248th REPORT

&htab;&htab;&htab; &htab;Paragraphs &htab; Pages

Introduction ....................................&htab; 1-23 1-11

Cases not calling for further examination .......&htab; 24-66 11-22

&htab;Case No. 1358 (Spain): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Spain presented by the &htab; Municipal Welfare and Health Workers' &htab; Union (SIBESA) ...........................&htab; 24-35 11-14

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 33-34 13

&htab;The Committee's recommendation .............&htab; 35 14

&htab;Case No. 1387 (Ireland): Complaints against &htab; the Government of Ireland presented by the &htab; Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the World &htab; Confederation of Organisations of the &htab; Teaching Profession and the International &htab; Federation of Free Teachers' Unions ......&htab; 36-66 14-22

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 60-65 20-22

&htab;The Committee's recommendation .............&htab; 66 22

Cases in which the Committee has reached definitive conclusions ........................&htab; 67-272 22-90

&htab;&htab;&htab; &htab;Paragraphs &htab; Pages

&htab;Case No. 1356 (Canada): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Canada (Quebec) &htab; presented by the World Confederation &htab; of Labour (WCL), the Quebec Central &htab; Teachers' Union (CEQ), and the World &htab; Confederation of Organisations of the &htab; Teaching Profession (WCOTP) ..............&htab; 67-147 22-44

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 132-146 39-43

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 147 44

APPENDIX &htab;&htab;&htab;

&htab;Cases Nos. 1363 and 1367 (Peru): Complaints &htab; against the Government of Peru presented &htab; by the Federation of Banking Employees of &htab; Peru and the Trade Union of Crew Members &htab; of the Humboldt Shipping Company SA ......&htab; 148-172 56-63

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 165-171 60-63

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 172 63

&htab;Case No. 1365 (Portugal): Complaints &htab; againstthe Government of Portugal &htab; presented by the National Federation of &htab; PublicEmployees' Trade Unions (FCSFP) and &htab; the Public Administration Trade Union &htab; Front (FESAP) ............................&htab; 173-204 63-71

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 197-203 69-71

&htab;The Committee's recommendation .............&htab; 204 71

&htab;Case No. 1370 (Portugal): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Portugal presented &htab; by the Workers' Union of the Southern &htab; and Islands Insurance Companies ..........&htab; 205-227 71-77

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 222-226 76-77

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 227 77

&htab;Case No. 1371 (Australia): Complaint &htab; against the Government of Australia/ &htab; Victoria presented by the Australian &htab; Building Construction Employees' and &htab; Builders Labourers' Federation ...........&htab; 228-257 78-85

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 250-256 83-85

ii

&htab;&htab;&htab; &htab;Paragraphs &htab; Pages

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 257 85

&htab;Case No. 1374 (Spain): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Spain presented by &htab; the Trade Union Confederation of &htab; Workers' Committees ......................&htab; 258-272 85-90

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 267-271 89-90

&htab;The Committee's recommendation .............&htab; 272 90

Cases in which the Committee requests to be kept informed of developments ......................&htab; 273-420 91-130

&htab;Case No. 1130 (United States): Complaint &htab; against the Government of the United &htab; States of America presented by the &htab; Capitol Employees Organising Group .......&htab; 273-298 91-98

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 294-297 96-98

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 298 98

&htab;Case No. 1330 (Guyana): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Guyana presented by &htab; the National Association of Agricultural, &htab; Commercial and Industrial Employees and &htab; five other trade unions ..................&htab; 299-310 98-101

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 306-309 100-101

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 310 101

&htab;Case No. 1346 (India): Complaint against &htab; the Government of India presented by &htab; the Federation of Medical and Sales &htab; Representatives' Associations of India &htab; (FMRAI) ..................................&htab; 311-322 101-104

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 318-321 103-104

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 322 104

&htab;Case No. 1377 (Brazil): Complaints against &htab; the Government of Brazil presented by the &htab; World Confederation of Labour (WCL) and &htab; the International Confederation of Free &htab; Trade Unions (ICFTU) .....................&htab; 323-330 104-106

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 328-330 106

&htab;&htab;&htab;&htab;&htab; iii

&htab;&htab;&htab; &htab;Paragraphs &htab; Pages

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 331 106

&htab;Case No. 1379 (Fiji): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Fiji presented by &htab; the International Confederation of &htab; Free Trade Unions ........................&htab; 332-362 107-114

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ...............&htab; 351-361 111-113

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 362 113-114

&htab;Case No. 1380 (Malaysia): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Malaysia presented &htab; by the International Metalworkers' &htab; Federation ...............................&htab; 363-380 114-120

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 375-379 118-120

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 380 120

&htab;Case No. 1381 (Ecuador): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Ecuador presented by &htab; the International Confederation of Free &htab; Trade Unions (ICFTU) .....................&htab; 381-420 121-130

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 411-419 127-129

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 420 130

Cases in which the Committee has reached interim conclusions ...................................&htab; 421-523 130-169

&htab;Cases Nos. 1129 and 1351 (Nicaragua): &htab; Complaints against the Government of &htab; Nicaragua presented by the Latin American &htab; Central of Workers, the World &htab; Confederationof Labour and the &htab; International Organisation of &htab; Employers ...............................&htab; 421-436 130-139

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 432-435 137-138

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 436 138-139

&htab;Case No. 1309 (Chile): Complaint against &htab; the Government of Chile presented by the &htab; International Confederation of Free Trade &htab; Unions (ICFTU), the World Confederation of &htab; Labour (WCL), the World Federation of &htab; Trade Unions (WFTU) and other trade &htab; union organisations ......................&htab; 437-492 139-152

iv

&htab;&htab;&htab; &htab;Paragraphs &htab; Pages

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 478-491 148-150

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 492 150-152

&htab;Case No. 1343 (Colombia): Complaints &htab; against the Government of Colombia &htab; presented by the World Federation of &htab; Trade Unions and the Trade Union &htab; Confederation of Colombian Workers .......&htab; 493-503 152-162

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 500-502 160-161

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 503 161-162

ANNEX &htab;&htab;&htab;

&htab;Case No. 1376 (Colombia): Complaint &htab; against the Government of Colombia &htab; presented by the Union of Workers of &htab; the National Coffee-Trade Federation &htab; of Colombia (SINTRAFEC) ..................&htab; 504-523 163-169

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 518-522 167-168

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 523 168-169

249th REPORT

Introduction ....................................&htab; 1-4 170

Cases Nos. 997, 999 and 1029 (Turkey) Complaints &htab; against the Government of Turkey &htab; presented by the World Confederation of &htab; Labour, the World Federation of Trade &htab; Uninons, the International Confederation &htab; of Free Trade Unions and several other &htab; trade union organisations

&htab; Representation submitted by the General &htab; Confederation of Norwegian Trade Unions &htab; under article 24 of the Constitution, &htab; concerning non-observance of the Right of &htab; Association (Agriculture) Convention, &htab; 1921 (No. 11), and the Right to Organise &htab; and Collective Bargaining Convention, &htab; 1949 (No. 98) by Turkey ..................&htab; 5-31 170-178

&htab;&htab;&htab;&htab;&htab; v

&htab;&htab;&htab; &htab;Paragraphs &htab; Pages

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 21-30 175-177

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 31 177-178

250th REPORT

Introduction ....................................&htab; 1-3 179

&htab;Case No. 1364 (France) Representation &htab; against the Government of France pursuant &htab; to article 24 of the Constitution made by &htab; the General Federation of Labour

&htab; Complaint against the Government of &htab; France presented by the Trade Unions &htab; International of Textile, Clothing, &htab; Leather and Fur Workers ..................&htab; 4-143 179-220

&htab; The Committee's conclusions ..............&htab; 119-142 215-220

&htab;The Committee's recommendations ............&htab; 143 223

vi

Earlier reports of the Committee on Freedom of Association have been published as follows:

Report&htab;Publication

&htab;Reports of the International Labour Organisation &htab;to the United Nations (Geneva, ILO)

1-3&htab;Sixth Report (1952), Appendix V 4-6&htab;Seventh Report (1953), Appendix V 7-12&htab;Eighth Report (1954), Appendix II

&htab;Official Bulletin

&htab;Volume &htab;Year&htab;Number

13-14&htab;XXXVII&htab;1954&htab;4 15-16&htab;XXXVIII&htab;1955&htab;1 17-18&htab;XXXIX&htab;1956&htab;1 19-24 &htab;XXXIX&htab;1956&htab;4 25-26&htab;XL&htab;1957&htab;2 27-28 &htab;XLI&htab;1958&htab;3 29-45&htab;XLIII&htab;1960&htab;3 46-57&htab;XLIV&htab;1961&htab;3 58&htab;XLV&htab;1962&htab;1 S 59-60&htab;XLV&htab;1962&htab;2 SI 61-65&htab;XLV&htab;1962&htab;3 SII 66&htab;XLVI&htab;1963&htab;1 S 67-68&htab;XLVI&htab;1963&htab;2 SI 69-71&htab;XLVI&htab;1963&htab;3 SII 72&htab;XLVII&htab;1964&htab;1 S 73-77&htab;XLVII&htab;1964&htab;3 SII 78&htab;XLVIII&htab;1965&htab;1 S 79-81&htab;XLVIII&htab;1965&htab;2 S 82-84&htab;XLVIII&htab;1965&htab;3 SII 85&htab;XLIX&htab;1966&htab;1 S 86-88&htab;XLIX&htab;1966&htab;2 S 89-92&htab;XLIX&htab;1966&htab;3 SII 93&htab;L&htab;1967&htab;1 S 94-95&htab;L&htab;1967&htab;2 S

The letter S, followed as appropriate by a roman numeral, indicates a supplement.

For communications relating to the 23rd and 27th Reports see Official Bulletin , Vol. XLIII, 1960, No. 3.

&htab;&htab;&htab;&htab;&htab; vii

Report&htab;Publication

&htab;Volume&htab;Year&htab;Number

96-100&htab;L&htab;1967&htab;3 SII 101&htab;LI&htab;1968&htab;1 S 102-103&htab;LI&htab;1968&htab;2 S 104-106&htab;LI&htab;1968&htab;4 S 107-108&htab;LII&htab;1969&htab;1 S 109-110&htab;LII&htab;1969&htab;2 S 111-112&htab;LII&htab;1969&htab;4 S 113-116&htab;LIII&htab;1970&htab;2 S 117-119&htab;LIII&htab;1970&htab;4 S 120-122&htab;LIV&htab;1971&htab;2 S 123-125&htab;LIV&htab;1971&htab;4 S 126-133&htab;LV&htab;1972&htab; S 134-138&htab;LVI&htab;1973&htab; S 139-145&htab;LVII&htab;1974&htab; S 146-148&htab;LVIII&htab;1975&htab;Series B, Nos. 1-2 149-152&htab;LVIII&htab;1975&htab; " No. 3 153-155&htab;LIX&htab;1976&htab; " No. 1 156-157&htab;LIX&htab;1976&htab; " No. 2 158-159&htab;LIX&htab;1976&htab; " No. 3 160-163&htab;LX&htab;1977&htab; " No. 1 164-167&htab;LX&htab;1977&htab; " No. 2 168-171&htab;LX&htab;1977&htab; " No. 3 172-176&htab;LXI&htab;1978&htab; " No. 1 177-186&htab;LXI&htab;1978&htab; " No. 2 187-189&htab;LXI&htab;1978&htab; " No. 3 190-193&htab;LXII&htab;1979&htab; " No. 1 194-196&htab;LXII&htab;1979&htab; " No. 2 197-198&htab;LXII&htab;1979&htab; " No. 3 199-201&htab;LXIII&htab;1980&htab; " No. 1 202-203&htab;LXIII&htab;1980&htab; " No. 2 204-206&htab;LXIII&htab;1980&htab; " No. 3 207&htab;LXIV&htab;1981&htab; " No. 1 208-210&htab;LXIV&htab;1981&htab; " No. 2 211-213&htab;LXIV&htab;1981&htab; " No. 3 214-216&htab;LXV&htab;1982&htab; " No. 1 217&htab;LXV&htab;1982&htab; " No. 2 218-221&htab;LXV&htab;1982&htab; " No. 3 222-225&htab;LXVI&htab;1983&htab; " No. 1 226-229&htab;LXVI&htab;1983&htab; " No. 2 230-232&htab;LXVI&htab;1983&htab; " No. 3 233&htab;LXVII&htab;1984&htab; " No. 1 234-235&htab;LXVII&htab;1984&htab; " No. 2 236-237&htab;LXVII&htab;1984&htab; " No. 3 238&htab;LXVIII&htab;1985&htab; " No. 1 239-240&htab;LXVIII&htab;1985&htab; " No. 2 241-242&htab;LXVIII&htab;1986&htab; " No. 3

viii

Report&htab;Publication

&htab;Volume&htab;Year&htab;Number

243&htab;LXIX&htab;1986&htab;Series B, No. 1 241-242&htab;LXVIII&htab;1985&htab; " No. 3 243&htab;LXIX&htab;1986&htab; " No. 1 244-245&htab;LXIX&htab;1986&htab; " No. 2 246-247&htab;LXIX&htab;1986&htab; " No. 3

&htab;&htab;&htab; ix

248th REPORT INTRODUCTION

&htab;1.&htab;The Committee on Freedom of Association, set up by the Governing Body at its 117th Session (November 1951), met at the International Labour Office, Geneva, on 23, 24 and 26 February 1987 under the chairmanship of Mr. Roberto Ago, former Chairman of the Governing Body.

&htab;2.&htab;The members of the Committee of Indian, Spanish, French and Australian nationality were not present during the examination of the cases relating to India (Case No. 1346), Spain (Cases Nos. 1358 and 1374), France (Case No. 1364) and Australia/Victoria (Case No. 1371), respectively.

* * *

&htab;3.&htab;The Committee is currently seized of 63 cases [this figure includes the cases relating to Turkey (Cases Nos. 997, 999 and 1029) and France (Case No. 1364) which are examined in the 249th and 250th Reports respectively] in which the complaints have been submitted to the governments concerned for observations. At its present meeting it examined 26 cases in substance, reaching definitive conclusions in 18

The 248th, 249th and 250th Reports were examined and approved by the Governing Body at its 235th Session (March 1987).

cases and interim conclusions in 8 cases; the remaining cases were adjourned for the various reasons set out in the following paragraphs.

* * *

&htab;4. &htab;New cases : The Committee adjourned until its next meeting the cases relating to Greece (Case No. 1384), Peru (Case No. 1386), Morocco (Case No. 1388), United Kingdom (Case No. 1391) and Venezuela (Case No. 1392) concerning which it is still awaiting information or observations from the governments concerned. All these cases relate to complaints submitted since the last meeting of the Committee.

&htab;5. &htab;Adjournments : The Committee awaits observations or information from the governments or complainants concerning the cases relating to Nicaragua (Cases Nos. 1298, 1344 and 1372), Morocco (Case No. 1340), Portugal (Case No. 1382) and Pakistan (Case No. 1383). As regards Case No. 1352 (Israel), the Committee is still awaiting receipt of further information requested from the complainant organisation. As regards Cases Nos. 1271 and 1369 (Honduras) and 1385 (New Zealand), the Governments concerned have transmitted certain observations and additional information is awaited. The Committee again adjourned these cases and requests the governments of these countries to transmit the information or observations requested.

&htab;6.&htab;As regards Cases Nos. 1273 (El Salvador), 1327 (Tunisia), 1341 (Paraguay), 1362 (Spain), 1389 (Norway) and 1390 (Israel) the Committee has received the observations of these governments and intends to examine these cases in substance at its next meeting.

&htab;7.&htab;As regards Case No. 1190 (Peru), the Committee had requested the Government to supply information on the alleged detention of trade unionists in 1983 following a national strike (see 233rd Report, para. 295). In a communication dated 9 October 1986, the Government indicates that Jorge Ravines Bartre and Juan Calle Mendoza are listed as "not detained" in the report presented by the 4th Criminal Prosecutor's Office to the 19th Magistrate's Court in Lima. The Government adds that in this report there is no mention of any proceedings being taken against Mr. Hernán Espinoza Segovia. Lastly, the Government indicates that, as soon as it receives additional information from the judicial authorities, it will transmit this to the Committee.

&htab;8.&htab;As regards Case No. 1199 (Peru), which the Committee examined in its 233rd Report (see, in particular, para. 295), the Government, in its communication of 23 October 1986, states that the investigation into the death of the miner Gelacio Bernado Mendoza and the physical attacks on other workers of the Santa Luisa S.A. mining company in March 1983, has not resulted in the identification of the person, or persons, responsible; there are, therefore, no proceedings under way concerning the matter. The Committee takes note of this information and regrets that it was not possible to identify the guilty parties.

&htab;9.&htab;In connection with Case No. 1250 (Belgium), which the Committee adjourned at its February 1986 meeting at the request of the Government (see 243rd Report, para. 8, February 1986), it had expressed the wish to have the decision of the Council of State concerning the National Federation of Independent Trade Union's (UNSI) appeal to annul the Order of the Minister of Employment and Labour refusing this organisation a seat on the National Labour Council. The Committee would recall, as it did already in Case No. 1373 (Belgium) in its 246th Report, para. 11 (November 1986) that its competence to examine allegations is not subject to the exhaustion of national procedures and that it will only suspend its examination of cases for a reasonable period to await a court's decision. The Government states in its communication of 14 January 1987 that it does not have any additional information on the matter and that it will not present further observations. It points out that the procedures before the Council of State, because of their formal and distinct character, usually take some time to be heard and it is difficult to estimate when a decision will be handed down. The Committee notes that the original UNSI complaint was presented to the Committee on 18 June 1983 and that this organisation appealed to the Council of State on 5 December 1985. The Committee considers that it can only adjourn its examination of this case for a reasonable period and consequently, given the time that has elapsed since the complaint was presented, intends to examine the substance of this matter at its next meeting.

&htab;10.&htab;As regards Case No. 1373 (Belgium) which concerns a complaint presented to the Committee in July 1986 by the Belgian Federation of Automobile and Cycle Industries (FEBIAC) and which also concerns a question of representativity within the Joint Committee for garages (see 246th Report, para. 11), the Committee had adjourned this case in view of the Government's explanation that this employers' organisation had presented an appeal to the Council of State requesting the annulment of the decision that it is not considered as being representative for the garage sector. The Committee takes note of the Government's reply dated 14 January 1987 to the effect that, as in Case No. 1250, the trials pending before the Council of State take some time and it is not possible to estimate when a decision will be handed down. The Committee would recall that it can only adjourn its examination of the case for a reasonable period and thus hopes to have the decision of the Council of State at an early date.

&htab;11.&htab;As regards Case No. 1375 (Spain), the Committee has already received the Government's reply. The Committee notes that an appeal is pending before the competent courts concerning the constitutionality of one provision of the 1984 State General Budget Act, whose coverage of certain categories of workers is objected to by the complainant organisation. The Committee, recalling that its procedures are not subject to the exhaustion of procedures at the national level, decides to examine this case in substance at its next meeting.

URGENT APPEALS

&htab;12.&htab;The Committee notes that in spite of the time which has elapsed since the last examination of Cases Nos. 953, 973 and 1168 (El Salvador), Cases Nos. 1176, 1195, 1215 and 1262 (Guatemala), Case No. 1219 (Liberia), Cases Nos. 1275 and 1368 (Paraguay), Case No. 1337 (Nepal), and Case No. 1361 (Nicaragua), the observations and information requested of the Governments have not yet been received. The Committee draws these Governments' attention to the fact that, in conformity with the procedural rules set out in paragraph 17 of the Committee's 127th Report approved by the Governing Body, it will present a report at its next meeting on the substance of these cases even if the Governments' observations have not been received at that date. The Committee accordingly requests these governments to transmit their observations as a matter of urgency.

* * *

&htab;13.&htab;The Committee draws the legislative aspects of the following cases to the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations: Cases Nos. 997, 999 and 1029 (Turkey), 1330 (Guyana), 1367 (Peru), 1370 (Portugal) and 1379 (Fiji).

Effect given to the recommendations of the Committee and of the Governing Body

&htab;14.&htab;As regards Case No. 792 (Japan) the Committee recalls that, at its meeting in May 1986 (244th Report, para. 15, approved by the Governing Body at its 233rd Session, May-June 1986), it noted information transmitted by the World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession and observations thereon submitted by the Government concerning sentences passed by the High Court of Tokyo in cases concerning Mr. Makieda and Mr. Masuda, leaders of the Japan Teachers' Union (NIKKYOSO). The Committee recalled that it has acknowledged that the right to strike may be restricted or even prohibited in the civil service - civil servants being those who act on behalf of the public authorities - or in essential services in the strict sense of the term, i.e. services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. The Committee pointed out that teachers do not fall within the above definition of essential services. It drew the Government's attention - as had the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations in its observations on Japan's application of Convention No. 87 - to the principle that penal sanctions should only be imposed where there are violations of strike prohibitions that are in conformity with the principles of freedom of association. The Committee accordingly urged the Government to re-examine its legislation in the light of the above considerations and to keep it informed of the outcome of the appeal against the prison sentences lodged by the union leaders in this case.

&htab;In a communication dated 16 January 1987, the Government of Japan, referring to the above statement of the Committee, suggests that these conclusions reached by the Committee did not wholly correspond with those reached in the same case in November 1978 (187th Report, paras. 69-141) in which, the Government points out, the Committee expressly stated that "as regards public officials, recognition of the principle of freedom of association does not necessarily imply the right to strike" (para. 135 of the 187th Report) and that "having regard to the fact that strike action is prohibited by law as regards this category of workers, the imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions, or, as in the present case, the arrest and prosecution under the ordinary law of persons who instigate or incite local public personnel to strike cannot be said to be violations of the principle of freedom of association" (ibid., para. 138).

&htab;The Committee would explain that, in reaching the conclusions it did in 1978 in the case before it, it had regard to the principles cited above by the Government and to the entire circumstances in which the strike instigated by the persons who were ultimately convicted took place. The conclusions were based on certain facts or indications that the said strike was, at least to a degree, political in character and, in addition, that it had been pre-arranged very far in advance of its taking place. Since the Committee has, on a number of occasions, pointed out that strikes of a political character, as well as strikes decided systematically long before negotiations take place do not fall within the scope of the principle of freedom of association [see Digest of Decisions and Principles of CFA, para. 372], it held in 1978 that the action taken under the law against the teachers in question could not, in the circumstances, constitute a violation of freedom of association.

&htab;As regards the right to strike for public servants the Committee would recall that, prior to its General Survey of 1983, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations had generally followed the principle that, as regards the public service, recognition of the principle of freedom of association did not necessarily imply the right to strike. Already, however, in its General Surveys of 1959 and 1973, the Committee of Experts had suggested that the outright prohibition of the right to strike should be confined to public servants acting in their capacity as agents of the public authority or to those services that are strictly essential. [See RCE, Report III, Part IV, ILC, 43rd Session 1959, para. 68 and RCE, Report III, Part 4B, ILC 58th Session, 1973, para. 109.] The Committee of Experts redefined this principle in 1983 in its General Survey on freedom of association, pointing out that services that are essential in the strict sense of the term are those whose interruption would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population. [RCE, Report III, Part 4B, ILC, 69th Session, 1983, para. 214.] This principle has since been emphasised on numerous occasions by the Governing Body on the recommendation of the Committee.

&htab;In this connection the Committee considers it appropriate to recall that the Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association concerning persons employed in the Public Service in Japan, in 1966, commenting on the pledge made by the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (SOHYO) to pursue its goal of the total restoration of the right to strike for public employees, and the Government's view that the absolute prohibition of the right to strike should be maintained indefinitely in the public sector, stated that both views were unduly rigid and unrealistic. It believed that in Japan, as in other countries, a reasonable compromise was both possible and necessary. [Report of the Fact Finding and Conciliation Commission on Freedom of Association concerning Persons Employed in the Public Sector in Japan, Official Bulletin, Vol. XLIX, No.1, January 1966, Special Supplement, paras. 2134-2135.]

&htab;The Committee draws the above principles and explanations to the attention of the Government for further consideration at the national level.

&htab;15.&htab;As regards Case No. 1040 (Central African Republic), the Committee noted at its November 1986 meeting that the Minister of Labour agreed before the Committee on the Application of Standards of the 72nd International Labour Conference (June 1986) that a direct contacts mission be sent to the Central African Republic in order to examine the questions raised in the comments formulated by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations concerning Convention No. 87. Subsequently, in a communication of 13 January 1987 the Government confirmed its agreement that this mission take place. The Committee welcomes the positive attitude of the Government of the Central African Republic and hopes that it will be able to indicate soon the most acceptable dates on which the direct contacts mission can take place.

&htab;16.&htab;As regards Case No. 1074 (United States), the Committee had requested the Government to continue to inform it of the outcome of the appeals pending before various appeal bodies against the dismissals of air traffic controllers after a strike in 1981. In a communication of 7 November 1986, the Government states that, as at 27 October 1986, 444 reinstatements had been ordered and that, following the issuance of the "lead case" decision in May 1984, 3,378 controllers had renewed their appeals, 31 of which were still pending. 490 of the renewed appeals were subsequently dismissed voluntarily by the appellants and 1,086 were dismissed by the appeal body, the Federal Circuit Court. The Government states that in 1,754 cases the Court affirmed the controllers' removal; in 12 cases it reversed the removal orders and 5 cases were remanded to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The Committee takes note of the information provided by the Government and requests it to continue to inform the Committee of the outcome of the cases still pending before appeal bodies.

&htab;17.&htab;As regards Case No. 1282 (Morocco), the Committee had requested the Government at its November 1985 meeting (see 241st Report, para. 421) to keep it informed of the outcome of the appeals lodged by the workers who had been dismissed for having participated in 48-hour and 24-hour strikes in January and February 1984 in the Computers Vincent undertaking in Mohammedia. In a communication dated 13 November 1986, the Government states that the court of first instance at Mohammedia, in a judgement dated 19 December 1985, ordered the employer to compensate the dismissed workers. The Government points out, however, that this judgement did not satisfy the parties, both of whom have appealed to the appropriate appeals court. The Committee takes note of this information and awaits receipt from the Government of a copy of the judgement to be handed down in these cases.

