to conclude        #
safelye 
and truelye, that the substaunce of God, is sette also in the   #
same 
good, and not ells where, in any other thynge. 

<S SAMPLE 3> 
<P 78> 
[}BOECIUS.}] 
   I assent to all thy sayinges, for they all be knytt to       #
gether with 
ryghte stronge reasons. 
   PHIL: Howe muche wylte thou esteme it, if thou knowest 
what thynge the sayde good is? 
   BOE: I wyll esteme it aboue all things if it so happen that  #
I 
maye knowe also there withall, God that is good. PHIL: Certes 
I shall open the same by very good reason, so that the thynges, 
that be concluded a lytle before, do yet remayne in thy mynde. 
BOECIUS: I saye they shall remayne. PH: Haue I not shewed 
the that the same thinges that be desyred of many folke, that   #
is 
to say: suffysaunce, reuerence, power, and such other be not 
true, and perfyt goodes, by cause they vary and dyffer one from 
another? and that when the one is without the other it may not 
brynge in suche good that is full and absolute, that is to      #
saye, 
hauynge nede of nothyng? But we haue shewed before, that then 
it is trewe and perfyt good when that all the sayd thynges be 
gathered together, as into one forme, that is to saye into      #
good, 
so that the same that is suffysaunce, is power, reuerence,      #
noblesse, 
and delight. And truely except all the sayde thinges be one 
without diuersite, they haue nothynge in them whereby they 
shoulde be accountyd emongeste thynges that are to be desyred. 
BOE: I saye it is declared alredy, and no man maye doughte 
thereof. 
   PHIL: Then the thynges that do vary and dyffer, be no        #
goodes. 
But when they haue begonne to be al one thynge then they be 
goodes. Do it not happen that these thynges be good by adoption 
or optaynyng of vnitie? 
   BOE: So I saye it semeth. PHIL: But al that is good,         #
grauntest 
thou to be good perticipation or partakyng, or not? BOE: It 
is so. PHIL: Then thou muste nedes graunt by lyke reason, that 
one and good, be all one thynge. For there is but one           #
substaunce 
of such thynges, whose effecte is not naturally dyuers. 
   BOE: I saye I cannot denye it. P: Hast thou not knowen 
the~ that euery thing that is, do so longe remayne and dwel 
together, as long as it is all one? And when it cessethe and is 
<P 79> 
not all one that then it dyeth and dyssolueth together? BOE: 
By what meanes? PHILO: As in beastes, when the soule or lyfe 
and the body, do ioyne together in one, and so remayn and dwel, 
it is called a beast. And when y=t= vnitie of them both is      #
dissolued 
by separacion of the one from the other then it appereth that   #
it 
dyeth and is no longer a beste. And lykewyse the body of 
mankynde, when it remayneth in one forme by coniunction or 
ioynynge together of the me~bers or lymmes, the fygure of man 
is sene, but yf the partes of the bodye (beynge distributed and 
seperated one from another) haue distroyed the vnitie, the body 
is not as it was before. And whosoeuer woulde serche other 
thynges, after the same maner it wyl appere, y=t= euery thyng   #
wyl 
remayn in his proper substaunce whyle it is all one. And when 
it is no more all one, it dyeth. B: When I consyder w=c= my     #
self 
many thynges, yet it semeth that it is none other thyng, then 
thou hast saide. PHI: Therfore is there any thyng, that (in 
as moche as it worketh naturally) leueth the appetyte and       #
desyre 
of beynge, or of substaunce, and desyreth to come to death and 
corruption? BO: If I consyder the beastes that haue any nature 
to wyll or not to wyll: I fynde nothing (excepte it be          #
compelled 
by outwarde vyolence) that forsaketh the intente or desyre to 
lyue, and hastyth of fre wyll to dye. For euery beaste          #
labourethe 
to defende and kepe his lyfe and to eschew deathe and           #
distruction. 
But I dought muche what I maye iudge of herbes, and 
trees, and of such things that haue no lyuynge soules, nor      #
felynge 
at al as bestes haue. PHIL: Certes thereof thou mayst no dout, 
when thou lokeste on the hearbes and trees, howe they do growe, 
and flowryshe in places, conuenient for them, wher they cannot 
lightly wyther nor drye so longe as theyr nature may kepe them. 
