<B CMBOETH>
<Q M3 XX PHILO BOETHCH> 
<N BOETH CHAUCER> 
<A CHAUCER GEOFFREY> 
<C M3> 
<O 1350-1420> 
<M 1350-1420> 
<K X> 
<D EMO> 
<V PROSE> 
<T PHILOSOPHY> 
<G TRANSL> 
<F LATIN/FRENCH> 
<W WRITTEN> 
<X MALE> 
<Y 20-40> 
<H PROF HIGH> 
<U X> 
<E X> 
<J INTERACTIVE> 
<I X> 
<Z X> 
<S SAMPLE X> 
 

[^CHAUCER, GEOFFREY.
TEXT:  BOETHIUS.
THE RIVERSIDE CHAUCER.
THIRD EDITION.
GENERAL EDITOR L. D. BENSON.
BASED ON THE WORKS OF GEOFFREY CHAUCER,
EDITED BY F. N. ROBINSON.
BOSTON: HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY, 1987. 
PP. 429.C1.1 - 431.C1.195      (SAMPLE 1)
PP. 431.C2.1 - 434.C1.250      (SAMPLE 2)
PP. 434.C2.1 - 436.C2.230      (SAMPLE 3)
PP. 446.C2.1 - 449.C2.300      (SAMPLE 4)
PP. 450.C2.1 - 454.C2.376      (SAMPLE 5)^]
 
<S SAMPLE 1>  
<P 429.C1> 
[} (\HACTENUS MENDACIS FORMAM.\) - PROSA 9}] 
 
   "It suffiseth that I have schewyd hiderto the 
forme of fals welefulnesse, so that yif thou loke 
now cleerly, the ordre of myn entencioun requireth 
from hennes forth to schewe the verray 
welefulnesse." 
   "For sothe," quod I, "I se wel now that suffisaunce 
may nat comen by rychesse, ne power 
by remes, ne reverence by dignites, ne gentilesse 
by glorie, ne joie be delices." 
   "And hastow wel knowen the causes," 
quod sche, "whi it es?" 
   "Certes me semeth," quod I, "that Y see hem 
ryght as thoughe it were thurw a litil clyfte, but 
me were levere knowen hem more opynly of 
the." 
   "Certes," quod sche, "the resoun is al redy. 
For thilke thyng that symply is o thyng withouten 
ony devysioun, the errour and folie of 
mankynde departeth and divideth it, and 
mysledeth it and transporteth from verray 
and parfit good to godes that ben false and 
inparfit. But seye me this. Wenestow that he 
that hath nede of power, that hym ne lakketh 
nothyng?" 
   "Nay," quod I. 
   "Certes," quod sche, "thou seyst aryght; for 
if so be that ther is a thyng that in ony partie 
be feblere of power, certes, as in that, it moot 
nedes be nedy of foreyne help." 
   "Ryght so is it," quod I. 
   "Suffisaunce and power ben thanne of  
o kynde?" 
   "So semeth it," quod I. 
   "And demestow," quod sche, "that a thyng 
that is of this manere ( (^that is to seyn, suffisaunt 
and mighty^) ) oughte ben despised, or ellis that 
it be right digne of reverence aboven alle 
thynges?" 
   "Certes," quod I, "it nys no doute that it 
nys right worthy to ben reverenced." 
   "Lat us," quod sche, "adden thanne reverence 
to suffisaunce and to power, so that we 
demen that thise thre thynges be al o thyng." 
<P 429.C2>
   "Certes," quod I, "lat us adden it, yif we 
wiln graunten the sothe." 
   "What demestow thanne," quod sche, "is 
that a dirk thyng and nat noble that is suffisaunt, 
reverent, and myghty; or elles that it is 
ryght noble and ryght cleer by celebrete of 
renoun? Considere thanne," quod sche, "as 
we han grauntide hirbyfore, that he that ne 
hath nede of no thyng and is moost myghty 
and moost digne of honour, if hym nedeth ony 
cleernesse of renoun, whiche clernesse he myght 
nat graunten of hymself; so that for lak of 
thilke cleernesse he myghte seme the feblere 
on any side, or the more outcast." ( (^Glose. This 
to seyn, nay; for whoso that is suffisaunt, 
myghty, and reverent, clernesse of renoun 
folweth of the forseyde thynges; he hath it 
al redy of his suffysaunce.^) ) 
   (^Boece.^) "I mai nat," quod I, "denye it, but I 
moot granten, as it is, that this thyng be ryght 
celebrable by clernesse of renoun and noblesse." 
   "Thanne folweth it," quod sche, "that we  
adden clernesse of renoun to the thre forseyde 
thynges, so that there ne be amonges hem no 
difference." 
   "This is a consequence," quod I. 
   "This thyng thanne," quod sche, "that ne  
hath nede of no foreyne thyng, and that 
may don alle thynges by hise strengthis, and 
that is noble and honourable, nys nat that a 
myry thyng and a joyful?" 
   (^Boece.^) "But whennes," quod I, "that any sorwe 
myghte comen to this thyng that is swiche, 
certes I mai nat thynke." 
   (^Philosophie.^) "Thanne mote we graunten," 
quod sche, "that this thing be ful of gladnesse, 
if the forseide thynges ben sothe; 
and certes also mote we graunten that suffisaunce,  
power, noblesse, reverence, and gladnesse 
be oonly diverse by names, but hir substaunce  
hath no diversite." 
   (^Boece.^) "It moot nedly ben so," quod I. 
   (^Philosophie.^) "Thilke thyng thanne," quod 
sche, "that is oon and symple in his nature, the 
wikkidnesse of men departeth it and divideth 
it; and whanne thei enforcen hem to gete 
partie of a thyng that ne hath no part, thei 
ne geten hem neyther thilke partie that nis 
noon, ne the thyng al hool that thei ne desire 
nat." 
   (^Boece.^) "In whiche manere?" quod I. 
<P 430.C1>
   (^Philosophie.^) "Thilke man," quod sche, "that 
seketh richesse to fleen poverte, he ne travaileth 
hym nat for to geten power, for he hath 
lever to ben dirk and vyl; and eek withdraweth 
from hymself manye naturel delites, for he 
nolde leese the moneie that he hath assembled. 
But certes in this manere he ne 
geteth hym nat suffisance, that power forleteth, 
and that moleste prikketh, and that filthe maketh 
outcaste, and that dirknesse hideth. And 
certes he that desireth oonly power, he wasteth 
and scatereth rychesse, and despyseth delices 
and eek honour that is withoute power, ne he 
ne preiseth glorie nothyng. Certes thus seestow 
wel that manye thynges failen to hym, for 
he hath som tyme defaute of manye necessites, 
and manye anguysshes byten hym; 
and whan he ne mai nat do tho defautes awey, 
he forletith to ben myghty, and that is the 
thyng that he moost desireth. And ryght thus 
mai I make semblable resouns of honours, and 
of glorie, and of delyces; for so as every of 
thise forseide thinges is the same that thise 
othere thynges ben ( (^that is to seyn, al oon 
thyng^) ), whoso that evere seketh to geten 
the toon of thise, and nat the tothir, he ne 
geteth nat that he desireth." 
   (^Boece.^) "What seystow thanne, yif that a 
man coveyte to geten alle thise thynges 
togidre?" 
   (^Philosophie.^) "Certes," quod sche, "I wolde 
seye, that he wolde geten hym sovereyn blisfulnesse; 
but that schal he nat fynde in tho 
thynges that I have schewed that ne mowen 
nat yeven that thei byheeten?" 
   (^Boece.^) "Certes no," quod I. 
   "Thanne," quod sche, "ne sholde men 
nat by no weye seken blisfulnesse in siche 
thynges as men wenen that they ne mowen 
yeven but o thyng sengly of al that men 
seken." 
   (^Boece.^) "I graunte wel," quod I, "ne no  
sothere thyng ne may be seyd." 
   (^Philosophie.^) "Now hastow thanne," quod 
sche, "the forme and the causes of fals 
welefulnesse. Now torne and flytte the 
eighen of thi thought, for ther shaltow 
seen anoon thilke verray blisfulnesse that I 
have behyght the." 
