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<T PHILOSOPHY> 
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[^PRESTON, RICHARD LORD VISCOUNT.
TEXT: BOETHIUS.
ANICIUS MANLIUS SEVERINUS BOETIUS,
OF THE CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY.
IN FIVE BOOKS. 
MADE ENGLISH AND ILLUSTRATED WITH NOTES,
BY THE RIGHT HONOURABLE 
RICHARD LORD VISCOUNT PRESTON. 
LONDON, PRINTED BY J. D. FOR AWNSHAM 
AND JOHN CHURCHILL, AT THE BLACK SWAN 
IN PATER-NOSTER ROW; AND FRANCIS HILDYARD 
BOOKSELLER IN YORK, 1695.  
PP. 124.1  - 129.5       (SAMPLE 1)
PP. 133.15 - 140.4       (SAMPLE 2)
PP. 141.17 - 147.15      (SAMPLE 3)
PP. 177.7  - 185.19      (SAMPLE 4)
PP. 190.1  - 201.15      (SAMPLE 5)^]


<S SAMPLE 1>
<P 124>

[}PROSA IX.}]
   Let it suffice that I have hitherto described
the Form of counterfeit Happiness: So
that if thou considerest well, my Method will
lead me to give to thee a perfect Draught of the
true. (^Boet.^) I now see plainly that Men cannot
arrive at a full Satisfaction by Riches, nor at
Power by enjoying Principalities or Kingdoms,
nor at Esteem and Reverence by the Accession
of Dignities, nor at Nobility by Glory, nor at
true Joy by carnal Pleasures. (^Ph.^) Thou sayest
well, but knowest thou the Causes of all these?
(^Bo.^) I perceive them by the small Light I can afford
to my self, but I should be very glad to
know them more fully from thee. (^Ph.^) The
Reason is most obvious, for humane Error doth
separate and divide that which is simple, and
by Nature indivisible, and doth transport it
from that which is true and perfect to their
contrary. Let me ask thee, can that, dost thou
think, which needeth nothing want Power?
(^Bo.^) No, I am not of that Opinion. (^Ph.^) Thou
thinkest right indeed; for if there be any thing
which, upon any occasion of Performance, doth
shew a Weakness or want of Power, it must,
as to that, necessarily need foreign Aid. (^Bo.^) So
it is. (^Ph.^) And therefore Sufficiency and Power
are of one Nature. (^Bo.^) So it truly seems.
<P 125>
(^Ph.^) And thinkest thou that things of this kind
are to be undervalued and contemn'd, or rather
to be reverenced of all? (^Bo.^) They are doubtless
worthy of Reverence. (^Ph.^) Let us then
add to Sufficiency and Power Reverence, and
so then judg of these three as one. (^Bo.^) Let us
join them then, because the Truth must be confess'd.
(^Ph.^) What dost thou think then? Is 
that an obscure and ignoble thing which is
grac'd with these three great Attributes of Self-sufficiency,
Power and Reverence, or otherways
is it noble and worthy of Fame? Consider
then, as we have granted before, that he
who wants Gifts of Fortune; who is most powerful,
and most worthy of Renown, if he, I
say, want Fame, which he cannot give to himself,
he may on that hand, in some measure,
seem more weak and abject. (^Bo.^) I cannot indeed
deny it, but aver as it is, that Renown attends
the aforesaid things. (^Ph.^) Then by consequence
Renown differs nothing from the three
above-mention'd Attributes. (^Bo.^) I grant it.
(^Ph.^) Must not then that thing which wants not
the Help of another, which can by its own
Strength perform every thing which is famous
and reverend, of necessity be joyful also, and
always pleasant? (^Bo.^) I cannot indeed well comprehend
how any Grief or Trouble can possess
the Breast of one in those Circumstances.
(^Ph.^) Then we may well grant that such are always
<P 126>
in a State of Joy, if what I have said be
true. And then may we also grant Self-sufficiency,
Power, Nobility, Reverence and Pleasure,
do differ only in Name, but not in Essence
or Substance. (^Bo.^) It is necessarily so. (^Ph.^) Then
therefore that which is one simple Nature is
torn violently asunder by the Pravity of Men;
and whilst they endeavour for a part of a thing
which wants Parts, they neither get that Part,
nor the entire thing which they so much desire.
(^Bo.^) How can that be? (^Ph.^) Why thus; He
who in amassing Riches proposeth only to himself
the end of avoiding Poverty, is no way solicitous
to obtain Power; he had rather be unknown
and obscure, and chuseth rather to
withdraw from himself many natural Pleasures,
than run the hazard of losing that Money
which he hath gathered. But surely such an
one by this means doth not purchase Self-sufficiency,
when he loseth Power, when he is
prick'd with Trouble, when his sordid Ways
make him be looked upon as an Out-cast, when
he is hidden in Obscurity. If we come to the
Person who only aims at Power, he squanders
away Riches, he despiseth Pleasures, he slights
Honour which is not accompanied with Power,
and contemns Glory. So then thou seest how
many things that Man wanteth. For often he 
must stand in need of Necessaries, he must be
subject to great Anxieties; and when he cannot
<P 127>
drive away these things, he shews clearly
his want of that which he did most affect, I
mean Power. One may also reason thus of
Honours, of Glory, and of Pleasures. For
whilst every one of these is the same with the
rest, whoever endeavours to obtain any of
these without the other, loseth that which
he desireth. (^Bo.^) What then if a Man should
desire to gain all these things together? (^Ph.^) I
would then say, that he hath a mind to arrive
at the sovereign Good; but can it be thought
that it shall ever be found in these Acquisitions,
which I have shewed already, not to be able to
perform any thing they promise? (^Bo.^) No surely.
(^Ph.^) In these things therefore which are
believed able to satisfy our Desires, we must
by no means seek for Happiness. (^Bo.^) I confess
it, and nothing can be said more truly than this.