For some of them do growe and sprynge in the feldes, other in 
the mountaynes, other in the marish, and other do cleue to the 
rockes or stones, some be grosse and plentyful some be lene and 
baren, whych would drye awaye yf a man go aboute to conuey 
the~ into any other places then such they be in al readie. For 
nature geueth to euerye thinge, that thynge that is conuenient, 
and laboureth to lyue and not to die, whiles they may haue 
strengthe to contynue. What shall I saye that they all do take 
there noryshynge from their rotes, as thoughe they had mouthes 
fastened in the earthe, and spredeth their nourishyng by the 
pyth, by the wod and by the barke? And what wylt thou saye: 
<P 80> 
that  the softest thynge suche as the pyth of tre is, in the    #
myddest, 
is defended wyth a certayne hardnes of the wode, and the barke 
is sette vttermoste of all, agaynst the intemperaunce of the    #
ayer, 
as a defender to sustayne the hurt that may fal? And thus thou 
mayst see howe greate is the dyligence of nature, for al        #
thinges 
be renued with multiplication of sede, whiche sedes who doth 
not know but that they be as certayne instrumentes not onelye   #
to 
tary for a tyme, but also to remayne for euer, by generation or 
successyon. And also the thyngs that men do think haue no 
soules, do not euery of them desyre (by lyke reson) to kepe     #
that 
is hys owne? wherfore els doth lightnes bere vpward the flames 
of the fyer, and grauitie or heuynes presse downe the erth but 
that the same places and mouings do best agre so, for euery of 
them. And farthermore euery thyng, kepethe that thynge, that 
is agreyng and according to it, ryght as the thynges that be 
contrarye, corrupteth and dystroyeth it. 
   Nowe truely the thynges that be hard as stones, do cleue so 
fast together, to theyr partes and defend them self, that they  #
maye 
not be easylye deuided or broken a sonder. But veryly, the 
thynges that be soft and lyquyd, as the ayer and the water, do 
lyghtly geue place to any thyng that deuydeth them, but yet 
they do quyckely come together and ioygne vnto the partes, 
from the whyche they be deuyded. But the fyre wyll in noo 
wyse deuyded, but refuseth all dyuisyon. And I do not speke 
nowe of the voluntarye mouynges of the soule, that hath         #
knowledge, 
but of the natural intencion of thynges, euen as it is that 
we do digest meates, that we haue eten without thynkyng thereon 
howe it is digested and as we do take wynde and breathe in      #
slepe, 
not knowyng thereof. For certes, the loue in beastes to tary,   #
or 
lyue, commeth not of the wyll of the soule, but of the          #
begynnynges 
and instyncte workes of nature. For certes the wyll 
often tymes embraseth death, when that causes co~pelleth the 
same, whiche death nature feareth. And contrarywyse, other 
whyles the wyll compelleth vnto the thyng, that nature alwaies 
desireth, that is the worke of generacion, wherby onelye the 
contynuaunce of mortall thynges, endureth. And this loue or 
appetyte that euerye thynge hathe to it selfe, procedeth not,   #
nor 
cometh of the mocion of the soule: but by naturall intencion. 
For the prouydence, or wysdom of God, hath giuen vnto thynges 
that he hath creat this, that is to saye: a great cause to      #
contynewe 
<P 81> 
styll, in as moche as they desyre naturally to lyue as longe 
as they may. Wherfore there is nothynge that thou nedest to 
doubte in any maner, for all thynges that be: desyreth          #
naturally 
stedfast dwellyngs, and to eschewe distruction. BOE: I confesse 
that I do se nowe without any doubte, the thynges that of late, 
semed vncertayne vnto me. PHY: Certes, the thynge that desyreth 
to be and remayne alwaies, desyreth to be one and not 
dyuers. For yf that one, were taken away and dystroyed: certes 
there shulde remayne no beynge to any thynge. 
   BOECIUS: I saye, it is trewe. PHI: Therfore al thinges 
desyreth one. BOE: I haue graunted. 
   PHY: Then I haue shewed that the same one thinge, is the 
thing that is good. BO: Ye truly. 
   PHY: Then all thynges desyreth good, and that thou mayst 
descrybe and decerne thus, the same good is the thinge that is 
desyred of all men. 
   BOE: I saye nothyng maye be thought more true, for either al 
thyngs be brought to nothing and do wander withoute a gouernour 
of gyde destitute and spoyled of one, as of their head and 
beginning, or if there be any thinge wherevnto all thynges, 
draweth, that thynge is the soueraign of al goodes. 
   PHI: O my norished child I am glad of the, for thou hast 
fastened in thy mynde, and thought, the verye marke of perfette 
truthe, but in thys it appereth to the that thou saydist a      #
lytel 
before that thou diddest not knowe, or were ignorant. 
   BOE: What is it? PHIL: Certes thou saidest thou wist not 
what was the ende of all thinges: surely the same ende is the 
thyng that is desired of all men. 
   And forasmuch as we haue gathered that good is the thynge 
that is desired of all, it behoueth that we confesse and agree  #
that 
good is the ende of all thinges. 

<S SAMPLE 4> 
<P 98> 
[}BOECIUS.}] 
   Then I saye, I graunt that thou haste sayde. And I perceyue 
that wycked folke may be sayde ryght well to be chau~ged into 
beastes, by y=e= qualitie of their mind or thought, although    #
they 
kepe the forme of mans body. But I wolde not that it were leful 
for them to do the wickednes or bestly thoughtes, whose 
mynde being cruell and wicked, waxeth wode in destruction of 
good folk. P: Certes it is not lawefull for them, as it shalbe 
shewed in place conueniente. But yet if the selfe same thynge 
(that is thoughte to be lawefull for wycked folke, to do) be    #
taken 
away from them, soo that they myght not hurte good folke 
a grete part of the payne of the wiked folke, shoulde then be 
reuealed and shewed. For it semeth perchaunce incredible 
to some folke, that it behoueth that wycked folke be more 
vnhappye when they haue accomplyshed ther desyres, then 
<P 99> 
if they myght not performe and do the same, that they desyre. 