&htab;18.&htab;As regards Case No. 1304 (Costa Rica), concerning a representation presented by various trade union organisations under article 24 of the ILO Constitution for the non-observance by Costa Rica of international labour Conventions, the Committee examined this representation at its May 1985 meeting (see 240th Report, paras. 65 to 102) and, in its recommendations, inter alia, drew the Government's attention to the fact that the ILO's technical assistance might contribute effectively to the drafting of a text to reform the Labour Code so as to bring it into conformity with Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. In a communication of 26 December 1985, the Government stated that, as regards the request for the ILO's technical assistance, it would make a formal request to the ILO Office in San José. Subsequently, in a communication of 24 March 1986, the Government states that it will try to give effect to what was requested in this case. The Committee would once again draw the Government's attention to the need to amend the Labour Code so as to bring it into conformity with the international Conventions ratified by Costa Rica. It therefore invites the Government to consider the possibility of accepting the ILO's offer of technical assistance and to inform it as soon as possible of the decision taken in this respect.

&htab;19.&htab;As regards Case No. 1353 (Philippines) in which the Committee requested the Government to keep it informed of developments concerning the investigation related to the Escalante massacre (see 246th Report, November 1986), the Government, in a letter dated 20 January 1987, states that the military authorities in Negros Province have reported that 29 of the 46 accused are now in their custody. These are eight soldiers, 15 policemen and six firemen who allegedly took part in the massacre of 20 September 1985. Warrants for the arrest of all the accused have been issued by the court and no bail was recommended by the prosecutors. The Government explains why, in a related development, the Sandiganbayan (the special court investigating the Escalante case) decided to drop the multiple murder and attempted murder charges against one of the accused, the former Negros del Norte Governor Armando Gustillo. The Committee takes note of this information and requests the Government to continue to supply information on progress in the investigation, in particular details concerning the trial of the accused.

&htab;20.&htab;As regards the case concerning Greece (Case No. 1354) the Committee had examined this case at its February 1986 meeting and presented definitive conclusions to the Governing Body [see 243rd Report, paras. 312-343]. At its meeting in November 1986, the Committee noted that on 30 May 1986 the Government had sent certain information on the effect given to its recommendations and that on 17 June 1986 the complainants had supplied information on some aspects of this case, in which they allege interference in trade union activities by the Government and by the courts. The Government, to whom the information was transmitted, replied in a communication dated 27 October 1986.

&htab;In its reply, the Government observes that the most recent allegations of the complainants refer to questions which were examined by the Committee in its 243rd Report. It considers that this report of the Committee has a definitive character, that it was adopted by the Governing Body of the ILO and that it may not be the subject of re-examination, modification or revision. However, it reiterates the opinion which it had previously expressed on the various allegations, and adds that the court which appointed on 4 December 1985 an interim administrative council of the CGTG entrusted with convening a congress within the next four months, took account of the results of the elections of the 22nd Congress of 1983 and appointed trade unionists belonging to all trade union tendencies, in proportion to their electoral strength at the time of the last congress. The Government considers that the complainants' allegation concerning the convening of an extraordinary congress by the CGTG administration (namely the Group of 26) is not an argument against the appointment by the court of an interim administrative council since the Magistrate's Court of Athens had, as early as 25 November 1985, issued an order staying the execution of the decisions of the the Group of 26; consequently, any such congress, if it had taken place, would have been ipso facto null and void, and this would have resulted in the prolongation of the crisis.

&htab;The Government explains once again the reasons for which it adopted, for a limited period, the measures to protect the national economy and the accompanying safeguards. It states that the legislative text has a duration which is limited to the period 1986-87 and adds that a national general collective agreement has provided for minimum wage increases at the national level for 1986. Furthermore, the Government repeats the information which it had already furnished on the subject of the 23rd Pan-Hellenic Congress of the CGTG in its communication of 30 May 1986. It mentions, in particular, the very large number of international and foreign trade union organisations which attended the work of the Congress. Thus, according to the Govenment, the crisis created in the trade union affairs of the country is gradually moving towards a definitive solution thanks to the trade union organisations concerned and the legal and statutory procedures, without any intervention by the State.

&htab;The Committee has taken note of the additional information supplied by the complainants as well as by the Government. It observes that the complainants denounce the manoeuvres of the administration which had been appointed by the courts in the organisation of this congress. It also observes that the Government refutes this allegation and that it indicates that in appointing an interim administrative council to convene a congress within the next four months, the court took account of the results of the election of the 22nd Congress of 1983 and appointed trade unionists from all trade union tendencies in proportion to their electoral strength at the time of the last Congress. The Committee notes that in accordance with the decision of the court, the Congress was in fact held within the next four months, that a large number of the 609 representatives of the trade union organisations of the country who should have participated abstained since the new administration of the CGTG had been elected by only 290 representatives, and that representatives of many international and foreign trade union organisations attended the Congress. The Committee considers that even if a large number of delegates abstained from designating the new administration of the CGTG, it is not within the competence of the Committee to assess the reasons for which these delegates abstained, unless their decision was the result of interference by the Government in trade union affairs.

&htab;In addition, as regards measures interfering in the wage-fixing process the Committee hopes that in future the Government will take the necessary steps to ensure that the matters regarding the wage-fixing process are resolved by negotiation between the parties.

&htab;21.&htab;As regards Cases Nos. 1016 and 1258 (El Salvador), 1100 (India), 1157 and 1192 (Philippines), 1191 (Chile), 1216, 1268 and 1307 (Honduras), 1230 and 1348 (Ecuador), 1261 (United Kingdom), 1270, 1294, 1313 and 1331 (Brazil), 1279 (Portugal), 1296 (Antigua and Barbuda), 1350 (Canada/British Columbia) and 1360 (Dominican Republic), the Committee again requests these Governments to keep it informed of developments in these cases. The Committee hopes that these Governments will communicate the information requested at an early date.

* * *

&htab;22.&htab;As regards Cases Nos. 988 and 1003 (Sri Lanka), 1175 (Pakistan), 1189 (Kenya) and 1277 and 1288 (Dominican Republic), the Committee regrets that despite repeated appeals the governments concerned have not replied to its request to be kept informed of developments in these various matters. The Committee would recall that: &htab;In Cases Nos. 988 and 1003 (Sri Lanka) , it had requested the Government to endeavour to reinstate workers who had been unemployed for more than five years for having participated in a strike which took place in July 1980 and to transmit its observations on certain allegations formulated at a later stage by the Trade Unions International of Public and Allied Employees according to which the Government continued to take reprisals against civil servants who had participated in the strike. The Committee would again draw the Government's attention to the principle that the imposition of excessively severe measures, such as mass dismissals or refusal to reinstate workers because of participation in a strike which is recognised as a legitimate means of defending the workers' occupational interests, constitutes a violation of freedom of association.

&htab;In Case No. 1175 (Pakistan) , the Committee had requested the Government to keep it informed of any decisions taken relating to acts of anti-union discrimination (dismissals, downgrading, transfer). The Committee had requested the Government to submit these cases to the National Commission of Industrial Relations or to the judicial authorities in order to obtain the reinstatement of those workers who had been dismissed for legitimate trade union activities. The Committee regrets once again that the Government has not replied to this request for information.

&htab;In Case No. 1189 (Kenya) , the Committee had requested the Government to keep it informed of the measures taken to permit the establishment of trade unions in the public service and to send information on the assets that were confiscated following the cancellation of the registration of the Association of Public Servants of Kenya. The Committee would again draw the Government's attention to the importance of the principle that all workers, including public servants, without distinction whatsoever, should be able to establish and join organisations of their own choosing, without previous authorisation, to further and defend their occupational interests. It regrets that the Government has not replied to its request for information on the confiscated assets and draws the Government's attention to the principle that when a union is dissolved, its assets should be distributed among its members or handed over to the organisation which succeeds it where that organisation or organisations pursue the aims for which the dissolved union was established and do so in the same spirit.

&htab;In Cases Nos. 1277 and 1288 (Dominican Republic) , the Committee had requested the Government to carry out an impartial judicial inquiry into the nature of the protest demonstration of April 1984 as well as into the deaths and injuries which had occurred on that occasion and to keep it informed of the results of such an inquiry. The Committee regrets that the Government has not replied to its request for information and would stress the importance of carrying out an independent judicial inquiry into the protest movements and the deaths and injuries which occurred at that time so as to identify those responsible.

&htab;23.&htab;The Committee expresses the firm hope that, in all these cases, the governments concerned will take the necessary measures to give full effect to the recommendations of the Committee and of the Governing Body.

CASES NOT CALLING FOR FURTHER EXAMINATION Case No. 1358 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN PRESENTED BY THE MUNICIPAL WELFARE AND HEALTH WORKERS' UNION (SIBESA)

&htab;24.&htab;The complaint is contained in a communication of the Municipal Welfare and Health Workers' Union dated 28 November 1985; new allegations were sent by this organisation in communications dated 12 November and 2 December 1986. The Government sent its observations in communications dated 31 October 1986 and 9 January 1987.

&htab;25.&htab;Spain has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

&htab;26.&htab;The Municipal Welfare and Health Workers' Union (SIBESA) alleges that its president, Mr. Angel Zurbano Sastre, who is also a trade union delegate of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (Central Sindical Coalición de Independientes), and who held the post of medical inspector of the fire brigade, was transferred from his post on 18 October 1985, with a change in work schedule (he used to work a flexible schedule).

&htab;27.&htab;The complainant organisation adds that the transfer runs counter to article 53 of the collective agreement in force and was carried out purely for trade union reasons. Thus, although the transfer was said to have been carried out owing to requirements of service, the reason appears to be Mr. Zurbano's having attended a meeting of firemen. According to the complainant organisation, the doctor who formerly worked the shift now worked by Mr. Zurbano now occupies the latter's former post as inspector of the fire brigade.

&htab;28.&htab;The complainant organisation further alleges that Mr. José Luis Palomino Fernández, General Secretary of SIBESA and a delegate of the National Workers' Force (Fuerza Nacional del Trabajo), was dismissed from his post as surgeon of the Madrid City Council because of his militant trade union activities. The complainant organisation states that politicians in the Madrid City Corporation found his trade union activity in the Madrid City Council a nuisance. In August 1986 a decree of the Mayor of Madrid, on the basis of a decision of the General Inspectorate of Services attached to the Ministry of the Presidency, stated that there was incompatibility of functions. Both the Mayor's decree and the decision of the General Inspectorate of Services were invalid, since it is for the city corporation to rule on incompatibility of functions.

&htab;29.&htab;The above-mentioned trade union delegate lodged two appeals for reinstatement against the Madrid City Council and the General Inspectorate of Services (the complainant organisation encloses copies of these appeals). The Madrid City Council did nothing about the matter and the General Inspectorate of Services stated that the trade union delegate had not exercised his option for a working post as provided in the law on incompatibility. This is not true, since the trade union delegate did exercise his option, both in the Madrid City Council and in the General Inspectorate of Services, in the sense that the post he opted for was that in the Madrid City Council. In effect, the General Inspectorate of Services rejected the appeal for reinstatement on the basis of false allegations, since the trade union delegate concerned had opted for the Madrid City Council. The outcome was that the Madrid Territorial Court ordered the reinstatement of Mr. José Luis Palomino Fernández and 100 other doctors who had been dismissed pursuant to the law on incompatibility.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;30.&htab;The Government states that when the municipal budgets for 1986 were approved in November 1985, the Madrid City Council decided that staff adjustments should be made in public health and social services; among other measures, it was proposed that certain posts occupied by general practitioners should be converted to specialist posts. One of the main objectives stated was to improve emergency medical centres. For this purpose, letters were issued by the city councillor for public health and social services assigning certain doctors to medical centres. Medical assistants and nursing and other staff were likewise appointed in order to meet the need for services. It was for this reason that Dr. Zurbano was assigned to the medical centre for the Retiro district. The city councillor for public health sent a photocopy of the above-mentioned letters to the Council's personnel department, stating that there had been no change in the working post. The personnel department replied that there was no need to issue a new computerised staff order, since there was no change in post, but merely an assignment of duties which does not infringe any of Mr. Zurbano's acquired rights, either in professional or financial terms, and that it was not necessary to change his post number as required by the computerised list of municipal employees in the event of a change in working post. It is thus completely untrue that the purpose of the assignment of duties referred to above was to infringe the freedom of association of the trade union which Mr. Zurbano represents.

&htab;31.&htab;The Government states further that the complainant's letter cites Mr. Zurbano's position as trade union delegate as a reason why he should not be transferred. In this respect, the Government points out that, according to the collective agreement (agreement of the Madrid City Council), "members of the staff committee and trade union delegates shall be the last to be transferred or put on another shift". From this it is clear, on the one hand, that the agreement itself allows for changes in shift and transfers and, on the other, that the persons referred to "shall be the last" to be transferred, but that this may occur when the needs of the service so require.

&htab;32.&htab;In conclusion, the Government points out that on 4 August 1986 Mr. Zurbano's request was granted in that he was assigned to the fire brigade, once again stressing that this was a change in the actual place where the work is performed, which does not mean that he was transferred back to the post from which he was alleged to have been transferred, since there was only a change in duties and not in post.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;33.&htab;The Committee notes that the Government denies that the trade union leader Mr. Angel Zurbano was transferred on 18 October 1985 for trade union reasons, pointing out that he was merely assigned new duties in the interests of the service, without any infringement of his acquired rights, whether in professional or financial terms. The Committee observes further that on 4 August 1986 Mr. Zurbano was assigned back to the fire brigade where he had performed his duties prior to 18 October 1985.

&htab;34.&htab;The Committee also notes that the judicial authority annulled the dismissal of Mr. José Luis Palomino, thus enabling his reinstatement. The Committee points out, however, that it does not find that the dismissal of Mr. Palomino was carried out for trade union reasons, since the person concerned did not rely on this in the administrative appeals which he lodged (a copy of which was supplied) before a ruling was made by the judicial authority.

The Committee's recommendation

&htab;35.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to decide that this case does not call for further examination.

Case No. 1387 COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND PRESENTED BY - THE IRISH CONGRESS OF TRADE UNIONS - THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF ORGANISATIONS OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION - THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF FREE TEACHERS' UNIONS

&htab;36.&htab;In communications dated 31 October and 7 November 1986 the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) presented a complaint alleging infringement of trade union rights by the Government of Ireland in relation to a dispute concerning teachers' trade unions, and this was supported in a communication dated 11 November 1986 from the International Federation of Free Teachers' Unions on behalf of its affiliate, the Teachers' Union of Ireland. A communication relating to the same dispute dated 5 November 1986 contained a complaint by the World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) on behalf of its affiliates, the Association of Secondary Teachers of Ireland and the Irish Teachers' Union of Ireland, and further information concerning the matter was contained in a communication from the WCOTP on 16 December 1986.

&htab;37.&htab;The Government's reply was contained in a communication dated 15 January 1987.

&htab;38.&htab;Ireland has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). It has not ratified the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151) or the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).

A. The complainants' allegations

&htab;39.&htab;The complainants set out in their communications and in documents attached thereto details concerning the course of a dispute over pay increases for teachers and the alleged breach by the Government of ILO instruments in relation thereto, in particular as regards its actions in the period which followed the referral of the matter to arbitration.

&htab;40.&htab;The complainants indicate that the pay claim was made in 1982 and, after disagreement had been registered in December 1983, was referred to an arbitration board for teachers (established in terms of a "Scheme for Conciliation and Arbitration for Teachers" of 1973) which met on 27 June 1985.

&htab;41.&htab;An allegation made by the Irish Congress of Trade Unions relates to the refusal of the Government, from August 1985 to March 1986, to appoint a chairman of the arbitration board after the expiry of the term of office of the incumbent on 31 July 1985. It is indicated by the complainant that similar failures to appoint arbitration board chairmen for other areas of the public service were linked in a statement by the Minister for the Public Service on 11 and 23 October 1985 with a condition that agreement should first be reached on a general pay agreement covering 1986 and beyond, and to agreement with the unions on methods of pay determination; while the Minister of Education had suggested in a statement to Parliament on 6 February 1986 that he would recommend the appointment of a chairman only after receiving a commitment from the unions to refer draft proposals for a pay agreement for consideration by their members in the context of negotiations on other public service pay settlements. The ICTU considers that, in refusing to appoint a chairman to the teachers' arbitration board and in seeking to impose preconditions on the appointment, the Irish Government acted contrary to Conventions Nos. 98, 151 and 154 as well as Recommendation No. 163 and the 1966 Guiding Principles concerning the status of teachers; it points out in this regard that it is aware of the fact that the Government has not yet ratified Convention No. 151 but that it had voted for it in 1978 and is considering ratification.

&htab;42.&htab;The complainants refer to the report of the chairman of the arbitration board on 1 November 1985 (a copy of which is appended to the letter) recommending a 10 per cent increase in teachers' salaries, half to be effective from 1 September 1985 and the other half from 1 March 1986. They point out in this regard that, although the recommendation was only received by the Minister on 5 November, he had already been reported on 20 August as having commented on the outcome of the arbitration, and they regard these comments (which refer to the unilateral announcement by the Government on 14 August of a pay freeze in the public sector) as interference in the arbitration procedure.

&htab;43.&htab;The complainants go on to state that in February 1986 the Government used its power as the Government to set aside the outcome of the collective bargaining process which had been arrived at for teachers, by amending the award of the teachers' arbitration board through a resolution adopted by Parliament at its instance. In terms of the modification thus introduced, the salary increase was to be paid in three equal instalments, one on 1 December 1986 and the others on 1 December 1987 and 1 July 1988, respectively.

&htab;44.&htab;In this regard, the complainants point out that when introducing these changes, the Government had in its resolution referred to paragraph 46(1) of the Scheme for Conciliation and Arbitration for Teachers which contained a provision making such modification by the Government possible. The ICTU considers that, in amending the arbitration award to teachers and in the manner in which it conducted the subsequent industrial dispute (q.v.), the Government acted contrary to the ILO instruments already mentiond.

&htab;45.&htab;The WCOTP, in its communication of 5 November 1986, states that the stipulation enabling the Government to modify the arbitration award which is contained in paragraph 46(1) of the Scheme of Conciliation and Arbitration for Teachers must be looked upon as not in accordance with an effective machinery for the settlement of disputes between teachers' unions and the Government. In information communicated on 16 December, it adds, on the basis of a memorandum which it encloses from the Irish National Teachers' Organisation (INTO), that this "doomsday clause" was designed to protect the sovereignty of Parliament in the event of a major national crisis; the clause allowed a government which might find itself in dire financial circumstances to ask the Parliament to vote down an arbitration award. The memorandum points out that when such a crisis had existed in 1956-57, INTO had been persuaded not to pursue a claim through conciliation and arbitration on the ground that if the Parliament were obliged because of dire financial circumstances to set aside the award, the conciliation and arbitration machinery would be seriously undermined. It is further pointed out that no Irish Government has sought to set aside a teachers' arbitration award since the establishmnent of the teachers' conciliation and arbitration machinery in the early 1950s.

&htab;46.&htab;The complainants also state, in relation to the reference by the Government in its resolution to the financial implications of the arbitration award, that it is unacceptable that the Government continue to act as a party to the dispute while the final decision on the matter rested with the legislature.

&htab;47.&htab;Turning to the events following the alteration of the arbitration award by Parliament, the complainants state that the Government challenged the right of the teachers' unions to undertake industrial action and refer to a special broadcast on national television in April 1986 in which the Prime Minister portrayed the dispute as a constitutional crisis. They go on to point out that in March and April 1986 the Department of Education threatened to withdraw from the teachers' unions the facility of deducting trade union subscriptions at source; threatened not to pay the salaries of teachers during the summer vacation; and set out, inter alia, through advertisements, to hire unqualified persons as superintendents and examiners to undertake work in relation to the conduct of public examinations which would normally be undertaken by teachers.

&htab;48.&htab;In support of their allegations, the complainants refer to ILO instruments, the WCOTP stating that the Irish Government has obviously not acted in the spirit of Convention No. 98, and the ICTU citing an extract from the Declaration of Philadelphia as well as Articles 4 of Convention No. 98, 8 of Convention No. 151, 5(d) and (e) of Convention No. 154 and Paragraph 6 Recommendation No. 163 in elaboration of its view that the circumstances outlined reveal an approach that is totally contrary to the spirit of ILO Conventions and Recommendations on collective bargaining. The ICTU also provides detailed citations from the Guiding Principles of the 1966 ILO Recommendations concerning the status of teachers.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;49.&htab;In its communication of 15 January 1987, the Government, after pointing out that it has not ratified Conventions Nos. 151 and 154, provides information concerning the 1973 Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme for Teachers (the text of which it appends to its reply) and, in particular, on the composition of the arbitration board to which disputes may be referred. This comprises all the parties to the Scheme, i.e. the teachers' representatives and representatives of various educational authorities, as well as of the Ministries of Education and the Public Service and an employer and an employee member of the labour court; the chairman is an independnet person, normally a senior counsel. The chairman of the board submits a report of its findings on a claim to the two ministers, who in turn submit it to the Government.

&htab;50.&htab;On the question of the alterations made to the award, the Government draws attention to two clauses in the Scheme: (a) clause 2 is designed to preserve the Government's liberty of action and states that the Scheme "does not imply that the Government have surrendered or can surrender their liberty of action in the exercise of their constitutional authority and the discharge of their responsibilities in the public interest"; (b) clause 46 states that the Government will either within three months of the receipt of a report from the ministers give immediate effect to the findings of the Board or , after the expiration of that period, introduce a motion in Parliament proposing rejection, modification or deferment of the finding (emphasis added). The Government points out that the Scheme does not specify the circumstances in which these courses of action may be taken.

&htab;51.&htab;The Government goes to to indicate that, in proposing the modifications in the payment of the award, it had to take into account the annual cost involved at a time of serious economic and budgetary difficulty. Furthermore, it had sought, unsuccessfully, through a series of four talks with the teachers' unions between 2 and 15 January 1986, to secure agreement to arrangements on the phasing of the payments (which were the same as those proposed to other unions representing non-manual workers in the public service).

&htab;52.&htab;The Government points out that it is correct that this is the first time it has sought to modify an arbitration award in respect of teachers with the approval of Parliament, but states that in doing so it was acting strictly in accordance with the terms of the Scheme, as agreed with and signed by the unions concerned. It states further that the fact that this power has been so rarely invoked is an indication of its reluctance to modify independent adjudications in the collective bargaining area and of its wholehearted commitment to that process.

&htab;53.&htab;The Government concludes its reply on this aspect of the allegations by summarising the position: it disputes the contention that it had set aside the arbitration award; states that it was in fact prepared to accept the recommendation subject to a modification in the dates on which it was to be implemented; that it had been reluctantly forced to exercise its rights under paragraph 46 of the Scheme by the very serious budgetary situation facing the country, and had then only done so after the breakdown of talks with the unions in which it had attempted to reach a negotiated agreement containing arrangements which were the same as those subsequently accepted by other public service unions.

&htab;54.&htab;On the subject of the reappointment of the chairman of the teachers' arbitration board, the Government points out that there is nothing in the Scheme which requires such a chairman to be in office continuously, and that there have in fact been a number of occasions since 1973, when the Scheme came into operation, when there have been intervals between one period of office and the next. In the past these had entailed periods of seven, four and two months.

&htab;55.&htab;The Government states that it had announced in October 1985 its intention in principle to reappoint the outgoing chairman, and that the period between the expiry of his term of office on 31 July 1985 and his reappointment on 29 May 1986 had not interfered with the progress and processing by him of the teachers' pay claim. This claim had been heard on 27 June 1985 and the chairman's findings were sent in draft to the secretary of the arbitration board on 1 August; the arbitration report was signed by him on 1 November 1985. There had only been one minor claim outstanding and the interval had not had the effect of either depriving the teachers' unions of the arbitration findings or of delaying the issue of such findings on any substantial matter.

&htab;56.&htab;In this regard, the Government also refers to its desire to engage in discussions and negotiations with the teachers' unions and with civil service unions with the aim of reviewing the existing machinery for conciliation and arbitration. It states that the other unions had agreed to enter such negotiations, but the primary concern of the teachers' unions had been with their special pay award and they had engaged in industrial and political confrontation which disregarded the terms of their agreed conciliation and arbitration scheme.

&htab;57.&htab;In elaboration of this, the Government states that, in terms of paragraph 46 of the Scheme, the Government could take up to three months from the date of receipt of the report of the arbitration board chairman's findings (i.e. 5 November 1985) to provide its response, and that during this period it was entitled to the benefit of the safeguards contained in paragraph 7 of the Scheme. This paragraph provides that, during the period in question, no form of public agitation shall be sponsored or resorted to by any of the parties to the Scheme in furtherance of its case nor shall any of the parties move any outside body to make representations on its behalf. The unions had, in contravention of the provision, engaged in industrial action, including a one-day strike on 15 October and had enlisted the support of the ICTU and the WCOTP in an effort to compel the Government to implement the arbitration award without modification.

&htab;58.&htab;The Government goes on to state that the check-off facility (which, it states, is an administrative arrangement, not a contractual agreement), was not withdrawn from the teachers and denies any threat by the Department of Education to do so. It also denies any threat by the Department not to pay the salaries of teachers during the summer vacation.

&htab;59.&htab;As regards the advertisements for the hiring of superintendents and examiners, the Government indicates that these were placed after a period of industrial action had been undertaken following the passage of the resolution in Parliament in February; in addition to work stoppage, this action had involved a threat by the teachers of non-cooperation in the supervision, etc. of examinations (work which teachers were not contractually obliged to undertake and for which they received extra pay). This, if implemented, would have been the action which would have had a most serious impact on the examinations. The Government had found it necesary to make contingency plans, in the form of advertisements for a reserve pool of examination staff, but had deferred action pending a decision at the teachers' annual conferences which had taken place between 1 and 3 April 1986. These had in fact decided to ballot members on the matter of co-operation with the running of examinations, and the advertisements had appeared on 4 April so that suitably qualified people would be available if the teachers decided to discontinue their voluntary participation in the examination system. In the event, it had not proved necessary to make use of the reserve pool of supervisors and examiners, as negotiations had taken place between the Ministers of Education and the Public Service and the unions, the outcome of which were proposals for the settlement of the dispute which had been accepted following a ballot on 19 May 1986.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;60.&htab;The Committee notes that the dispute concerning teachers' salaries and the manner in which the claim in respect thereof was dealt with, was settled some six months before the complaints were submitted. The complainants have, however, raised a number of questions concerning the collective bargaining machinery in force for teachers in Ireland and the way in which this was implemented in relation to the dispute, as well as in respect of a number of other actions taken by the Government in the course thereof.