<P 430.C2>
   (^Boece.^) "Certes." quod I, "it is cler and opene, 
theyghe it were to a blynd man; and that 
schewedestow me ful wel a litel herbyforn, 
whan thow enforcedest the to schewe me the 
causes of the fals blisfulnesse. For, but if I be 
begiled, thanne is thilke the verray parfit 
blisfulnesse that parfitly maketh a man suffisaunt, 
myghty, honourable, noble, and 
ful of gladnesse. And for thow schalt wel 
knowe that I have wel undirstonden thise 
thinges withynne myn herte, I knowe wel that 
thilke blisfulnesse that may verrayly yeven on 
of the forseyde thynges, syn thei ben alle oon 
- I knowe dowtelees that thilke thyng is the 
ful blysfulnesse." 
   (^Philosophie.^) "O my nory," quod sche, 
"by this opynyoun I seie that thow art 
blisful, yif thow putte this therto that I 
schal seyn." 
   "What is that?" quod I. 
   "Trowestow that ther be any thyng in this 
erthly, mortel, toumblynge thynges that may 
brynge this estat?" 
   "Certes," quod I, "Y trowe it nought; and 
thow hast schewyd me wel that over thilke good 
ther nys no thyng more to ben desired." 
   (^Philosophie.^) "Thise thynges thanne," 
quod sche ( (^that is to seyn, erthly 
suffysaunce and power and swiche thynges^) ),
"outher thei semen lyknesses of verray good, or 
elles it semeth that thei yeve to mortel folk a 
maner of goodes that ne be nat parfyt. But thilke 
good that is verray and parfyt, that mai thei nat 
yeven." 
   (^Boece.^) "I accorde me wel," quod I. 
   (^Philosophie.^) "Thanne," quod sche, "for as 
moche as thou hast knowen whiche is thilke 
verray blisfulnesse, and eek whiche thilke 
thynges ben that lyen falsly blisfulnesse ( (^that is 
to seyn, that be deceyte semen verray goodes^) ), 
now byhoveth the to knowe, whennes and 
where thow mowe seke thilke verrai 
blisfulnesse." 
   "Certes," quod I, "that desire I gretly and 
have abyden longe tyme to herkne it." 
   "But for as moche," quod sche, "as it 
liketh to my disciple Plato, in his book of 
(\In Thymeo\) , that in ryght litel thynges men 
<P 431.C1>
schulde byseche the help of God, what juggestow 
that be now to done, so that we may 
desserve to fynde the seete of thilk sovereyn 
good?"   
 
<S SAMPLE 2> 
<P 431.C2> 
[} (\QUONIAM IGITUR QUE SIT.\) - PROSA 10}] 
 
   "For as moche thanne as thow hast seyn 
whiche is the fourme of good that nys nat parfit, 
and whiche is the forme of good that is parfit, 
now trowe I that it were good to schewe in 
what this perfeccioun of blisfulnesse is set. 
And in this thing I trowe that we schulde first 
enquere for to witen, yf that any swich maner 
good as thilke good that thow hast dyffinysshed 
a litel herebyforn ( (^that is to seyn, sovereyn 
good^) ) may be founde in the nature of 
thinges, for that veyn ymagynacioun of 
thought ne desceyve us nat, and put us out of 
the sothfastnesse of thilke thing that is summytted  
to us. But it may nat be denyed that 
thilke good ne is, and that it nys ryght as a 
welle of alle goodes. For alle thing that is 
cleped inparfyt is proevid inparfit be the 
amenusynge of perfeccioun or of thing that is 
parfit. And herof cometh it that in every 
thing general, yif that men seen any thing 
that is inparfit, certes in thilke general ther 
moot ben som thing that is parfit. For yif so be 
that perfeccioun is don awey, men may nat 
thinke ne say fro whennes thilke thing is that 
is cleped inparfyt. For the nature of thinges ne 
took nat hir begynnynge of thinges amenused 
and inparfit, but it procedith of thinges that 
ben alle hole and absolut, and descendith so 
doun into uttereste thinges and into thinges 
<P 432.C1>
empty and withouten fruyt. But, as I have 
schewid a litel herebyforn that yif ther be 
a blisfulnesse that be freel and veyn and inparfyt, 
ther may no man doute that ther nys 
som blisfulnesse that is sad, stedefast, and 
parfyt." 
   (^Boece.^) "This is concluded," quod I, "feermely 
and soothfastly." 
   (^Philosophie.^) "But considere also," quod sche, 
"in whom this blisfulnesse enhabiteth. The 
comune accordaunce and conceyt of the 
corages of men proveth and graunteth that 
God, prince of alle thinges, is good. For, so as 
nothyng mai ben thought betere than God, it 
mai nat ben douted thanne that he that no 
thinge nys betere, that he nys good. Certes resoun 
scheweth that God is so good that it 
proeveth by verray force that parfyt good is in 
hym. For yif God nys swyche, he ne mai nat be 
prince of alle thinges; for certes somthing 
possessyng in itself parfyt good schulde be 
more worthy than God, and it scholde 
semen that thilke thing were first and eldere than 
God. For we han schewyd apertely that alle 
thinges that ben parfyt ben first er thynges that 
ben inparfit; and forthy, for as moche as that 
my resoun or my proces ne go nat awey withouten 
an ende, we owe to graunte that the 
sovereyn God is ryght ful of sovereyn parfit 
good. And we han establissched that the 
sovereyne good is verray blisfulnesse. 
Thanne moot it nedis be that verray blisfulnesse 
is set in sovereyn God." 
   (^Boece.^) "This take I wel," quod I, "ne this 
ne mai nat be withseid in no manere." 
   "But I preye the," quod sche, "see now how 
thou mayst proeven holily and withoute corrupcioun  
this that I have seid, that the sovereyn 
God is ryght ful of sovereyne good." 
   "In whiche manere?" quod I. 
   "Wenestow aught," quod sche, "that this  
prince of alle thynges have itake thilke sovereyne 
good anywher out of hymself, of whiche 
sovereyne good men proeveth that he is ful; 
ryght as thou myghtest thenken that God, that 
hath blisfulnesse in hymself, and thilke blisfulnesse 
that is in hym, were divers in substaunce? 
For yif thow wene that God have resseyved 
<P 432.C2>
thilke good out of hymself, thow mayst wene 
that he that yaf thilke good to God be more 
worth than is God. But I am beknowe and 
confesse, and that ryght dignely, that God 
is ryght worthy aboven alle thinges. And yif 
so be that this good be in hym by nature, but 
that it is dyvers from hym by wenynge resoun, 
syn we speke of God prynce of alle thynges,   
feyne who so feyne mai who was he that 
hath conjoyned thise divers thynges togidre. 
And eek at the laste se wel that a thing that is 
divers from any thing, that thilke thing nys 
nat that same thing fro whiche it es undirstonden 
to be diverse. Thanne folweth it 
that thilke thing that be his nature is divers  
from sovereyn good, that that thyng nys nat 
sovereyn good; but certes it were a felenous 
cursydnesse to thinken that of hym that no 
thing nys more worth. For alwey, of alle 
thinges, the nature of hem ne may nat ben betere 
thanne hir begynnynge. For whiche I mai concluden 
by ryght verray resoun that thilke 
that is begynnynge of alle thinges, thilke 
same thing is sovereyn good in his 
substaunce." 
   (^Boece.^) "Thow hast seyd ryghtfully," quod I. 
   (^Philosophie.^) "But we han graunted," quod 
sche, "that the sovereyn good is blisfulnesse." 
   "That is sooth," quod I. 
   "Thanne," quod sche, "moten we nedes 
granten and confessen that thilke same sovereyn 
good be God?" 
   "Certes," quod I, "Y ne may nat denye  
ne withstonde the resouns purposed; and 
I se wel that it folweth by strengthe of the 
premisses." 