For if it be a wretched thyng to wyll to do euyll thynges, It   #
is a 
more wretched thyng to haue myght to do it, without whych 
myght theffect and dede of the wicked will, should fayle. 
   And nowe synce that euery of the sayde thynges, that is to   #
say 
wyll, myght, and effect, hath his own mysery, it behoueth that  #
the 
wycked (whome thou seyst to wyl and may do wyckednes) 
be greued w=c= three folde myscheyfe. 
   BOECI: I saye I graunt the same, but I herteley desyre that 
the wycked folke (forsakynge the power to do euyll) maye sone 
lacke the sayde thre folde myschyfe. P: So shall they want 
peraduenture sooner then eyther thou wouldeste be sorye they 
shoulde, or that they themselfe wene, that they shall wante.    #
For 
there is nothyng so durable in so shorte bonds of this lyfe,    #
that 
the myndes (specially immortal) do thynke longe to abyde and 
endure. Of whyche foresayde wycked the gret hope and the gret 
compassing power of wyckednes, is oft distroyed with sodayne 
ende, and er they beware thereof: which foresayde sodden 
destructyon, truelye hathe appoynted them an ende of theyr 
wretchednes. 
   For yf wyckednes makethe wycked folke then must he nedes 
be most wycked that longest is wycked. Whyche foresayde 
wycked folke I would iudge most vnhappye or caytyfe, if that 
extreme death at lest waye dyd not finish their wyckednes. 
   For if I haue truely concluded of the myschyfe of the wycked 
folke, then it apperethe that their wyckednes is withoute ende 
whyche appereth to be eternall or euer contynuyng. BOE: I 
saye this is a merueylous and a hard conclusion, to graunt: but 
I do knowe that the same doo wel agre to the thynges that were 
graunted before. PHIL: Thou iudgest well in this, but he that 
thynkethe it a harde thynge to agre to the conclusion, it       #
behoueth 
hym to shew eyther that some false thynge hath gone before, or 
ells he must shewe that the conferrynge of proposions is not 
effectuall or maketh no force of a necessary conclusion, Or els 
yf he graunt the thinges precedent there is no cause at all,    #
whye 
that he should complayne vpon the argument. For thys thynge 
that I shall say now shall no lesse seme maruaylous, but is soo 
necessarye to be concluded, of the thinges that be concluded    #
before. 
   BOE: I saye, tell me what is it? 
   PHIL: Certes the sayd wycked folke be more happye and 
<P 100> 
blessed that be ponyshed for their desertes, then yf no         #
ponyshment 
of right do chastyce them at all. And I do not intend thys 
now, for that any man myght thynke that the wycked maners of 
men be corrected by ponishment, and that they be brought to the 
ryght waye for feare of ponishment, nor for that their payne    #
and 
ponyshment shoulde be an example to others, to eschewe vyce 
and wyckednes, but I doo iudge that the wycked folke that be 
iustlye ponyshed be more blessed after another maner, the~ for  #
y=e= 
sayd .ii. causes though no maner of correctyon nor respect of 
example be had. 
   BOE: I saye what shalbe that maner besydes the sayd other. 
PHIL: Haue we not graunted that good men be happy and 
blessed, and euyll folke wretched. BOE. I say it is so. PHIL: 
Then yf anye good be added or put to the wretchednes of any 
man, is not he more happy then the man, whose myserye is pure 
withoute myxture of anye good wyth such mysery or wretchednes. 
B. I say it semeth so as thou sayest. PH. What if some other 
euyll (besydes the euyl he hath alredi) were annexed vnto y=t= 
same wretche that wanteth al good, sholde he not be demed 
more wycked then he a great deale whose euyll is tempered and 
mytigated with y=e= distribution or partakyng of suche good. 
BOE: I saye what ells. PHIL. Then certes the wicked folke 
when they be ponished, haue some good annexed, That is to 
saye: theyr payne and ponishement that they suffer, whych is 
good, by reason of iustyce. And there is in the same wicked 
folke (when they be vnponyshed) some other euyll, that is to 
saye: the lacke of ponyshment, whyche lacke of ponyshme~t (for 
desert of wickednes) thou hast graunted to be euyll. BOE: I 
cannot denye it. PHIL: Then such wycked folk be more wycked 
when they be wrongfullye perdoned and delyuered from            #
ponyshment, 
then when they be ponyshed by iust iudgement. And so 
it is manyfest that it is ryght to ponyshe wycked folke, and 
that it is a wicked thing to let them escape vnponyshed. 