&htab;61.&htab;The machinery in question was established by agreement between the relevant Irish teachers' trade unions and the Government and is embodied in a document dated 9 October 1973 known as the "Scheme of Conciliation and Arbitration for Teachers" (hereinafter referred to as the "Scheme"). It is understood to contain similar provisions to those in force in relation to other public employees.

&htab;62.&htab;In relation to the present case, the two aspects of the Scheme which require consideration both relate to the arbitration procedure which it sets up, the Government's powers in relation thereto and the ways in which they were exercised. Specifically, they concern (a) the failure to appoint (or reappoint) the independent chairman of the arbitration board provided for in the Scheme between the expiry of his term of office on 31 July 1985 and May 1986. During this period the dispute continued and involved, inter alia, industrial action by the teachers because of their dissatisfication with (b) the decision of Parliament on the motion of the Government to modify the award made by the arbitration board.

&htab;63.&htab;As regards the first of these matters, it would appear from the information before the Committee that the chairman of the arbitration board was in office at the time of the hearing of, and deliberation on, the teachers' salary claim which had been referred to it, and that the draft report of the board (which was not changed when it appeared in final form) was submitted on the day after the expiry of his appointment. It would also seem that the (by then, former) chairman only signed the report on 1 November 1985, some three months after he had vacated office. The Committee does not consider it appropriate to address itself to questions concerning the exact timing of these events, as they have a bearing only on purely formal aspects of the status of the arbitration board's report, and not to the substantive content of its award which has not been placed in doubt. The Government has, moreover, explained that gaps have occurred on at least three occasions in the past between the appointment of persons to preside over the arbitration board, though it does also indicate that the period here at issue was also used to propose discussions with public service unions, including the teachers' unions, with a view to revising the schemes for conciliation and arbitration applicable to them. With the teachers' dispute continuing at the time and involving industrial action, such discussions did not prove possible, but there is no evidence before the Committee to suggest that the vacancy in the office of the chairman of the arbitration board in any material way impeded the activities of that body, in relation to the pay claim in dispute - on which it had already made its recommendations in the form of an award - or in any other way. The fact that the award had already been made by the time the Minister of Education made a reference on 20 August 1986 to the Government's pay freeze and its likely effect on the ability to meet the award also leads the Committee to the view that this statement was not designed to influence the outcome of the arbitration proceedings. The Committee accordingly concludes that the allegations relating to the delay over the appointment of the arbitration board's chairman and an attempt to influence the award do not require further examination.

&htab;64.&htab;The other aspect of the case arising from the Scheme concerns the modifications made in the arbitration board's award by Parliament in February 1986 on the proposal of the Government. It is alleged that this action reflects on the effectiveness of the machinery for collective bargaining and the extent to which such machinery is in conformity with ILO principles on freedom of association. In addition, it is claimed that the particular provision under which the Government acted has not been used for about 30 years, and that the Government's resort to its use in 1986 on the basis of budgetrary and economic policy considerations is unacceptable because it is also a party to the dispute. For its part, the Government has disputed the claims that it set aside the arbitration board's award, pointing out instead that its action was directed to an alteration thereof, and that this was in any event based on a specific option open to it in terms of the provisions of the Scheme. The Committee notes in this regard that, in describing the background to these provisions, one of the complainants refers to the fact that they were designed to reserve to the Government powers which might be used in times of economic crisis. It also notes that, although the provision in question was not brought into play over a considerable period, the Scheme establishing the conciliation and arbitration procedures was drawn up and agreed to voluntarily by the teachers' unions, and that all parties to the dispute availed themselves of the opportunities which it provided. It is, therefore, of the view that neither the Scheme as a whole nor the Government's resort to the particular provision enabling it to propose modfications in the award of the arbitration board, are in breach of ILO principles concerning collective bargaining and concludes that this aspect of the case also does not require further examination.

&htab;65.&htab;The complainants have also made three other allegations regarding the conduct of the Government during the course of the dispute, namely that the Government threatened the removal of check-off facilities for unions, that teachers were threatened with non-payment of salaries during vacations and that attempts were made by the Government to recruit replacements for teachers who were, as part of their industrial action, refusing to supervise and mark examinations. The first two allegations are denied by the Government, which also points out that the check-off facility was an administrative arrangement and not a contractual entitlement. In relation to the third allegation, the Government states that it did place advertisements for the recruitment of persons to perform the functions normally done on a voluntary basis by teachers, as part of a contingency plan to cope with disruption to the examination system, but that no such recruitment had in fact taken place. The Committee thus notes that the information before it in relation to the first two of the above allegations is contradictory, while that concerning the third does not indicate any breach of the principles of freedom of association. In the circumstances, it concludes that no purpose would be served by a further examination of the three allegations referred to in this paragraph.

The Committee's recommendation

&htab;66.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to decide that this case does not call for further examination.

CASES IN WHICH THE COMMITTEE HAS REACHED DEFINITIVE CONCLUSIONS Case No. 1356 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA (QUEBEC) PRESENTED BY - THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR (WCL), - THE QUEBEC CENTRAL TEACHERS' UNION (CEQ), AND - THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF ORGANISATIONS OF THE TEACHING PROFESSION (WCOTP)

&htab;67.&htab;The complaint of the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) is contained in communications dated 9 December 1985 and 8 January 1986, that of the Quebec Central Teachers' Union (CEQ) in a communication of 18 June 1986, and that of the World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) in a communication of 10 July 1986. In a letter of 10 October 1986, the federal Government forwarded the remarks and information furnished by the Government of Quebec, dated 2 September 1986.

&htab;68.&htab;Canada has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); it has not ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) or the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151).

A. The complainants' allegations

&htab;69.&htab;According to the 9 December 1985 communication of the World Confederation of Labour (WCL), Quebec's Act 37 of 19 June 1985 respecting the process of negotiation of the collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors severely limits the right to organise, to bargain and to reach collective agreements in these sectors. It alleges that the Act infringes Articles 3 and 10 of Convention No. 87, as well as the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, and runs counter to the jurisprudence of the Committee on Freedom of Association, in that it allows government authorities to take measures that suppress arbitration and limit the right to strike, thus effectively limiting the right of workers to organise and promote and defend their own interests.

&htab;70.&htab;In a subsequent communication of 8 January 1986, the WCL explains that Act 37 modifies the framework for the negotiation of collective agreements in the sectors of education, social affairs and government agencies by imposing new bargaining methods on workers' organisations, which the Act refers to as "groups of associations of employees" or "associations of employees"; in certain cases, their scope for bargaining is reduced, and the workers are divided into separate groups, even though they may belong to the same sector or work in the same establishment. The Act authorises the Government to establish by decree salaries and salary scales for the second and third years of a collective agreement, without providing for a procedure by which workers in the sectors concerned may defend their interests. Furthermore, the Act introduces severe restrictions to the right to strike. It confers to the Essential Services Council - which, as its very name indicates, is a council, and therefore an administrative body - a vast number of quasi-judicial functions and powers, thus effectively replacing the judiciary (section 111-17, subparagraphs 1 to 6), in violation of the constitutional principles concerning the separation of powers which are universally applied in democratic countries.

&htab;71.&htab;According to the WCL, this Act undermines the rights of workers' organisations and interferes in the organisation of their activities and management by limiting their scope of bargaining (national, regional or local) and their programmes of action, which should be determined by the workers' organisations themselves through their own policies and organisational structures. Moreover, the Act limits recourse to strikes over wages issues to a period of one year (sections 55 and 56). As concerns regional or local issues, the Act effectively suppresses the right to strike and the right to seek the settlement of disputes before a court of law (sections 60, 64, 65 and 66); it prohibits strikes as a means of resolving local arrangements, and provides no guarantees to safeguard the interests of workers (section 71).

&htab;72.&htab;The WCL further alleges that the provisions of Act 37 arbitrarily restrict bargaining procedures by imposing bargaining modalities that do not favour the promotion or defence of workers' social and economic interests. The restriction on the right to strike introduced by the Act seriously limits the means available to trade unions to promote and defend the interests of their members (Article 10 of the Convention), as well as the right of trade unions to organise their activities (Article 3), and is therefore incompatible with the principles of freedom of association.

&htab;73.&htab;According to the WCL, Act 37 authorises the Government to establish by decree the salaries and salary scales of workers in the public and parapublic sectors for the second and third years of collective agreements. These workers are neither allowed to strike, nor are they granted adequate guarantees to safeguard their interests. Experience in Canada has shown that the adjustment of wages in the public sector in the past three years has fallen short of the rate of inflation (approximately 3.8 per cent) by 1.5 per cent. It is thus clear that, whatever the results of the studies and research undertaken by the Institute for Research and Information on Remuneration concerning the forecast of wage adjustments based on hypothetical inflation rates, such adjustments will always fall short of actual rates of inflation. There will then be a need for direct action, which is now prohibited or limited. Only the salaries and salary scales for the first year will be negotiable, and only in this respect are workers entitled to exercise their right to strike, except for workers in the social affairs sector. The right to strike is non-existent with respect to all matters which the Act requires to be negotiated at the local or regional level, and yet there are no adequate guarantees that the interests of workers in these sectors will be safeguared.

&htab;74.&htab;As regards the social affairs sector, the Act requires trade unions and workers to maintain essential services functioning at an abusively high level, to the order of 55 to 90 per cent, thus rendering illusory the exercise of the right to strike and the freedom to negotiate at this level, without providing adequate guarantees that the interests of these workers will be safeguarded.

&htab;75.&htab;In the education sector, the Act abolishes the right of teachers as well as non-teaching professional staff of colleges to strike with regard to a considerable number of collective bargaining issues.

&htab;76.&htab;Lastly, as concerns the whole of the education sector, including the support staff and the non-teaching professional staff of school boards, the Act abolishes recourse to strike action in connection with the determination of salaries and salary scales for the second and third years of collective agreements.

&htab;77.&htab;In conclusion, the WCL considers that the present case represents a recidivism by the Government of Quebec, recalling that during the November 1983 discussion within the ILO Governing Body of Case No. 1171 concerning the complaint filed by the WCL in connection with Acts Nos. 70, 105 and 111, the representative of the Government of Canada had declared that all consideration would be given to the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, including the possibility of repealing Act 111, with a view to restoring harmonious relations between the Government and teaching personnel. However, the WCL notes with regret that, contrary to its promises, the Government of Quebec failed to give effect to the recommendations of the Committee on Freedom of Association, and that not only is Act 111 still in force, but that the new Act 37 further infringes trade union freedoms.

&htab;78.&htab;Subsequently, in a communication of 18 June 1986, the Quebec Central Teachers' Union (CEQ), which claims to encompass 168 trade unions of teachers, professional staff and support staff in the public sector representing 108,000 members, as well as the Quebec Government Professionals' Trade Union (10,000 workers), likewise presented a complaint against Act 37.

&htab;79.&htab;According to the CEQ, section 25 of Act 37 imposes collective bargaining at the national or local levels. It claims that the procedures for negotiating salaries, described in sections 52 to 56, call for the unilateral fixing of salaries for the second and third years of a collective agreement, and that section 91 undermines the right to organise by abolishing the right to strike in respect of the determination of salaries and salary scales for the second and third years of the collective agreement, thus diluting management's obligation to negotiate in good faith, as required in sections 30 to 43 of the Act. Sections 57 to 74 of the Act allegedly deny trade unions the right to strike over issues as fundamental as trade union recognition, union dues, the right to hold meetings and receive information, thus threatening the trade unions' very survival. It alleges that the Act would virtually deprive employees of the right to strike and would establish a permanent system for collective labour relations in the public and parapublic sectors without introducing an effective machinery for arbitration.

&htab;80.&htab;In conclusion, the CEQ considers that the Act abolishes the right to strike in the second and third years and in respect of certain matters listed in Schedule A of the Act, and that it fails to provide any other machinery with a view to compensating for the loss of the right to strike, since it calls for certain conditions of work to be fixed by legislation or regulations. The Quebec Human Rights Commission has declared that, in its opinion, Act 37 is incompatible with Convention No. 87.

&htab;81.&htab;The World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP), in its communication of 10 July 1986, claimed that Act 37 represents a flagrant and direct violation of Convention No. 87, and specifically that sections 52 to 56 limit the duration of collective agreements to one year and give the Government full power to determine unilaterally by regulation the conditions for the renewal of collective agreements during the course of their second and third year, and that section 91 prohibits recourse to strikes during this period.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;82.&htab;In a letter of 10 October 1986, the federal Government forwarded the reply of the Government of Quebec, dated 2 September 1986, in which it declares that it has always held the ILO's institutions in high esteem and has taken great care in preparing its reply, and requests the Committee to understand that the delay in replying is due to the importance that the Government attaches to this procedure.

&htab;83.&htab;Concerning the substance of the complaint, the Government notes that the complainants are critical of the Act respecting the process of negotiation of the collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors (Act  37), adopted by Quebec's National Assembly on 19 June 1985, and that they allege that Act 37 is contrary to the principles of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), in the sense that it "authorises the Government to establish by decree the salaries and salary scales for the second and third years of a collective agreement, without providing for a procedure by which workers in the sectors concerned may safeguard and defend their interests, and by placing severe restrictions on the right to strike".

&htab;84.&htab;The Government of Quebec sets out to show that the machinery instituted by Act 37 provides trade union associations with appropriate means to defend the interests of their members, and that it respects the Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation, to which the Government attaches the utmost importance. The Government explains that the experience of recent years has demonstrated the need for revising the legal framework for negotiations in the public and parapublic sectors in Quebec; that since 1983 it had undertaken a study and consulted all interested parties in order to identify solutions that might improve labour relations in these sectors; and that Act 37 is the outcome of the search for a balance between the means given to workers and their trade union organisations to promote their legitimate interests, and the responsibilities of the State, as employer and guardian of the public interest. Foremost among its objectives, this Act seeks to harmonise labour relations in these sectors which have a substantial social and economic impact in Quebec; within the context of Quebec, the Act seeks to promote the kind of free collective bargaining which the Committee upholds.

&htab;85.&htab;The Government begins by describing the general rules that govern labour relations in Quebec, explaining that they are contained in the Labour Code, which guarantees workers the freedom of association. Like most labour legislation in North America, the Code endorses the monopoly system for trade union representation, under which only one association which represents the absolute majority of all wage earners in a given establishment or group of wage earners, is recognised as the bargaining agent for this group (or bargaining unit). This recognition or certification is declared by a special tribunal and usually cannot be challenged except during a specified period preceding the expiry of the collective agreement. The Labour Code requires the parties to undertake and pursue negotiations with diligence and good faith with a view to reaching a collective agreement, and sets out a machinery available to the parties to settle their differences, such as recourse to conciliation or arbitration.

&htab;86.&htab;The right to strike and lock-out is generally recognised and may be exercised provided advance notice is given upon the expiry of the collective agreement. In accordance with Quebec's Labour Code, employers are forbidden to engage persons or avail themselves of the services of other employees for the purpose of replacing workers who are inactive due to a lawful strike or lock-out; according to the Government, these measures which are intended to speed up the settlement of disputes and to eliminate any violence that may arise in connection with the exercise of the right to strike, are among the most progressive as concerns the rights that they confer on workers' associations. It should be noted that the Code suspends the right to strike or lock-out during the duration of the collective agreement, but provides for all disagreements concerning the interpretation or application of an agreement to be submitted to an arbiter.

&htab;87.&htab;The Code also provides for machinery aimed at ensuring the maintenance of essential services during a labour dispute in the public services, such as electricity or gas supply services, and services entrusted to the public and parapublic sectors. The Essential Services Council was created in 1982 to oversee the application of this machinery and to help the parties to identify the services to be maintained during a dispute. The Essential Services Council is composed of eight members: a president and a vice-president, two members from the ranks of the most representative workers' associations in the areas of public and health services and social services, two members from the most representative employers' associations in these same areas, and two additional members who are chosen after consultations with the Human Rights Commission and other bodies.

&htab;88.&htab;The provisions of the Labour Code apply to labour relations in the public and parapublic sectors, subject to certain adaptations. The Code defines the "public and parapublic sectors" as being the Government, its ministries and agencies, the establishments of the public health network and social services, as well as the establishments of the public education network. As regards the organisation of the parties, Act 37, which was adopted on 19 June 1985, substantially reproduces the provisions of the 1978 Act on the organisation of employers and trade unions for the purposes of collective bargaining in the education, social affairs and government agency sectors. Negotiations in these sectors are thus held on a sectoral basis, in derogation of the general system provided for in the Labour Code, pursuant to which negotiations are held, in principle, at the level of the undertaking.

&htab;89.&htab;Moreover, Act 37 institutes new machinery which specifically addresses the particular needs of the public sector as distinct from the private sector. It also establishes a procedure for determining salaries in which a new body, the Institute for Research and Information on Remuneration, plays a vital role, and establishes other mechanisms for settling other specific differences. Furthermore, Act 37 grants new powers to the Essential Services Council.

&htab;90.&htab;In general, Quebec legislation grants very broad rights to the associations of workers in the public and parapublic sectors. The rights granted to trade unions in the private sector, such as the principle of monopoly in trade union representation, obligatory check-off of union dues for all wage earners, whether or not they are members of a trade union association, and the prohibition against replacing striking workers, are also conferred on trade unions in the public and parapublic sectors. They represent suitable means to enable these trade unions to promote and defend the economic interests of their members.

&htab;91.&htab;In the private sector, the weight of these trade union rights is counterbalanced by the economic constraints inherent in an enterprise's competitive posture, which helps the parties to reach an equilibrium. In the public and parapublic sectors, in which services are rendered to the public in a virtual monopoly and in which bargaining is carried out on a sectoral basis, the element of competition is missing, and its absence creates a disequilibrium between trade unions and the State as employer; thus, other means must be found to strike a balance between the parties.

&htab;92.&htab;The Government outlines the history of the development of labour relations in the public and parapublic sectors from 1960 to 1983, explaining that throughout this period the public and parapublic sectors experienced considerable growth due to the nationalisation of the electricity services, the reform of the educational system and the introduction of a hospitalisation insurance scheme. In 1964, the Labour Code granted the right to strike to workers in the public and parapublic sectors and subsequently extended this right to teachers and some government employees in 1965.

&htab;93.&htab;From 1964 to 1977, collective bargaining which was supposed to take place locally, in accordance with the existing legal framework, experienced a gradual centralisation at the national level. The Government twice adopted new legislation with a view to defining the legal framework of negotiations and in an effort to institutionalise them at the national level, namely the 1971 Act respecting the process of collective negotiation in the education and hospital sectors, and the 1974 Act respecting collective bargaining in the education, social affairs and government agencies sectors.

&htab;94.&htab;The centralisation and accrued politisation of negotiations in the early 1970s led to a major confrontation between the trade unions, joined in a common front, and the Government during the negotiations of 1972. This period was further marked by significant disruptions in public services available to the general public, including certain essential services. The negotiations which began in 1976 were also accompanied by the disruption of a number of services to the general public, and highlighted once again the fact that, under the existing bargaining system, the parties were unable to conclude negotiations without a significant disruption of services.

&htab;95.&htab;In 1977, the Government set up a committee to study and advise on the revision of the collective bargaining system in the public and parapublic sectors; the committee presented a number of recommendations to the Government, without, however, calling the existing structures and machinery into question. As a follow-up to the committee's report and with a view to fresh bargaining, in 1978 the Government adopted Act 59 amending the Labour Code and instituting a new procedure for determining essential services, as a prerequisite for the exercise of the right to strike. This Act called for the creation of a council on the maintenance of health and social services in the event of labour disputes, which was responsible for keeping the public informed as regards the maintenance of essential services; the Act also called for the creation of another council responsible for keeping the public informed on the progress of negotiations. Lastly, the Act fixed the stages and time limits for bargaining with a view to ensuring its progress.

&htab;96.&htab;In 1978, Quebec's National Assembly also adopted the Act on the organisation of employers and trade unions for the purposes of collective bargaining in the education and social affairs sectors. Among other things, the Act called for the establishment of employer committees responsible for conducting negotiations in accordance with the mandates issued by the Government. The Act confirmed the principle of bargaining at the national level, but allowed the parties to negotiate arrangements regarding the application of clauses agreed at the national level, to the local and regional levels.

&htab;97.&htab;The 1979 negotiations opened with the creation of a central negotiations board; the number of issues dealt with at this level increased, further accentuating the centralisation of discussions. Because these negotiations took place in a context of relative economic growth, the conditions of work set forth in the collective agreements allowed employees to profit from the more favourable general economic conditions. Thus, the collective agreements resulting from these negotiations included indexation clauses which assured employees of annual wage increases throughout the duration of the agreement, in other words, for a period of three years.

&htab;98.&htab;However, like all Western economies, Quebec experienced a broad economic and social crisis in the early 1980s, and the Government was forced to adopt exceptional legislative measures in Acts Nos. 70, 105 and 111. It proposed the establishment of a joint commission on remuneration and the creation of a working party to explore an overhaul of the bargaining system in the public sector. The joint commission on remuneration, whose creation was favourably received by the trade unions, was to discuss the bases of the Government's remuneration policy (comparisons with the private sector, ability to pay, etc.).

&htab;99.&htab;This period of reflection and consultations led, in March 1982, to a symposium attended by all the parties concerned. The symposium helped to define the problems affecting the bargaining system in the public and parapublic sectors and to draw certain conclusions which, on the whole, proved negative. Although the bargaining system was successful in reaching a number of predefined objectives, including that of endowing public and parapublic sector employees with working conditions equivalent to those of wage earners in the private sector, a number of problems had come to light in the course of negotiations in these sectors. In fact, labour disputes, the disruption of services to the population, the impact of the right to strike, the special laws adopted by the Government, the centralisation of negotiations, the sudden improvement in the wages of public sector workers which actually exceeded those of workers in the private sector, all pointed to the need to change the bargaining system with a view to reaching a fair balance between the State, as employer, and the trade unions.

&htab;100.&htab;Thus, the Act impugned by the complainants must be viewed within the context of a general dissatisfaction with the collective bargaining system in the public and parapublic sectors. The Government sets out to demonstrate that it took appropriate measures to encourage and promote the broadest development and use of procedures for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements as regards conditions of work, and that the ensuing limitations to the right to strike in the public and parapublic sectors have been accompanied by appropriate safeguards to protect the workers' interests. The Government emphasises that, within the framework of Act 37 for the reform of the collective bargaining system in the public and parapublic sectors, it has sought not to restrict the trade union rights of employees in the sectors concerned, but rather to promote the search for new solutions based on negotiation and mediation.

&htab;101.&htab;The introduction of the system of negotiating collective agreements as defined in Act 37 was preceded by a series of consultations that took place over a period of two years. A working party set up in April 1983 undertook successive consultations with trade union and employer representatives, requesting them to participate in the reform of the institutional and legal framework of collective bargaining in the public sector. Concurrently, in 1983, the Government commissioned a study of the characteristics of labour relations systems in the public sector in a number of industrialised countries, including the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, France, Italy, Sweden, the United States and the other Canadian provinces; the study focused on three aspects, namely, the rights of public sector trade unions, the machinery for determining working conditions, and the machinery for settling labour disputes. The study revealed that Quebec is the only province to have complemented the North American system of trade union rights with a machinery for negotiations which is exclusively typical of sovereign western European States. The study also revealed that the imbalance between the employer and trade union parties arises from the fact that the Quebecois system subjects an exceedingly large number of trade union rights to negotiation, thus allowing trade unions pressure to have maximum impact, without providing for counterbalancing limitations to help to settle disputes arising within the system itself. The study concluded that the readjustments needed to render the system more effective were not simple or mechanical, but required serious consideration and political and social choices that could not be simply copied from elsewhere.

&htab;102.&htab;In the spring of 1984, the Quebec Government opened a public debate on a document entitled "The search for a new balance. Reform of the process of negotiation in the public sector", which identified the main points of the above-mentioned study: the State's role and responsibilities as government and employer, the centralisation of negotiations, the systematic confrontation resulting from the system then in effect, and lastly, the settlement of differences and alternatives to the right to strike as regards essential services.

&htab;103.&htab;In October 1984, following the public debate and the advice gathered at several informal meetings, the responsible minister proposed to trade union leaders that a new bargaining system be established before negotiating new collective agreements. The Government proposed a model agreement covering the following points: the negotiability of remuneration on an annual basis, the creation of a research centre on remuneration, the decentralisation of negotiation on certain normative clauses in accordance with a permanent bargaining model, binding mediation machinery and, lastly, the enforcement of existing legal provisions concerning essential services.

&htab;104.&htab;On 5 November 1984, the three central trade unions, CNS, CEQ and FTQ, stated that they were ready to consider procedures aimed at making negotiations more effective, in particular by supplying the parties with basic data on remuneration, and foregoing in advance a process for the automatic adjustment of wages; although they indicated their preference for maintaining negotiations on a national basis, they agreed that certain issues could be negotiated in other fora, subject to agreement between the parties. None the less, the central trade unions proposed that the discussions on the reform of the bargaining system be held concurrently with discussions aimed at reviewing the conditions of work which had been established more than two years earlier through collective agreements within the framework of Act 105. This trade union proposal is indicative of the respective positions of the parties throughout the discussions and consultations held since the spring of 1983: while the Government of Quebec aimed essentially at revising the process of negotiation, the central trade unions sought to link this revision to new negotiations in order to attenuate the effects of Act 105, which had met with strong opposition among the employees.

&htab;105.&htab;At the time, the Government considered the discrepancy in objectives to be of little consequence and proceeded to the parliamentary phase of the reform in question; on 20 December 1984, the Government presented the draft bill respecting the process of negotiation of the collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors. All parties concerned were given the opportunity to comment on the draft bill during the course of a parliamentary commission held in January and February 1985.