   "Loke now," quod sche, "yif this be proevid 
yet more fermely thus, that there ne mowen not 
ben two sovereyn goodis that ben divers among 
hemself. For certes the goodis that ben divers 
among hemself, the toon is nat that that the 
tothir is; thanne ne mowen neither of hem 
ben parfit, so as eyther of hem lakketh to 
othir. But that that nys nat parfit, men 
mai seen apertely that it nys not sovereyn. The 
thinges thanne that ben sovereynly gode ne 
mowe by no weie be divers. But I have wel 
concluded that blisfulnesse and God ben the 
sovereyn good; for whiche it mote nedes be that 
sovereyne blisfulnesse is sovereyn devynite." 
<P 433.C1>
   "No thing," quod I, "nys more sothfaste than 
this, ne more ferme by resoun, ne a more 
worthy thing than God mai not ben 
concluded." 
(^Philosophie.^) "Upon thise thynges thanne," quod 
sche, "ryght as thise geometriens whan thei han 
schewed her proposicions ben wont to bryngen 
yn thinges that thei clepen porismes or declaracions 
of forseide thinges, right so wol I yeve 
the here as a corolarie or a meede of coroune. 
Forwhy, for as moche as by the getynge of blisfulnesse 
men ben makid blisful, and blisfulnesse  
is dyvinite, than is it manifest and 
open that by the getynge of dyvinite men 
ben makid blisful. Right as by the getynge of 
justise [{men ben maked just{] , and be the gettynge 
of sapience thei ben maked wise, ryght so 
nedes by the semblable resoun, whan they han 
geten dyvinite thei ben maked goddes. Thanne 
is every blisful man God. But certes by nature 
ther nys but o God; but by the participacioun 
of dyvinite ther ne let ne distourbeth nothyng 
that ther ne ben many goddis." 
   "This ys," quod I, "a fair thing and a 
precious, clepe it as thou wilt, be it corolarie, or 
porisme, or mede of coroune, or declarynges." 
   "Certes," quod sche, "nothing nys fairere 
than is the thing that by resoun schulde ben 
addide to thise forseide thinges." 
   "What thing?" quod I. 
   "So, quod sche, "as it semeth that blisfulnesse 
conteneth many thinges, it weere for 
to witen whether that alle thise thinges 
maken or conjoynen as a maner body of 
blisfulnesse by diversite of parties or membres, 
or elles yif ony of alle thilke thinges ben swich 
that it acomplise by hymself the substaunce of 
blisfulnesse, so that alle thise othere thynges 
ben referrid and brought to blisfulnesse ( (^that 
is to seyn, as to the cheef of hem^) )." 
   "I wolde," quod I, "that thow madest me 
clerly to undirstonde what thou seist, and 
that thou recordidest me the forseide 
thinges." 
   "Have I not jugged," quod sche, "that blisfulnesse 
is good?" 
   "Yys for sothe," quod I, "and that sovereyn 
good." 
   "Adde thanne," quod sche, "thilke good that 
is maked blisfulnesse to alle the forseide 
<P 433.C2>
thinges. For thilke same blisfulnesse [{is{] 
demed to ben sovereyn suffisaunce, thilke 
selve is sovereyn power, sovereyn reverence, 
sovereyn clernesse or noblesse, and 
sovereyn delyt. What seistow thanne of alle 
thise thinges, that is to seyn, suffisaunce, power, 
and thise othere thinges, - ben thei thanne as 
membris of blisfulnesse, or ben they reffered 
and brought to sovereyne good ryght as alle 
thinges [{ben{] brought to the cheef of hem?" 
   (^Boece.^) "I undirstonde wel," quod I, "what 
thou purposest to seke, but I desire for  
to herkne that thow schewe it me." 
   (^Philosophie.^) "Tak now thus the discrecioun 
of this questioun," quod sche; "yif alle thise 
thinges," quod sche, "weren membris to felicite, 
thanne weren thei dyverse that on fro that 
othir. And swich is the nature of parties or of 
membres, that diverse membris compounen a 
body." 
   "Certes," quod I, "it hath wel ben schewyd 
herebyforn that alle thise thinges ben 
al o thyng." 
   "Thanne ben thei none membres," quod 
sche, "for elles it schulde seme that blisfulnesse 
were conjoyned al of o membre allone; 
but that is a thing that mai not ben don." 
   "This thing," quod I, "nys not doutous; but 
I abide to herknen the remenaunt of the 
question." 
   "This is opene and cler," quod sche, "that 
alle othere thinges ben referrid and 
brought to good. For therfore is suffisaunce 
requerid, for it is demyd to ben 
good; and forthy is power requirid, for men 
trowen also that it be good; and this same thing 
mowen we thinken and conjecten of reverence, 
and of noblesse, and of delyt. Thanne is sovereyn 
good the somme and the cause of al that 
oughte ben desired; forwhy thilke thing that 
withholdeth no good in itselve, ne semblance 
of good, it ne mai not wel in no 
manere be desired ne requerid. And the 
contrarie; for thoughe that thinges by here 
nature ne ben not gode, algates yif men wene 
that thei ben gode, yet ben thei desired as 
theigh that thei were verrayliche gode; and 
therefore is it that men oughte to wene by ryghte 
that bounte be the sovereyn fyn and the cause 
of alle the thinges that ben to requiren. But 
certes thilke that is cause for whiche men 
<P 434.C1>
requiren any thing, it semeth that thilke 
same thing be moost desired. As thus: yf 
that a wyght wolde ryden for cause of hele, 
he ne desireth not so mochel the moevyng to 
ryden, as the effect of his hele. Now thanne, 
syn that alle thynges ben required for the grace 
of good, thei ne ben not desired of alle folk 
more than the same good. But we han grauntide 
that blisfulnesse is that thing for whiche that 
alle thise othere thinges ben desired; thanne 
is it thus that certes oonly blysfulnesse is 
requered and desired. By whiche thing it 
scheweth cleerly that of good and of blisfulnesse 
is al on and the same substaunce." 
   "I se nat," quod I, "wherfore that men 
myghten discorden in this." 
   "And we han schewed that God and verray 
blisfulnesse is al o thing." 
   "That is sooth," quod I. 
   "Thanne mowen we concluden sykerly, that 
the substaunce of God is set in thilke same 
good, and in noon other place.   
 
<S SAMPLE 3> 
<P 434.C2> 
[} (\ASSENCIOR INQUAM CUNCTA.\) - PROSA 11}] 
 
   (^Boece.^) "I assente me," quod I, "for alle thise 
thinges ben strongly bounden with ryght ferme 
resouns." 
   "How mychel wiltow preysen it," quod sche, 
"yif that thow knowe what thilke good is?" 
   "I wol preyse it," quod I, "be pris withouten 
ende, yif it schal betyde me to knowe also togidre 
God that is good." 
   "Certes," quod sche, "that schal I [{undo{] 
the be verray resoun, yif that tho 
thinges that I have concluded a litel herebyforn 
duellen only in hir first grauntynge." 
   (^Boece.^) "Thei dwellen graunted to the," quod 
I. ( (^This to seyn as who seith, "I graunte thi 
forseide conclusyouns."^) ) 
   "Have I nat schewed the," quod sche, "that 
the thinges that ben required of many folk ne 
ben not verray goodis ne parfite, for thei ben 
divers that on fro that othir; and so as iche 
of hem is lakkynge to othir, thei ne han no 
power to bryngen a good that is ful and 
absolut; but thanne at erste ben thei verraye 
good, whan thei ben gadred togidre [{als{] into o 
forme and into oon werkynge, so that thilke 
thing that is suffisaunce, thilke same be power, 
and reverence, and noblesse, and myrthe; and 
for sothe, but yif alle thise thinges ben alle o 
same thing, thei ne han not wherby that thei 
mowen be put in the nombre of thinges 
that oughten ben required or desired?" 
   (^Boece.^) "It is schewyd," quod I, "ne herof 
mai ther no man douten." 
   (^Philosophie.^) "The thinges thanne," quod sche, 
"that ne ben none goodis whan thei ben diverse, 
and whanne thei bygynnen to ben al o thing, 
thanne ben thei goodes - ne cometh it hem nat 
thanne be the getynge of unyte that thei ben 
maked goodes?" 
   (^Boece.^) "So it semeth," quod I. 
   "But alle thing that is good," quod sche, 
"grauntestow that it be good by the participacioun  
of good, or no?" 
   "I graunte it," quod I. 