   BOE: Who wyll denye the same. 
   PHIL: Certes no man can deni al thing to be good, that is 
iust and ryghte, and on the other syde the thyng that is vniust 
and false, appereth to be euyll. BOE. I say Certes, that these 
thinges be consequences, to the thyngs that be concluded a 
lytell before. But I praye the tell me, dost thou thynke that   #
any 
ponyshment is lefte for the soule after that the body is dede? 
<P 101> 
   PHIL. Ye truelye and that very great ponishment, of the      #
whyche 
soules I thynke that some be tormented with intollerable payne, 
and other be ponyshed by the meke paines of purgatorye, but I 
am not now mynded to speke of suche thynges. But I haue 
spoken hytherto that thou myghtest know, y=t= the myght and 
power of wycked folke (that semed to the most vnworthy) is no 
myght nor power. And that the wycked folke that y=u=            #
complaynest 
vpon that they were vnpunyshed, thou sawest dyd 
neuer wa~t due ponyshment for their wyckednes. And thou 
dyddest praye that the power and myght, in malyce that the 
wicked folke had agaynst the good folke, shortlye to be ended. 
And that thou myghtest perceyue that it is not long, and that 
y=e= myght of the wycked were more vnhappye yf it were          #
continuall 
or longe enduryng, and that it is most vnhappye if it 
were perdurable, and should neuer cese. And furthermore it 
is proued that the wycked folke that be let go without iust 
ponyshment, be more wycked then when they be ponyshed by 
iust iudgemente. And to thys sentence it is a consequence, that 
then at the last the wycked folke be turmented with more 
greuous ponyshments, when they seme to be vnponyshed. 
BOE. When that I do consyder thy resones (I say) I do thinke 
that nothing is sayde moore true. But if I tourne agayne to 
the iudgementes of the comen people, what man is there that 
not onely semed to haue beleuyd these thynges, but at lest way 
to haue hard these thynges? PHI. It is euen so. For the 
commen people cannot lift vp their eyes (that be vsed to 
darkenes) vnto y=e= light of the very truth, but they be like   #
vnto 
birdes whose sight the night doth lyghten and the daye doth 
blynde. For whyles the commen people do not beholde the 
order of thynges, but theyr own affectes and desyres, they do 
iuge that eyther the power of the wycked agaynst good folke, 
or their escapyng from ponyshment is happy and blessed. But 
se what Goddes lawe apopynteth. If thou conforme thy mynde 
to the beste thynges, thou hast nede of no iuge that shal       #
rewarde 
the, for thou hast applyed thy selfe to the most excellent and 
beste thynges. But if thou hast turnyd thy mynde vnto euyll 
thinges, as vnto vyce, seke not anye outewarde ponysher without 
thy selfe, for thou hast cast thy selfe into the worste         #
thynges. 
Like as if thou shouldest loke vpon the foule erth and heuen in 
order (all outwarde thynges leyde apart for the tyme) then it 
<P 102> 
should seme to the by reson of lokyng, that thou were now 
present in the sterres and now in the foule earthe. But the 
commen people beholde not these thynges. What than, shall 
we ioyne vnto these comen people whych (I haue shewed) be 
like vnto beastes? What woldest thou say yf that a man had 
vtterly lost his sight and also hadde forgotten that euer he    #
sawe, 
and yet dyd thynke that he lacked nothing of the perfection of 
a man would not we that saw the same iuge that he were blynde. 
For the common people woulde not beleue the thynge that I 
shall saye, whyche is sustayned by as strong groundes of        #
reason, 
that is, that they that do wronges be more wretched the~ they 
that suffer wrong. BOE. I saye I wold fayne heare these 
reasones. PHIL. Wilt thou denye that all wycked folk be not 
worthy ponishment. BOETI. No. PH. Truely it appereth 
diuers wayes that they that be euyll be wycked. BOE. I saye 
it is euen so. PHI. Then thou doughtest not that they that be 
worthye ponyshmente be wretches. BOE. I saye it behoueth 
so. PHIL. If thou that satiste as a iudge, whether wouldest 
thou thynke hym worthy ponyshement that hathe done wrong, 
or he that hath suffered wro~g? BOE. I saye I woulde no doute 
but I would satisfye and contente hym that hath suffered wronge 
with the ponysment of hym that dyd the wrong. PHI. Then 
it semethe the, that he that doth wrong is more wretche then he 
that taketh wronge. BOE. I saye it foloweth well. PHI.          #
Therefore 
for thys cause and for other lyke causes of the same sorte, 
it appeareth that syns of it self, by nature maketh men         #
wretches. 