&htab;106.&htab;The central trade unions, CEQ, FTQ and CSN, together with 16 other trade union associations composing a vast coalition, began by requesting that the draft bill be simply withdrawn; in a working paper presented at a trade union meeting in early February 1985, they reiterated their commitment to certain principles: the freedom to negotiate the whole of working conditions, the establishment of an agency to make public information concerning wage comparisons, the maintenance of the recognition of trade unions bargaining at the national level, the suppression of the Government's discretionary power as regards the designation of issues subject to local bargaining, the recognition of the inalienable right to resort to strikes, and lastly, the return to the 1979 process for determining and maintaining essential services.

&htab;107.&htab;Concurrent with the parliamentary discussions, negotiations were held between members of the trade union coalition and government representatives. A number of meetings were held between the Prime Minister and the trade union leaders. Eventually, on 2 May 1985, the Government presented to the National Assembly the Bill of Act 37 respecting the process of negotiation of the collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors. Again, parliamentary hearings were held at which all interested parties were given the opportunity to present their views. The Act was finally adopted on 5 June 1985 and signed into law on 19 June 1985.

&htab;108.&htab;The Government claims to have taken appropriate measures to encourage and promote the broadest development and use of procedures for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements as regards conditions of employment.

&htab;109.&htab;As regards remuneration, the Government recalls that the impasse encountered during the negotiations prior to the adoption of Act 37 resulted, in particular, from the significant discrepancy between the Government's wage offers and the trade union demands, which was due to the absence of acceptable comparative data on remuneration in the public and private sectors. In order to correct this situation, Act 37 called for the creation of an Institute for Research and Information on Remuneration, which is responsible for publishing information on the comparative state and trends in the total government wage bill, and the wage bills of school boards, colleges and social affairs establishments, in particular, and the global wage bill of other wage earners in Quebec in categories designated by the Institute. In fact, the Government had adopted a policy designed to align public sector wages with those of the private sector. Thus, the Institute can carry out surveys, studies and analyses on the remuneration of different groups or sectors of wage earners in Quebec, and may also carry out any other study or research approved by its governing body. It publishes a report on its findings by 30 November of each year.

&htab;110.&htab;The Institute is administered by a governing body composed of 19 members, including a president and two vice-presidents, who are appointed by resolution of the National Assembly passed by no less than two-thirds of its members, on a motion of the Prime Minister, presented after consultation with the employers and trade union associations. The other 16 members who may be appointed to the governing body come in equal numbers from employer and trade union circles.

&htab;111.&htab;As concerns the salaries and salary scales of public and parapublic sector employees, Act 37 requires that the clauses in collective agreements applicable for the first year shall be negotiated and agreed at the national level, as well as other matters dealt with at this level. The Government considers that its responsibility with regard to the management of public funds requires that negotiations concerning remuneration take place on a national basis. The wage-fixing machinery instituted by the Government for the first year of a three-year collective agreement does not place any restrictions on negotiations between the parties, and guarantees that associations of employees shall have the right to strike in defence of their economic interests.

&htab;112.&htab;For the second and third years of the agreement, remuneration is determined in accordance with the following modalities: following the publication of the annual report of the Institute for Research and Information on Remuneration, the parties are to negotiate with a view to reaching an agreement on the fixing of the salaries and salary scales for the following year. Once this bargaining is concluded, a draft regulation is prepared and, where necessary, adopted by the Government. However, the draft regulation may not be submitted to the appropriate government bodies for approval until the parties have been invited to a hearing on its content before a Parliamentary Committee. The salaries and salary scales thus determined by regulation, which according to Act 37 may not be lower than those of the preceding year, are incorporated into the collective agreement for the current year.

&htab;113.&htab;This machinery for determining salaries on an annual basis allows for periodic adjustments in terms of budgetary and economic fluctuations which cannot be accurately forecast several years in advance; it will help to avoid a repetition of the events of 1982, when the Government of Quebec was forced to revise wage increases that had been set for the last year of a three-year contract due to a sudden change in the economic situation. Thus, the remuneration of workers in the public sector will reflect the overall health of Quebec's economy, without the risk of significant differences in respect of the situation prevailing in the private sector.

&htab;114.&htab;To the extent that negotiations in the public and parapublic sector take place every three years, the Government considers that the procedures established by Act 37 as concerns remuneration, and, in particular, the creation of the Institute for Research and Information on Remuneration and the machinery for fixing salaries on an annual basis, conform with the criterion endorsed by the Committee of Experts in its 1983 General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining: "While machinery and procedures are established in many countries by legislation, they must be designed to facilitate bargaining between the two sides of industry and leave them free to reach their own settlements" (paragraph 304), as well as the criterion laid down by the Committee on Freedom of Association in its Digest of decisions and principles of 1985, which acknowledges that "Article 7 of Convention No. 151 allows a degree of flexibility in the choice of procedures to be used in the determination of the terms and conditions of employment" (paragraph 606).

&htab;115.&htab;In the opinion of the Government of Quebec, the negotiation of remuneration on the right to strike, without restrictions for the first year of the agreement, the negotiation hearing before a Parliamentary Committee and determination of remuneration for the second and third years of the agreement on the basis of data furnished by the Institute, together with the guarantee that salaries shall not be reduced, constitute a machinery which favours voluntary negotiation of collective agreements with a view to determining conditions of employment. This machinery gives trade union associations suitable means to protect and defend the economic interests of their members in terms of prevailing economic conditions; furthermore, within the context of Quebec, it guarantees a fair balance between trade union rights and the public administration's imperatives of maintaining budgetary and economic order.

&htab;116.&htab;As concerns the various levels of bargaining, the Government explains that the execessive centralisation of negotiations in the public and parapublic sectors had been identified as a further shortcoming in the previous system. The experience of previous negotiations had shown that the concentration of discussions at the national level led to an increased politisation of negotiations which tended to transform the relationship between the State, as employer, and the trade unions, into a relationship of the State as government, and the trade unions. The fact that the vast majority of the conditions of work of public sector employees in Quebec are subject to negotiation, led inevitably to the overloading of central negotiations owing to the multitude, variety and complexity of the subjects dealt with. Lastly, the great distance between the place in which the normative conditions of work were discussed and the places in which they were experienced on a daily basis, often led to serious problems in the implementation of collective agreements at the local level; the ensuing dissatisfaction tended to have negative repercussions on subsequent negotiations.

&htab;117.&htab;The Government considers that Act 37 will inaugurate a new process that will reverse the disturbing trends of the last 20 years; this process will encourage, generally at the wish of the parties, the local negotiation of matters more appropriate to the local level. While the Act upholds the principle of bargaining at the national level, it institutes machinery to encourage the parties to bargain at the local level with respect to subjects that are better suited to that level. Thus, the Act provides that in the social affairs sector and, in the education sector, in respect of the support staff and the non-teaching professional staff of school boards, the parties meeting at the national level will themselves determine the matters to be negotiated at the local or regional level. For teaching staff in the education sector, and in respect of non-teaching professional staff in the case of colleges, the matters to be negotiated at the local or regional level, in addition to those agreed to by the parties, are listed in Schedule A of the Act.

&htab;118.&htab;The Act also provides that the stipulations of collective agreements negotiated at the national level may be the subject of arrangements negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level. Thus, in the social affairs sector and in the education sector, in respect of the support staff and in respect of the non-teaching professional staff of school boards, the parties may, once the collective agreement comes into force, agree upon local or regional arrangements with a view to the implementation or replacement of a clause of the collective agreement on matters provided for in Schedule B of the Act.

&htab;119.&htab;As regards matters defined by the Act or the parties as the subject of clauses negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level, the Act establishes a permanent machinery for negotiation. The Act provides that an association of employees and an employer, may at any time, negotiate and agree on the replacement, amendment, addition or repeal of a clause of the collective agreement. This permanent bargaining process, which had heretofore not existed in Quebec's labour laws, has the advantage of allowing the parties to determine conditions of work from time to time in keeping with the needs of each establishment or region by reference to the kinds of services involved and local practices. The right to bargain at any time with regard to conditions of work is counterbalanced by the absence of the right to strike or lock-out at this level.

&htab;120.&htab;Act 37 provides that clauses on matters defined as being the subject of negotiation and agreement at the local or regional level remain in force as long as they are not amended, repealed or replaced by common accord between the parties. Thus, the bargaining process at this level guarantees that workers and their organisations will maintain the rights acquired during the course of previous negotiations, since these can only be modified by common agreement.

&htab;121.&htab;The Government of Quebec considers that the machinery provided for in Act 37 concerning the levels of negotiation will encourage the parties to agree voluntarily to a gradual decentralisation of bargaining. The objective is to preserve the negotiation of the principal conditions of work, such as remuneration, which are common to all employees in the public and parapublic sectors and which depend on budgetary constraints, at the central bargaining level. In this connection, trade union rights which have been recognised for over 20 years, including the right to strike, are maintained. Moreover, the Act provides for negotiating at a more appropriate level the conditions of work that are not common to all employees in the public and parapublic sectors, and which do not directly affect their standard of living.

&htab;122.&htab;Only the matters listed in Schedule A, which apply to certain categories of staff in the education sector, are to be negotiated and agreed at the local level without requiring an agreement between the parties at the national level to that effect. A brief examination of this schedule shows that the matters listed essentially concern the modalities for applying regulations established at the national level or by law, or for establishing regulations that necessarily depend on the conditions in individual establishments and which, for practical purposes, can only be determined on a local basis. As regards "union dues", for example, the employer is required by the Labour Code to withhold these dues and turn them over to the trade union; thus, bargaining will be limited to the modalities for collecting and turning over these funds. The "distribution of work load" provides another good example of the way in which rules established at the national level are to be applied in accordance with the needs of individual institutions.

&htab;123.&htab;The Government of Quebec considers that this procedure conforms with the principle set out by the Committee on Freedom of Association: "While the public authorities have the right to decide whether they will negotiate at the regional or national level the workers, whether negotiating at the regional or national level, should be entitled to choose the organisation which shall represent them in the negotiations" (paragraph 607 of the Digest of Decisions).

&htab;124.&htab;As concerns limitations on the right to strike in the public and parapublic sectors, in which the interruption of services could seriously endanger society at large, the Government of Quebec has provided appropriate guarantees to protect the interests of workers. The Government explains that Act 37 establishes new machinery adapted to the various levels of negotiations to facilitate the settlement of differences and clearly sets forth conditions for exercising the right to strike.

&htab;125.&htab;As regards all matters negotiated at the national level, with the exception of salaries and salary scales, the Government explains that the Minister of Labour, at the request of either party, appoints a mediator to try to settle a dispute. If no agreement is reached within 60 days after the date of his appointment, the mediator transmits to the parties a report containing his recommendations on the dispute, which must be made public, unless an agreement on the dispute has been reached. Act 37 also provides that the parties may agree on other procedures of mediation. The Government of Quebec considers that this procedure for settling disputes on matters negotiated at the national level is in accordance with Article 8 of the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151), which provides that: "The settlement of disputes arising in connection with the determination of terms and conditions of employment shall be sought, as may be appropriate to national conditions, through negotiation between the parties or through independent and impartial machinery, such as mediation, conciliation and arbitration, established in such a manner as to ensure the confidence of the parties involved." The Government recalls that trade union associations still benefit from the right to strike on matters negotiated at the national level, thus preserving all safeguards required for the defence of the interests of workers; consequently, the Government considers that the procedure established by Act 37 for settling disputes on these matters is in accordance with the principle stated by the Committee on Freedom of Association in the following words: "Legislation imposing recourse to compulsory conciliation and arbitration procedures in industrial disputes before calling a strike cannot be regarded as an infringement of freedom of association" (paragraph 378 of the Digest of Decisions).

&htab;126.&htab;As regards matters negotiated at the local or regional level in respect of which the Act prohibits strikes or lock-outs, the Government considers that, inasmuch as these matters may be negotiated at any time during the life of the collective agreement, it is reasonable that such matters, which do not directly affect the standard of living of employees, unlike remuneration or other major conditions of work, should not provide grounds for interrupting services to the population. In order to avoid an impasse in negotiations, Act 37 proposes a machinery to help the parties settle their differences. Thus, either party may request the Minister of Labour to appoint a mediator-arbitrator with a view to settlement of the disagreement. The mediator-arbitrator endeavours to bring the parties to settle their disagreement, but if the disagreement still subsists 60 days after his appointment, the parties may, in common agreement, request the mediator-arbitrator to rule on the subject of the disagreement. If the mediator-arbitrator is then of the opinion that a settlement is not likely to be reached by the parties, he carries out their request. If the mediator-arbitrator gives no decision, he makes a report of his recommendation on the subject and makes the report public ten days after having transmitted it to the parties. Lastly, the Act allows the parties to agree on other modes to settle disagreements.

&htab;127.&htab;According to the Government, the fact that certain matters are negotiated at the local or regional level unless otherwise agreed by parties, as well as the institution at this level of a permanent machinery for negotiation endowed with an elaborate process for mediation and arbitration by an impartial third party, and the requirement for a negotiated agreement in matters affecting the acquired rights of workers, represent safeguards that guarantee the complete and effective representation of workers by their trade unions. The only matters which, in accordance with the Act, must be dealt with at the local or regional level are, according to the Government, matters which do not directly affect the economic interests of workers in the educational sectors concerned. Therefore, the Government considers that the Act conforms with the principle set out by the Committee on Freedom of Association in the following words: "While the Committee has always regarded the right to strike as constituting a fundamental right of workers and of their organisations, it has regarded it as such only in so far as it is utilised as a means of defending their economic interests" (paragraph 364 of the Digest of Decisions).

&htab;128.&htab;As regards the maintenance of essential services, the Government reports that Act 37 has amended the provisions of the Labour Code concerning the maintenance of essential services in the event of disputes, by providing that, in the social affairs sector, the parties must negotiate the number of employees to be maintained by unit and category of service, subject to the following minimum percentages: 90 per cent in establishments providing the services of a reception centre or long-term care, or specialised care in psychiatry, neurology or cardiology and in hospital centres having a department of clinical psychiatry or a community health department; 80 per cent in hospital centres for short-term care and the health care centres not contemplated in the previous category; 60 per cent in local community services other than health care centres; 55 per cent in social service centres. The Government adds that, in the event an agreement is not reached, the association of employees is required to submit to the Essential Services Council a list specifying the services to be maintained, and that the exercise of the right to strike is subject to the Council's approval of an agreement or list.

&htab;129.&htab;The Government explains that the Essential Services Council, which is composed of equal numbers of employers' and workers' representatives, has been granted new powers. Thus, in the event of a lock-out, strike, slowdown or other organised action which is contrary to the Act or likely to affect the services to which the public is entitled, or in the absence of an agreement or list concerning essential service in connection with a strike, the Council may intervene in an effort to help the parties settle the dispute and, if need be, order the parties to take corrective measures appropriate to the circumstances.

&htab;130.&htab;The Government considers that the new limitations on the right to strike in the social affairs sector are in accordance with the principles and criteria stated by the Committee on Freedom of Association as follows: "The right to strike may be restricted or even prohibited in the civil service - civil servants being those who act on behalf of the public authorities - or in essential services in the strict sense of the term, i.e. services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population" (paragraph 394 of the Digest of Decisions), and that "the hospital sector is an essential service" (paragraph 409).

&htab;131.&htab;The Government emphasises that the minimum percentages established in Act 37 have been determined so as to guarantee services which are strictly necessary to avoid endangering the life, personal safety or health of Quebec's population. As concerns safeguards instituted to compensate for the limitation of the right to strike in the social affairs sector, the procedures for settling disputes on matters negotiated at the national level and at the local or regional level are equally applied. Thus, the Government considers to have conformed with the principles set out by the Committee on Freedom of Association in the following words: "Where the right to strike is restricted or prohibited in certain essential undertakings or services, adequate protection should be given to the workers to compensate them for the limitation thereby placed on their freedom of action with regard to disputes affecting such undertakings and services" (paragraph 396 of the Digest of Decisions).

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;132.&htab;In the present case, the complainants criticise the contents of Quebec's Act 37 of 19 June 1985 concerning the process of negotiation of the collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors. They allege that the text would effectively suppress arbitration and limit the right to strike, claiming: (1) that the scope of negotiation of groups of associations of employees or associations of employees would be limited or fragmented, even for workers belonging to the same sector or the same establishment, and that collective bargaining would be imposed at the national or local level; (2) that the Government would determine salaries and salary scales by decree for the second and third years of the collective agreement, and that the workers would have no means to guarantee or defend their interests in the sectors concerned; (3) that the right to strike would be severely limited; (4) and lastly, that the Essential Services Council, an administrative body, would be given quasi-judicial powers.

&htab;133.&htab;The Committee notes that a complaint was filed in 1982 by several trade union organisations in the public sector concerning the determination of salaries for these workers (Case No. 1171). This complaint was examined in November 1983 (see 230th Report, paragraphs 114 to 171), and the Committee had then noted that the Government of Quebec strove to negotiate with the trade unions in the public and parapublic sectors, and that for a considerable number of them including certain of the complainant unions, these negotiations did lead to the conclusion of a collective agreement or some other agreement amending the decrees determining working conditions in those sectors. Nevertheless, the Committee noted with concern that Acts Nos. 70 and 105 had imposed important salary reductions on certain salaried employees by proclaiming that the requirements of government financial policy took precedence over collective agreements, and it regretted that Act No. 111 had suspended the right to strike of teachers until 1985. In conclusion, the Committee recommended that, in order to restore harmonious industrial relations, the Government should continue collective bargaining in the sectors concerned so as to settle the salary conditions of the workers in question in an atmosphere of mutual trust, and requested the Government to lift the suspension of the right to strike imposed on teachers until 1985.

&htab;134.&htab;In the present case, the Committee notes that the system of industrial relations instituted by Act 37 which, as the Government states, covers the Government, its ministries and bodies, the establishments of the public health network, social services as well as the establishments of the public education network, is complex. What is at issue now is whether the procedures for determining the conditions of employment and the settlement of disputes involving persons employed by the public authorities in Quebec conform with the principles set forth in these matters by the Committee on Freedom of Association.

&htab;135.&htab;The Committee notes that the Government claims to have taken appropriate measures to encourage and promote the development and full utilisation of procedures for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements in the determination of conditions of employment, and that the limitations to the right to strike in the public and parapublic sectors are accompanied by suitable safeguards to protect the interests of workers.

&htab;136.&htab;In the present case, as regards the level of negotiations, the Committee notes that the complainants allege that the scope of negotiation of groups of associations or associations has been limited and fragmented, even in cases where the workers concerned belong to the same sector or the same establishment, and that bargaining has been imposed at the national or local level. On the other hand, according to the Government, the experience of previous negotiations has shown that the concentration of bargaining at the national level resulted in the politisation of discussions and the overloading of agendas, on the one hand, and on the other that the great distance between the places where working conditions were discussed and those where they were experienced on a daily basis, created difficulties in applying collective agreements locally; therefore Act 37 sought to establish a process which allows the parties to agree to negotiate on a local basis matters more suitably discussed at that level. The Government acknowledges, however, that, in the education sector, as regards teaching personnel and, in the case of colleges, as regards professional non-teaching staff, the matters to be discussed at the local or regional level, in addition to those agreed by the parties, will also include those listed in Schedule A of the Act.

&htab;137.&htab;The Committee notes that the schedule in question contains from 25 to 28 matters as diverse as the recognition of local parties, union dues, time off for union activities, meetings and bill posting, information transmitted at the local level, labour relations committees, departments, selection of teachers, education committees, engagements, seniority, disciplinary measures, leave for professional activities and leave without pay, modalities for the payment of salary, moving expenses, civil liability, professional improvement, hygiene and safety, placement on reserve, distribution of workload, annual vacation, parking, sexual harassment, grievance and arbitration on matters negotiated locally, etc.

&htab;138.&htab;According to the Government, however, the text establishes a permanent process for negotiation as regards matters defined by the law or by common consent between the parties as clauses to be negotiated at the local or regional level. The Government claims that the opportunity to initiate negotiations at any time is counterbalanced, in the terms of Act 37, by the absence of the right to strike and lock-out at this level.

&htab;139.&htab;To the extent that the terms of this Act allow the parties to decide by common agreement to negotiate at a more appropriate level the conditions of work that are not common to all employees and which do not directly affect their standard of living, thereby accepting the permanent machinery for negotiation set up by the Act, and waiving the right to resort to strikes or lock-outs on these matters, the Committee considers that these provisions of the Act do not require further comment. On the other hand, as concerns the matters listed in Schedule A, which must be negotiated through the new permanent machinery and which cannot constitute grounds for a strike or lock-out, while it is true, as the Government notes, that these matters concern the modalities for applying regulations established at the national level or by law, or concern rules that affect conditions of employment in each undertaking, and as such can only be negotiated locally (for example, with union dues, the modalities for collecting and remitting funds, since the Labour Code itself stipulates the obligation for the employer to withhold union dues at the source), it is none the less a fact that the Act deprives workers in teaching establishments of the right to resort to strikes to protect their rights.

&htab;140.&htab;Consequently, the Committee requests the Government to amend the relevant provisions of Act 37 (in particular section 58) in order to allow the parties themselves to determine freely which matters concerning conditions of work shall be negotiated at the local level, where such matters are not common to all employees, and accept the permanent machinery for negotiation established by the Act.

&htab;141.&htab;As regards the allegations that Act 37 allows the Government to determine salaries and salary scales by decree for the second and third years of a collective agreement without providing safeguards for workers to defend the interests of the sectors concerned, and prohibits recourse to strikes in matters affecting salaries, the Committee notes the Government's statement that the impasses encountered during previous negotiations resulted from substantial discrepancies between government offers and trade union demands due, in particular, to the absence of comparative statistics on remuneration in the private and public sectors. The Government explains that Act 37 creates a Bipartite Institute for Research and Information on Remuneration, which is responsible for publishing information on trends in the remuneration of government employees and other wage earners. The machinery for determining salaries allows unrestricted negotiation and guarantees the associations of employees the right to strike with respect only to the first year of a collective agreement lasting three years. Nevertheless, the Government states that, as regards the second and third years, remuneration is determined according to certain specific modalities: after the publication of the Institute's report, the parties negotiate and the Government prepares and adopts a proposed regulation after the parties have had the opportunity to make their views known before a parliamentary commission. Furthermore, the Act contains an important safeguard: the salaries and salary scales cannot be less than those of the preceding year.

&htab;142.&htab;The Committee takes note of the Government's detailed explanations on the reasons that led it to set up this machinery. As regards this procedure for determining the wages of workers employed by the public authorities of Quebec, the Committee considers that it might be acceptable in so far as it inspires the confidence of the parties concerned, in accordance with Article 8 of Convention No. 151, especially since the Institute in question is bipartite. The Committee suggests that, given the prohibition against strikes, in the event of the machinery in question being blocked by an impasse, consideration should be given to establishing a procedure that would allow the parties to appeal to a mediator or an independent arbiter to resolve the dispute; the decisions of such a mediator or arbiter would be binding on both parties.

&htab;143.&htab;More generally, the Committee recalls the principles it has cited many times before on similar matters, namely that the right to strike is one of the essential means available to workers and their organisations for the furthering and defence of their social and economic interests, and that these rights relate not only to obtaining better conditions of work or collective occupational claims, but also involve the search for solutions to social and economic policy questions and to problems of direct concern to workers. On the other hand, the Committee admits that the right to strike could be limited and even prohibited, in the public service or in essential services; however, these limitations or prohibitions would become meaningless if the legislation defines the notion of public service and essential services too broadly. Thus, such restrictions or prohibitions must be confined to public officials who act in their capacity as agents of the public authority or essential services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.

&htab;144.&htab;Moreover, if the right to strike is restricted or prohibited in the public service or in essential services, appropriate safeguards must be afforded to protect workers who are thus denied one of the essential means of defending their occupational interests. Restrictions therefore should be offset by appropriate, impartial and speedy conciliation and arbitration procedures, in which the parties concerned can take part at every stage, whose awards should be binding on both parties, and, once rendered, be rapidly and fully implemented. In addition, the Committee has always considered that the requisitioning of workers involves a possibility of abuse, and may be justified only by the need to ensure the operation of essential services in the strict sense of the term. Likewise, it has admitted that a certain minimum service may be requested in the event of strikes, whose scope and duration could cause an acute national crisis; however, in these cases, the trade union organisations should be able to participate, along with the employers and the public authorities, in defining the minimum service.

&htab;145.&htab;As regards the allegations that Act 37 has, in the social affairs sector, conferred on the Essential Services Council, an administrative body, what amounts to quasi-judicial powers for determining the services to be maintained, and therefore also for restricting the right to strike, the Committee notes that the Government claims that the Council in question includes an equal representation of employers and workers. The Government admits, however, that according to the terms of Act 37, this Council has certain remedial powers. The Government explains that in the event of a strike or concerted action in violation of the law or capable of affecting services to which the public is entitled, or in the event that essential services are not provided during the course of the strike, the Council may intervene in an effort to help the parties resolve the dispute, or failing this, order them to take the appropriate corrective measures. The Government considers that these limitations on the right to strike in the social affairs sector conform with the principles of freedom of association.

&htab;146.&htab;The Committee trusts that the Essential Services Council, which is a joint body, will not avail itself of its remedial powers except in the event of a strike in services considered essential in the strict sense of the term, which endanger the life, personal safety or health of all or part of the population. Furthermore, the Committee recalls that trade union organisations, as well as employers, must be consulted in determining the minimum service to be maintained. Furthermore, the Committee suggests that, in the event that the machinery in question fails to resolve a labour dispute, the Government institute machinery enabling the parties to have recourse to independent arbitration, whose awards would be binding on both parties.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;147.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) As regards the establishment through legislation of the list of matters which must compulsorily be negotiated locally and for which the right to strike is thus prohibited, the Committee requests the Government to take measures to amend the legislation so as to permit the parties themselves to decide freely the level at which they wish to negotiate certain conditions of work.

(b) As regards the determination of salaries for the second and third years of a collective agreement in the public sector, the Committee suggests that the Government consider the possibility of establishing a further procedure enabling both parties to appeal to a mediator or independent arbiter to resolve a dispute in cases where the machinery set up by the Act is unsuccessful in resolving the dispute, especially since strikes are prohibited during this period. The awards of such arbiters should be binding on both parties. Furthermore, the Committee reminds the Government that workers in education establishments should enjoy the right to strike.