(^Ph.^) Thou hast now then the Form and Causes
of that adulterate sophisticate Felicity: now
turn again the Eyes of thy Consideration upon
the contrary Prospect, and thou shalt soon comprehend
that true and genuine Happiness which
I so long have promised thee. (^Bo.^) That a blind
Man may see, and who runs may read it, for
thou shewedst it to me before, when thou didst
endeavour to open to me the Causes of its Counterfeit:
for if I be not mistaken, that is the true
consummate Felicity which makes a Man self-sufficient,
powerful, reverenced, noble and pleasant.
And that thou mayst know that thy Sayings
<P 128>
have sunk deep into my Understanding, I
say, I know that that which one of these (for
they are all one) can truly perform is, without
doubt, the chief Good and true Happiness.
(^Ph.^) O my Pupil, thou art most happy in this
Opinion, provided thou wilt add this to it,
which I shall offer to thee. (^Bo.^) What is that?
(^Ph.^) Thinkest thou that any thing on this side
Heaven can confer that Good of which thou
speakest. (^Bo.^) I think not indeed; and thou
hast already shewed me, that nothing can be desired
beyond such a State of Perfection. (^Ph.^) These
things then above-mentioned either confer the
Likeness of the true Good, or else they seem to
give me some imperfect Good; but the true and
perfect one this can by no means afford. (^Bo.^) I agree
with you. (^Ph.^) Seeing then thou knowest
already which is the true Happiness, and which
the false one, it remains thou shouldst be informed
from what Fountain to derive that true one.
(^Bo.^) That I indeed expect with much Impatience.
(^Ph.^) But as (^Plato^) says in his (^Timaeus^) , that
<P 129>
even in the least things the Divine Assistance
ought to be implored, what dost thou think
is fit to be done, that we may deserve to
find the true Source and Seat of the sovereign
Good?

<S SAMPLE 2>
<P 133>
[}PROSA X.}]
   Now that thou hast had the Character of
the true, and also of the false Felicity
truly represented to thee, I think it time to shew
thee in what the Perfection of Happiness is
placed. And whilst we are in quest of this, I
think our best Method will be to examine,
whether there can in Nature bu such a Good as
that which thou hast before defin'd, lest the
Vanity of Imagination, and Heat of Thought,
should deceive us, and carry us beyond the
Truth of the Matter subjected to our Inquiry.
But that such a thing doth exist, and that it is as
<P 134>
it were the Fountain of all Good, cannot be denied;
for every thing which is said to be imperfect
is proved to be so by the Diminution of
that which is perfect. Hence it is that if any
thing in any kind be said to be imperfect, it is
presently understood that in it there is also something
perfect. For if Perfection be taken away,
no Man can tell in what that which is
said to be imperfect can exist. For Nature doth
not derive her Origine from things diminished
and inconsummate, but proceeding from an
intire and absolute Substance, she extends her
self in the remotest and most fruitless Beings.
So that if, as before I have demonstrated, there
be a certain imperfect Felicity, a fading Good,
there must also be, without doubt, a solid and
perfect one. It is most logically and truly concluded
(said I). But where this doth reside
(continued she) thus consider; That God the
Governour of all things is good, is proved by
the universal Opinion of all Men. For since
nothing can be found out which is better than
God, who will deny Him to be good, than
whom nothing can be better? Reason then doth
so clearly demonstrate that God is good; that
at the same time it evinceth the sovereign Good
to be in him. For if it were not so, he could
not be the Ruler of all things; for there would
be some Being excelling him, which would possess
the perfect Good, and in this World seem 
<P 135>
to excel him, and be antienter than he. We
have already shewn that all perfect things excel
those which are less perfect. Wherefore that
we may not infinitely produce our Reasons, it
must be confess'd that the great God is full of
the greatest and most perfect Goodness. But
we have already shewn that perfect Goodness
is true Happiness. Therefore it necessarily follows
that true and consummate Happiness resides
only in the great and most perfect God.
This (returned I) I apprehend aright, nor can
I by any means say against it. Then I pray
thee (saith she) see how well and irrefragably
thou canst prove what I have said, to wit, that
god is wholly replenished with the sovereign
Good. How shall I do that? (replied I). Dost
thou presume (said he) that the Father of all
things hath received this sovereign Good, with
which he is proved to abound, from any thing
without himself, or that he hath it so naturally,
that thou shouldst imagine that He possessing it,
and Happiness possessed, are of different Substances?
If thou dost think that he received it
from any foreign Hand, thou must imagine the
Giver to be more excellent than the Receiver.
But that God is the most excellent of all Beings,
most worthily we confess, if we own then that
the sovereign Good is in him by Nature; and
yet we may conceive that it is not the same that
he is, since we speak of God, who is the Prince
<P 136>
of Nature, let him who can find out who it
was that joined these so differing things. Lastly,
whatever doth essentially differ from any
thing, it cannot be said to be that from which
it is understood to differ. Therefore that which
is in its Nature differing from the chief Good,
cannot be said to be the Good it self: which to
think of God would be most impious and profane,
since nothing can excel him in Goodness
and Worth. Nothing that ever was can in its
Nature be better than that from which it draweth
its Beginnings. Wherefore that which is
the Principle of all things must, as to its Substance,
with the truest reason be concluded to
be the chief of Goods. (^Boet.^) Most right
(^Phil.^) But Happiness was before granted to be
the chief of Goods. (^Bo.^) So it was. (^Ph.^) Therefore
it must necessarily be confess'd that God is
the very Happiness. (^Bo.^) I cannot oppose the
Reasons you have given, and I confess you have
drawn a very right Conclusion from your Premises.