And it semeth to euerye man that the wronge that is done, is 
not the wretchednes of hym that taketh the wrong but of hym 
that doeth the wrong. BOE. Certes the orators do contrarye 
for they so labour to moue the iudge, to haue pitie vpon the~, 
that haue done some haynous and greuous offence, where as 
more pytie ought to be shewed vnto them that haue suffred 
wrong and it behoueth that they y=t= haue done such offences 
should be broughte (not with angre, but rather with merciful 
accusers) vnto iudgemente, as sycke folke be broughte vnto the 
physicion, that the iudge myght put awaye the syckenes, of the 
offence, with ponyshment, by whych meanes the dyligence of 
the orators should either holye cesse, or els if they would     #
profyte 
offenders, their diligence shoulde be turned into the habyte of 
accusation, that is to say they shoulde rather accuse           #
offenders, 
<P 103> 
then excuse them or intreate for them. And so the offenders 
(if it were lawefull for them to se by any chyn or clifte the 
vertue and goodnes that they haue loste, and that they shoulde 
expulse the vylenes of theyr synnes, by torme~tes of paynes, to 
optayne some recompence of theyr goodnes) woulde not esteme 
thys for ponyshments, but wold forsake the diligence of suche 
orators and defenders, and commyt them selfe holy to the        #
accusars 
and to the iudges. Whereby it happeth that hatred hath no 
place emongeste wise me~. For who hateth good folk but he be 
a very fole? And he hath no wyt that hateth wicked folke. 
For lyke as syckenes is the dyssease of the bodye, euen so vyce 
and synne is as the syckenes of the mynde, or soule. And when 
we doo iudge that men that be sycke in their bodyes, be not 
worthy to be hated but rather worthy to be pytied, eue~ so much 
the more are they not to be hated, but to be pitied whose 
myndes wickednes greaueth, that is more fierse and cruell, than 
any syckenes of the body. 

<S SAMPLE 5> 
<P 105> 
[}BOECIUS.}] 
   I saye it is euen so. But forasmuch as it is in thy goodnes  #
to 
declare vnto me the hyd, and secrete causes of thynges, and to 
shewe me the darke reasones thereof, I pray the that thou 
wouldest dispute and iudg of the same secrete causes, for this 
wonder or meruayle troubleth me gretely. P. Then philosophye 
smylynge a lytle thereat, sayd: thou requyrest me to 
shewe the, the greteste thinge of all thynges that maye be 
requyred, wherevnto scarse any thinge is left sufficiente to    #
resolue 
the same. For the matter that thou askest is such, that one 
dought beyng determyned, other doughtes innumerable do ryse 
vp thereof, as the heades of the serpent Hidra: And there 
shoulde be no ende of the same doubtes, except a man kept in, 
the same doutes wyth the quicke fyer, or serche of the wytte. 
For in thys matter men be wont to inquyre of the symplicitie or 
puritie, of gods ordinaunce, of the order of destinye, of       #
sodayne 
chaunces of fortune, of the diuine knowledge and                #
predestinacion, 
and of the libertie of fre wyll. All whyche thynges, of howe 
greate wayte and difficultye they be of, for to determyne, thou 
thy selfe doeste verye well perseyue. But forasmuch as it is 
<P 106> 
parte of thy medicine, for the to know these thynges, although  #
I 
haue lytle leysure to do it, yet I wyl endeuor my selfe to      #
declare 
somwhat thereof. But if the swetenes of the versys or metyr of 
musycke, do delyght the any thynge at all, thou must defer and 
put of a lytle that delyght, vntyll I shall forme certayne      #
reasones 
ioyned in order, together for that purpose. BOE: I say do what 
it please the. 

<Q E1 XX PHILO BOETHCO> 
<N BOETH1 COLVILLE> 
<A COLVILLE GEORGE> 
<C E1> 
<O 1500-1570> 
<M X> 
<K X> 
<D ENGLISH> 
<V PROSE> 
<T PHILOSOPHY> 
<G TRANSL> 
<F LATIN>
<W WRITTEN>
<X MALE>
<Y X>
<H X>
<U X>
<E X>
<J X>
<I X>
<Z X>

<P 106>
PHIL. Then spake phylosophy thus as one that 
began to speake by another principle. The generacion of all 
thynges, and the procedynges of natures mutabilitie, and all 
other thynge that moueth now taketh their causes, order, 
and fourme by the stedfastnes of gods wyll and pleasure. And 
the same, that is to saye: goddes wyll and plesure, beyng 
set fast in the towre, or profounde altitude of hys simplicitie #
or 
puritie, hath appoynted many maners or wayes, for thynges to 
be done: whych wayes or maners, when they be conceyued in the 
puritie of the dyuyne intelligence, it is named prouidence or 
ordynaunce. But when the sayde maner or wayes is referred by 
men vnto the thynge that mouethe and disposeth, it is called of 
olde folke, destinye. Whyche thynges, that is to say,           #
prouidence 
and destenie, shal easely appere to be contrary thynges, yf a   #
man 
wyll well consyder in hys mynde the strength of them both. For 
prouydence is the same deuyne or godly reason that is           #
established 
in the soueraine hygh prynce of al thynges, which godly reso~   #
diiposeth 
and apointeth al things. But destinie is a disposicion, 
cleuyng vnto mutable or temporal thinges, by which dispositio~, 
prouide~ce knitteth al thinges in order. For prouide~ce         #
embrasethe 
all thynges together in one, although they be dyuers and        #
infinite. 