<P 435.C1>
   "Thanne mustow graunten," quod sche, "by 
semblable resoun that oon and good be o same 
thing; for of thinges of whiche that the effect nys 
nat naturely divers, nedes the substaunce moot 
be oo same thing." 
   "I ne may nat denye it," quod I. 
   "Hastow nat knowen wel," quod sche, 
"that alle thing that is hath so longe his 
duellynge and his substaunce as longe as it es 
oon, but whanne it forletith to be oon, it moot 
nedys deien and corrumpen togidres?" 
   "In whiche manere?" quod I. 
   "Ryght as in beestes," quod sche, "whanne 
the soule and the body ben conjoyned in oon 
and dwellen togidre, it es cleped a beeste; and 
whanne her unyte is destroyed be the 
disseveraunce the toon fro the tothir, 
thanne scheweth it wel that it is a deed 
thing, and that it nys no lengere no beeste. And 
the body of a wyght, while it duelleth in oo 
fourme be conjunccion of membris, it is wel 
seyn that it is a figure of mankynde; and yif 
the parties of the body ben so devyded and 
disseverid the ton fro the tother that thei destroyen 
unite, the body forletith to ben that it was 
beforn. And whoso wolde renne in the 
same manere be alle thinges, he scholde 
seen that withouten doute every thing is in 
his substaunce as longe as it is oon; and whanne 
it forletith to ben oon, it dyeth and peryssheth." 
   (^Boece.^) "Whanne I considere," quod I, "manye 
thinges, I se noon other." 
   "Is ther any thing thanne," quod sche, "that 
in as moche as it lyveth naturely, that forletith 
the talent or the appetyt of his beynge and 
desireth to come to deth and to 
corrupcioun?" 
   "Yif I considere," quod I, "the beestes 
that han any maner nature of wyllynge and of 
nyllynge, I ne fynde no beeste, but if it be 
constreyned fro withoute-forth, that forletith or 
despiseth the entencion to lyven and to duren; 
or that wole, his thankes, hasten hym to dyen. 
For every beest travaileth hym to defende and 
kepe the savacion of his lif, and eschueth deeth 
and destruccioun. But certes I doute me of  
herbes and of trees [{and{] I am in a doute 
of swiche thinges [{as{] ne han no felyng 
soules (ne no naturel werkynges servynge to 
appetites as beestes han, whether thei han 
appetyt to duellen and to duren). 
<P 435.C2>
   "Certes," quod sche, "ne therof thar the nat 
doute. Now looke upon thise herbes and thise 
trees. They wexen first in suche places as ben 
covenable to hem, in whiche places thei mowen 
nat sone deye ne dryen, as longe as hir 
nature mai defenden hem. For some of 
hem waxen in feeldis, and some in mountaynes, 
and othere waxen in mareys, and 
othre cleven on roches, and some wexen 
plentyvous in soondes; and yif any wyght 
enforce hym to bere hem into other places, thei 
wexen drye. For nature yeveth to every thing 
that that is convenient to hym, and travailleth 
that they ne deie nat, as longe as thei han power 
to duellen and to lyven. What wiltow seyn 
of this, that thei drawen alle here 
norysschynges by here rootes, ryght as thei 
hadden here mouthes yplounged withynne the 
erthes, and sheden be hir maryes hir wode and 
hir bark? And what wyltow seyn of this, that 
thilke thing that is ryght softe, as the marie is, 
that it is alwey hyd in the seete al withinne, and 
that it is defended fro withoute by the 
stedfastnesse of wode, and that the outreste bark 
is put ayens the distemperaunce of the 
hevene as a deffendour myghty to suffren 
harm? And thus certes maistow wel seen 
how greet is the diligence of nature; for alle 
thinges renovelen and publysschen hem with 
seed ymultiplied, ne ther nys no man that ne 
woot wel that they ne ben ryght as a foundement 
and edifice for to duren, noght oonly for a tyme, 
but ryght as for to dure perdurably by 
generacion. 
   And the thinges eek that men wenen ne 
haven none soules, ne desire thei nat, iche 
of hem, by semblable resoun to kepyn that 
that is hirs ( (^that is to seyn, that is accordynge 
to hir nature in conservacioun of hir beynge 
and endurynge^) )? For wherfore ellis bereth 
lightnesse the flaumbes up, and the weyghte 
presseth the erthe adoun, but for as moche as 
thilke places and thilke moevynges ben covenable 
to everyche of hem? And forsothe every 
thing kepeth thilke that is accordynge 
and propre to hym, ryght as thinges that 
ben contrarious and enemys corrumpen 
hem. And yet the harde thinges, as stones, 
<P 436.C1>
clyven and holden here parties togidere ryght 
faste and harde, and defenden hem in 
withstondynge that thei ne departe nat lyghtly 
atwynne. And the thinges that ben softe and 
fletynge, as is watir and eyr, thei departen 
lyghtly and yeven place to hem that breken or 
divyden hem; but natheles they retorne 
sone ageyn into the same thinges fro 
whennes thei ben arraced; but fyer fleeth 
and refuseth alle dyvisioun. 
   "Ne I ne trete not here now of willeful 
moevynges of the soule that is knowyng, but of 
the naturel entencioun of thinges, as thus: ryght 
as we swolwen the mete that we resseyven and 
ne thinke nat on it, and as we drawen our breeth 
in slepynge that we witen it nat while we slepyn. 
For certes in the beestis the love of hire 
lyvynges ne of hire beynges ne cometh 
not of the wilnynges of the soule, but of 
the bygynnynges of nature. For certes, thurw 
constreynynge causes, wil desireth and embraceth 
ful ofte tyme the deeth that nature 
dredeth. ( (^That is to seyn as thus: that a man 
may be constreyned so, by som cause, that his 
wille desireth and taketh the deeth whiche 
that nature hateth and dredeth ful sore.^) ) And 
somtyme we seen the contrarye, as thus: 
that the wil of a wyght distourbeth and 
constreyneth that that nature desireth and 
requirith alwey, that is to seyn the werk of 
generacioun, by whiche generacioun only 
duelleth and is susteyned the longe durablete of 
mortel thinges. And thus this charite and this 
love, that every thing hath to hymself, ne 
cometh not of the moevynge of the soule, but of 
the entencioun of nature. For the purveaunce of 
God hath yeven to thinges that ben creat of 
hym this, that is a ful grete cause to lyven 
and to duren, for whiche they desiren 
naturely here lif as longe as evere thei mowen. 
For which thou mayst not drede be no manere 
that alle the thinges that ben anywhere, that thei 
ne requiren naturely the ferme stablenesse of 
perdurable duellynge, and eek the eschuynge of 
destruccioun." 
   (^Boece.^) "Now confesse I wel," quod I, "that Y 
see wel now certeynly withouten doutes 
the thinges that whilom semeden uncerteyn 
to me." 
   (^Philosophie.^) "But," quod sche, "thilke thing 
that desireth to be and to duelle perdurably, he 
<P 436.C2>
desireth to ben oon. For yif that oon were 
destroyed, certes, beynge schulde ther noon 
duellen to no wyght." 
   "That is sooth," quod I. 
   "Thanne," quod sche, "desiren alle thinges 
oon." 
   "I assente," quod I. 
   "And I have schewed," quod sche, "that 
thilke same oon is thilke that is good." 
   (^Boece.^) "Ye, forsothe," quod I. 
   "Alle thinges thanne," quod sche, "requiren 
good; and thilke good thow mayst descryven 
ryght thus: good is thilk thing that every wyght 
desireth." 
   "Ther ne may be thought," quod I, "no more 
verraye thing. For eyther alle thinges ben 
referrid and brought to noght, and floteren 
withouten governour, despoyled of oon as 
of hire propre heved; or elles, yif ther be any 
thing to whiche that alle thinges tenden and 
hyen to, that thing muste ben the sovereyn good 
of alle goodes." 
   (^Philosophie.^) Thanne seide sche thus: "O my 
nory," quod sche, "I have greet gladnesse of 
the, for thow hast fycched in thyn herte the 
[{marke of the{] myddel sothfastnesse, ( (^that 
is to seyn, the prykke^) ). But [{in{] this thing 
hath ben discoveryd to the [{that{] thow 
seydest that thow wistest not a litel herbyforn." 