(^Ph.^) Look then a little further, and see
if this Truth can be proved more firmly thus,
to wit, that there cannot be two sovereign
Goods which differ in themselves: For it is
clear, that of the Goods which differ, one cannot
be what the other is; wherefore neither
can be perfect when one wants the other. But
it is evident, that that which is not perfect cannot
be sovereign; therefore those which are the
<P 137>
chief Goods can by no means be diverse in their
Natures. But I have rightly concluded that
Good and Happiness are the chief Good: wherefore
the highest Divinity must certainly be the
highest Happiness. (^Bo.^) Nothing can be truer
than this; nothing by the Course of Reasoning
more firm; nor can any Conclusion be made
more becoming of the Divine Majesty. (^Ph.^) Upon
the whole Matter then, as Geometricians,
after they have demostrated their Propositions,
are wont to infer and draw their [^GREEK OMITTED^] or
Consequences, in the same manner shall I deduce
to thee something like a Corollary, thus:
Because by the attaining of Beatitude Men are
happy, and Beatitude is Divinity it self, by the
attaining of Divinity it is manifest that Men are
made happy. But as from Mens being endowed
with the Vertue of Justice, they are denominated
Just; and from that of Prudence they
are pronounced Wise, so should they who are
possessed of Divinity by parity of reason be
esteemed Gods. Every happy Man then is a
God; but by Nature there is only One, yet by
suffering others to participate of the Divine Essence
nothing hinders but there may be Many.
(^Bo^) This truly is a very fair and most pretious,
call it Deduction or Corollary, which you
please. (^Ph.^) But there can be nothing nobler
than that which Reason commands us to subjoin
to this. (^Bo.^) What is that? (^Ph.^) It is this,
<P 138>
Since Happiness seems to comprehend in it many 
things, to consider whether they all, by the
Variety of Parts conjoined, do constitute the
Body of Happiness; or whether there may be
any one amongst them which may compleat the
Substance of it, and to which all the rest may
be referr'd. (^Bo.^) I could wish that thou wouldst
open these things to me by recounting them.
(^Ph.^) Do not we account Happiness a Good?
(^Bo.^) Yes certainly, and the chiefest. (^Ph.^) Add
then that Good to all the aforesaid things, for
that Happiness which is Self-sufficiency is also
the Height of Power, of Reverence, of Nobility,
of Pleasure. What sayst thou then, are
all these things, as Self-sufficiency, Power, and
the rest, Members and constituting Parts of
Happiness; or are they, as all other things are,
to be referr'd to the Sovereign Good as their
Source and Principle? (^Bo.^) I well understand
what thou dost aim to search for, but I desire
to hear what thou dost propose. (^Ph.^) Observe
then the thing thus sifted and distinguished upon.
If all these things were Members of Happiness,
they would differ amongst themselves;
for it is of the Nature of differing Parts to compose
one Body: But it is already demonstrated
that all things are the same, therefore they are
not Parts; for if so, even out of one of them
Happiness might be composed, which is absurd.
(^Bo.^) This I doubt not; but I desire to
<P 139>
hear that which remains. (^Ph.^) It is clear that
all other things are brought to be tried by Good
as the Rule and Square: For Self-sufficiency is
therefore desired, because it is thought to be
Good: So also it may be said of Power, Esteem,
Nobility, Pleasure. Good then, is the Cause
why all things are desired; for that which neither
in Reality nor Shew doth retain any thing
of Good, is by no means to be desired: On the
contrary, whatever by Nature is not good, if
yet it seems to be so, is desired as if it really
were so. Hence it is that Goodness, justly
looked upon, is the Cause, the Sum, the Hinge
from which all our Desires arise, in which they
centre, and upon which they turn. That which
is the Cause of our desiring any thing, seems it
self most to be desired. For if any Man desires
to ride abroad because of his Health, he
doth not so much desire the Motion of Riding
as the Effect of his Health. Since therefore all
things are sought after for the sake of Good,
they cannot be more desirable than Good it self.
But we have before shewed that it is Happiness
for which all these abovesaid things are desired,
where it is clear that only Happiness is sought
for. He then who considers this cannot deny
that Good and Happiness are of one and the
same Substance. (^Bo.^) I see no Cause why any
Man should dissent from your Opinion. (^Ph.^) And
we have shewed that God and Happiness are
<P 140>
inseparably joined in Essence. (^Bo.^) You have
so done. (^Ph.^) We may then securely conclude
that the Nature and Substance of God resides
in Good, and can be sought for no where else.

<S SAMPLE 3>
<P 141>
[}PROSA XI.}]
   (^Boet.^) I Assent, and am overcome by the
Strenght of thy Reasons. (^Phil.^) At
how great a rate wouldst thou value this Good,
if thou didst rightly know it? (^Bo.^) At an infinite
rate; if at the same time I might attain to
the Knowledg of God, who is the true Good.
(^Ph.^) That thou shalt do so, I shall make clear
to thee by undeniable Reasons, if thou wilt but
grant me those things which a little before I
have laid down as Conclusions. (^Bo.^) I grant
<P 142>
them all. (^Ph.^) Have not I made it clear that
those things which are desired by most are not
therefore true and perfect Goods, because they
differ amongst themselves; and that when one
is absent, the other cannot confer absolute Happiness?
And then that they are the perfect Good
when they are molded up into one Form, that
is to say, when Self-sufficiency, Power, Veneration,
Renown and Pleasure collectively meet.
For if they be not one and the same thing, they
have nothing to recommend them, or to make
them to be numbred amongst desirable things?
(^Bo.^) I grant thou hast demonstrated these things,
nor can they by any means be doubted of.