But destynye deuydeth all thynges being distributed in mouing, 
places, formes, and tymes, as thus. Thys explycacion or         #
declaracion 
of temporall order, that appertayneth vnto destynye, being 
vnite or knytte together, in the syght of gods thought, is      #
called 
prouydence or ordynaunce. But the vniting of such ordynaunce 
temporall, beynge deuyded and shewed in successyon of tymes, 
may be called destinie. Which destinie and prouydence, 
althoughe they be dyuers, yet the one of them dependeth vpon 
the other. For the order of destinie procedeth and commethe of 
the simplicitie or puritie of gods prouidence. For lyke as a 
workeman conceyuing in his mynde the forme or fashyon of the 
thyng that he is about to make, moueth and goeth aboute 
theffecte of his worke, and ledeth by temporal or bodily        #
ordynaunces 
<P 107> 
the thing that he had conceyued symply and presently 
in his thought, euen so certainelye god by his prouidence or 
ordinau~ce disposeth and ordrythe singulerly and fyrmely al 
thynges that be to be done. But he mynystreth dyuersly and 
temporally the same thynges by destynye that he hath disposed 
or appoynted to be done. Then whether that destynye be          #
exercised 
by certaine godly spyryts, attendyng vpon gods prouidence, 
or by the soule, or by nature, holye seruyng god, or by the     #
celestiall 
mouinge or constellacion of sterres, or by the vertue of 
Aungels, or by the dyuers craftes and soteltyes of deuylles, or #
by 
anye of them, or by them all, the order of destinie is          #
accomplyshed 
and done. Certes it is manyfest that gods prouidence 
is a stedefast and symple or pure forme or maner, of thynges to 
be done. 
   But destinye, is a mutable disposition and temporall order   #
of 
the things that gods simplicitie or puritie hath appointed or 
suffered to be done. Whereby it happeth that all thynges that 
be vnder or subiect to destinie be also subiect and vnder gods 
prouidence and ordynaunce. To the whyche prouidence or          #
ordynaunce 
destinye is subiecte it selfe. But some thynges that be 
subiecte and put vnder godes prouidence, and ordynaunces, doo 
excell and passe the order of destinye. Truely the thinges that 
be fixed and knyt faste nyghe to the godhed, do excell the      #
order 
of mouable destynie, for as circles or wheles that do turne     #
them 
selfe about one self centyr or poynte, the innermost circle     #
next 
vnto the centyr or poynt, cometh and ioyneth next of al vnto 
that which is a lone in the myddell, and is as it were a        #
certayne 
centyr or pointe to the other circles or wheles, that be set    #
and 
placyd aboute, and be turned without the centre or poynt. And 
the vttermost cyrcle that is turned wyth a greater compasse, 
is set fourth with so muche more large spaces as it is distant  #
by 
diuision from the myddle of the centyr, or poynte. But yf there 
be any thinge that knyttethe and vnytethe it selfe, to the same 
myddell centyr, or poynte, it is driuen into simplicitie, that  #
is to 
sai: into a thinge pure and alone of it self, constant and      #
immouable, 
and ceasseth to be seperate or to go at libertye. And 
so by lyke reason the thynge that departeth or goeth awaye 
ferthest from the fyrst thought of God, is wrapped with greater 
bandes of destynye. And soo much more is any thyng fre from 
distinye, as it is nere the same centyr, or poynte of thynges,  #
that 
<P 108> 
is to saye nere vnto god. And yf the thynge doo cleue firmely 
to the hygh thought of GOD without mouing, truely it passeth 
the necessitie and power, of destinie. 
   Therefore like comparison or diuersitie as is betwene        #
reasonynge, 
and vnderstandynge, and betwene the thinge engendred 
and the thynge that is, and betwene tyme and eternitie, and 
betwene the circle, and the middle centyr or poynt, euen so is  #
the 
mouable order of destinye vnto the stedefast simplicitie or     #
puritie, 
or gods prouidence and ordynaunce. The same order of destenye 
moueth heuen and the sterres, and tempereth the elementes       #
together 
emongest them self and chau~geth them by enterchaungeable 
mutacions. And the same order of destinye renueth all 
thynges, growinge, springing and fallyng by lyke progressions   #
of 
frutes and of sedes, that is to saye, of all beastes and        #
growing 
thinges. 