   "What was that?" quod I. 
   "That thou ne wistest noght," quod sche, 
"whiche was the ende of thinges. And certes that 
is the thyng that every wyght desireth; and for 
as mochel as we han gadrid and comprehendid 
that good is thilke thing that is desired of alle, 
thanne mote we nedys confessen that good 
is the fyn of alle thinges.  
 
<S SAMPLE 4> 
<P 446.C2> 
[} (\TUM EGO FATEOR INQUAM.\) - PROSA 4}] 
 
   Thanne seide I thus: "I confesse and am 
aknowe it," quod I, "ne I ne se nat that men 
may seyn as by ryght that schrewes ne ben 
chaunged into beestes by the qualite of hir 
soules, al be it so that thei kepin yit the forme 
of the body of mankynde. But I nolde nat of 
schrewes, of whiche the thought crwel woodeth 
alwey into destruccion of gode men, that 
it were leveful to hem to don that." 
   "Certes," quod sche, "ne it is nat leveful 
to hem, as I schal wel schewen the in covenable 
place. But natheles, yif so were that 
thilke that men wenen ben leveful to schrewes 
were bynomyn hem, so that they ne myghte 
nat anoyen or doon harm to gode men, certes 
a gret partie of the peyne to schrewes scholde 
ben alegged and releved. For al be it so that 
this ne seme nat credible thing peraventure to 
some folk, yit moot it nedes be that 
schrewes ben more wrecches and unsely 
whan thei mai doon and parforme that 
thei coveyten, than yif thei ne myghte nat 
acomplissen that thei coveiten. For yif so 
be that it be wrecchidnesse to wilne to doon 
yvel, thanne is it more wrecchidnesse to mowe 
don yvel, withoute whiche mowynge the wrecchid  
wil scholde langwisse withouten effect. 
Thanne syn that everiche of thise thinges hath his 
wrecchidnesse (that is to seyn, wil to don 
ivel and mowynge to don yvel), it moot 
nedes be that thei schrewes ben constreyned by 
thre unselynesses, that wolen, and mowen, and 
parformen felonyes and schrewednesses." 
   "I acorde me, " quod I; "but I desire gretly 
that schrewes losten sone thilke unselynesses, 
that is to seyn, that schrewes weren despoyled 
of mowynge to don yvel." 
   "So schollen thei," quod sche, "sonnere peraventure 
than thou woldest, or sonnere 
than they hemselve wene. For ther nis 
nothing so late, in so schorte bowndes of 
this lif, that is long to abyde, nameliche to a corage 
immortel. Of whiche schrewes the grete 
hope and the heye compassynges of schrewednesses 
is ofte destroyed by a sodeyn ende, or 
<P 447.C1>
thei ben war; and that thing establisseth to 
schrewes the ende of hir schrewednesse. For 
yf that schrewednesse makith wrecches, than 
mot he nedes ben moost wrecchide that 
lengest is a schrewe. The whiche wikkide  
schrewes wolde I demen althermost unsely 
and kaytifs, yif that hir schrewednesse ne were 
fynissched at the leste weye by the owtreste 
deth; for yif I have concluded soth of the unselynesse  
of schrewednesse, thanne schewith it 
clerly that thilke wrecchidnesse is withouten 
ende the whiche is certein to ben perdurable." 
   "Certes," quod I, "this conclusion is hard and 
wondirful to graunte; but I knowe wel 
that it accordeth moche to the thinges that 
I have grauntid herebiforn." 
   "Thou hast," quod sche, "the ryght estimacion 
of this. But whosoevere wene that it be 
an hard thing to accorde hym to a conclusioun, 
it is ryght that he schewe that some 
of the premysses ben false, or elles he mot 
schewe that the collacioun of proposicions 
nis nat spedful to a necessarie conclusioun; 
and yif it ne be nat so, but that the premisses 
ben ygraunted, ther nys nat why he 
scholde blame the argument. For this thing 
that I schal telle the now ne schal nat seme 
lesse wondirful, but of the thingis that ben 
taken also it is necessarie." ( (^As who seith, it 
folweth of that which that is purposed 
byforn.^) ) 
   "What is that?" quod I. 
   "Certes," quod sche, "that is that thise wikkid 
schrewes ben more blisful, or elles 
lasse wrecches, that abyen the tormentz 
that thei han desservid, than if no peyne of 
justise ne chastisede hem. Ne this ne seie I 
nat now for that any man myghte thinke that 
the maneris of schrewes ben coriged and chastised 
by vengeaunce and that thei ben brought 
to the ryghte weye by the drede of the torment, 
ne for that they yeven to other folk ensaumple 
to fleen fro vices; but I undirstonde yit in another 
manere that schrewes ben more unsely 
whan thei ne ben nat punyssched, al 
be it so that ther ne be hadde no resoun or 
lawe of correccioun, ne noon ensample of 
lokynge." 
<P 447.C2>
   "And what manere schal that be," quod I, 
"other than hath ben told herbyforn?" 
   "Have we nat thanne graunted," quod sche, 
"that good folk ben blisful and schrewes ben 
wrecches?" 
   "Yis," quod I. 
   "Thanne," quod sche, "yif that any good 
were added to the wrecchidnesse of any 
wyght, nis he nat more blisful than he that 
ne hath no medlynge of good in his solitarie 
wrecchidnesse?" 
   "So semeth it," quod I. 
   "And what seistow thanne," quod sche, "of 
thilke wrecche that lakketh alle goodes so that 
no good nys medlyd in his wrecchidnesse, 
and yit over al his wikkidnesse, for which 
he is a wrecche, that ther be yit another 
yvel anexed and knyt to hym - schal nat 
men demen hym more unsely thanne thilke 
wrecche of whiche the unselynesse is relevid by 
the participacioun of som good?" 
   "Why sholde he nat?" quod I. 
   "Thanne certes," quod sche, "han schrewes, 
whan thei ben punyschid, somwhat of good 
anexid to hir wrecchidnesse (that is to seyn, the 
same peyne that thei suffren, which that is 
good by the resoun of justice); and whanne 
thilke same schrewes ascapen withouten 
torment, than han they somwhat more of yvel 
yit over the wikkidnesse that thei han don, that 
is to seyn, defaute of peyne, which defaute of 
peyne thou hast grauntid is yvel for the disserte 
of felonye?"      
   "I ne may nat denye it," quod I. 
   "Moche more thanne," quod sche, "ben 
schrewes unsely whan thei ben wrongfully  
delivred fro peyne, thanne whan thei 
ben punyschid by ryghtful vengeaunce. 
But this is opene thing and cleer, that it is ryght 
that schrewes ben punyschid, and it is wikkidnesse  
and wrong that thei escapen 
unpunyschid." 
   "Who myghte denye that?" quod I. 
   "But," quod sche, "may any man denye that 
al that is ryght nis good, and also the contrarie, 
that al that is wrong is wikke?" 
   "Certes," quod I, "thise thinges ben 
clere ynowe, and [{folwen that{] that we han 
concluded a lytel herebyforn. But I preye the 
<P 448.C1>
that thow telle me, yif thow accordest to leten 
no torment to the soules aftir that the body is 
ended by the deeth?" ( (^This to seyn, "Undirstondestow 
aught that soules han any 
torment aftir the deeth of the body?"^) ) 
   "Certes," quod sche, "ye, and that ryght 
greet. Of whiche soules," quod sche, "I 
trowe that some ben tormented by asprenesse  
of peyne, and some soules I trowe 
ben exercised by a purgynge mekenesse; but 
my conseil nys nat to determyne of thise peynes. 
   "But I have travailed and told yit hiderto for 
thou scholdest knowe that the mowynge of 
schrewes, whiche mowynge the semeth to ben 
unworthy, nis no mowynge; and ek of schrewes, 
of whiche thou pleynedest that they ne were nat 
punysschid, that thow woldest seen that 
thei ne were neveremo withouten the 
tormentz of hir wikkidnesse; and of the 
licence of mowynge to don yvel that thou 
preyedest that it myghte sone ben ended, and 
that thou woldest fayn lernen that it ne sholde 
nat longe endure, and that schrewes ben more 
unsely yif thei were of lengere durynge, and 
most unsely yif thei weren perdurable. And aftir 
this I have schewyd the that more unsely ben 
schrewes whan thei escapen withouten hir 
ryghtful peyne thanne whan thei ben 
punyschid by ryghtful venjaunce; and of 
this sentence folweth it that thanne ben schrewes 
constreyned at the laste with most grevous 
torment, whan men wene that thei ne ben nat 
punyssched." 