(^Ph.^) These things then when they are distinct
not being Goods, and when they meet immediately
being made Goods, do not they owe
their Beings of Good to Unity? (^Bo.^) So it seems
to me. (^Ph.^) But wilt thou yield that every
thing which is good, is so by the Participation
of the sovereign Good, or not? (^Bo.^) It is certainly
so. (^Ph.^) Thou must then by the same
Reason acknowledg Unity and Good to be the
same thing: for the Substance of those things
must be the same, whose Effects do not naturally
differ. (^Bo.^) I cannot deny it. (^Ph.^) Knowest
thou then that every Being doth so long endure
and subsist as it is entire and knit together
by Unity; but that as soon as it looses that Bond
it is dissolv'd, and Privation follows? (^Bo.^) How
<P 143>
dost thou make out that? (^Ph.^) Thus; As in
Animals or sensitive Creatures it is plain, the
Soul and Body being united and continuing together,
the Being then is called Animal, a living
Creature: But so soon as this Unity is dissolved
by the Separation of these, it immediately perisheth,
ceasing to be what it was before. The
Body also it self, which whilst it remains in one
Form by the Conjunction of its Members, retains
the Form and Resemblance of a Man;
but if by dissevering and segregating the Parts
that Oneness is distracted, it is no more what
before it was. In the same manner, if we run
through all other Beings, it will surely appear,
that every thing, as long as it preserveth Unity
doth subsist; and if that dies, the other must also
die with it. (^Bo.^) Though I consider never so
long, yet I can see no other thing. (^Ph.^) Is there
then any thing, which inasmuch as it lives naturally,
doth forgo its Desire of Subsisting, and
affect Corruption and Annihilation? (^Bo.^) If I
consider those living Creatures which have any
Power of willing or refusing, I do not in Nature
find any thing, which without some foreign
Impulse, or the Concurrence of outward
Accidents, doth cast away its Intention and Desire
of subsisting, and willingly hasten to Destruction;
for every Animal is endowed with
that great Principle of Self-preservation, and
pursues it, and doth eschew Mischief and
<P 144>
Death. But if I, casting an Eye upon the Vegetative 
World, consider Herbs and Trees, and
other inanimate things, I confess I am under a
doubt, and know not well what to think of
them. (^Ph.^) But even of these there is no Cause
that thou shouldst doubt; for behold Herbs and
Trees first choose a convenient Place to grow
in, where their Nature, as much as it can, hinders
them from withering and perishing soon;
for some spring in the Fields, others upon
Mountains, others rise in Lakes and Marshes, others
put forth amongst the Stones; some choose
the most barren Sands for the Place of their
Birth; and all these, if any Hand should endeavour
to transplant them to any other place,
would forthwith wither. But Nature gives to
every thing that which is agreeable to, and
convenient for them, and endeavours that they
should not perish before their time. Dost thou
not know that all Herbs and Trees, as if their
Mouths were fastned downward in the Earth,
do draw up their Nourishment by the Root,
and diffuse their Strength and Bark as through
their Marrow? And also that the softest and
most tender Matter, as the Pith or Marrow is,
is always laid up in the most inward Cabinet,
and covered by a strong Coat of Wood; and
the uppermost Garment of Bark is opposed to
the Storms and Weather, as being fitted best to
endure them? and canst thou not here behold
<P 145>
and admire the Diligence and Care of Nature,
which propagates all things by a Multiplicity of
Seeds, which all Men know are as a Foundation
for a Building not to remain for a time, but as
if it were for ever? And even those things
which are thought to be inanimate, do not they
by the same Reason desire that which properly
belongs to them, and to preserve their Beings?
For why should Levity carry the Flames upward,
and Gravity make the Earth tend downwards
towards its Centre, but that these Places
and Motions agree with their several Bodies?
Furthermore, whatsoever is agreeable to the
Nature of any thing, that preserves that thing,
as that which hath an Abhorrency from it corrupts
and destroys it. Now that which is hard, as
a Stone, doth most tenaciously adhere together in
all its Parts, and resists an easy Dissolution; but
what things are liquid or flowing, as Air and
Water, yield easily to those who would separate
them, but soon again return and slide back to
those things from which they were divided: but
Fire doth utterly refuse any such Division. And
now I do not treat of the voluntary Motions of
a knowing and discerning Soul, but of natural
Intention and Instinct. Thus we swallow our
Meat without thinking of it, and draw our
Breath in our Sleep without perceiving it: For
the Love of Life is not derived to living Creatures
from the Inclinations and Bent of their
<P 146>
Souls, but only from the Principles of Nature;
for the Will, often pushed on by urgent Causes,
affects and imbraces that Death which Nature
fears and abhors: And on the contrary, we see
that the Works of Generation, by which alone
the Race of Men is propagated, and which
Nature always affects, often restrained by the
Will. Therefore this Love which every thing
beareth to it self, doth not proceed from the
Motions of the Soul, but from the Intentions
of Nature: For Providence hath given to all
things created by it, this greatest Cause and
Principle of Duration, to wit, a Desire of existing
as long as it can. Therefore doubt not
but every Being hath a natural Appetite towards
Living, and an Abhorrence of Dissolution.
(^Bo.^) I now confess that plainly, and without
doubting, I see those things which before seemed
uncertain to me. (^Ph.^) I go on then; Whatever
doth desire to subsist and endure, doth also
desire Unity; for if this be taken away its Essence
is dissolved. (^Bo.^) That is most true.
(^Ph.^) Then all things desire one thing. (^Bo.^) I
assent. (^Ph.^) But I have before demonstrated
that that one thing must be that which is good.
(^Bo.^) You have so, (^Ph.^) All things therefore desire
Good; which Good you may describe to be
that which is desired of all. (^Bo.^) Nothing is
truer: For either all things must be reduced to
nothing, and so being destitute of an Head
<P 147>
float and rove about without Governance and
Order; or if there be any thing to which all
things do tend, that must be the chief of all
Goods. (^Ph.^) I rejoice but too much, O my
Pupil; for thou hast fixed in thy Mind the very
middle and manifest Note of Truth: but this
thing hath been discovered to thee, because a
little before thou saidst thou wert ignorant of
it. (^Bo.^) What is that? (^Ph.^) Thou didst not
know what was the End of all things: And
this is it which every one desires. And because
we have from our former Arguments gathered,
that Good is that which is the Subject of all
Mens Desires, we must necessarily confess that
Good is the End of all things.