   And thys order of destenye kepethe in and constraineth from 
liberty al mens actes and fortunes by a band of causes that can 
not be vndone or losed, which causes when they do procede from 
the immouable begynnynges of gods prouidence and ordynaunces, 
it behoueth that they be immutable. And so al thinges be well 
gouerned, as longe as the simplicitie or the onelye             #
stedefastenes 
abydyng in the dyuine thought, sheweth fourth the immouable 
order of causes. And truly this order of the deuine prouidence, 
kepeth in, by his stedefastnes, thynges mutable of them selfe,  #
and 
that otherwyse wold passe awaye casually and rasshely, if that 
restrayned not: wherby it happeth that although al thyngs seme 
confuse, darke, and troublesome to you that be not able to      #
consyder 
thys order of thinges: the proper maner of gods prouidence 
directynge it selfe to good, disposeth and ordereth all thyngs. #
For 
there is nothyng done for the entente or euil, not so muche of  #
the 
same wicked folke. Which wicked folke (as it is shewed          #
aboundauntlye 
before) do seke for good, but that wycked errour do 
peruert, and turne them from it, and not the order that cometh  #
from 
the bosome of the high soueraign good, that is god, do turne    #
anye 
man from his begynnynge, that is to saye from god. Certes what 
confusion may be more wycked, the~ that other whiles aduersitie #
and 
other whiles prosperite do happen vnto good folke, and also to 
wycked folke sometyme what they desyre, and sometyme the 
thynges that they hate and abhorre. Do men now liue in such     #
perfection 
of mynde that suche folk as they do iudge to be good or euil 
<P 109> 
must nedes be suche as they doo iudge them? But mens            #
iudgementes 
in this thynge do varye and not accorde. For the same 
folke that some me~ do esteme worthy reward, other agayne do 
deme to be worthy of ponyshmente. But let vs graunt that some 
ma~ may discerne and knowe the good or the euyl folke, maye he 
than know and se the inward condicion of mans thoughte as it    #
hath 
bene wont to be sayd of the bodyes? That is to saye: maye a 
man knowe a mans thought, as men may knowe the complexion 
or outward condicio~s of the bodye? Certes is not this lyke a 
myracle vnto a man that knowethe not, whye that swete thynges 
agree well to hole folke, and bytter thinges to sycke folk?     #
Also
why some sycke folk be heled with gentle medicines, and other
sick folke with sharp medicines. But the phisicion that knoweth
bothe the maner and temperaunce of helthe and syckenes, 
meruayleth not therat. But what other thynge semethe to be 
the helth of mens mindes and thoughts, but onely vertue? and 
what other thynge semeth y=e= sicknes of mens myndes and 
thoughtes, then vyce and syns. Who els is the keper of good 
folk, and expulser or suppresser of wickyd folke, but only god 
the ruler and the healer of mennes soules, whych god, when he 
beholdeth and loketh downe from the high towre of his           #
prouidence, 
he knowethe what is conueniente and meete for euerye man, and 
geueth to euerye manne the thing that he knoweth is mete for 
him. Nowe hereof commethe thys notable myracle of the order 
of destinie, when that god (that knoweth all thynges) doeth the 
thynge that the ignoraunte people do wonder at. For to speake 
a fewe thynges of the profounde depenes of the godhed that 
mans resonne, may attayne vnto, the same man that thou demyst 
iust and kepyng equitye, and ryght, semeth contrarye to Gods 
prouidence that knoweth all thynges. And certes my familier 
felowe Lucan declareth, that the cause victorius, plesyth the   #
gods, 
and the cause that is ouercome pleaseth Plato. Therefore what 
soeuer thinge thou seist donne here in this world contrary to   #
the 
knowledge and expectacion of the ignoraunt folk, it is the      #
ryght 
order of thynges, but to thy iudgement, it is a peruers         #
confusion 
of thynges. But admyt that some man is so well learned or 
instructed, y=t= both gods iugement, and ma~s iugement do agre  #
in 
him together as one, but yet y=t= he is weke minded or harted,  #
that 
yf any aduersitie by chaunce happen vnto hym he wilbe clene 
turnyd from his vertue or innocensye, wherby he may not kepe 
<P 110> 
his fortune, then the wise dispensacion or prouidence of God 
spareth hym, whome aduersitie and trybulacion myghte empayre 
and make worse. And god wyll not suffer him to laboure that 
is not mete or able to laboure. Another man is absolute perfit 
in al vertues, holy and nere vnto god, so that gods prouidence 
woulde deme it wronge y=t= he shulde be touched with any        #
aduersitie, 
in so much that he will not suffer him to be vexed w=c= any 
infyrmitie or sycknes of the body. For as a certayne            #
phylosopher 
(more excellente by me) hath sayde: certes a true preistly man 
laboreth not, for vertues haue preserued the body of an holy    #
ma~ 
from aduersitie. And often tymes it happith that the cheyf 
thynges y=t= be to be done, be geuen vnto good folke, that the 
wyckednes aboundyng in euyl folke, shold be oppressid. And 
god dystributeth and geueth to some folke nowe good, nowe euyll 
thinges, accordyng to the qualitie of theyr mind. And some good 
folke he greueth with aduersitie, leste that they should waxe 
proude, of long prosperitie. And other folke he sufferethe to   #
be 
vexed with harde thynges, that thereby they may confyrme the 
vertues of their mynde, by the vse and exercyse of pacience. 