   "Whan I considere thi resouns," quod I, "I ne 
trowe nat that men seyn any thing more 
verrayly. And yif I turne ayein to the studies of 
men, who is he to whom it sholde seme that 
he ne scholde nat oonly leven thise thinges, 
but ek gladly herkne hem?" 
   "Certes," quod sche, "so it es - but men may 
nat. For they have hir eien so wont to the 
derknesse of erthly thinges that they ne may nat 
lyften hem up to the light of cler sothfastnesse, 
but thei ben lyk to briddes of whiche the nyght 
lightneth hir lokynge and the day blendith hem. 
For whan men loke nat the ordre of thinges, but 
hir lustes and talentz, they wene that either 
the leve or the mowynge to don wikkidnesse, 
or elles the scapynge withouten 
peyne be weleful. 
<P 448.C2>
   "But considere the jugement of the perdurable 
lawe. For yif thou conferme thi corage to the 
beste thinges, thow ne hast noon nede of no juge 
to yeven the prys or mede; for thow hast joyned 
thiself to the most excellent thing. And yif thow 
have enclyned thi studies to the wikkide thinges, 
ne seek no foreyne wrekere out of thiself; 
for thow thiself hast thrist thiself into wikke 
thinges, ryght as thow myghtest loken by 
diverse tymes the fowle erthe and the hevene, 
and that alle othere thinges stynten fro withoute, 
so that thow nere neyther in [{hevene{] ne in  
erthe, ne saye no thyng more; thanne scholde it 
semen to the as by oonly resoun of lokynge that 
thow were now in the sterres, and now in the 
erthe. But the peple ne loketh nat on these 
thinges. What thanne? Schal we thanne 
approchen us to hem that I have schewed 
that thei ben lyke to beestes? And what 
wyltow seyn of this: yif that a man hadde al 
forlorn his syghte, and hadde foryeten that he 
evere sawhe, and wende that no thing ne faylede 
hym of perfeccioun of mankynde; now we that 
myghten sen the same thinges - wolde we nat 
wene that he were blynd? Ne also ne accordeth 
nat the peple to that I schal seyn, the whiche 
thing is sustenyd by as stronge foundementz 
of resouns, that is to seyn, that 
more unsely ben they that doon wrong to 
othere folk, than they that the wrong suffren." 
   "I wolde here thilke same resouns," quod I. 
   "Denyestow," quod sche, "that alle schrewes 
ne ben worthy to han torment?" 
   "Nay," quod I. 
   "But," quod sche, "I am certein by many 
resouns that schrewes ben unsely." 
   "It accordeth," quod I. 
   "Thanne ne dowtestow nat," quod sche, 
"that thilke folk that ben worthy of 
torment, that they ne ben wrecches?" 
   "It accordeth wel," quod I. 
   "Yif thou were thanne iset a juge or a 
knowere of thinges, whethir trowestow that men 
scholden tormenten, hym that hath don the 
wrong or elles hym that hath suffred the 
wrong?" 
   "I ne doute nat," quod I, "that I nolde 
doon suffisaunt satisfaccioun to hym that 
hadde suffrid the wrong, by the sorwe of 
hym that hadde doon the wrong." 
<P 449.C1>
   "Thanne semeth it," quod sche, "that the 
doere of wrong is more wrecche than he that 
hath suffride wrong?" 
   "That folweth wel," quod I. 
   "Than," quod sche, "by thise causes and by 
othere causes that ben enforced by the same 
roote, that filthe [{of{] synne be the propre 
nature of it maketh men wrecches, [{it{] 
scheweth wel that the wrong that men 
doon nis nat the wrecchidnesse of hym that 
resceyveth the wrong, but the wrecchidnesse of 
hym that dooth the wrong. Bur certes," quod 
sche, "thise oratours or advocattes don al the 
contrarie; for thei enforcen hem to commoeve 
the juges to han pite of hem that han suffrid 
and resceyved the thinges that ben grevous 
and aspre, and yit men scholden more 
ryghtfully han pite of hem that doon the 
grevances and the wronges: the whiche 
schrewes it were a more covenable thing that the 
accusours or advocattes, nat wrooth but pytous 
and debonayre, ledden tho schrewes that han 
don wrong to the jugement ryght as men leden 
syke folk to the leche, for that thei sholden seken 
out the maladyes of synne by torment. And 
by this covenant, eyther the entent of the 
deffendours or advocatz sholde fayle and 
cesen in al, or elles, yif the office of 
advocatz wolde betre profiten to men, it 
scholde be torned into the habyte of accusacioun. 
( (^That is to seyn, thei scholden accuse 
schrewes, and nat excusen hem.^) ) And eek the 
schrewes hemself, yif it were leveful to hem to 
seen at any clifte the vertu that thei han forleten, 
and sawen that they scholden putten adoun the 
filthes of hir vices by the tormentz of peynes, 
they ne aughten nat, ryght for the 
recompensacioun for to geten hem bounte 
and prowesse whiche that thei han lost, 
demen ne holden that thilke peynes weren 
tormentz to hem; and eek thei wolden refuse the 
attendaunce of hir advocattz, and taken hemself 
to hir juges and to hir accusours. For whiche it 
betydeth that, as to the wise folk, ther nis no 
place yleten to hate ( (^that is to seyn, that hate 
ne hath no place among wise men^) ); for no 
wyght nil haten gode men, but yif he were 
overmochel a fool, and for to haten 
<P 449.C2>
schrewes it nis no resoun. For ryght so as 
langwissynge is maladye of body, ryght so ben 
vices and synne maladye of corage; and so as we 
ne deme nat that they that ben sike of hir body 
ben worthy to ben hated, but rather worthy of 
pite; wel more worthy nat to ben hated, but 
for to ben had in pite, ben thei of whiche 
the thoughtes ben constreyned by felonous 
wikkidnesse, that is more crwel than any 
langwissynge of body.  
 
<S SAMPLE 5> 
<P 450.C2> 
[} (\ITA EST INQUAM.\)  - PROSA 6}] 
 
   "Thus is it," quod I. "But so as thou hast 
yeven or byhyght me to unwrappen the hidde 
causes of thinges, and to discovere me the 
resouns covered with derknes, I preie the that 
thou devyse and juge me of this matere, and 
that thou do me to undirstonden it. For this 
miracle or this wonder trowbleth me ryght 
gretly." 
   And thanne sche, a litelwhat smylinge, 
seide: "Thou clepist me," quod sche, "to 
telle thing that is gretteste of alle thingis 
that mowen ben axed, and to the whiche questioun 
unnethes is ther aught inowh to laven 
it. (As who seith, unnethes is ther suffisauntly 
any thing to answeren parfitly to thy questioun.) 
For the matere of it is swich, that 
whan o doute is determined and kut awey, ther 
waxen othere doutes withoute nombre, ryght 
as the hevedes wexen of Idre, the serpent 
<P 451.C1>
that Hercules slowh. Ne ther ne were no 
manere ne noon ende, but if that a wyght 
constreynede tho doutes by a ryght lifly and 
quyk fir of thought (that is to seyn, by vigour 
and strengthe of wit). For in this matere 
men weren wont to maken questiouns of the 
symplicite of the purveaunce of God, and of 
the ordre of destyne, and of sodeyn hap, and 
of the knowynge and predestinacioun devyne, 
and of the liberte of fre wil; the whiche 
thinges thou thiself aperceyvest wel of 
what weighte thei ben. But for as moche 
as the knowynge of thise thinges is a maner 
porcioun of the medycyne to the, al be it so 
that I have litil tyme to doon it, yit natheles 
y wol enforcen me to schewe somwhat of it. 