<S SAMPLE 4>
<P 177>
[}PROSA IV.}]
   (^Boet.^) I Confess that vitious Men are not unjustly
called Beasts, for although they
retain the Form and Shapes of an humane Body,
yet the Qualities of their Souls shew them
to be changed into them. But I would not
have it in the Power of those vitious Persons,
who even rage with a Desire of destroying
just Men, to do so. (^Ph.^) Nor is it in their
Power, as shall be shewed in a convenient
Place; but if this Power which People think ill
Men to have, were taken away from them,
they would be eased of the greatest part of
their Punishment: For it would almost seem
incredible to any one, and it is yet true, that
evil Men must necessarily be more unhappy
when they have compassed what they desire,
than when they cannot do so: For if it be a
miserable thing but to have a Will to do an ill
thing, it must be much worse to have a Power
to do it; without which the wretched Desire
<P 178>
would languish without effect. Since then
each of these things hath its unhappiness, it
must of necessity be, that a threefold Misfortune
must urge those Men who both will, can,
and do commit Wickedness. (^Bo.^) I grant it,
but I should much desire that evil Men were
soon depriv'd of this Misfortune, I mean of the
Power of doing ill. (^Ph.^) They shall be dispoil'd
of it sooner than perhaps thou wouldst
have them, or than they think they shall: For
there is nothing of so late a Beginning within
the narrow Bounds of this Life, that can continue
long, or expect Immutability; and the
great Hopes and subtle Machinations of ill Men
are by a sudden and unforeseen End ruinated
and destroyed; which thing puts an End to
their Wickedness. For if Vice subjects Men
to Misery, the longer they are vitious, the
longer they must be miserable; whom I should
judg the most unhappy of all Beings, if their
Unhappiness were not ended at least by Death:
For if I have made a true Conclusion concerning
the Misfortune which attends Impiety, that
Misery must be without end which certainly is
Eternal. (^Bo.^) This is a most wonderful Consequence,
and difficult to be granted; yet I
must acknowledg it doth but too much agree
with those things which we have concluded
before. (^Ph.^) Thou dost rightly judg: but he
who thinks it hard to assent to a Conclusion, it
<P 179>
is fit he should demonstrate that the Premises
are untrue, or that from the Collation of the
Propositions a necessary Conclusion is not to be
drawn; otherwise if the Premises be granted,
he hath no Reason to blame the Inference from 
them: for this which I am now about to say
will not seem less wonderful, but it necessarily
follows from what hath been before proposed.
(^Bo.^) What is that? (^Ph.^) That wicked Men are
more happy when they are punished according
to their Demerits, than if they should escape
the Hand of Justice. Nor do I now offer to
thee that which every Man can think, that the
Manners of ill Men are corrected by Vengeance,
and that by fear of Torment they are reduced
to the right way, and that they are Examples
to other Men to fly from things which
are blame worthy: but I, after another manner,
believe these Wretches if they escape Punishment
to be unhappy, although no Regard be
had to the Correction and Example. (^Bo.^) And
what other manner is there besides those above-mentioned?
(^Ph.^) Have we not granted already
that the Good are happy, and the Impious
miserable? (^Bo.^) We have. (^Ph.^) If then there
be any Addition of Good to any Man's Misery,
is not he happier than another, whose Misery
is pure and simple, without the mixture of any
manner of Good? (^Bo.^) It seemeth so to be.
(^Ph.^) And if to the same miserable Person, who
<P 180>
wants all manner of Goods to those Evils which
have already made him miserable, another
should be annexed, is not he to be esteemed
much more unhappy than he whose Misfortune
is relieved by the participation of Good?
(^Bo.^) What will follow then? (^Ph.^) Evil Men
then, even when they are punished, have
something of Good annexed, to wit, the Punishment
it self, which, as it is the Effect of
Justice, is good: And there is also annexed to
the same Persons, when they go unpunished,
something more of Ill, that is to say, Impunity
it self, which before thou hast deservedly
granted to be an Evil. (^Bo.^) I cannot deny
it. (^Ph.^) Much more unhappy then are impious
Wretches when they meet with an
unjust Impunity, than when they fall under
a merited Vengeance. But it is manifest,
that nothing can be more just than that evil
Men should be punished, and unjust than that
they should escape Punishment. (^Bo.^) Who denies
it? (^Ph.^) Nor will any Man deny but that
every thing which is just, is good; and on the
other hand, whatsoever is unjust, is ill. (^Bo.^) These
are consequential to our former Conclusions:
But I pray thee tell me, dost thou believe that
there are any Punishments allotted to Souls after
the Death of the Bodies? (^Ph.^) Great ones
most certainly; some of which I believe to be
exercised and applied by Sharpness of Pain,
<P 181>
others by a kind of Purgative
Clemency: But we will
not at this time discourse of these. But our
Business hitherto hath been, to let thee see that
the Power which thou didst imagine to be most
unworthily bestowed upon evil Men, is indeed
none at all: And also that thou mightst be satisfied
that evil Men, who as thou didst complain
went unpunished, do never indeed escape
Punishment: And also that thou mightst learn
that that Licence of doing Evil, which thou
prayedst might soon end, is not long; and that
The Enjoyers would be more unhappy if it were
<P 182>
longer, and most wretched of all if it were
perpetual. After this I shewed that ill Men
are more unhappy if they be dismiss'd with an
unjust Impunity, than if punish'd with a just
Revenge. From which Opinion it follows,
that then they are urg'd and afflicted with the
greatest Punishments when they are believed
to escape free. (^Bo.^) When I consider intently
thy Reasons, I think nothing can be said more
truly. but if we look upon the Judgments of
Men, who is there to whom these things seem
not only not to be believed, but also not to be
heard? (^Ph.^) So it is indeed: for they who
have long been accustomed to Darkness cannot
lift up their Eyes to the Light of perspicuous
Truth without difficulty; and they resemble
those Birds which see well by Night,
but are blind in the Day-time: For whilst they
do not regard the Order of things, but only
their own disordered Affections, they vainly
imagine the Power of doing Evil, or Impunity
after it is acted, to be an Happiness. But now,
behold what the Law Eternal delivereth! Conform
thy Mind to the best things, and then
thou shalt have no need of a Judg to confer upon
thee a Reward, since thou hast adjoined thy
self to the most excellent things. But if thou
art inclined to Impiety, and dost imbrace wicked
Practices, seek for no Avenger without, for
thou hast forfeited thy Advantages, and associated
<P 183>
thy self with the worst of things: as if
thou shouldst by turns sometimes behold the
Heavens, sometimes the sordid Earth; and
that all other things ceasing from without, thy
Eye should seem to carry thee now above the
Stars, and that again thou shouldst be placed
upon the Earth. But the Multitude doth not
consider this. What then? Shall we put our
selves into the Company of those which I have
before shewed to resemble Beasts? What wilt
thou say, if a Man who hath quite lost his Sight,
and hath also forgotten that ever he saw, and
should think that he wants nothing to render
him perfect, should we therefore judg those
who retain their Sight to be blind also? Either
will the (^Many^) acquiesce in what I shall say, although
it is supported by as firm Reasons, to
wit, that those are more unhappy who do, than
they who suffer Injuries. (^Bo.^) I would willingly
hear those Reasons. (^Ph.^) Canst thou
deny but that all ill Men deserve Punishment?