(c) Concerning the power to determine which services should be maintained in the event of strike in the social services sector and the remedial powers granted to the Essential Services Council, the Committee trusts that this joint Council will not use its powers except in situations involving strikes in essential services in the strict sense of the term, which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of part or all of the population. Furthermore, it invites the Government to allow the parties to resort to independent arbitration for the settlement of disputes.

APPENDIX Extract of pertinent provisions of the Act respecting the process of negotiation of the collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors

CHAPTER II

INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH AND INFORMATION ON REMUNERATION

DIVISION I

ESTABLISHMENT AND COMPOSITION

&htab;2.&htab;An agency is hereby established under the name of "Institut de recherche et d'information sur la rémuneration" (Institute for Research and Information on Remuneration).

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;4.&htab;The affairs of the Institute shall be administered by a board of directors consisting of not more than 19 members, including a president and two vice-presidents.

&htab;5.&htab;The president and vice-presidents shall be appointed by resolution of the National Assembly passed by no less than two-thirds of its Members, on a motion of the Prime Minister, presented after consultation with the groups of associations of employees contemplated in section 26, the associations of employees contemplated in section 27, the groups of school boards, colleges and establishments contemplated in sections 31 and 37 and with the associations of employees recognised or certified under sections 54 to 67 of the Public Service Act.

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;6.&htab;The other members shall be appointed by the Government.

&htab;Six of the members shall be chosen from among the persons whose names appear on lists drawn up by the associations of employees and the groups of associations of employees contemplated in this Act and by the associations of employees recognised or certified under sections 64 to 67 of the Public Service Act.

&htab;Six other members shalnl be appointed after consultation with the groups of school boards, colleges and establishments.

&htab;The Government may, in addition, appoint not more than two other members after consultation with the organisations most representative of the employees of the private sector and not more than two other members after consultation with the organisations most representative of the employers of the private sector.

DIVISION II

FUNCTIONS

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;19.&htab;The Institute is responsible for informing the public on the comparative state and evolution of the total remuneration of the employees of the Government and of school boards, colleges and establishments, and the total remuneration of any other category of persons employed in Quebec that it determines.

&htab;The Institute may conduct surveys, studies and analyses on the remuneration in various occupations or groups of employees in Quebec.

&htab;No later than 30 November each year, the Institute shall publish a report of its findings.

CHAPTER III

COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS OF THE EDUCATION AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS SECTORS

DIVISION I

GENERAL PROVISION

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;25.&htab;The clauses of a collective agreement binding between an association of employees and a school board, a college or an establishment shall be negotiated and agreed by unions and management at the national level or at the local or regional level in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

DIVISION II

ORGANISATION OF THE PARTIES

1. The unions

&htab;26.&htab;Every association of employees that belongs to a group of associations of employees shall negotiate and agree the clauses contemplated in section 44 through a bargaining agent appointed by that group.

&htab;A group of associations of employees includes a union, federation, confederation, corporation, labour body or other organisation which an association of employees representing persons employed by a school board, a college or an establishment joins, or to which it belongs or is affiliated.

&htab;27.&htab;Every association of employees that does not belong to a group of associations of employees shall negotiate and agree the clauses contemplated in section 44 as well as those contemplated in sections 57 and 58 that are applicable to the employees that it represents, through a bargaining agent appointed by that association.

&htab;28.&htab;The clauses negotiated and agreed by a group of associations of employees are binding on every new association of employees that affiliates to that group while the clauses contemplated in section 44 are in effect.

&htab;29.&htab;For the purposes of the negotiation of a collective agreement binding between an association of employees and a school board or a college, the following classes of personnel shall form separate groups:

(1) the teachers employed by the school boards or, as the case may be, by the colleges;

(2) the non-teaching professional staff;

(3) the support staff.

&htab;..................................................................

DIVISION III

MODE OF NEGOTIATION

1. Clauses negotiated and agreed at the national level

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;44.&htab;The clauses negotiated and agreed at the national level shall deal with all the matters contained in the collective agreement, except those matters that are defined as being the subject of clauses negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level under sections 57 and 58.

&htab;They may also provide for modes of discussion between the parties for the duration of the collective agreement for the purpose of resolving difficulties.

&htab;45.&htab;The clauses negotiated and agreed at the national level may be the subject of agreements negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level in accordance with section 70.

&htab;46.&htab;At the request of either party the Minister of Labour shall entrust a mediator with attempting to settle a dispute on matters that are the subject of a clause negotiated and agreed at the national level, except salaries and salary scales.

&htab;In the social affairs sector, the request to the Minister shall be made by a management negotiating subcommittee or by the union negotiating with the subcommittee. The dispute to be settled by the appointed mediator shall include all matters contemplated in section 44 concerning the establishments represented by the subcommittee, except salaries and salary scales.

&htab;47.&htab;If no agreement is reached within 60 days after the date of his appointment, the mediator shall transmit to the parties a report containing his recommendations on the dispute.

&htab;The report shall be made public unless an agreement on the dispute has been reached.

&htab;The period provided for in the first paragraph may be extended with the consent of the parties.

&htab;48.&htab;The parties may agree on a procedure of mediation other than that provided in sections 46 and 47. They may, in particular, appeal to a board of mediation or a public interest group.

&htab;A third party designated under the first paragraph shall make to the parties a report of its recommendations on the dispute within the time-limit they determine.

&htab;The report shall be made public unless an agreement on the dispute has been reached.

&htab;49.&htab;In case of a dispute on a matter that is the subject of a clause negotiated and agreed at the national level, the parties may also agree to make a joint report on the subject of their dispute and make it public.

&htab;50.&htab;Every person or group by whom or which a report is made public pursuit to sections 47, 48 or 49 shall, on the same day, give a written notice thereof to the Minister of Labour.

&htab;The Minister shall, without delay, inform the parties of the date he received the notice.

&htab;..................................................................

2. Salaries and salary scales

&htab;52.&htab;The clauses of the collective agreements which deal with salaries and salary scales shall be negotiated and agreed at the national level for a period ending, at the latest, on the last day of the year in course of which an agreement concerning such clauses has been reached at the national level.

&htab;For each of the two years following the year for which the clauses are applicable, the salaries and salary scales shall be determined in accordance with the provisions which follow.

&htab;53.&htab;After publication by the Institute of the report contemplated in section 19, the Conseil du trésor (Council of the Treasury), in collaboration with the management negotiating committees established under this chapter, shall negotiate with the groups of associations of employees or, as the case may be, the associations of employees in view of reaching an agreement on the determination of the salaries and salary scales.

&htab;54.&htab;The Chairman of the Conseil du trésor shall, each year, during the second or third week in March, table in the National Assembly a draft regulation fixing the salaries and salary scales for the current year.

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;The draft regulation shall be accompanied with a notice that it will be submitted to the Government, for adoption with or without amendment, during the second or third week in April. &htab;In no case may the draft regulation be submitted to the Government for adoption until the parties have been invited to a hearing on its content before a Parliamentary Committee.

&htab;55.&htab;The salaries and salary scales applicable for the current year are those provided for in the regulation adopted by the Government during the second or third week in April. In no case may the salaries and salary scales be lower than those of the preceding year.

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;56.&htab;Once fixed by regulation, the salaries and salary scales shall form part of the collective agreement and have the same affect as clauses negotiated and agreed at the national level.

3. Clauses negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level

&htab;57.&htab;In the social affairs sector and, in the education sector, in respect of the support staff and the non-teaching professional staff of school boards, the matters pertaining to the clauses negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level are those that are defined by the parties in the course of the negotiation of the clauses negotiated and agreed at the national level.

&htab;58.&htab;In the education sector, in respect of the teaching staff, and in the case of colleges, in respect of the non-teaching professional staff, the matters listed in Schedule A are the subject of clauses negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level.

&htab;The same applies, in respect of the same classes of personnel, to any other matter defined by the parties in the course of the negotiation of the clauses negotiated and agreed at the national level.

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;60.&htab;In matters defined as being the subject of clauses negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level, an association of employees and an employer may, at all times, negotiate and agree on the replacement, amendment, addition or repeal of a clause of the collective agreement.

&htab;In no case, however, may any negotiation under the first paragraph give rise to dispute.

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;62.&htab;If no agreement is reached on a matter that is the subject of clauses negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level, one party may request the Minister of Labour to appoint a mediator-arbitrator in view of the settlement of the disagreement.

&htab;63.&htab;The mediator-arbitrator shall endeavour to bring the parties to settle their disagreement. For that purpose, he shall meet the parties and, in case of refusal to attend a meeting, give them an opportunity to present their views.

&htab;64.&htab;If a disagreement still subsists 60 days after the appointment of the mediator-arbitrator, the parties may, in common agreement, request the mediator-arbitrator to rule on the subject of the disagreement. If the mediator-arbitrator is then of the opinion that a settlement is not likely to be reached by the parties, he shall rule on the question and inform the parties of his decision.

&htab;The decision of the mediator-arbitrator is deemed to be an agreement within the meaning of section 60.

&htab;65.&htab;If the mediator-arbitrator makes no decision under section 64, he shall make a report of his recommendations on the subject of the disagreement to the parties.

&htab;The mediator-arbitrator shall make the report public ten days after having transmitted it to the parties.

&htab;66.&htab;The parties may agree on any other mode of settlement of a disagreement.

&htab;..................................................................

4. Local arrangements

&htab;70.&htab;In the social affairs sector and, in the education sector, in respect of the support staff and in respect of the non-teaching professional staff of the school boards, the parties may, once the collective agreement is in force, agree on local or regional arrangements in view of the implementation or replacement of a clause of the collective agreement negotiated and agreed at the national level on a matter provided for in Schedule B that is applicable to the establishment, to the school board or, as the case may be, to the college.

&htab;In addition to what is provided for in the first paragraph, the parties to a collective agreement may also negotiate and agree such agreements to the extent that a clause negotiated and agreed at the national level provides therefore.

&htab;71.&htab;In no case may the negotiation of a local arrangement give rise to a dispute.

&htab;..................................................................

CHAPTER VI

AMENDMENTS TO THE LABOUR CODE

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;89.&htab;The said Code is amended by replacing sections 111.10 to 111.10.6, enacted by sections 11 and 12 of Chapter 37 of the Statutes of 1982, by the following sections:

&htab;111.10 In the event of a strike in an establishment, the percentage of employees to be maintained per workshift from among the employees who would usually be on duty during that period shall be at least:

(1) 90 per cent in an establishment providing the services of a reception centre or long-term care, an establishment providing specialised care in psychiatry, neurology or cardiology and a hospital centre having a department of clinical psychiatry or a community health department; (2) 80 per cent in a hospital centre for short-term care and a health-care centre not contemplated in paragraph 1; (3) 60 per cent in a local community service centre other than a health-care centre; (4) 55 per cent in a social service centre. &htab;In the case of a body declared by the Government to be classified as an establishment under the fourth paragraph of section 1 of the Act respecting the process of negotiation of the collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors, the number of employees to be maintained shall be determined by agreement between the parties or, failing an agreement, by a list established in accordance with section 111.10.3. The agreement or the list shall be approved by the Council.

&htab;111.10.1 &htab;The parties shall negotiate the number of employees to be maintained per unit of care and class of services from among the employees usually assigned to such units of care and classes of services. The agreement shall, in addition to conforming to section 111.10, in the case of an establishment contemplated therein, include provisions designed to ensure the normal operation of intensive care units and emergency care units, if necessary. It shall also include provisions designed to ensure a recipient's freedom of access to the establishment. &htab;The agreement shall be transmitted to the Council for approval.

&htab;111.10.2 &htab;Every establishment shall, upon request, inform the Council of the number of employees per bargaining unit, workshift, unit of care and class of services, who are usually on duty for the period indicated in the request.

&htab;111.10.3 &htab;If no agreement is reached, every certified association shall transmit to the Council for approval a list providing, per unit of care and class of services, the number of employees of the bargaining unit who are maintained in the event of a strike.

&htab;The list shall provide, from among the employees of the bargaining unit usually assigned to a care unit or class of services in the establishment, that a number of employees at least equal to the percentage provided in subparagraphs 1-4 of the first paragraph of section 111.10 that is applicable to the establishment, are maintained.

&htab;The list shall also include provisions designed to ensure the normal operation of intensive care units and emergency care units, if necessary. It shall also include provisions designed to ensure a recipient's freedom of access to the establishment.

Any list providing for a number of employees greater than the usual number of employees required in the service concerned is null and void.

&htab;111.10.4 &htab;On receiving an agreement or a list, the Council shall assess, with reference to the applicable criteria set forth in sections 111.10, 111.10.1 and 111.10.3, whether or not the essential services provided for therein are sufficient.

&htab;In case of disagreement between the parties, the Council may, to the exclusion of any other person, rule on the qualification of an establishment for the purposes of the application of the percentages provided in the first paragraph of section 111.10.

&htab;The parties are bound to attend any sitting of the Council to which they are convened."

&htab;111.10.5 &htab;Even where a list or agreement is consistent with the criteria set forth in sections 111.10, 111.10.1 and 111.10.3, the Council, before approving it, may, if the situation of the establishment justifies it, increase or modify the services provided for therein.

&htab;If it considers that the services are insufficient, the Council may make to the parties the recommendations that it considers appropriate in view of amending the list or agreement, or it may approve the list with amendments.

&htab;111.10.6 &htab;No list approved by the Council may be amended thereafter except at the latter's request. If an agreement is reached between the parties after the list is filed with the Council, the agreement approved by the Council shall prevail.

&htab;111.10.7 &htab;Every list or agreement is considered to be approved as filed if, within 90 days of its receipt by the Council, the latter has not ruled on the sufficiency of the services provided for in it.

However, the Council may subsequently amend, if necessary, such a list or agreement in order to bring it into conformity with the applicable provisions of sections 111.10, 111.10.1 and 111.10.3.

&htab;111.10.8 &htab;No person may derogate from the provisions of a list or agreement approved by the Council.

&htab;90.&htab;Section 111.11 of the said Code, enacted by section 34 of Chapter 45 of the statutes of 1984, is amended

&htab;(1)&htab;by replacing the first paragraph by the following paragraphs:

&htab;111.11 &htab;In no case may a party declare a strike or a lock-out unless 20 days have lapsed since the date on which the Minister received the notice provided for in section 50 of the Act respecting the process of negotiation of collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors and the party has given a prior notice of at least 7 clear juridical days in writing to the Minister and to the other party, and to the Council in the case of an establishment, indicating when it intends to resort to a strike or to a lock-out.

&htab;Where the parties have reached an agreement on all the clauses negotiated and agreed at the national level except salaries and salary scales, the 20 day period after which a strike or lock-out may be declared shall run from the date of the agreement.

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;91.&htab;Sections 111.12 to 111.15 of the said Code, enacted by sections 14 and 15 of Chapter 37 of the Statutes of 1982, are replaced by the following sections:

&htab;111.12 &htab;In the case of an establishment, no strike may be declared by a certified association unless an agreement or a list has been approved by the Council or unless a list or agreement is considered to be approved under section 111.10.7 and unless the list or agreement has been transmitted to the employer not less than 90 days previously.

&htab;..................................................................

&htab;111.14 &htab;Strikes and lock-outs are prohibited in respect of a matter defined as pertaining to clauses negotiated and agreed at the local or regional level or subject to local arrangements pursuant to the Act respecting the process of negotiation of the collective agreements in the public and parapublic sectors as well as in respect of the determination of the salaries and salary scales provided for in the second paragaph of section 52 and in sections 53 to 55 of the said Act.

&htab;92.&htab;The said Code is amended by adding, after Division III of Chapter V.1, the following:

DIVISION IV

REMEDIAL POWERS

&htab;111.16 &htab;In public services and in the public and parapublic sectors, the Conseil des services essentiels (Essential Services Council), of its own initiative or at the request of an interested person, may inquire into a lock-out, a strike or a slowdown that is contrary to law or during which the esential services provided for in a list or agreement are not rendered. &htab;The Council may also endeavour to bring the parties to an agreement or entrust a person it designates with attempting to bring them to an agreement and reporting on the situation.

&htab;111.17 &htab;The Council, if it considers that the conflict is or is likely to be prejudicial to a service to which the public is entitled or that the essential services provided for in a list or agreement are not rendered during a strike, may, after giving the parties the opportunity to submit their views, make an order to ensure that a service to which the public is entitled is available, or require compliance with the law, a collective agreement or an agreement or list on essential services.

&htab;The Council may:

(1) enjoin any person involved in the conflict or any category of these persons it determines to do what is required to comply with the first paragraph of this section, or abstain from doing anything in contravention thereof; (2) require from any person involved in the conflict to remedy any act or omission done or made in contravention of the law, of an agreement or of a list; (3) order in respect of a person or group of persons involved in a conflict, taking into consideration the conduct of the parties, the application of the measures of redress it considers best appropriate, including the establishment of a fund for the benefit of the users of the service that has been adversely affected, and the terms and conditions governing the administration and use of that fund; (4) order every person involved in the conflict to do or abstain from doing anything that it considers reasonable in the circumstances in view of maintaining services for the public; (5) order, where that is the case, that the grievance or arbitration procedure under a collective agreement be accelerated; (6) order a party to make known publicly its intention to comply with the order of the Council.

&htab;..................................................................

Cases Nos. 1363 and 1367 COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF PERU PRESENTED BY - THE FEDERATION OF BANKING EMPLOYEES OF PERU AND - THE TRADE UNION OF CREW MEMBERS OF THE HUMBOLDT SHIPPING COMPANY SA

&htab;148.&htab;The complaint concerning Case No. 1363 appears in a communication from the Federation of Banking Employees of Peru dated 25 February 1986; this organisation sent additional information in a communication dated 10 March 1986.

&htab;149.&htab;The complaint concerning Case No. 1367 appears in a communication from the Trade Union of Crew Members of the Humboldt Shipping Company SA dated 21 March 1986; this organisation sent additional information in a communication dated 15 May 1986.

&htab;150.&htab;The Government replied in communications dated 7, 9, 23 and 27 October 1986.

&htab;151.&htab;Peru has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

Case No. 1363 1. &htab;Allegations of the complainant organisation

&htab;152.&htab;The Federation of Banking Employees of Peru alleges that section 1 of Supreme Decree 0107-85-PCM is an infringement of Convention No. 98 and the acquired rights of employees in state banks regarding hours of work and remuneration established by collective agreements in so far as it stipulates that with a view to stimulating the economic recovery of the country:

&htab;From 1 January until 31 March 1986 the hours of work of employees in the public administration and workers in undertakings subject to public law, state undertakings subject to private law or mixed undertakings in which the State is the majority shareholder, irrespective of whether ownership is direct or indirect, will be from 7.45 a.m. to 3.45 p.m., including 30 minutes for lunch.

&htab;Compliance with the provisions of the above paragraph does not entail an increase in the remuneration which is normally received by the official or the payment of overtime except in those cases when work is performed outside the hours of work established by this Decree.

&htab;153.&htab;The complainant organisation explains that the above-mentioned Supreme Decree extended without any additional remuneration the summertime (January, February, March) hours of work by 90 minutes, contrary to the provisions of collective agreements and legal texts in force for many years (which the complainant organisation annexes to its communication).

&htab;154.&htab;The complainant organisation submits a copy of the ruling of the Twenty-second Magistrate's Court of Lima dated 31 January 1986 which states that the Supreme Decree in question does not apply to the Federation of Banking Employees of Peru. One of the grounds given in support of the ruling is that article 87 of the Constitution prohibits "a Supreme Decree such as that in question (and which is of less importance) from modifying or revoking an Act or collective agreement, especially when the benefits enjoyed by the members of the plaintiff constitute acquired rights which therefore may not be rescinded, and the exercise and observance of which are guaranteed by the Contitution ...". This ruling was appealed by the Attorney-General of the Republic on 3 February 1986.

2. &htab;The Government's reply

&htab;155.&htab;The Government states that Supreme Decree No. 0107-85-PCM dated 28 December 1985 established the hours of work of officials in the public service and workers in undertakings subject to public law, state undertakings subject to private law and mixed undertakings in which the State is the majority shareholder (irrespective of whether ownership is direct or indirect) from 7.45 a.m. to 3.45 p.m. during the period between 1 January and 31 March 1986 and that the observance of this work schedule does not entail an increase in remuneration or the payment of overtime. The Federation of Banking Employees, lodged an appeal for protection ( amparo ) on 6 January 1986, alleging the nullity and lack of legal force of Supreme Decree No. 0107-85-PCM since it considered that it violated the Political Constitution of the State and the rights acquired by these workers through collective agreements.

&htab;156.&htab;The Government adds that the Attorney-General of the Republic responsible for judicial matters in the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers, in an appeal dated 17 January 1986, denied and refuted the allegation and requested that the claim be declared either unacceptable, contrary to law or without foundation. The Twenty-second Magistrate's Court of Lima, on 27 January 1986, issued a ruling in support of the request for protection and annullment of the application of Supreme Decree No. 0107-85-PCM made by the Federation of Banking Employees of Peru, thus re-establishing the status quo as it existed prior to the date of the Decree. The Attorney-General lodged an appeal against this ruling on 8 February 1986, which is still pending.

&htab;157.&htab;The Government states that it will forward the opinion of the Director-General of Labour Relations on this matter as well as the information requested from the Attorney-General of the Republic on the outcome of the appeal lodged. The Government states that the Supreme Decree in question remained in force for only three months (January, February, March 1986), as indicated in section 1.

Case No. 1367 l. &htab;Allegations of the complainant organisation

&htab;158.&htab;The Trade Union of Crew Members of the Humboldt Shipping Company SA alleges that at the beginning of February 1986 the Government issued Supreme Decree No. 009-86-TR which amends Supreme Decree No. 006-71-TR regulating the collective bargaining procedure. The new Supreme Decree reduces from 20 to eight days the maximum duration of the conciliation stage which, furthermore, may be terminated automatically following the failure to appear by any of the parties following the first request to do so. This procedure makes it impossible to establish a satisfactory dialogue and a direct knowledge of the real economic situation and the actual capacity of employers to satisfy labour claims. The conciliation stage is followed automatically by one designed to "resolve the list of claims by the labour authority." The complainant organisation adds that a strike is declared illegal by the authorities when this stage is reached and it includes in the annex a copy of an administrative resolution dated 26 April 1986 which states that a strike is illegal if a matter is being resolved by the administrative authority.

&htab;159.&htab;The complainant organisation also alleges that previously, if negotiations had resulted in a collective agreement with the full approval of the parties or if a "solution" had been concluded with the labour authorities, a general wage increase was established along with two adjustment clauses (partial increases) to be applied at the end of the sixth and ninth months respectively during the annual period covered by the agreement. Following the publication of Supreme Decree No. 010-86-TR, from 1 January 1986 the second readjustment clause is eliminated thus leaving only one which is called the "additional renumeration increase" and which is fixed in accordance with the consumer price index (which is inaccurate in practice) and applied at the end of the sixth month during which the collective agreement or the authority's "solution" is in force. In this way workers are unable to recuperate their purchasing power.

&htab;160.&htab;The complainant organisation alleges that pursuant to subdirectoral resolution No. 069-86-ISD-NEC dated 24 February 1986 and directoral resolution No. 321-86-DR-LIM dated 6 March 1986, a leave of absence of 90 days for trade union purposes is granted to all leaders of the trade union whereas previously a permanent leave of absence for trade union purposes was granted to one or two leaders. The complainant organisation explains that it had reached an agreement with the undertaking, as can be seen from the conciliation document dated 22 November 1985, concerning the respect of rights and benefits established by the collective agreements previously signed between the Association of Shipowners of Peru and the Federation of Crew Members of Peru; this agreement recognised the above-mentioned permanent leave of absence which is especially important in the case of crew members since, if leaders are absent because they have been sent on a voyage by the undertaking, it becomes impossible for them to carry out their trade union activities given that they are not permitted to appoint representatives.

&htab;161.&htab;Finally, the complainant organisation refers to a series of matters which are not directly related to the application of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98.

2. &htab;The Government's reply

&htab;162.&htab;The Government states that Supreme Decree No. 09-86-TR dated 7 February 1986 made the following amendments to the collective bargaining procedure (Supreme Decree No. 006-71-TR):

- The period during which the Conciliation Board meets is reduced from 20 to eight days since, on the basis of existing statistics, very few lists of claims are settled at this stage. - If either or both parties fail to attend the meeting of the Conciliation Board, the attempt at conciliation shall be deemed to be unsuccessful and their absence seen as a tacit expression of a lack of interest in resolving the dispute at this stage of the procedure. It is important to stress that at the first meeting of the Conciliation Board the employer is notified that he must within three days present the evidence required by the technical body of the sector for carrying out the economic and labour study. In this way the technical body can make an advance examination of the corresponding evidence on the basis of which the authority must take a subsequent decision.

- The period of the direct settlement and conciliation stages is reduced from ten to eight days and from ten to five days respectively. This provision has made it possible to reduce considerably the time required for the processing of claims and thus enable workers to enjoy at an early date the benefits resulting from collective bargaining.

&htab;163.&htab;As regards Supreme Decree No. 010-86-TR dated 7 February 1986, the Government states that this Decree established a new mechanism governing the increase of remuneration by collective agreement to come in force as from 1 January 1986 which may be agreed between employers and workers subject to the labour regulations governing the private sector. This "additional increment" is calculated on the basis of the cumulative variation in the consumer price index for metropolitan Lima during the first six months during which the collective agreement is in force. The consumer price index to be used is that established monthly by the National Institute of Statistics.

&htab;164.&htab;The Government adds that the purpose of the above-mentioned modification in the method of granting wage increases is to compensate during the period covered by the collective agreements for the loss in purchasing power of the wages as a result of inflation, thus protecting the workers and ensuring them greater advantages as compared with the previous system.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;165.&htab;As regards Case No. 1363, the Committee observes that the complainant organisation contested Supreme Decree No. 0107-85-PCM which provides for an increase of 90 minutes in the hours of work in state banks during the months of January, February, March of 1986. The complainant organisation considers that this Decree violates the provisions of Convention No. 98 and is contrary to the contents of collective agreements and the legal provisions in force for many years.