But although the noryssynges of dite of musyk 
deliteth the, thou most suffren and forberen a 
litel of thilke delit, whil that I weve to the resouns 
yknyt by ordre." 
   "As it liketh to the," quod I, "so do." 
 
<Q M3 XX PHILO BOETHCH> 
<N BOETH CHAUCER> 
<A CHAUCER GEOFFREY> 
<C M3> 
<O 1350-1420> 
<M 1350-1420> 
<K X> 
<D EMO> 
<V PROSE> 
<T PHILOSOPHY> 
<G TRANSL> 
<F LATIN/FRENCH> 
<W WRITTEN> 
<X MALE> 
<Y 20-40> 
<H PROF HIGH> 
<U X> 
<E X> 
<J X> 
<I X> 
<Z X> 
 
<P 451.C1>
   Tho spak sche ryght as by another bygynnynge, 
and seide thus: "The engendrynge 
of alle thinges," quod sche, "and alle the progressiouns  
of muable nature, and al that moeveth 
in any manere, taketh his causes, his ordre, 
and his formes, of the stablenesse of the devyne 
thought. And thilke devyne thought that 
is iset and put in the tour (that is to seyn, in 
the heighte) of the simplicite of God, stablissith  
many maner gises to thinges that ben 
to done; the whiche manere whan that 
men looken it in thilke pure clennesse of the 
devyne intelligence, it is ycleped purveaunce; 
but whanne thilke manere is referred by men  
to thinges that it moeveth and disponyth, than 
of olde men it was clepyd destyne. The whiche 
thinges yif that any wyght loketh wel in his 
thought the strengthe of that oon and of that 
oothir, he schal lyghtly mowen seen that 
thise two thinges ben dyvers. For purveaunce 
is thilke devyne resoun that is establissed 
in the sovereyn prince of thinges, the 
whiche purveaunce disponith alle thinges; but, 
certes, destyne is the disposicioun and ordenance 
clyvynge to moevable thinges, by the 
whiche disposicion the purveaunce knytteth 
alle thingis in hir ordres; for purveaunce enbraceth 
alle thinges to-hepe, althoghe that thei 
<P 451.C2>
ben diverse and although thei ben infinit. 
But destyne, certes, departeth and ordeyneth 
alle thinges singulerly and devyded in 
moevynges in places, in formes, in tymes, as 
thus: lat the unfoldynge of temporel ordenaunce, 
assembled and oonyd in the lokynge 
of the devyne thought, be cleped purveaunce, 
and thilke same assemblynge and oonynge, devyded 
and unfolden by tymes, lat that ben 
called destyne. 
   "And al be it so that thise thinges ben 
diverse, yit natheles hangeth that oon of 
that oother; forwhi the ordre destynal 
procedith of the simplicite of purveaunce. For 
ryght as a werkman that aperceyveth in his 
thought the forme of the thing that he wol make, 
and moeveth the effect of the werk, and ledith 
that he hadde lookid byforn in his thought 
symplely and presently by temporel ordenaunce; 
certes, ryght so God disponith in his 
purveaunce singulerly and stablely the 
thinges that ben to doone; but he 
amynistreth in many maneris and in diverse 
tymes by destyne thilke same thinges that he 
hath disponyd. Thanne, whethir that destyne be 
exercised outhir by some devyne spiritz, 
servantz to the devyne purveaunce, or elles by 
some soule, or elles by alle nature servynge to 
God, or elles by the celestial moevynges of 
sterres, or ellis by vertu of aungelis, or elles by 
divers subtilite of develis, or elles by any of 
hem, or elles by hem alle the destinal 
ordenaunce is ywoven and acomplissid, 
certes, it es opene thing that the purveaunce is 
an unmoevable and symple forme of thinges 
to doone, and the moevable bond and the 
temporel ordenaunce of thinges whiche that the 
devyne symplicite of purveaunce hath ordeyned 
to doone, that is destyne. 
   "For whiche it is that alle thinges that ben 
put undir destyne ben certes subgitz to 
purveaunce, to whiche purveaunce destyne 
itself is subgit and under. But some thinges 
ben put undir purveaunce, that sourmounten 
the ordenance of destyne; and tho ben thilke 
that stablely ben ifycchid neyghe to the first 
godhede. They surmounten the ordre of 
destynal moevablete. For ryght as of cerklis that 
<P 452.C1>
tornen aboute a same centre or aboute a poynt, 
thilke cerkle that is innerest or most withinne 
joyneth to the symplesse of the myddle, 
and is, as it were, a centre or a poynt to the 
tothere cerklis that tornen abouten hym; 
and thilke that is utterest, compased by a largere 
envyrownynge, is unfolden by largere spaces in 
so moche as it is ferthest fro the myddel 
symplicite of the poynt; and yif ther be any thing 
that knytteth and felawschipeth hymself to thilke 
myddel poynt, it is constreyned into simplicite 
( (^that is to seyn, into unmoevablete^) ), and it 
ceseth to ben schad and to fleten diversely; 
ryght so, by semblable reson, thilke thing 
that departeth ferrest fro the firste thought 
of God, it is unfolden and summittid to grettere 
bondes of destyne; and in so moche is the thing 
more fre and laus fro destyne, as it axeth and 
hooldeth hym neer to thilke centre of thinges 
( (^that is to seyn, to God^) ); and yif the thing 
clyveth to the stedfastnesse of the thought of 
God and be withoute moevynge, certes it 
surmounteth the necessite of destyne. 
Thanne ryght swich comparysoun as is of 
skillynge to undirstondyng, and of thing 
that ys engendrid to thing that is, and of tyme to 
eternite, and of the cercle to the centre; ryght so 
is the ordre of moevable destyne to the stable 
symplicite of purveaunce. 
   "Thilke ordenaunce moveth the hevene and 
the sterres and atemprith the elementz togidre 
amonges hemself, and transformeth hem by 
entrechaungeable mutacioun. And thilke 
same ordre neweth ayein alle thinges 
growynge and fallynge adoun, by semblable 
progressions of sedes and of sexes (that 
is to seyn, male and femele). And this ilke 
ordre constreyneth the fortunes and the dedes of 
men by a bond of causes nat able to ben 
unbownde; the whiche destynal causes, whan 
thei passen out fro the bygynnynges of the 
unmoevable purveaunce, it moot nedes be that 
thei ne be nat mutable. And thus ben the 
thinges ful wel igoverned yif that the 
symplicite duellynge in the devyne thoght 
scheweth forth the ordre of causes unable to ben 
ibowed. And this ordre constreyneth by his 
<P 452.C2>
propre stablete the moevable thingis, or elles 
thei scholden fleten folyly. 
   "For whiche it es that alle thingis semen to 
ben confus and trouble to us men, for we ne 
mowen nat considere thilke ordenaunce. 
Natheles the propre maner of every thing, 
dressynge hem to gode, disponith hem alle, 
for ther nys no thing doon for cause of yvel, 
ne thilk thing that is doon by wikkid folk nys nat 
doon for yvel, the whiche schrewes, as I have 
schewed ful plentyvously, seken good, but 
wikkid errour mystorneth hem; ne the ordre 
comynge fro the poynt of sovereyn good ne 
declyneth nat fro his bygynnynge. 
   "But thou mayst seyn, 'What unreste may ben 
a worse confusioun than that gode men 
han somtyme adversite and somtyme 
prosperite, and schrewes also han now 
thingis that they desiren and now thinges that 
thei haten?' Whethir men lyven now in swich 
holnesse of thought (as who seith, ben men now 
so wyse) that swiche folk as thei demen to ben 
gode folk or schrewes, that it moste nedes ben 
that folk ben swiche as thei wenen? But in this 
manere the domes of men discorden, that thilke 
men that som folk demen worthy of mede, 
other folk demen hem worthy of torment. 
But lat us graunten, I pose, that som man 
may wel demen or knowen the good folk and 
the badde; may he thanne knowen and seen 
thilke innereste atempraunce of corages as it 
hath ben wont to ben seyd of bodyes? ( (^As who 
seith, may a man speken and determinen of 
atempraunce in corages, as men were wont to 
demen or speken of complexions and atempraunces 
of bodies?^) ) Ne it ne is nat an 
unlike miracle to hem that ne knowen it nat 
( (^as who seith, but it is lik a mervayle or 
miracle to hem that ne knowen it nat^) ) whi 
that swete thinges ben covenable to some bodies 
that ben hole, and to some bodies byttere 
thinges ben covenable; and also why that some 
syk folk ben holpen with lyghte medicynes, and 
some folk ben holpen with sharpe medicynes. 