(^Bo.^) No, I cannot. (^Ph.^) But I am throughly
satisfied that impious Men are many ways unhappy.
(^Bo.^) Certainly they are so. (^Ph.^) Then
thou doubtest not that those who deserve Punishment
are miserable. (^Bo.^) I agree. (^Ph.^) If
therefore thou wert to be Judg, to which dost
thou think thou wouldst adjudg Punishment,
to him who hath done, or to him who hath suffered
the Injury? (^Bo.^) I doubt not but that I
<P 184>
should adjudg Satisfaction to the Sufferer, by
punishing the Doer of Wrong. (^Ph.^) The injuring
Person then would seem more miserable
to thee than him who had receiv'd the Wrong.
(^Bo.^) That follows. (^Ph.^) From this then, and
from several other Reasons founded on the same
bottom, it appears, that Impiety, properly and
by its own Nature, makes Men miserable; and
that an Injury done to any Man is the Misery
of the Doer, and not of the Sufferer. But now
Orators and Advocates run a Course contrary
to this: For they endeavour the Pity and Compassion
of the Judges for those who suffered
any thing bitter or grievous, when the juster
Pity is due to them who did the Wrong; who
should be led to Judgment, as the Sick are to
the Physician, not by angry but by merciful
and compassionate Accusers; that so they may,
by the Application of Punishment, as a fit and
proper Remedy, be cured of the Malady of
the Crime. By this means the Employment of
this kind of Defenders would either wholly
cease, or else, that it may be more to the Advantage
of Mankind, it would be turned into
an Habit of Accusation, and would always be
forward to accuse, and not to excuse ill Men:
and even those Wretches themselves, if they
could through the least Hole or Chink behold
that Vertue which they have forsaken, and see
that they should be in some way of cleansing
<P 185>
themselves from their filthy Vices, by receiving
the Pains and Torments which are due to them,
they ought, for the Recompence of regaining
the Vertue from which they have fallen, not
to esteem them so, but should chearfully refuse
the Defence of their Advocates, and give themselves
up wholly to their Accusers and Judges.
Hence it is that the Wise hate no Body: For
who but the most foolish would hate good
Men? and it is irrational to hate the most profligate:
For if a depraved Temper be, as it
were, the Sickness of the Soul, since we do
not think those whose Bodies are distempered
to be worthy of our Hate, but rather of our
Compassion, much less are those over whom
Vice, more cruel than any bodily Distemper,
hath gain'd the Ascendant to be adjudged so,
but are rather to be looked upon as Subjects of
our Pity.

<S SAMPLE 5>
<P 190>
[}PROSA VI.}]
   (^Boet.^) So it is; but because it is thy Province
to unfold the hidden Causes of things,
and to lay open those Reasons which are now
invelop'd in Darkness, I intreat thee to give me
thy Judgment in this Matter, and to discourse
upon it, for this Wonder troubles me very
much. Philosophy then a little smiling, said to
me, O thou call'st upon me to declare to thee
the greatest thing which could be asked, and
which indeed can scarce be answered: For such
is the Matter of it, that one Doubt being removed,
innumerable others, like the Heads of
(^Hydra^) , grow up. Nor would there indeed
be any End of them, unless they were restrained
by the Quickness and lively Fire of the
Mind: For in this Matter Men are wont to
make Questions of the simple Actings of Providence,
of the Order and Course of Destiny,
of sudden Chance, of Knowledg, of Divine Predestination,
and of Free-will: And of what
Weight these things are, thou thy self mayst
perceive. But because it is part of thy Medicine,
<P 191>
and it will contribute much to thy Cure
to know these things, although I am confined
within the narrow Bounds of Time, I shall endeavour
to give thee some Taste of them. And
although the Charms and Musick of my Verse
may delight thee, yet thou must defer that
Pleasure a little, whilst I in order weave together
my Reasons, which may tend to the Solution
of thy Doubts. (^Bo.^) Observe thy own
Method as it pleaseth thee.

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<P 191>
Then taking her
Beginning as from another Principle, she thus
discoursed. (^Ph.^) The Generation of all things,
and every Progression of changeable Natures,
and all things which are any way moved, receive
their Causes, Order and Forms out of the
Stability or Constancy of the Divine Mind.