&htab;166.&htab;The Committee hopes that the previous work schedule was a right acquired from collective agreements (not in force) and legal provisions, in pursuance of the constitutional principles establishing that the rights granted to workers may not be rescinded and that collective agreements have force of law, which in Peru would establish the right to maintain the working conditions acquired through a collective agreement even after it had expired.

&htab;167.&htab;The Committee considers that it is for the judicial authority to determine whether the extension of the above-mentioned work schedule for three months is an infringement of the said constitutional principles. In this respect, the Committee takes notes of the fact that there has already been a legal ruling handed down by the Court of First Instance in favour of the complainant organisation.

&htab;168.&htab;As regards Case No. 1367, the Committee observes that the complainant organisation essentially objects to certain provisions concerning collective bargaining contained in Supreme Decrees Nos. 009-86-TR and 010-86-TR dated 7 February 1986 and which are reproduced below:

&htab;Supreme Decree No. 009-86-TR

&htab;Section 13. If the parties are unable to conclude either by direct negotiation or in proceedings before a Conciliation Board a collective agreement as a result of which they no longer press any claim, a decision shall be taken on the claim by the labour administration authorities.

&htab;Section 25. If either or both of the parties fail to attend the Conciliation Board hearing after having been duly notified, the attempt at conciliation shall be deemed unsuccessful and the matter shall be submitted to the technical body of the Ministry of Labour and Social Promotion for the carrying out of the respective studies.

&htab;Section 26. If either or both of the parties fail to attend the Conciliation Board hearing at the second date fixed, the attempted conciliation shall be deemed unsuccessful and the conciliation officer shall submit a report on the matter to the higher authority accompanied by the evidence and statements deposited by the party which entered an appearance.

&htab;Section 29. An official of the Ministry of Labour and Social Promotion designated by the governor's office for the zone or administrative area concerned shall be the chairman of the Conciliation Board. There shall be a maximum time-limit of eight days for the sitting of the Board. &htab;Supreme Decree No. 010-86-TR

&htab;Section 1. In the collective agreements which come into force as from 1 January 1986, workers subject to the labour regulations applicable to the private sector may reach an agreement with their employers concerning the granting of an 'additional increment in remuneration'.

&htab;If the parties cannot agree concerning the amount of 'additional increment', this will be established by the labour administration authority.

&htab;The "additional increment" shall be calculated in accordance with the cumulative variation in the consumer price index for metropolitan Lima during the first six months of the period of the collective agreement. This increase will be paid at the end of the sixth month during which the collective agreement, administrative resolution, or arbitration award, as the case may be, is in force.

&htab;169.&htab;The Committee considers that sections 25, 26 and 29 of Supreme Decree No. 009-86-TR, which reduce the conciliation period within the collective negotiation procedure to eight days and which stipulate that following the failure of either party to appear at the conciliation stage, the attempt at conciliation shall be deemed to be unsuccessful, are not contrary to Article 4 of Convention No. 98, since they are provisions of a technical nature designed, as can be seen from the statements of the Government, to facilitate and accelerate the negotiation procedure. The Committee observes, however, that Supreme Decree No. 009-86-TR and, in particular, section 13 establishes unilaterally a system of compulsory arbitration by the administrative authority following the failure of the negotiation and conciliation stages and which, according to the documentation provided by the complainant, in practice prevents the declaration or continuation of a strike. In this respect, the Committee would point out that provisions which establish that failing agreement between the parties the points at issue must be settled by arbitration by the labour authorities do not conform to the principle of voluntary negotiation contained in Article 4 of Convention No. 98 [See, for example, 116th Report, Case No. 541 (Argentina), para. 72]. The Committee also points out that in as far as compulsory arbitration prevents the exercise of a strike, it is contrary to the right of trade union organisations to organise freely their activities and could only be justified in the public service or in essential services in the strict sense of the term [See, for example, 236th Report, Case No. 1140 (Colombia), para. 144].

&htab;170.&htab;As regards section 1 of Supreme Decree No. 010-86-TR which provides for an "additional increment" in collective agreements (whereas previous legislation had made provision for two increments during the year) the Committee considers that without prejudice to the observations made in the previous paragraph, this section is not contrary to Article 4 of Convention No. 98.

&htab;171.&htab;Finally, as regards the reduction of permanent leave of absence for trade union purposes of one or two trade union leaders to a leave of absence of 90 days for all trade union leaders, the Committee observes that the Government has not sent observations in this respect. In these circumstances, and noting that the above-mentioned reduction was issued by a resolution of the administrative authority when acting as arbitrator as pursuant to the legislation in the event that the parties do not reach an agreement in collective bargaining, and since this reduction implicitly contradicts the provisions established in the conciliation document dated 22 November 1985 concluded between the complainant organisation and the employer, the Committee deplores this interference by the authorities in collective bargaining especially if account is taken of the detriment of a reduction in leave of absence for trade union purposes which may result in such a special sector as that of ships' crews.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;172.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) Concerning Case No. 1363, the Committee takes notes of the fact that the Court of First Instance has handed down a decision declaring the inapplicability of the Supreme Decree which extended working hours.

(b) As regards Case No. 1367, the Committee considers that the system of compulsory arbitration established unilaterally by Supreme Decree No. 009-86-TR is contrary to the principle of voluntary collective bargaining contained in Article 4 of Convention No. 98 and impedes the exercise of the right to strike.

(c) It requests the Government to take steps to amend this Decree and draws the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations to the legislative aspect of the case.

Case No. 1365 COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL PRESENTED BY - THE NATIONAL FEDERATION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' TRADE UNIONS (FCSFP) - THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION TRADE UNION FRONT (FESAP)

&htab;173.&htab;The complaint of the National Federation of Public Employees' Trade Unions is contained in a communication of 3 March 1986; that of the Public Administration Trade Union Front in a communication of 14 March 1986. The World Federation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession associated itself with the FCSFP complaint in a communication of 27 March 1986. The Government replied in a letter dated 2 October 1986.

&htab;174.&htab;Portugal has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) and the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151).

A. The complainants' allegations

&htab;175.&htab;The complainants allege the infringement of trade union rights in Portugal in connection with the bargaining procedure for the review of public service wages for the year 1986.

&htab;176.&htab;The National Federation of Public Employees' Trade Unions, which is affiliated to the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP-IN), and which together with the National Federation of Teachers, Local Public Administration Employees and Public Ministry Magistrates, comprises the National Federation of Public Employees' Trade Unions and claims to represent 70 per cent of the employees in this sector, presents a complaint concerning the infringement of Convention No. 151.

&htab;177.&htab;The Public Administration Trade Union Front (FESAP), composed of the Federation of State Workers, which is affiliated with the General Confederation of Labour (UGT), together other independent trade unions, claims to represent 250,000 employees in public administration and to have been the only representative trade union organisation to have signed two wage agreements on behalf of public employees in 1984 and 1985. This organisation also alleges the infringement of Convention No. 151.

&htab;178.&htab;The facts, as described by the complainants, are as follows: according to the national federation affiliated with the CGTP-IN, the Trade Union Bargaining Committee (CNS) requested the Government on 15 October 1985 to increase wages for 1986. Following the legislative elections which brought about a change in Government, the CNS resubmitted its demands to the new Government on 4 November 1985. The negotiations, however, did not get under way until three months later, following a number of trade union demonstrations. On 4 December, 70 trade union leaders appeared at the Prime Minister's residence and on 18 December, 300 trade union leaders and activists called on the Secretary of State for the Budget, who received them and agreed to open negotiations. The Government and the CNS held the first of three bargaining meetings on 15 January 1986.

&htab;179.&htab;In the knowledge that, according to the General Enabling Act on the Budget, public expenditures are not supposed to exceed the corresponding budgetary credits, and that the scheduling of wage and other negotiations must be subordinate to the preparation of the budget and its parliamentary review, and in the knowledge that the Parliament would review the proposed budget in the first months of 1986, the trade union front affiliated with the UGT presented a draft bargaining agreement on 18 and 27 December 1985. The Government failed to reply to this request and did not meet with the trade union front until 16 January 1986.

&htab;180.&htab;The national federation affiliated with the CGTP-IN alleges that the trade unions requested an increase of 26.6 per cent, as well as a daily allowance of 1,880 escudos and a meal allowance of 280 escudos. The national federation and the trade union front agree that the Government proposed an increase of 15 per cent, with a daily allowance of 1,710 escudos and a meal allowance of 210 escudos. The trade union front affiliated with the UGT reports that it signed a draft agreement with the Government to the effect that both parties wished to conclude negotiations in the month of January, and that the Government agreed to furnish all necessary information during the current month.

&htab;181.&htab;The national federation states that at the second meeting, the Government and the CNS modified their proposals, with the Government offering an increase of 16 per cent and the CNS settling for one of 23 per cent. However, at the third meeting, the government representative requested the CNS to accept its offer of 16 per cent, failing which negotiations would be suspended immediately. The CNS refused to accept this counter-proposal, and although it declared that it was still willing to pursue negotiations and moderate its demands, the Government nevertheless broke off the negotiations unilaterally. On 27 January 1986, the CNS requested the opening of further negotiations, in accordance with the law; the Government, however, without taking this request into account or replying in any way whatsoever, decided on 28 January 1986 to increase the public service wage bill by 16.4 per cent, which was more than the last proposals made during the negotiations.

&htab;182.&htab;The national federation further reports that the Government simultaneously reached an agreement with the State Technical Supervisors' Trade Union, an organisation similar to the national federation, but not merely as representative, as it encompasses only 2 per cent of the employees covered by the agreement.

&htab;183.&htab;For its part, the trade union front reports that the Government, represented by the Secretary of State for the Budget, delivered a genuine ultimatum at the meetings held on 20, 21 and 22 January: that the front accept an increase of 15.8 or 16 per cent, failing which negotiations would be suspended. The trade union front refused to accept the Secretary of State's proposal but indicated its willingness to pursue negotiations, pointing to the fact that it had shown during the three previous meetings its interest in dialogue and its steadfast wish for a rapprochement. It stated that its proposal of 21.5 per cent was not final, that the 16 per cent increase proposed by the Secretary of State was not acceptable, and that there was room for negotiation. Furthermore, the trade union front adds that the Government's reply did not furnish all required information, although it fails to specify which information was not forthcoming. According to the trade union front, the suspension of negotiations was premeditated since, in December 1985, the Government had avoided negotiations on the pretext that it had to submit the supplementary budget for 1985 to Parliament, although this budget had no bearing on wage revisions for 1986. The Government had agreed to negotiate during the month of January, with a view to reaching an agreement by the end of January, since the review of the budget by Parliament was scheduled for February. However, according to the trade union front, the Government failed to keep its word. It sought to rush the negotiations by packing them into four days, i.e. 16, 20, 21 and 22 January; the first meeting, in fact, was limited to a presentation of the Government's proposals and the signing of a draft agreement; the last meeting served only to allow the Government to state that it had no intention of making any concessions or going beyond its position.

&htab;184.&htab;Given the Government's suspension of negotiations, on 27 January the trade union front requested the opening of further negotiations as provided by law. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State for the Budget, in a letter of 30 January, a copy of which was attached by the complainant, refused to open further negotiations on the pretext that he had to submit the budget to Parliament on 3 February 1986, that none but his own proposal was compatible with the policy aimed at stabilising inflation at 14 per cent in 1986, and that his proposal and the counter-proposal (16 and 21.5 per cent, respectively) were too far apart to allow for a resolution of the dispute in time for the budget debate. The trade union front also confirms that it later learned through the media of the Council of Minister's decision to raise salaries by 16.5 per cent for 1986, and of the agreement with the State Supervisors' Trade Union, which is a minority organisation representing less than half of this very small category.

&htab;185.&htab;According to the trade union front, the Government's bad faith is evident in its decision to grant the State Technical Managers' Trade Union, on behalf of all public employees, an increase of 16.5 per cent, while the Secretary of State had only proposed a maximum 15.8 per cent to the trade union front, which represents all occupational categories in the public service. Furthermore, the agreement with the Managers' Trade Union is dated 28 January, which shows that the Government, after breaking off negotiations with the trade union front on the pretext that it no longer had time to negotiate prior to presenting the 1986 budget to Parliament, did, in fact, find time to pursue negotiations with the Managers' Trade Union. Obviously, by signing this agreement with a minority and non-representative organisation, the Government was seeking to establish working conditions for 1986 unilaterally before the second round of presidential elections, which was scheduled for 16 February, in a purely political move. As of the date of its complaint, in other words, 14 March 1986, the trade union federation reports that the Government had not yet opened the debate on the budget, during the course of which modifications could be made; therefore, the trade union front concludes that the Government's sudden suspension of negotiations well before the end of January was not motivated by the urgency of Parliament's examination of the budget, but by purely electoral considerations. The Government's refusal to utilise the procedure for further negotiations is unjustified and deplorable. Furthermore, the provisions of Portuguese legislation (Legislative Decree No. 45-A/84, section 8, paragraph 2) are not consistent with the spirit or the letter of Convention No. 151, and in particular with Article 8.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;186.&htab;In its reply of 2 October 1986, the Government notes that both complaints concern the bargaining procedure in connection with the review of public service wages for 1986 as regards the principles of good faith and usual confidence between the parties.

&htab;187.&htab;Specifically, the Government is alleged to have infringed the provisions of Article 8 of Convention No. 151 concerning the settlement of differences regarding the determination of employment conditions, by having delayed the opening of negotiations and then, only after having been subjected to pressure. It is alleged that the number and frequency of meetings that were held made it impossible to give due consideration to the proposals advanced by the parties, to the detriment of the bargaining process. It is further alleged that the Government decided unilaterally to terminate negotiations despite the large gap between the parties' proposals regarding the increase in question.

&htab;188.&htab;As regards the opening of the procedure for settling these differences, the National Federation of Public Employees' Trade Union alleges that in spite of its expressed intention to request further negotiations during the course of the last meeting, the Government ignored this request and failed to reply.

&htab;189.&htab;For its part, the trade union front states that the Government refused to initiate the procedure for further negotiations and that this refusal was unjustified and should be condemned. The front also claims that the provisions of Portuguese legislation, namely Legislative Decree No. 45-A/84, section 8, paragraph 2, do not conform with the spirit or the letter of Convention No. 151.

&htab;190.&htab;As regards the general wage bargaining procedure in question, the Government replies that it has always shown an interest in bargaining with the trade unions on questions concerning the review of public service wages, and that this interest was translated into action as soon as it was possible to hold meetings. As it happened, this was not possible until mid-January, owing to the fact that the Government, which had taken office in November, had been busy preparing the 1985 supplementary budget and discussing it with Parliament. The trade unions were informed of this situation; they knew why it had not been possible to hold the meetings. It must also be pointed out that the meetings were called and scheduled on the very day on which the supplementary budget was put to a final vote, and that the first meeting was held on the first working day following the budget's approval. Thus, there are no grounds to support the national federation's allegation that negotiations only commenced after pressure was brought to bear by the trade unions.

&htab;191.&htab;Throughout the meetings, the Government always adopted a frank and clear attitude, as evidenced by the records of the meetings which the Government encloses. In fact, the Government's representative clearly set forth the principles that should guide the negotiations in the light of the Government's objectives and the constraints on increases which had already been included in the new budget that the State would submit to the National Assembly in early February. The Government clearly defined the limits of negotiation in the meetings, in accordance with the provisions of section 4 of Legislative Decree No. 45-A/84, which stipulates that both parties must be guided by the "principle of safeguarding the public interest". In the case at hand, this implied that the parties should respect the sprit of the budgetary and fiscal policy outlined at the outset of the negotiations by the Secretary of State for the Budget, and presented in the budgetary bill to the National Assembly. Thus, it is difficult to understand why the national federation alleges that the Government imposed an ultimatum.

&htab;192.&htab;According to the Government, both complainant organisations were aware from the outset of the urgency of taking a decision within the above-mentioned limits; in fact, they insisted on presenting counter-proposals so greatly at odds with those of the Government that there were no prospects for an agreement, given the need to submit the budgetary proposals for 1986 to the National Assembly no later than had been scheduled.

&htab;193.&htab;Moreover, according to the Government, the fact that an agreement was reached with the State Technical Supervisors' Trade Union - one of the trade union organisations participating in the negotiations - attests to the Government's good faith and willingness to negotiate. It was possible, in fact, to reach an agreement expeditiously with the above-mentioned trade union, precisely because, unlike the complainant organisations, this trade union proved open to the proposals within the limits and parameters established by the Government and presented along exactly the same lines to all the trade union organisations involved.

&htab;194.&htab;In reply to the allegations concerning the request for further negotiations, the Government reports that it replied as required by the letter of the law that governs the right of public employees to negotiation, as substantiated by letters attached by the Government, which explain the reasons that led it to reject the grounds invoked for reopening negotiations. The Government does not understand why the national federation alleges that it did not reply to the request for further negotiations, nor why the national federation alleges that the Government rejected the request for further negotiations. In fact, the Government was of the opinion that it was not possible to accept the reasons invoked for reopening negotiations since, as explained above, the Government considered that it would not be possible to resume negotiations owing to the short time available to complete work on the state budget for 1986. In any event, according to the Government, it is not within the competence of trade union organisations to interefere or even comment on the Government's decisions regarding the manner in which the State's budget is presented to the National Assembly; their only legitimate recourse is to demand that the conditions governing the negotiations be clearly set forth at once, and this, in fact, was done.

&htab;195.&htab;The trade union front's allegations that certain provisions of Portuguese legislation do not conform with the spirit or the letter of Convention No. 151, have no bearing on the negotiations in question. In fact, the Government considers that it has abided by the legislation in force as of the date on which the negotiations began. The Legislative Decree in question, which was open to public debate when it was presented as a bill, was prepared in accordance with the provisions of its preamble and with the intention of respecting the international obligations undertaken by Portugal in ratifying Convention No. 151. This was an overriding concern in the preparation of the section in question. The proposed text was presented to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations within the framework of the reports presented on the application of this Convention; the Committee did not formulate any observations or direct requests that would support the alleged incompatibility. Furthermore, the complainant organisation itself never reported the slightest legal incompatibility when copies of this report were forwarded to it.

&htab;196.&htab;In conclusion and in light of the foregoing, the Government considers that the complaints should be rejected as the allegations are groundless.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;197.&htab;The Committee observes that the complaints concern a denunciation of Legislative Decree No. 45-A/84 of 3 February 1984 concerning the right of negotiation of public employees, in the sense that it fails to establish a procedure for the resolution of disputes in the public service. In particular, they concern the Government's refusal to initiate further negotiations with the complainant organisations, following the failure of wage increase negotiations, and the Government's alleged unilateral decision to grant a wage increase greater than that which it had proposed during the negotiation.

&htab;198.&htab;The Committee observes that the national federation affiliated with the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP-IN) had already submitted complaints concerning collective bargaining in the public service in 1981 and in 1985 (Case No. 1042, examined in the 214th Report in March 1982, and Case No. 1315, examined in the 239th Report in March 1985). The first of these complaints was presented before the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 45-A/84; the second, after its adoption. At the time of the first complaint, the Government had already ratified Convention No. 151, but had not yet adopted Decree No. 45-A/84 of 3 February 1984 concerning the right of negotiation of public employees. In its conclusions, the Committee on Freedom of Association had requested the Government to adopt legislation that would grant public employees the guarantees provided for by Convention No. 151 in such a way as to secure the confidence of the parties concerned. [214th Report, para. 331.] In response to the second complaint, the Committee had noted that the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations had examined Legislative Decree No. 45-A/84 and found it to comply with the requirements of Convention No. 151. The Committee endorsed this opinion, considering that the procedure chosen in Portuguese law to resolve disputes, namely further negotiations, complied with the terms of the Convention, which were correctly applied by the Government in the case in question, and decided at that time that the case did not call for further examination. [239th Report, paras. 74-81.]

&htab;199.&htab;In the present case, the two largest and most representative organisations of public employees presented complaints alleging that the Government had infringed the Legislative Decree by refusing to open further negotiations. Section 8 of this Legislative Decree, which concerns the resolution of disputes, provides in paragraph 1 that "the resolution of disputes that arise during the bargaining procedure may be undertaken at the request of the trade union organisations by further negotiations"; the second paragraph of the same section provides that the opening of further negotiations requires the approval of the Government and must take place within 20 days and aim at securing an agreement. The third paragraph provides that the consensus reached in the further negotiations will assume the character of a recommendation.

&htab;200.&htab;The Government recalls that the bill of Legislative Decree No. 45-A/84 was prepared with the intention of complying with Convention No. 151, that it was publicly debated, that it was communicated to the Committee of Experts who formulated no observations or direct requests, and that the trade union front - the second complainant organisation in this case - never alleged the slightest legal incompatibility when copies of the reports on the application of Convention No. 151 were forwarded to it.

&htab;201.&htab;In fact, the Committee observes that, as the trade union front itself indicates at the outset of its complaints, the Government succeeded twice before, in 1984 and in 1985, in signing wage agreements for public employees with this representative organisation affiliated with the UGT.

&htab;202.&htab;The Committee observes, nevertheless, that in the present case the Government failed to reopen negotiations with the most representative organisations, but that it managed to reach an agreement with an organisation which is considerably less representative.

&htab;203.&htab;In the Committee's opinion, although the procedure chosen in Portuguese law to resolve disputes, namely further negotiations, complies with the terms of the Convention, the Government and trade union organisations, as parties to the negotiation, must nevertheless maintain an attitude of good faith in all negotiations. In the case in question, the Committee notes with regret that the Government did not resume negotiations with the complainant organisations which are the most representative.

The Committee's recommendation

&htab;204.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendation:

&htab;The Committee requests the Government in the future to open further negotiations at the request of the most representative trade union organisations with a view to reaching an agreement.

Case No. 1370 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL PRESENTED BY THE WORKERS' UNION OF THE SOUTHERN AND ISLANDS INSURANCE COMPANIES

&htab;205.&htab;The complaint submitted by the Union of Workers of the Southern and Islands Insurance Companies is contained in a communication dated 30 May 1986. The Government sent a reply on this matter in a communication of 16 October 1986.

&htab;206.&htab;Portugal has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

&htab;207.&htab;In this case, the complainant trade union alleges an infringement of the right of collective bargaining by the Government of Portugal. It states that it represents almost all the workers in the insurance sector and on the islands and is affiliated to the General Confederation of Workers (UGT).

&htab;208.&htab;The complainant explains that, in accordance with the law, the trade union associations, which had previously accepted the collective labour agreement for the insurance sector, proposed to the employers' associations that the said agreement should be revised. The social partners entered into discussions but, as these gave rise to disagreement and a collective dispute, they called upon the Minister of Labour and Social Security to mediate in this matter. As a result of this conciliation, an agreement was, according to the complainant, ratified by a representative of the Ministry of Finance and a representative of the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. The presence of a representative from the Ministry of Finance was justified on the grounds that it was an agreement applying to publicly owned insurance companies under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance.

&htab;209.&htab;The parties jointly submitted this agreement to the General Labour Directorate so that it might be registered and published after having requested, in accordance with the law, the approval of the appropriate ministry and other responsible ministries, in this case the Deputy Secretary of State to the Minister of Finance and the Treasury, acting for the Ministry of Finance, and the Secretary of State for Undertakings and Vocational Training, acting for the Ministry of Labour and Social Security. However, the complainant protests, the Deputy Secretary of State for the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury refused to give his approval under Order No. 1001/86/X of 3 January 1986. The Order in question is enclosed together with the complaint.

&htab;210.&htab;The supervisory authority refused to give his approval on the grounds that a clause in the agreement provided for a reduction of 15 minutes in weekly hours of work (clause 35) whereas, according to the complainant, only the Minister of Labour and Social Security would have been empowered to take a decision of this nature, in accordance with Decree No. 505/74 of 1 October 1974. The social partners therefore called upon this Minister to give his authorisation.

&htab;211.&htab;Apart from this incident, moreover described by the complainant as minor, the Deputy Secretary of State for the Minister of Finance and the Treasury allegedly took the liberty, under this Order of 3 January 1986, of placing restrictions on future revisions of the collective agreement in the insurance sector.

&htab;212.&htab;The complainant acknowledges that following the Order in question, the social partners signed, for registration purposes, a new text which no longer referred to the 15-minute cut in weekly working time. It claims that the social partners were obliged to take this action in order not to delay the application of the new pay scales.

&htab;213.&htab;In concluding, the complainant considers that the Order of 3 January 1986 infringes the principle of the confidence of the social partners. Indeed, it is of the opinion that the intervention of the supervisory authority, in so far as it implies that instructions may be given to the representatives of undertakings under supervision who are obliged to accept them as guide-lines binding the social partners, does not augur well for the future. It believes that the freely accepted revision of the agreement does not call for any corrective measure from the Government.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;214.&htab;In its lengthy reply dated 16 October 1986, the Government confirms several of the complainant's allegations. For instance, it admits that following a disagreement which arose whilst the collective agreement was being renewed, the social partners called upon the Ministry of Labour to mediate in this matter and that, during the last conciliation meeting with the responsible service of this Ministry, the parties present, both trade union and employer, reached an agreement. It explains that, from the beginning, the presence of the Ministry of Finance at these conciliation meetings was justified on the grounds that the instrument to be revised applied to publicly owned undertakings under state supervision. The Government also acknowledges that the parties had jointly submitted the text of the agreement to the General Labour Directorate so that it might be registered and published; it goes on to explain that in order to be registered, this agreement had to be previously approved by the appropriate ministry acting in co-operation with the other responsible ministries, in this case the Deputy Secretary of State for the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury and the Secretary of State for Undertakings and Vocational Training.

&htab;215.&htab;On the other hand, the Government denies the allegation that the Ministry of Finance ratified this agreement and, as evidence, it submits the Minutes of the conciliation proceedings of 17 December 1985 which do not bear the signature of the expert from the Ministry of Finance, although the latter was assisting the expert from the Ministry of Labour. According to the Government, as is evident from the Minutes of one of the previous meetings held on 13 December 1985, the text of which it encloses, the expert from the Ministry of Finance communicated the recommendations of his Ministry concerning wages, and not the length of working time, to the social partners during this meeting. The Government states that nothing in this communication points to the fact that the representatives of public undertakings were authorised to reduce the 35.5-hour working week even further, as it is already one of the shortest in Portugal, where the working week is around 44 hours (42 hours in the services sector).