But natheles the leche, that knoweth the manere 
and the atempraunce of hele and of 
maladye, ne merveyleth of it nothyng. But 
what othir thing semeth hele of corages but 
<P 453.C1>
bounte and prowesse? And what othir thing 
semeth maladye of corages but vices? Who is 
elles kepere of good or dryvere awey of yvel but 
God, governour and lechere of thoughtes? The 
whiche God, whan he hath byholden from the 
hye tour of his purveaunce, he knoweth what is 
covenable to every wight, and lenyth hem that 
he woot that is covenable to hem. Lo, herof 
comyth and herof is don this noble miracle 
of the ordre destynal, whan God, that al 
knoweth, dooth swiche thing, of whiche thing 
unknowynge folk ben astonyd. 
   "But for to constreyne ( (^as who seith, but for 
to comprehende and to telle^) ) a fewe thingis of 
the devyne depnesse, the whiche that mannys 
resoun may undirstonde, thilke man that thow 
wenest to ben ryght just and ryght kepynge of 
equite, the contrarie of that semeth to the 
devyne purveaunce, that al woot. And 
Lucan, my famylier, telleth that the 
victorious cause likide to the goddes, and the 
cause overcomen likide to Catoun. Thanne 
whatsoevere thou mayst seen that is doon in this 
world unhopid or unwened, certes it es the 
ryghte ordre of thinges, but as to thi wikkid 
opynioun it is a confusioun. But I suppose that 
som man be so wel ithewed that the devyne 
jugement and the jugement of mankynde 
accorden hem togidre of hym; but he is so 
unstidfast of corage that, yif any adversite 
come to hym, he wol forleten peraventure to 
continue innocence by the whiche he ne may 
nat withholden fortune. Thanne the wise 
dispensacion of God sparith hym, the whiche 
man adversite myghte enpeyren; for that God 
wol nat suffren hym to travaile to whom that 
travaile nis nat covenable. Anothir man is parfit 
in alle vertus, and is an holi man and neigh 
to God, so that the purveaunce of God 
wolde deme that it were a felonie that he 
were touched with any adversites; so that he wol 
nat suffre that swich a man be moeved with any 
bodily maladye. But so as seyde a philosophre, 
the more excellent by me - he seyde in Grec 
that 'vertues han edified the body of the holi 
man.' 
<P 453.C2>
   "And ofte tyme it betydeth that the somme of 
thingis that ben to done is taken to governe 
to good folk, for that the malice 
haboundaunt of schrewes scholde ben 
abated. And God yeveth and departeth to other 
folk prosperites and adversites imedled to-hepe 
aftir the qualite of hir corages, and remordith 
some folk by adversite, for thei ne scholden nat 
waxen proude by long welefulnesse; and other 
folk he suffreth to ben travailed with harde 
thinges for that thei scholden confermen the 
vertues of corage by the usage and the 
exercitacioun of pacience. And other folk 
dreden more than thei oughten the whiche 
thei myghte wel beren, and thilke folk God 
ledeth into experience of hemself by aspre and 
sorweful thingis. And many other folk han 
bought honourable renoun of this world by the 
prys of glorious deth; and som men, that ne 
mowen nat ben overcomen by torment, han 
yeven ensample to other folk that vertu mai nat 
ben overcomyn by adversites. And of alle 
thise thinges ther nis no doute that thei ne 
ben doon ryghtfully and ordeynly, to the 
profit of hem to whom we seen thise thingis 
betyde. 
   "For certes, that adversite cometh somtyme to 
schrewes and somtyme that that they desiren, it 
comith of thise forseyde causes. And of sorweful 
thinges that betyden to schrewes, certes, no man 
ne wondreth; for alle men wenen that thei han 
wel desservid it, and that thei ben of wykkid 
meryt. Of whiche schrewes the torment 
somtyme agasteth othere to don felonyes, 
and somtyme it amendeth hem that suffren the 
tormentz; and the prosperite that is yeven to 
schrewes scheweth a gret argument to good 
folk what thing thei scholde demen of thilke 
welefulnesse, the whiche prosperite men seen 
ofte serven to schrewes. In the whiche thing I 
trowe that God dispenseth. For peraventure the 
nature of som man is so overthrowynge to 
yvel, and so uncovenable, that the nedy 
poverte of his houshold myghte rather 
egren hym to don felonyes; and to the maladye 
of hym God putteth remedye to yeven hym 
<P 454.C1>
rychesses. And som othir man byholdeth his 
conscience defouled with synnes, and makith 
comparysoun of his fortune and of hymself, and 
dredith peraventure that his blisfulnesse, of 
whiche the usage is joyeful to hym, that the 
lesynge of thilke blisfulnesse ne be nat 
sorwful to hym; and therfore he wol 
chaunge his maneris, and, for he dredith to 
lesen his fortune, he forletith his wikkidnesse. 
To other folke is welefulnesse iyeven unworthely, 
the whiche overthroweth hem into 
destruccioun, that thei han disservid; and to som 
othir folk is yeven power to punysshen, for 
that it schal be cause of contynuacioun and 
exercisynge to good folk, and cause of torment 
to schrewes. For so as ther nis noon 
alliaunce bytwixe good folk and schrewes, 
ne schrewes ne mowen nat acorden among 
hemself. And whi nat? For schrewes discorden 
of hemself by hir vices, the whiche vices al 
toreenden her consciences, and doon ofte time 
thinges the whiche thingis, whan thei han doon 
hem, they demen that tho thinges ne scholden 
nat han ben doon. 
   "For whiche thing thilke sovereyne purveaunce 
hath makid ofte tyme fair 
myracle, so that schrewes han makid 
schrewes to ben gode men. For whan that 
some schrewes seen that they suffren wrongfully 
felonyes of othere schrewes, they wexen 
eschaufed into hate of hem that anoyed hem, 
and retornen to the fruyt of vertu, whan thei 
studien to ben unlyke to hem that thei han hated. 
Certis oonly this is the devyne myght to the 
whiche myghte yvelis ben thanne gode whan it 
useth the yvelis covenably and draweth out 
the effect of any good. ( (^As who seith that 
yvel is good oonly to the myghte of God, for 
the myght of God ordeyneth thilke yvel to 
good.^) ) 
   "For oon ordre enbraseth alle thinges, so that 
what wyght that departeth fro the resoun of 
thilke ordre whiche that is assigned to hym, 
algatis yit he slideth into an othir ordre; so that 
no thing nis leveful to folye in the reaume of the 
devyne purveaunce ( (^as who seith, no 
thing nis withouten ordenaunce in the 
reame of the devyne purveaunce^) ), syn that 
the ryght strong God governeth alle thinges in 
this world. For it nis nat leveful to man to 
comprehenden by wit, ne unfolden by word, 
alle the subtil ordenaunces and disposiciounis of 
<P 454.C2>
the devyne entente. For oonly it owghte suffise 
to han lokid that God hymself, makere of alle 
natures, ordeineth and dresseth alle thingis to 
gode; whil that he hasteth to withholden 
the thingis that he hath makid into his 
semblaunce ( (^that is to seyn, for to withholden 
thingis into gode, for he hymself is 
good^) ), he chasith out alle yvel fro the boundes 
of his comynalite by the ordre of necessite 
destinable. For whiche it folweth that, yif thou 
loke the purveaunce ordeynynge the thinges 
that men wenen ben outraious or haboundaunt 
in erthis, thou ne schalt nat seen in no place no 
thing of yvel. 
   "But I se now that thou art charged with 
the weyghte of the questioun, and wery 
with lengthe of my resoun, and that thou 
abydest som swetnesse of songe. Tak thanne this 
drawght, and, whanne thou art wel reffressched 
and refect, thou schalt be more stedfast to stye 
into heyere questions or thinges.