And this being placed in the Height of its own
Purity or Simplicity, doth establish a manifold
Mode or Way in doing things; which Mode
or Manner of Proceeding, when Men behold
it in the Purity of the Divine Understanding, is
called Providence; but being apply'd and referr'd
to that which it moveth, and of which
it disposeth, it was called Fate or Destiny.
And if any one shall throughly weigh in his
Mind the Force and Energy of the one and of
the other, he shall soon find them to be different
things: For Providence is that Divine Reason
settled in the chief Governour of the World,
by which he disposeth all things; but Fate or
<P 192>
Destiny is a Disposition inherent in moveable
Beings, by which Providence knits them together
in their Orders. Providence embraces and
comprehends all things, although divers, although
infinite; but Fate orders and digests all
single things into Motion, and distributeth them
according to Place, Form and Time: So that
the Explication of this temporal Order being
joined or folded up, in regard to the Divine
Mind, may be called Providence; and being
unfolded and digested according to Time, and
the other Circumstances, it may be called Fate.
And although these things be different, yet one
of them depends upon the other; for the Order
of Fate proceeds from the pure Simplicity of
Providence: For as the Artificer forming in his
Mind the Shape of the thing which he is about
to make, moves to effect his Work, and doth
in process of time draw out that which before
he had singly in his Imagination designed; so
God by his Providence simply and firmly doth
dispose the things which are to be done; and
he doth in several Ways, and according to
Time, administer by Fate those very things
which he hath so disposed. So then, whether
Fate be exercised and moved by some Divine
Spirits which attend upon Providence, or by
some Soul, or by the Ministry of the whole
Body of Nature, or by the Celestial Motions of
the Stars, or by Angelick Vertue, or by the manifold
<P 193>
Subtlety of Demons, whether good or
bad, or if by any of these, or if by all of them
the Series of Fate is woven: This certainly is
manifest, that the immovable and simple way
of doing things is Providence; and that the
movable Contexture and temporal Order of
those things which the Divine Purity fore-disposed
and ordered to be done, is Fate. Hence
it is that all things which are under the Dominion
of Fate, are also subject to Providence,
which commands even Fate it self. But some
things which are placed under the Guidance and
Protection of Providence, are wholly exempt
from the Jurisdiction of Fate, and surmount
the Series of it; and those are such things as are
stably fixed near to the Divinity, and are above
the Order of fatal Mobility. For even as amongst
several Circles turning about the same
Centre, that which is innermost approacheth
most to the Simplicity of the middle Point, and
is as it were a Centre, round which they may
turn, to those placed without it; and that
which is outermost, rolling in a greater Circuit,
the further it departs from the middle Individuity
of the Point, so much the more Space
it doth fill; but yet if any thing should join and
fasten it self to the Point, it is constrained to be
immovable, and ceaseth to be dilated. By parity
of Reason the further any thing departeth
from the first Mind, that is from God, it is so 
<P 194>
much the more embarassed, and faster bound
in the Bonds of Destiny; and every thing is by
so much the freer from Fate, by how much it
approacheth nearer to the Centre of all things.
And if it closely adheres to the Firmness of
the supreme Mind, without moving, it goes
beyond the Necessity and Power of Destiny.
As Ratiocination then is to the Intellect, as that
which is begotten is to that which hath a proper
Being, as Time is to Eternity, as the Circle is
to the Centre; so is the movable Order of Fate
to the stable Simplicity of Providence. This
Order moveth the Heavens and the Stars, tempereth
the Elements, and maketh them agree
amongst themselves, and by an alternative
Change transforms them. It reneweth all
things which are born, and which die by the
like Progressions of Sexes and Seeds. This
binds together the Actions and Fortunes of Men
by an indissoluble Connection of Causes; which
since they proceed from the Origine of immovable
Providence, must also themselves necessarily
be unchangeable: For so things are always
best governed, if that pure Simplicity or Singleness,
dwelling in the Divine Nature, may
produce that unalterable Order of Causes; for
this Order, by its own Unchangeableness and
Constancy, may restrain those things which in
their Nature are mutable, and which would
otherwise rashly and irregularly float about.
<P 195>
Hence it is that although things may seem confused
and disturbed to Men who cannot aright
consider this Order, nevertheless the proper
Manner and Course of every thing directs and
disposeth to the true Good: For there is nothing
done for the sake of Evil, no not by the 
most flagitious Wretches; who, as I have fully
before demonstrated, are in their Researches
after Good diverted by crooked Error, whilst
the Order proceeding from the Centre of Sovereign
Good doth not mislead any from its Principles.
But thou mayst say, what greater Confusion
can there be, that both prosperous and
adverse things should by times happen to good
Men, and that evil Men can enjoy what their
Hearts can desire, and yet be afflicted too with
things which they hate? Do People live now
a-days so vertuously, and with so much Integrity,
that those whom Men think good or bad,
must necessarily be either? But in this the
Judgments of Men disagree much: For those
whom some judg worthy of a Reward, others
think to deserve Punishment. But let us grant,
that it is possible that some one may be able to
distinguish betwixt the Good and the Bad; Is
it possible therefore that he should look into the
inward Temperament of the Mind, and pronounce
of it as one may of the Body? But it is
miraculous to him who knows it not, why
sweet things should be agreeable to some Bodies,
<P 196>
and bitter to others; and why some sick
People are eased by Lenitives, others are helped
by sharper Medicines. But it is no wonder to
the Physician, who knoweth the Measure and
Temperament of Health and Sickness. But
what other thing is it that makes the Mind
healthful and strong than Goodness? And what
is its Sickness but Vice? Who is the Preserver
of Good, and the Driver away of Evil, other
than God the great Ruler and Physician of the
Mind? who, when he looks about him from
the high Observatory of his Providence, sees
and knows what is convenient for every one,
and then accommodates him with the Convenience.