&htab;216.&htab;The Government acknowledges that Order No. 1001/86/X of 3 January 1986 laid down the conditions under which the Ministry could grant its approval and points out that the text of the agreement submitted by the social partners to the responsible services (which no longer contains the clause pertaining to the 15-minute cut in the weekly hours of work) on 8 January 1986 and approved by the Ministers of Finance and of Labour, was published in the Labour and Employment Bulletin on 22 January 1986.

&htab;217.&htab;According to the Government, the allegation that the Minister of Finance's refusal to give his approval as long as the clause providing for a 15-minute cut in weekly working hours remained, whereas only the Ministry of Labour would have been empowered to take such a decision, in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 505/74 of 1 October 1974, is the result of an incomprehensible error on the part of the complainant. Indeed, the Government acknowledges that the Legislative Decree in question stipulates that "the limits of working time established by the schedules in force may not be reduced either by collective agreement or by individual labour contract" and that "the Government, through the Ministry of Labour, may however authorise changes in the schedules in force if it considers this step in line with the economic development of the branch of activity under consideration". However, it points out that the text dates from 1974, that the insurance sector was only nationalised on 12 March 1975 and, since that time, Legislative Decree No. 260/76 of 8 April 1976 on public undertakings stipulates that various economic, financial and social issues affecting the running of public undertakings must be submitted for approval to the appropriate ministry (section 13).

&htab;218.&htab;The Government adds that section 24 of Legislative Decree No. 519/C1/79 of 29 December 1979 on collective agreements forbids the deposit of agreements concerning public or publicly owned undertakings if they are not accompanied by a document giving the permission or approval of the appropriate ministry, which decides upon this matter with the other responsible ministries. Approval must therefore be given by the appropriate ministry and, in the present case, the Ministry of Finance is the appropriate ministry. As far as the Government is concerned, the complainant is therefore making an error when he accuses the Secretary of State of Finances of having encroached upon the competence of the Ministry of Labour. Moreover, the Government concludes by stating that the negotiators, both trade unions and employers, showed their willingness to accept the lawfulness of this intervention by hastily amending clause 35 to ensure that the collective agreement as a whole might be approved, deposited and published.

&htab;219.&htab;As regards the allegation that the representative of the Ministry of Labour abused the confidence of the social partners by taking the liberty of restricting future revisions of the collective labour agreement in the insurance sector, the Government states the following: in examining the above-mentioned Minutes of 13 December 1985 and Order No. 1001/86/X of 3 January 1986 containing the request that the clause on the reduction of weekly working hours should be withdrawn, it is clear, according to the Government, that there is no basis to this accusation.

&htab;220.&htab;The Government is of the opinion that it has the right and duty to carry out a wages and incomes policy. However, it continues, having received a request for conciliation, it communicated to the social partners the limits within which wage bargaining could take place: the inflation rate + 1 per cent of the increase in wages in real terms + or - the variation in productivity rates, as stated in the Minutes of the meeting of 13 December 1985. However, Order No. 1001/86/X of 3 January 1986 notes that bargaining resulted in an increase of 19.6 per cent, in addition to an increase in the meal subsidy of 390 escudos, in spite of the guide-lines communicated to the parties to collective bargaining. In order to avoid the social consequences of a refusal, the Government gave its approval; however, in this Order, it informed the parties that the considerable wage increases granted (19.5 per cent) far exceeded inflation estimates for 1986 and drew their attention to the role they played in infringing the wages and prices policy in an economically sensitive sector made up of public undertakings. Whilst giving its authorisation for the wage increases agreed upon, it therefore proposed that the following riders should also be included:

- either the excessive difference between the increase in the aggregate payroll as a result of bargaining and the inflation rate forecast for the period during which the pay scales were to be applied should be offset by increased economic efficiency, implying that the undertaking, and especially its management and administrative bodies, must make a considerable effort to improve its operating conditions;

- or the excessive increase in wages should be offset by adjusting the upward trend in the aggregate payroll when next reviewing the collective agreement.

&htab;In the Government's opinion, this second point does not constitute an abuse of confidence; it rather aims at making the partners assume their responsibilities by providing them with the opportunity to offset the excessive outcome of bargaining.

&htab;221.&htab;According to the Government, the supervisory power exercised in this field is legitimate; it explains that in Portugal, supervision only goes so far as communicating to the parties, before they conclude their bargaining, the limits within which approval will be granted. The Government is therefore of the opinion that this intervention does not infringe Convention No. 98, since Article 4 of this Convention does not stipulate that collective bargaining is an absolute and unlimited right but that it is a privileged means of promoting and encouraging, through measures appropriate to national conditions, the regulation of terms and conditions of employment.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;222.&htab;The Committee notes the lengthy and detailed explanations provided by the Government. It nevertheless considers it necessary to draw attention to a principle to which it has referred on many occasions. It would observe that legislation authorising a refusal of the filing of a collective agreement on grounds of irregularity is not contrary to the principle of free collective bargaining. However, if this legislation implies that the filing of a collective agreement may be refused on grounds such as incompatibility with the general policy of the Government, this is tantamount to a requirement that prior approval be obtained before a collective agreement can come into force [see, for example, 236th Report, Case No. 1267 (Papua New Guinea), para. 600].

&htab;223.&htab;Moreover, the Committee recalls that the requirement of approval by a public authority before an agreement can enter into force is not in conformity with the principle of voluntary collective bargaining, established under Convention No. 98. In the case where clauses of various collective agreements might seem to conflict with considerations in the general interest, procedures might be envisaged whereby these considerations would be brought to the attention of the parties, so that they might examine them once again, it being understood that they should maintain their freedom as regards the final decision. [See 208th Report, Case No. 1007 (Nicaragua), para. 389.]

&htab;224.&htab;In the case in question, the Committee notes that under Act No. 505/74 of 1 October 1974, the limits of working time established by the schedules in force may not be reduced either by collective agreement or by an individual labour contract but that the Government may authorise changes in the schedules in force if it considers such changes compatible with the economic development of the branch of activity concerned. In the Committee's view, legislation excluding working time from the scope of collective bargaining, unless there is government authorisation, would seem to infringe the right of workers' organisations to negotiate freely with employers the working conditions guaranteed under Article 4 of Convention No. 98.

&htab;225.&htab;Furthermore, the Committee recalls that section 24 of Legislative Decree No. 519/C1/79 of 29 December 1979 on collective agreements bans the deposit of agreements concerning public or publicly owned undertakings if they are not accompanied by a document giving the permission or approval of the appropriate ministry, which decides upon this matter with the other responsible ministers. In the Committee's view, if this legislation only authorised the refusal of the filing of a collective agreement on grounds of irregularity, it would not be contrary to principles of free collective bargaining. However, as soon as it implies that the deposit may be refused on grounds such as incompatibility with the general policy of the Government, this is tantamount to a requirement that prior approval be obtained before a collective agreement can come into force, which is not in conformity with the principles of free collective bargaining laid down in Convention No. 98.

&htab;226.&htab;Although it is not for the Committee to pronounce on the economic measures that a government might deem useful on grounds of economic stabilisation, governments should give precedence to persuasion rather than constraint. Furthermore, instead of making the validity of collective agreements subject to government approval, the government might provide that every collective agreement filed with the respective authority should normally come into force a reasonable length of time after having been filed. If the public authority considered that the terms of the proposed agreement were manifestly in conflict with the objects of the economic policy recognised as being desirable in the general interest, the case could be submitted for advice and recommendation to an appropriate consultative body, it being understood, however, that the final decision in the matter lay with the parties to the agreement. [See 85th Report, Case No. 341 (Greece), para. 187; 132nd Report, Case No. 691 (Argentina), para. 28; and 236th Report, Case No. 1206 (Peru), para. 508.]

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;227.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) Given that the requirement of prior authorisation by the public authorities for the entry into force of a collective agreement is not in conformity with Article 4 of Convention No. 98, the Committee requests the Government to amend its legislation to remove this requirement and to allow free collective bargaining on matters concerning the length of working time.

(b) The Committee encourages the Government, whenever it wishes to draw the attention of the bargaining parties to considerations of general interest and major economic policy factors calling for a new examination on their part, to give precedence to persuasion rather than constraint.

(c) The Committee draws the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations to this case.

Case No. 1371 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA/VICTORIA PRESENTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN BUILDING CONSTRUCTION EMPLOYEES' AND BUILDERS LABOURERS' FEDERATION

&htab;228.&htab;The Australian Building Construction Employees' and Builders Labourers' Federation (BLF) submitted a complaint of violations of trade union rights in a communication dated 28 May 1986. The Government sent its reply in a communication dated 29 January 1987.

&htab;229.&htab;Australia has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

&htab;230.&htab;In its communication of 28 May 1986, the BLF refers to the proclamation of certain sections of the BLF (De-recognition) Act, 1985 which led to further action by the Victorian Government against the de-registered complainant union. [The BLF (De-recognition) Act was the subject of an earlier BLF complaint: see 244th Report, Case No. 1345, paras. 157 to 193, May 1986].

&htab;231.&htab;First, the BLF mentions the Victorian Govenment's order-in-council called "The Code of Conduct and Financial Assistance" which came into operation on 20 November 1985. According to the BLF, the legal status of this order is uncertain but the Government has regarded it as the law of the land and immediately began forcing employers to sign documents embodying the criteria set out in the Code of Conduct. These criteria include paragraph 2.3(f) which reads: "Firms in the Victorian building industry are required under the Code of Conduct to agree to refuse to deal with the BLF where it does not have coverage of work under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act." Under paragraph 2.4 the Code of Conduct becomes a fundamental term of all Victorian Government building contracts and paragraph 2.6 imposes a penalty of exclusion from further Government work of those found to have committed a fundamental breach of undertakings and/or the Code of Conduct. The BLF points out that the rest of the Code (a copy of which is supplied) deals with financial assistance to firms whose losses or delays are incurred as a result of industrial action in support of the BLF position.

&htab;232.&htab;The BLF states that sustained pressure was put on a number of companies to sign the Code of Conduct; e.g. threats were made that essential services like gas and electricity would be cut off on sites where builders had not signed. The BLF encloses a copy of a press release of the State Minister of Employment and Industrial Relations dated 13 February 1986 which lists sanctions against non-signatory firms such as a prohibition on any dealings with Government departments. Another press release of 14 February from the same source refers to "embargos" on non-signatory building contractors.

&htab;233.&htab;The BLF claims that the existence and use of the Code of Conduct is contrary to Articles 2 and 8(2) of Convention No. 87 since it is a disincentive to members of the BLF to remain in the union of their own choice, and since it makes membership of the BLF detrimental to workers in securing and maintaining employment.

&htab;234.&htab;Secondly, the BLF refers to the Victorian Government's "Official Forms for Builders Labourers" which were circulated as from April 1986 among building sites to enable BLF members to simultaneously resign from that union and join another union to obtain work. Referring to a copy of one such standard form supplied by the complainant union, it points out that it contains the phrase "to keep your job in the building industry, you are now required to resign from the BLF".

&htab;235.&htab;According to the complainant, government officials and the police were on several sites to ensure that the forms were completed i.e. if labourers did not resign from the BLF, dismissals would take place. The BLF states that dismissals did in fact occur on a number of sites, including dismissals of direct employees of the Government's Public Works Department. As a result of this, several BLF members took legal action in the courts but the complainant alleges that they are no longer protected by the anti-union dismissal legislation because of the de-registration proceedings at the Federal level examined by the Committee in the context of Case No. 1345 (244th Report, paras. 157 to 193, approved by the Governing Body at its 233rd Session, May-June 1986). Thus the legal actions are proceeding under the trade practices legislation and the common law. According to the BLF, some dismissed workers successfully obtained from the Victorian Supreme Court an Order restraining the State Minister of Labour from publishing any statement - until the trial - which asserts that the Code of Conduct requires employers who are parties to it not to employ BLF members.

&htab;236.&htab;The BLF alleges that the Victorian Government's action, both in dismissing its own employees for refusal to resign from the BLF and in pressuring employers in the building industry to dismiss BLF members in their employ, is a breach of Article 1 of Convention No. 98 and challenges the Government's stance that it is not requiring workers to relinquish all union membership but rather to join "appropriate" unions.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;237.&htab;The Government's communication of 29 January 1987 contains the detailed reply of the Victorian Government which essentially denies that either the Code of Conduct or the "Official Forms" issued to members of the BLF contravene Conventions Nos. 87 and 98.

&htab;238.&htab;As regards the allegation that the Code of Conduct breaches Articles 2 and 8(2) of Convention No. 87, the Government states that the Code must be considered in the context of the unprecedented industrial situation existing at the time of its introduction, as set out in paragraphs 169 and 170 of the Committee's 244th Report in which it examined the previous BLF complaint (contained in Case No. 1345). Briefly, the BLF had its registration under the federal Conciliation and Arbitration Act cancelled in 1974 after persistently engaging in serious industrial misconduct, and its re-registration was challenged again in 1981. When the BLF did not abide by the commitments it undertook on signing the 1984 Memorandum of Understanding between building industry employers and unions, the Federal Government, faced with the extraordinary problems caused by the BLF in the building industry, enacted the Building Industry Act 1985. This provided, among other things, for a hearing by the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission into the industrial conduct of the BLF which, in April 1986, gave its decision against the BLF. Subsequently, the Australian Parliament passed legislation to deregister the BLF and the Victorian Government proclaimed the BLF (De-recognition) Act - except for sections 4, 5 and 7. These sections have since been proclaimed in order to keep the Act in operation but sections 4 and 5 are not to come into operation until 1 January 2000.

&htab;239.&htab;The Government points out that the Code of Conduct is not primarily concerned with the BLF, but is a continuation of previous attempts (most notably the 1984 Memorandum of Understanding) designed to improve the industrial and economic climate in the building industry and to eliminate practices inconsistent with that objective. Four Governments in Australia have issued broadly similar Codes of Conduct in further attempts to address the industrial problems existing in the building industry. It stresses that the Code is simply an agreement between the Victorian Government and those builders who are prepared to abide by its terms, and builders who do not wish to abide by it are not legally obliged to do so. The consequence is, however, that the Victorian Government will not enter into contractual relations with those builders.

&htab;240.&htab;According to the Government, the Code of Conduct sets down six criteria with which employers in the building industry are expected to comply. Of these criteria, only one directly concerns the BLF, viz, that firms "agree to refuse to deal with BLF where it does not have coverage of work under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act". The Government explains what coverage of work means under the federal industrial relations system (which applies to most of the building industry in Victoria): registered unions have - for the purposes of participation in the formal conciliation and arbitration system and to ensure that employers are able to negotiate with unions which have appropriate coverage of work - the right to represent workers who are engaged in the kinds of work specified in the registered rules of those unions. Following the deregistration of the BLF, coverage of certain work previously coming within the federally registered rules of the BLF was allocated as an interim measure to other federally registered unions with their consent. This does not prevent the operation of the normal system of registered unions seeking the consent of the Industrial Registrar to the alteration of their rules to cover such work.

&htab;241.&htab;As regards the alleged coercion of builders to abide by the Code, the Government points out that representatives of the principal building industry employer organisations and individual contractors have all expressed their support for the Code and have recognised the need for it. According to the Government, no employer group has criticised the Code since its release in November 1985 and the BLF's allegation of the withdrawal of gas, etc. made against non-signatory builders should be viewed against the background of the serious problems which had been caused in the past by a small group of employers who had constantly made unjustifiable deals with the BLF so as to avoid industrial disruption on their worksites. The Government states that lawful action might have been necessary in relation to three or four employers in these exceptional circumstances to induce them to accept arrangements for achieving those objectives which have been voluntarily accepted by other employers and building unions other than the BLF. The Victorian Government's preparedness to withdraw certain services from non-complying employers should be regarded as a response to be used in an extreme situation, but the Government stresses that it has not been necessary for any such action to be taken.

&htab;242.&htab;The Government adds that the Code does not deny workers the right to join organisations of their own choosing; it provides only that employers are not to deal with the BLF where the BLF has no coverage under the Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The Victorian Government has taken the view that, if an employee belongs to the BLF, that does not constitute dealing between his employer and the BLF contrary to the Code of Conduct. Thus no employer would be acted against simply for employing BLF members.

&htab;243.&htab;As regards the alleged infringement of Article 1 of Convention No. 98 because certain employees were dismissed for being members of the BLF, the Government points out that some workers simultaneously have membership of the BLF and other unions: those workers have not been dismissed because they are members of the BLF. What employers have insisted upon is that employees be members of a registered trade union. To clarify this point, the Government refers briefly to the history of union security in the building industry stating that traditionally, employment in the industry has been very tightly controlled to ensure the maximum degree of unionisation amongst employees. It is thus accepted in the industry that persons working on a site covered by the rules of a particular union must belong to that union. Since the BLF's deregistration leaves it without coverage on work sites in Victoria, it cannot represent workers within, or offer them the benefits of the existing industrial relations system. Therefore, the refusal to employ workers who do not join an "appropriate" trade union capable of working within the system is consistent with past practice in the industry.

&htab;244.&htab;The Government recalls with regard to certain Victorian Government statements and the "Official Forms" (which stated that to keep their jobs in the building industry, workers had to resign from the BLF and join other unions), that the BLF has a very bad record of militant enforcement of the building industry's union security arrangements in its own favour to the extent that this has produced considerable resentment and opposition in other industry unions provoking serious industrial disruption. The Victorian Government was seriously concerned about the potential for further disruption by a continuing BLF presence on building sites after its deregistration. At the time of federal deregistration and de-recognition at the State level, employers were being subjected to intense and protracted industrial action by the BLF over a variety of industrial and non-industrial issues, and some had decided that an appropriate response would be the termination of the employment of BLF members. Some dismissals occurred prior to the BLF's deregistration, but after legal proceedings employers agreed to re-employ the workers concerned.

&htab;245.&htab;In the event, states the Government, following the reallocation of work coverage to other registered unions after the BLF had its registration cancelled, nearly all BLF members agreed to join those unions. Among those unions, there was, for the reasons mentioned above, an apprehension that continuing membership of the BLF in these circumstances would prove industrially unworkable. In fact, one major union, the Building Workers' Industrial Union of Australia (BWIU) initially imposed a condition that admission to membership was subject to resignation from the BLF. This condition has subsequently been dropped and BLF membership is no longer a barrier to joining the BWIU.

&htab;246.&htab;As regards the Supreme Court action brought under the Victorian Fair Trading Act 1985, the Government indicates that it has not been finally disposed of. It explains that the action relates in particular to the BLF claim that it was misleading to state in the "Official Forms" that under the Code of Conduct continuing employment in the building industry required resignation from the BLF. The Victorian Government undertook in May 1986, at a preliminary stage of the proceedings, to stop the distribution of the forms. As the Supreme Court proceedings are not completed, the Victorian Government does not consider that it would be appropriate to comment further on this aspect of the complaint.

&htab;247.&htab;As regards the allegation of police presence on sites to ensure the completion of forms, the Government states that such presence was a measured response, and solely the result of continuing acts of violence by the BLF and was intended to prevent further violence or intimidation. The BLF's continuing record of behaving outside accepted industrial standards since its deregistration and de-recognition in April 1986 has justified these concerns. Examples of its recent actions include: the storming and occupation of the offices of the Victorian Minister for Employment and Industrial Affairs in October 1986; the charging of BLF members with assault and resisting arrest; disruption of concrete pours and arrests for trespass on building sites.

&htab;248.&htab;Lastly, the Government refers to the lack of support for the BLF with the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the principal employee bodies in other States. It also points out that recruitment of builders' labourers by other unions has been extremely successful. In Victoria, the BWIU estimates that 80 per cent of builders' labourers are now its financial members and in New South Wales, it is estimated that at least 10,000 former BLF members now belong to other registered unions.

&htab;249.&htab;The Government also wishes to recall that the BLF will be able to apply to the Conciliation and Arbitration Commission for federal registration again five years from the date of commencement of the Builders Labourers' Federation (Cancellation of Registration) Act 1986, that is, 14 April 1986. The consequences for the BLF of deregistration thus need not be permanent. Of course, states the Government, whether any such application is successful depends significantly on the conduct of the BLF in the intervening period.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;250.&htab;The Committee notes that this case concerns certain action taken against BLF members by the Victorian Government as a consequence of the entry into force of the BLF (De-recognition) Act, 1985 which was examined in the context of Case No. 1345 in May 1986. Although it was stated by the Government during the examination of the earlier case that certain sections of the Act would not be proclaimed "in any circumstances", thereby leading the Committee to understand that the Act in question would automatically expire on 30 July 1986 (see 244th Report, paragraph 172), the Committee notes that the Government now declares that the provisions impugned have been proclaimed for technical reasons, i.e. in order to keep the Act in operation, but are not to be enforced until the year 2000.

&htab;251.&htab;Despite the apparent non-operation of these penalty provisions of the Act, the complainant claims that two texts - the Code of Conduct introduced in November 1985 and the Government's "Official Forms" circulated on building sites between April and May 1986 - discourage BLF members from remaining in the union of their own choosing and discriminate against BLF members in their employment because of their union affiliation.

&htab;252.&htab;First, the Committee observes that the Code of Conduct is not a legislative enactment or a binding prerequisite to receiving government building contracts in Victoria; although it contains a penalty of loss of governmental contracts for non-signatory builders. Indeed, on the contrary, the Government stresses that representatives of all major employer groups support the Code. Even the alleged coercion of employers to sign the Code by threatened withdrawal from sites of certain services within the Government's control has not been resorted to.

&htab;253.&htab;It appears to the Committee that the BLF's current status, i.e. de-recognised within the Victorian industrial relations system and thus incapable of applying for coverage of work on government building sites, explains why, in practical terms, the criterion was included in the Code of Conduct requiring signatory building firms to refuse to deal with the BLF where it does not have coverage of work. Moreover, since the Committee has already accepted that the de-recognition of the BLF was justified in the circumstances (see 244th Report, paragraph 185), it is not in a position to criticise a document which, from its clear wording, does not exclude BLF members from public works contracts, but merely requires the employer to deal with a union legally entitled to represent the workers employed on that worksite. The Committee considers that the Code is not contrary to Convention No. 87 since workers are at no time obliged to relinquish membership of the union of their choice - in this case the BLF. In reaching this conclusion, the Committee has kept in mind the fact that the BLF can apply for federal re-registration - and therefore coverage of work - as from April 1991. The Code of Conduct simply makes it clear to a worker who chooses to remain a member of or join only the BLF on a site where it does not, at the present time, have coverage that his employment relationship may suffer certain consequences.

&htab;254.&htab;The situation of the "Official Forms" is, however, in the Committee's opinion, quite different. These forms stated clearly that to keep their job in the building industry, workers were "required to resign from the BLF". Such a requirement is not acceptable under Article 1 of Convention No. 98. The Government's description of the BLF's past and continuing militancy and poor relations with other unions does not change this. It appears to the Committee that the Government acknowledged this violation of the BLF members' rights when, in the context of legal proceedings, it ceased circulation of the forms on public works sites one month after they had appeared. The Government has also stated that some dismissals of BLF members have taken place, but that the employers have re-employed all the workers concerned. Moreoever, the Committee notes that the BLF was successful in applying to the Supreme Court for an order restraining the State Minister of Labour from publishing any statement concerning an alleged obligation to dismiss BLF members.

&htab;255.&htab;The Committee trusts that the Supreme Court proceedings initiated by the BLF against the contents of the "Official Forms" will be terminated and that account will be taken of the principle, accepted by Australia when it ratified Convention No. 98, that no worker should be dismissed or otherwise prejudiced in his employment by reason of his union membership.

&htab;256.&htab;On this last point, the Committee recalls its comments on sections 4 and 5 of the 1985 Act, which permit rescission of public works contracts if BLF members are engaged or continue to be engaged on work covered by such contracts (see 244th Report, paragraphs 187 and 188). It had stated that, if proclaimed and applied, these provisions could cause unfair prejudice to BLF members in their employment solely because of their union membership, contrary to Article 1 of Convention No. 98. In the opinion of the Committee the wording of the "Official Forms", like these provisions, went too far in penalising all BLF members for the industrial and criminal misconduct within various levels of the BLF hierarchy. The Committee therefore hopes that these sections of the 1985 Act will be repealed before they enter into force in the year 2000.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;257.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee draws the Government's attention to the importance of protection against anti-union discrimination set out in Article 1 of Convention No. 98 and trusts that sections 4 and 5 of the 1985 State Act, proclaimed in 1986, being contrary to this principle, will be repealed before they enter into force in the year 2000.

(b) It expresses the hope that the Supreme Court proceedings concerning the "Official Forms" will be terminated and that account will be taken of the principle that no worker should be dismissed because of his union membership.

Case No. 1374 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN PRESENTED BY THE TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION OF WORKERS' COMMITTEES

&htab;258.&htab;The complaint is contained in a communication from the Trade Union Confederation of Workers' Committees dated 8 July 1986. The Government replied in a communication dated 28 October 1986.

&htab;259.&htab;Spain has ratified both the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

&htab;260.&htab;The Trade Union Confederation of Workers' Committees alleges that its affiliate, the Federation of Health Personnel, having fulfilled all the legal requirements - in particular that of giving ten days' notice and setting up a strike committee - called a strike for the 18, 19, 25 and 26 of June 1986 amongst the staff covered by the collective agreement for health services in the Community of Madrid, in various health centres within this Community. The aims of the strike were to remove the deadlock confronting bargaining on wages and the incorporation of administrative contracts into labour law, the reduction in working time and other working conditions.

&htab;261.&htab;The complainant organisation adds that, before calling this legal strike, the following events occurred which, in its opinion, constituted a violation of freedom of association:

- There were no negotiations or attempts at negotiations, in spite of the notice of 14 June stating this intention, either with the Federation of Health Personnel or with the strike committee set up for this purpose, to cover minimum services during the strike in the health centres of the Community of Madrid. With this in mind, the trade union drew up a detailed proposal for maintaining services during the strike, which provided for keeping on 100 per cent of staff in emergency and intensive-care units.

- The Government delegate's decision unilaterally imposed some extremely "excessive" minimum services which infringed upon the right to strike in an abusive manner, without consulting either the trade union or strike committee; they were proclaimed one day after the beginning of the strike, when the minimum services had already been set up by the management without it being known which services had been fixed by government authority.