Some folke doo feare more then they ought to feare, y=e= thing  #
that 
they maye well suffer. And other dispisethe more then they 
oughte, the thyng that they cannot suffer, and god ledethe them 
into experience of them selfe, that is to saye: makethe them to 
knowe themselfe by aduersities. And manye haue optayned a 
worshypfull fame of thys worlde by the meanes of a glorious 
deth. And some that coulde not be ouercome by ponishment, 
haue shewed example vnto other, that vertue cannot be ouercome 
by aduersitie. And there [^EDITION: therc^] is no dout but      #
that all these thynges 
be done ryghtfully, and ordynately, for the goodnes of them,    #
for 
whome they seme to happen. For certes where as sometyme 
aduersities, and otherwhiles thinges desired, doo happen vnto 
wycked folke, noo man meruayleth therat, but iudgeth that it 
comethe of the causes thereof, that is to saye, for theyr 
wyckednes. Lykewyse of the ponyshmentes that happen vnto 
wycked folke no man meruaylethe, for all men doo thynke that 
they haue well deserued the same, and that theyr ponyshmentes 
doth aswell feare other from wyckednes, as causeth them to 
amend that be ponyshed. And the prosperitie that happen 
vnto wycked folke in worldly goodes sheweth a great argument 
and proufe vnto good folke, what they ought to iudge of such 
<P 111> 
prosperitie whych men doo se often tyme serue y wycked folke. 
In whych thing I thynke also the same to be ordeyned by god, 
that some mans nature is perchaunce so ouerturnyng and          #
importunate 
vnto wyckednes, that the pouertie of his houshold may 
rather prouoke hym to stele, whose pouertie that goodnes of god 
cureth and releueth, wyth the medycyne or remedy of mony, and 
ryches. And another man perceyuing his owne conscience 
corrupt with wickednes, and consyderynge wyth hym selfe his 
prosperitie and welth, ferethe leste perchaunce the losse of    #
the 
same prosperitie whiche is pleasaunt vnto hym, should turne 
hym to sorowe and heuines, and therfore he wyl chaunge his 
euyll maners and conditions, and forsake his wyckednes, for     #
fear 
to lose hys prosperitie and riches. Prosperitie and ryches      #
vnworthelye 
gotten hathe ouer throwen other into iust destruction 
accordelye. Some be permytted to haue power to ponysh, for 
that it shuld be an occasion of continuaunce of exercyse in     #
vertue 
to good folke, and a ponyshment to the wycked folke. For as 
there is no concorde or argumente betwene good folke and 
wycked folke, euen so the wycked folke cannot agre emongest 
them selfe. And why not? 
   For all wycked folke do vary of them selfe by theyr          #
wyckednes, 
that rendith their conscience, and doo often tymes suche        #
thynges, 
that when they haue done, they themself do iudge that they 
oughte not to haue bene done. For whyche cause that hye 
prouydence of god, hath often shewed a gret myracle so that 
wycked folke, hath made wycked folke good folke. For when 
that some wycked folke do se that they suffer wronges of the 
wicked, they being moued with enuy and hatred of theyr 
wronges and hurtes, haue returnyd vnto the fruyte of vertue, 
that is to sai vnto goodnes, when they do studye to be vnlyke 
vnto the wicked whom they haue hated. Truely it is onely the 
power of god (to whome also euyll thyngs be good) when he in 
vsynge of those euyles, choseth oute theffecte of some goodnes, 
that is to say, when god turneth euyll to good. For order 
bindeth together all thynges, soo that what thyng departeth     #
from 
the reson and order appointed to the wycked, the same thing 
must nedes fall into some other order, that is to saye: of the 
good, soo that nothinge be lefte to folyshnes, or oute of order #
in 
the kyngdome of gods prouidence or ordynaunce. The strong 
god hath done al thyngs in the world, when he sawe and behelde 
<P 112> 
before all worldes. And certes it is not lawfull for men eyther 
to comprehende with their wit, or to declare with ther spech    #
all 
the causes of gods workes: It is sufficient only to behold thys 
that the same God, the maker of all natures, ordaynyng all 
things, disposeth them to good. And whyles that he hastethe 
to retayne and kepe the thynges that he hath made into his 
similytude and lykenes, that is to saye: in goodnes, he         #
excludeth 
all wyckednes from the bondes of hys commenaltye of 
thys world, by order of necessite of destenie: whereby it       #
happeth, 
that the euyl that men do thynke to abound in the world if 
thou considerest Gods prouidence, that disposeth all thynges, 
thou shalte perceyue that there is no euyll at all any where.   #
But 
I se well nowe, that thou being of late sore burdned, w=c= the  #
wayte 
of thys difficulte question, and also weryed with the           #
prolixitie or 
length of my reason, lokest for som swetenes of verses or       #
metyr. 
Therfore take thys drafte, whereby when thou arte refreshed, 
and stronger, thou mayst ascende into hier questions. 