Hence then proceeds that remarkable
Miracle of Order of Destiny, since the all-knowing
God doth that at which the Ignorant
are astonished. But now that I may glance at
a few things concerning the Depth of the Divine
Knowledg, which humane Reason may
comprehend, that Man whom thou believest to
be most just, and the greatest Observer and
Maintainer of Equity, of that Man, I say, the
all-knowing Providence doth think otherwise.
And my Familiar (^Lucan^) told us, that the
vanquishing Cause was pleasing to the Gods,
but the vanquish'd to (^Cato^) : Know this then,
<P 197>
that whatsoever thou seest done contrary to thy
Hope or Expectation, that notwithstanding the
Order of things is preserved right and entire;
but to thy perverted Opinion it seemeth Confusion.
But let us suppose that a Man may have
behaved himself so well, that the Approbation
of God and Man may both agree in him; but
he is perhaps of a weak Courage: so that if any
thing cross should befal him, he will forgo his
Innocence, since with it he cannot retain his
Fortune. The wise Dispensation of Providence
then spareth him whom Adversity may
make worse, lest he should be put to labour and
travel, who is not able to undergo such Hardship,
nor to bear Afflictions. Another Man is
Master of all Vertues, is holy, and one who
draws nigh to God: Providence judgeth it Injustice
that that Man should be oppressed by
any Adversity; so that it will not suffer him to
labour even under any bodily Distemper: But
as one more excellent than I said, [^GREEK
OMITTED^] (^Vertues do build up the
Body of the Holy Man^) . But it often comes to
pass that good Men have the Government of 
<P 198>
things committed to them, that the exuberant
Improbity of ill Men may be repell'd and abated.
To some, according to the Qualities of
their Minds, he gives a kind of Mixture of
Fortune, chequered with Good and Evil: Upon
some he lays grievous heavy Crosses, lest
they should grow luxurious by too long a
Course of Felicity: Upon others he sometimes
lays also heavy Crosses, that their Vertues may
be confirmed by the Use and Exercise of Patience: 
Some fear more than they ought that
thing which they can bear: Others despite more
than they ought that which they cannot; and
those, that by the Experiment they may come
to the Knowledg of themselves, he sometimes
afflicts. And many there are who have purchas'd
a great Name in the World, at the Expence
of a glorious Death. And some Men
whose Courage hath not yielded to Torment,
have given a noble Example to others, that
Vertue is not to be overcome by Adversity.
And there is no doubt but that all these things
are done justly and in order, and for the Good
of those to whom they happen. It also proceeds
from the said Causes that sometimes Adversity,
sometimes Prosperity, comes to be the
Lot of ill Men. And it is the Wonder of
no Man, that flagitious Persons should be
afflicted, because they are always thought to
deserve what comes upon them; and that their
<P 199>
Punishment doth deter others from such Aims,
and often work a Reformation in those on
whom they are inflicted: But the Prosperity of
such yields a great Argument to the Good, and
directs them what to judg of this kind of Happiness,
which they so often see to fall to the
share of the worst of Men. In which thing I
think often there is a Dispensation, because the
Nature of some Men may be so forward and
importunate, that Poverty, and the want of Necessaries,
would rather urge them to do ill.
But this Disease Providence doth cure by applying
the powerful Medicine of Money. One
Man finding his Conscience deeply spotted with
Crimes, and comparing himself and his Fortune,
fears perhaps that the Happiness which
he enjoyed by the Use of it, should be wholly
done away by its Loss; he will therefore change
his Manners, and whilst he fears to lose his
Estate he will leave his Impiety. Upon another
Happiness is conferr'd without Desert, and
that precipitates him into a merited Destruction.
To some there is a Power of Punishing granted,
that it may exercise the Vertues of the Good,
and may be Cause of Punishments and Torment
to the Evil. For as there is no Covenant or
Agreement betwixt the Vertuous and the
Wicked, so neither can wretched Men agree
amongst themselves. And why should they?
for they disagree amongst themselves by reason
<P 200>
of their Vices, which rend and tear the Conscience;
and they often do those things, which
when they are over, they judg they ought not to
have done them. From whence Providence
hath often produced a signal Miracle, to wit,
that evil Men have oft made other ill Men
good: For when some of these find that they
have suffered an Injury from others of them
urged by the Hate of those that have offended
them, they have returned to the Ways of
Vertue, studying nothing more than to be unlike
to those Persons whom they hate. It is only
the great Power of God which can make
Evil turn to Good, when by using them agreeably
and conveniently he draws out of them
the Effect of some Good: For a certain Order
embraceth all Beings, so that whatsoever doth
depart from the Reason and Laws of that Order
which is assigned to it, yet it passeth into
and under the Laws of another Order; for nothing
is left in the Power of Chance or Uncertainty
in the Realm of Providence. [^GREEK
OMITTED^] (^It is hard for 
me to express how God rules and disposeth all things
by his Providence^) . Nor is it lawful for a Man
(if he could) to comprehend all the Machines
and Movements of the Divine Work, even in
his Thought, much less to declare and describe
them in Words. Let it suffice to have seen only
this, that God, the Framer of all Natures,
<P 201>
orders and disposeth every thing towards Good;
and whilst he endeavours to retain those things
which he hath made in his own Likeness, he
banisheth all Evil by the Course of Destiny,
without the Bounds of his Commonwealth.
Hence it is that if thou dost but regard the all-disposing
Providence, thou mayst easily see,
that there are not those Evils which Men believe
do abound upon the Face of the Earth.
But now I see that thou dost almost lie down
under the Weight and Prolixity of my Reasoning;
and that thou dost expect the Musick of
my Verse: receive then this Draught with which
when thou art refresh'd, thou mayst more strongly
proceed to other Matters which yet remain.