- Prior to the notification (late) of the minimum services, the Autonomous Community of Madrid, which is the state entity affected by the strike, clearly acted illegally and encroached upon the exercise of the right to strike by demanding that those who were not on strike should individually state in writing their decision not to back the strike; it further declared that if they failed to do so, they would be penalised by a corresponding cut in wages. - Finally, the Autonomous Community of Madrid, the employer affected, made public announcements, as a state administrative body, warning and implying that the strike was illegal, thereby assuming legal functions incompatible with its dual character of public body and employer upon whom pressure was being put for negotiations.

&htab;262.&htab;In conclusion, the complainant organisation points out that this line of conduct of the Government and its public bodies, irrespective of the technical aspects of the minimum service imposed, which, in the complainant organisation's opinion, was clearly improper and excessive, infringes upon the free exercise of the right to strike.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;263.&htab;After referring to the legislation and jurisprudence pertaining to strikes, the Government states that the setting up of the minimum services, which on no account can be considered an infringement of the right to strike, was undertaken by the Autonomous Community of Madrid with such urgency because of the imminence and length of the strike (strike notice was given on 7 June 1986 and it was called for the 18, 19, 25 and 26 of the same month) and the nature of the sector be to protected - the most important in absolute terms - and since the standards in force prescribe that in view of the nature of the services, no consultation and negotiations were obligatory. In this connection, the Government quotes the judgement 52/86 handed down by the Constitutional Court on 14 April: "The doctrine of this court is that the decision on this matter [meaning the setting up of minimum services] lay and only lies with the competent government authority". "Allowing for the possibility of talks or negotiations to this effect is a very different matter from imposing these talks." "Prior talks are not excluded, they might even be desirable, but they are not an indispensable requirement for the validity of the administrative decision from a constitutional standpoint." The constitutionality of Royal Legislative Decree 17/1977 was upheld by the Constitutional Court in a ruling of 8 April 1981 in which it was stated, with reference to section 10(2) of this Decree: "The Government is granted the authority to order necessary steps to ensure the maintenance of essential services to the community, in so far as the exercise of this authority is subject to the jurisdiction of the law courts and to an appeal before this court."

&htab;264.&htab;As regards the complaint that the minimum services were announced one day after the beginning of the strike, implying that there was an attitude of concealment and bad faith in the Government delegate's decision in the Autonomous Community of Madrid, the Government states that this accusation is a distortion of the truth because the Government delegate's letter of 13 June 1986, sent to the strike committee, accepted the proposal to implement minimum services during the strike by the Autonomous Community of Madrid. The above-mentioned strike committee was aware in advance of this stand, as acknowledged by a member of this committee, Mr. Antonio Sánchez, in a letter dated 16 June 1986, i.e. two days before the announced beginning of the strike, sent to the Director-General of the Autonomous Community of Madrid Health Services. The Government claims that the strike committee was notified of the Government delegate's final decision in due time and form, although the notification was inadvertently sent to the Department for Health and Social Welfare, where, according to the correspondence register, it arrived on 18 June, and that the strike committee was informed of this on the following day. There is therefore no doubt that any speculation as to an attitude of concealment of the decision and its delay, and any accusation of bad faith are absolutely unfounded. Moreover, and as is well known, once decisions imposing minimum services have been taken, they are available at any time to any representative of the strike committee; it would only have been necessary to go to the Government delegation on the eve of the date announced for the beginning of the strike to be fully informed of the final resolution adopted to this effect.

&htab;265.&htab;As regards the interpretation in the complaint concerning the notice to be given by non-strikers of their intention not to back the strike and the warning that anybody backing the strike would have a corresponding cut in wages, the Government states that the said notice was solely designed to safeguard the workers' economic interests, thereby also facilitating the administrative work of the centres so that they might proceed with the correct and rapid payment of those workers not taking part in the strike; this can in no way be described as a coercive measure. The Spanish administration is aware that the exercise of the right to strike belongs to the workers and is the right of every citizen; the printed form in question is solely used for purposes of information, which the administration is obliged to give. The reference made to the wage deduction is misleading, in that it is protrayed as a penalty, whereas, in fact, what was involved was nothing other than the suspension of the labour contract. It therefore follows that whilst workers have the right to strike, the undertaking, for its part, may suspend wages paid to a worker in this situation; in no way does this imply a penalty, but merely a suspension of all aspects of the employment relationship during the period involved. In this connection, section 6(2) of Royal Legislative Decree No. 17 of 1977, which reforms standards pertaining to labour relations, states that: "Contracts of employment shall be deemed to be suspended during a strike and the workers shall not be entitled to their wages". Similarily, section 45(i) of the Workers' Statute deems the exercise of the right to strike as grounds for the suspension of the labour contract. Consequently, the Community of Madrid, with its printed form did nothing more than inform workers of the standards to be applied, thereby safeguarding their rights or economic interests.

&htab;266.&htab;The Government also states that the Community of Madrid did not, in the case of this strike, as wrongly pointed out in the complaint, make "public notices as a state administrative body". This is in no way self-evident since this autonomous administration is an undertaking and acts as an undertaking in its relationship with its employees. Of course, it is for the courts to declare the legality or illegality of a strike, but it is also true that at no time did the Community of Madrid take this legal function upon itself. It only stated that the strike might be declared illegal by the competent jurisdiction because several public centres were involved in which vital public services affecting the common good of the community were provided; however, it did not overlook the fact that it was up to the legal authority to declare the legality or illegality of the strike. For instance, in a letter from the Adviser to the President's Office, dated 17 June 1986, it is written: "... (the strike) might be considered illegal by the competent legal body". In a letter written by the Department for Health and Social Welfare to one of the signatories of the complaint, dated 16 June 1986, it is expressly stated that: "the provincial labour directorate has been consulted, which will not affect proceedings to be brought later before the judicial bodies". Finally, there were no errors in the Government delegate's decision (which is the subject of this complaint), which accepted the proposal of minimum services made by the Community of Madrid and there was no infringement either of the regulations pertaining to the right to strike, or of constitutional obligations and the doctrine of the Spanish Constitutional Court.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;267.&htab;The Committee notes that, in the present complaint, the complainant organisation makes allegations concerning the setting up of minimum services during a four-day strike in June 1986 in the health services sector of the Autonomous Community of Madrid.

&htab;268.&htab;The Committee notes in particular the Government's denial that the minimum services failed to be announced in due time and its explanations concerning the notice to be given by non-strikers on their decision not to back the strike, which, it claims, was designed to safeguard the rights or economic interests of these workers so that they would not lose the portion of their wages corresponding to the days of the strike. The Committee also notes the Government's explanations concerning the alleged notices published by the Autonomous Community of Madrid, implying that the strike was illegal.

&htab;269.&htab;On previous occasions, the Committee has considered that strike action may be subject to important restrictions (such as, for example, the maintenance of a minimum service), even banned, in the public service or in essential services, amongst which are included health services. In the present case, Spanish legislation authorises health personnel to exercise the right to strike, subject to the maintenance of a minimum service.

&htab;270.&htab;In attempting to define the framework for the establishment of minimum services in the event of strikes in essential services or of strikes, the extent and duration of which might be such as to result in an acute national crisis, the Committee has stressed that the determination of minimum services should involve not only the public authorities, but also the relevant employers' and workers' organisations. This not only allows a careful exchange of viewpoints on what in a given situation can be considered as minimum services limited to the absolutely essential, but also contributes to guaranteeing that the scope of the minimum service does not result in the strike becoming ineffective in practice because of its limited impact, and to dissipate possible impressions in the trade union organisations that a strike has come to nothing because of over-generous and unilaterally fixed minimum services [see, for example, 244th Report, Case No. 1342 (Spain), para. 154].

&htab;271.&htab;In the present case, the Committee observes that no discussions or talks on the minimum services were held with the trade union organisation concerned and that the latter respected the legal strike notice prerequisite. The Committee also notes that Spanish legislation (section 10(2) of Royal Legislative Decree No. 17/1977) and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court stipulate that it is not indispensable to hold talks or discussions on the minimum services with the trade union organisations, and that the authority to take the necessary measures to ensure the maintenance of essential services lies with the Government. In these circumstances, the Committee is of the opinion that the failure to consult with the trade union organisation concerned is not fully in conformity with the principles laid down in the previous paragraph.

The Committee's recommendation

&htab;272.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendation:

&htab;Given that all of the parties involved should take part in the determination of minimum services to be maintained during a strike, the Committee requests the Government to consult henceforth the workers' and employers' organisations concerned before deciding upon these minimum services.

CASES IN WHICH THE COMMITTEE REQUESTS TO BE KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS Case No. 1130 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PRESENTED BY THE CAPITOL EMPLOYEES ORGANISING GROUP

&htab;273.&htab;The Committee has already examined this case in depth on three previous occasions, the most recent being at its February 1984 meeting when it presented definitive conclusions to the Governing Body [233rd Report, paras. 137 to 160, approved by the Governing Body at its 225th Session (February-March 1984)].

&htab;274.&htab;Subsequently, in its 236th Report, paragraph 22 [approved by the Governing Body at its 227th Session, November 1984], the Committee noted certain further information provided by the Government and requested it to continue to keep it informed of any action taken affecting the workers concerned.

&htab;275.&htab;Since then, the case has been adjourned due to the late receipt of relevant information and observations from both the complainant organisation and the Government. The sequence of correspondence is as follows: the Capitol Employees Organising Group (CEOG) sent further information and allegations in communications dated 9 March, 19 June and 19 July 1985 and 11 April 1986. The Government transmitted its replies in communications dated 16 May and 23 October 1985, 7 February, 6 May and 10 October 1986 and 21 January 1987.

&htab;276.&htab;At its most recent meeting in November 1986, the Committee took note of the current status of this case and again suspended its examination thereof for a reasonable time, at the same time requesting the Government to keep it informed of procedural developments in the case [see 246th Report, para. 7, approved by the Governing Body at its 234th Session, November 1986].

&htab;277.&htab;The United States has not ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) or the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. Previous examination of the case

&htab;278.&htab;This case concerns a claim made by the CEOG - a union formed in December 1979 - for exclusive bargaining rights in respect of employees of the Senate restaurants. It also concerns allegations of harassment and discrimination against CEOG members by those responsible for the administration of the Senate and its restaurants. In September 1983, the employer organised a poll of the restaurant workers to determine their preferences as regards organising for the purposes of collective bargaining. The results of this poll showed that the majority of the employees did not wish to organise for such a purpose and preferred maintaining the existing system of restaurant management rather than the option of contracting out to private firms. At its February 1984 meeting, the Committee noted that, according to the Government, legislation was pending in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to include Congress under certain provisions of the federal law relating to employment and workers' rights. The Committee requested the Government to keep it informed of the outcome of the three draft laws that were currently pending before various committees for examination.

&htab;279.&htab;Also at its February 1984 meeting, the Committee examined the allegations of harassment of unionised staff and, in particular, the withdrawal of permission to use a meeting room for CEOG meetings on Senate restaurant premises. The Committee took note of the Government's explanations that the employer (the Architect of the Capitol) was making every effort (meetings with all the staff, bulletin-board postings, putting aside of disciplinary action) to accommodate the CEOG members but, in the case of allowing meeting space in the restaurant rooms, he was obliged to apply the rules which permitted this only for official business. The Committee expressed its regret that, notwithstanding the question of recognition for bargaining purposes, such facilities had been withdrawn, not only because freedom of assembly for trade union purposes constitutes one of the fundamental elements of trade union rights, but also because it was precisely this kind of incident which contributed to the ongoing tension which had been complained of in the case. In view of the fact that the staff involved might be included within the scope of the National Labour Relations Act once the three bills under study had been adopted, the Committee expressed the hope that the Architect of the Capitol would re-examine the question of providing meeting space for trade union purposes on the restaurant premises.

B. Further allegations

&htab;280.&htab;In its communication of 9 March 1985, the CEOG alleges that a similar situation was developing for employees of restaurants in the House of Representatives. According to the CEOG it notified the House of Representatives, on 30 July 1984, that a substantial majority of the House restaurant employees had signed cards asking the CEOG to be their exclusive representative for labour-management relations; the letter requested the House to take steps leading to prompt negotiations over a contract. The Committee on House Administration, which had jurisdiction over the House restaurant system, subsequently ordered the Architect of the Capitol to assume the direct supervision of the House restaurant employees as from 1 January 1985. The CEOG states that the Architect of the Capitol has not answered its request for negotiations and his staff members refuse to return the union's telephone calls. During 1984, and up to the date of this communication, the CEOG has organised a large number of labourers, custodial workers and others under the supervision of the Architect of the Capitol. However, states the complainant, the employer has repressed trade union activities, for example, by threatening the workers with discharge if they go to union meetings and giving them extra work assignments when CEOG staff representatives attempt to talk to the employees during their rest periods.

&htab;281.&htab;In support of this latter allegation, the complainant attaches a photocopy of a signed statement, dated 25 January 1985, from a civil and employment rights instructor of the CEOG (Mrs. Victoria Lessin) stating that she had visited the rest areas in House office buildings to talk to the employees during their non-working hours about their rights to form an employee association and to join in the civil rights and education programmes. According to this statement, although no signs are posted restricting entrance to these areas, no regulations govern access to the rooms and her initial visits were never challenged (the employees themselves requested her to come back regularly with more information about the CEOG programmes), on 3 January 1985, the instructor was arrested in one House office building by the United States Capitol police at the request of the superintendent, charged with unlawful entry and held for six hours. The charges were dropped on 22 January.

&htab;282.&htab;The CEOG contests the possibility of legislation being adopted concerning coverage of House and Senate restaurants; it considers that there was, and is, no majority in either body of the Congress to bring the Senate or the House under the nation's civil rights laws or labour legislation. It encloses excerpts from the proceedings of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration in which two members of that Committee agreed that the labour legislation for the Congress had little chance of passing.

&htab;283.&htab;In conclusion, referring to its earlier attempts to unionise Senate restaurant staff, the complainant maintains that the Senate did not really investigate its claims that the September 1983 ballot of restaurant staff was unfair and that the outcome was the result of many years of employee intimidation.

&htab;284.&htab;In its communication of 19 June 1985, the CEOG stresses that the House of Representatives is now telling its restaurant employees that they will be fired and replaced with non-union private employees; it expresses its fear that the situation will have deteriorated before November 1985.

&htab;285.&htab;In its communication of 19 July 1985, the CEOG states that it has affiliated with the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO/CLC. It encloses an extract from the Congressional Record of 21 June 1985 in which the Chairman of the House Education and Labour Committee's Subcommittee on Labour-Management Relations, states "The Architect of the Capitol is employing the same unfair labour practices against the House of Representatives' cafeteria workers as were used to defeat the efforts of Senate cafeteria employees to organise for the purposes of collective bargaining. [...] For the past several months there appears to have been a concerted campaign directed against the House cafeteria employees to frustrate and defeat their legitimate aspirations to engage in collective bargaining." The CEOG supplies copies of signed statements from nine House restaurant employees and a copy of further statements from the CEOG instructor mentioned above which attest management surveillance and harassment of union organisers on House of Representatives' premises as well as intimidation of workers who have contact with union officials, e.g. threats of dismissal, presence at union meetings. The complainant alleges that, despite a legal opinion from the Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives (dated 20 March 1985 and copy supplied) to the effect that the Architect of the Capitol does possess authority to recognise an employee association and to bargain collectively with it on certain conditions of employment, that employer refuses to meet with CEOG representatives. In addition, according to the CEOG, the Architect has been investigating the introduction of private restaurant operators in the House of Representatives' ten restaurants.

&htab;286.&htab;In its communication of 11 April 1986, the complainant contests the content and conduct of the opinion poll carried out of House restaurant employees: it claims that the question "Do you believe that your best interests would be served by becoming a member of a union?" was misleading; and that 50 of the 235 voters were not eligible since they were managers. It adds that the American Law Division of the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service has supported the legal opinion of 20 March 1985 to the effect that the Architect does have authority to engage in negotiations with employee representatives.

C. The Government's reply

&htab;287.&htab;In its communication of 16 May 1985, the Government states that the three Bills to include Congress under certain provisions of the federal law relating to employment and workers' rights expired at the end of the 98th Congress in 1984. However, new legislation was introduced at the beginning of the 99th Session and is pending in the House of Representatives. The Government encloses a copy of the proposed new legislation (H.R. 691) which is entitled "a Bill to amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination based on race, colour, religion, sex, handicap, national origin or age in employment in the legislative or judicial branches of the federal Government and to establish the employment review board composed of senior federal judges selected by the Chief Justice of the United States, which shall have authority to adjudicate claims regarding such discrimination".

&htab;288.&htab;In its communication of 23 October 1985, the Government comments on the situation of the staff of the House of Representatives' restaurants. Since the Architect of the Capitol was vested with responsibility for this restaurant system on 1 January 1985, he has undertaken improvements such as the institution of grievance and appeals procedures, including the election of employee representatives. It adds that while House employees, like Senate employees, are covered by no specific legislation granting the right to exclusive bargaining status, they are entitled to the full protection of the Constitution and have the same benefits as other federal employees as regards retirement, annual and sick leave, health benefits and life insurance.

&htab;289.&htab;In its communication of 7 February 1986, the Government refers first to the status of Bill 691: it is before the Committees on Education and Labour, Judiciary and House Administration. Although the Architect of the Capitol maintains that, until Congress legislates on this issue, he has no statutory authority to recognise or bargain with any organisation purporting to represent employees of the House restaurant system, he has confirmed in a written memorandum to all such employees their right to join and participate in any voluntary association without fear of reprisal, provided such activities are undertaken in public, non-working areas during non-working times. The Government points out, with reference to the recent institution of grievance procedures, that in May 1985 employee representatives were elected in work units to assist employees in presenting grievances, but that the election of an employee member of the grievance hearing committee has not been completed due to low vote turnout; a new ballot will be rescheduled for the near future. According to the Government, no employee grievances have been filed since this procedure was instituted. It adds that the Architect has offered employees - as space is available and during non-working hours - the use of a meeting room for discussion of labour relations matters.

&htab;290.&htab;As regards the alleged continued harassment of employees who participate in or support union activities, the Government states that, in a written memorandum to all House restaurant employees dated 28 June 1985, the Architect clearly indicated that managers and supervisors are not permitted to intimidate employees, or prevent or in any way interfere with their right to join a union and that any action by a manager or supervisor contrary to the memorandum may be brought to the attention of the Architect. As regards the arrest of the CEOG educator, the Government points out that she is not a restaurant employee but was in an area where she was not authorised to be; she was repeatedly asked and refused to leave whereupon the Capitol police arrested her; she was subsequently released and all charges dropped.

&htab;291.&htab;Lastly, the Government states that on 20 November 1985 the Architect conducted a voluntary informal opinion poll of House restaurant employees to ascertain their view of the restaurant management and to suggest further areas of improvement, including union representation. The poll was taken by secret ballot and voters were assured that neither participation nor non-participation would result in reprisals against the employees. Elected employee representatives and officials of an independent auditing agency of the United States Government were present at each polling station and certified the counting of ballots. Fifty-three per cent (or 125 persons) of eligible employees voted and the results were: 31 voters believed that their best interests would be served by a union; 68 did not and 13 had no opinion.

&htab;292.&htab;In its communication of 6 May 1986, the Government advises that in April the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers filed suit in the District Court against the Architect of the Capitol on behalf of the restaurant workers. On 10 October 1986, the Government further advised that the Architect had filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit.

&htab;293.&htab;In its communication of 21 January 1987, the Government states that the supply of food services in the House establishments has been contracted out to a private company, as a consequence of which the employees concerned are now covered by the National Labour Relations Act. Union representatives are engaged in organisational activity among the workers for collective bargaining purposes and the pending lawsuit, now a moot question, will probably be continued only in so far as the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages is concerned. The Government also confirms that Bill 691 expired at the end of the 99th Session of Congress without legislative action.

D. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;294.&htab;The Committee notes that since House restaurant employees are now covered by the federal labour relations legislation, the allegations concerning their access to collective bargaining procedures, in particular their inclusion under H.R. Bi11 691, are no longer relevant to this case. However, the status of Senate restaurant employees remains an issue. The Committee observes in this connection that Bill 691 has lapsed and that in any case it did not contain, as did earlier Bills (which lapsed at the end of the 98th Session of Congress), specific amendments to the National Labour Relations Act to bring within its scope employees of the legislative branch of the federal Government. The Committee would therefore again recall, as it has done in its previous examination of this case, that no person should be prejudiced in his employment by reason of his trade union membership or activities, even if the trade union to which workers belong is not recognised by the employer as representing the majority of workers concerned. In addition, the Committee has considered that it would be appropriate for governments to examine the possibility of adopting clear and precise provisions ensuring the adequate protection of workers and their organisations against acts of interference.

&htab;295.&htab;With regard to the non-recognition of the CEOG for collective bargaining purposes, the Committee observes that, at least in House restaurants, union representation is now assured in accordance with the legislation which applies to the private sector. However, as regards the Senate employees, it would emphasise the importance it attaches to the principle of voluntary collective bargaining by unions that are representative of the workers with a view to regulating terms and conditions of employment. It has also pointed out that employers, including governmental authorities in the capacity of employers, should recognise for collective bargaining purposes the organisations representative of the workers employed by them. The Committee observes that two legal opinions on the question declare that the Architect of the Capitol does possess authority, although limited, to recognise an employee association and engage in collective bargaining with it. The Committee therefore trusts that despite the result of the 1983 ballot the Architect of the Capitol will announce that, should a representative organisation of the workers concerned emerge, he will be prepared to bargain with it.

&htab;296.&htab;As regards the allegations of ongoing discriminatory practices against CEOG members and workers with whom they have contact, the Committee regrets that tension between the workers and management in both the Senate and House restaurants had escalated to such a level that a CEOG education instructor was arrested on 3 January 1985 for unlawful entry, held for six hours, and that the charge against her was only dropped three weeks later. On the other hand, the Committee notes that the Government stresses that the Architect of the Capitol had made efforts to remind employees of their rights and of existing grievance procedures but that no complaint had been filed. It also notes the Government's statement that care had been taken not to discipline CEOG members in an effort to avoid provoking complaints of discrimination [see 233rd Report, paras. 153 and 154] and that a meeting room is now available on restaurant premises.

&htab;297.&htab;Despite these positive steps, the Committee would recall that one of the fundamental principles of freedom of association is that workers should enjoy adequate protection against all acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment and that this protection is particularly desirable in the case of trade union officials because, in order to be able to perform their trade union duties in full independence, they should have the guarantee that they will not be prejudiced on account of the mandate which they hold from their trade unions [see, for example, 236th Report, Case No. 1113 (India), para. 130]. More generally, as regards the alleged threats of dismissal made by the representatives of the employer against those workers who had contacts with the CEOG representatives, the Committee would recall that no person should be prejudiced in his employment by reason of his membership of a trade union, even if that trade union is not recognised by the employer as representing the majority of workers concerned; the Committee had drawn the Government's attention to this in its earlier examination of this case [230th Report, para. 472].

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;298.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee requests the Government to give effect to the principle concerning free collective bargaining according to which employers, including governmental authorities in their capacity as employers, should recognise for collective bargaining purposes the organisations representative of the workers employed by them.

(b) The Committee asks the Government to request the Architect of the Capitol to announce that he is prepared to bargain collectively with an organisation that is representative of the Senate restaurant workers, and having done so, to organise a further ballot among these workers.

(c) As regards the allegations of continued harassment of CEOG members and workers who have contact with them, it recalls that one of the fundamental principles of freedom of association is that workers should enjoy adequate protection against all acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment and that this protection is particularly desirable in the case of trade union officials.

Case No. 1330 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF GUYANA PRESENTED BY - THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AGRICULTURAL, COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYEES AND - FIVE OTHER TRADE UNIONS

&htab;299.&htab;The Committee considered this case at its meetings in November 1985 and November 1986 when it presented interim conclusions to the Governing Body. [See 241st Report, paras. 822 to 845, approved by the Governing Body at its 231st Session, and 246th Report, paras. 358 to 380, approved by the Governing Body at its 234th Session.]

&htab;300.&htab;Further information was received from the Government in a communication dated 8 January 1987.

&htab;301.&htab;Guyana has ratified the Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98). It has also ratified the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151) and the Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981 (No. 154).

A. Previous examination of the case

&htab;302.&htab;When the Committee examined the case in November 1986, it made the following recommendations to the Governing Body [See 246th Report, para. 380.]:

(a) the Committee notes that aspects of the case concerning the constitutionality and validity of the Labour (Amendment) Act continue to be sub judice as they have been for more than two years, and trusts that every effort will be made to speed up the process whereby it can reach a conclusion on these matters in full possession of all the relevant information;

(b) the Committee notes with some concern the length of time that has expired since the draft "Trade Union Recognition Bill 1979" was submitted for consideration by employers' and workers' organisations, and once again expresses the hope that, in relation to the recognition of sole bargaining rights, the Government will find it possible to give effect to the principle that it is not necessarily incompatible with Convention No. 87 to provide for certification of the most representative bargaining union in a given unit as the exclusive bargaining agent, but that there is a need to provide for certain safeguards which include (a) certification by an independent body and (b) the choice of the representative organisation by a majority vote of the employees in the unit concerned;

(c) the Committee draws the above-mentioned legislative aspects of this case to the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations;

(d) as regards the dual governmental and trade union functions exercised by certain members of the GTUC executive the Committee draws the attention of the Government to its earlier decision that the fact that one of the members of a government is at the same time a leader of a trade union which represents several categories of workers employed by the State creates a possibility of interference in violation of Article 2 of Convention No. 98.

B. Additional information from the Government

&htab;303.&htab;In its communication of 8 January 1987, the Government commences by stating that the appeal it has lodged against the decision of a High Court judge in the matter of the Labour (Amendment) Act, No. 9 of 1984, is currently engaging the attention of the Court.

&htab;304.&htab;It also states that workers' and employers' representatives have now concluded their comments on the draft Trade Union Recognition Bill of 1979 and have both proposed to the Government an independent body for certification and representation by majority votes. It adds that these proposals are receiving the attention of the Government with a view to the enactment of the Bill as law early in 1987.

&htab;305.&htab;The Government also provides information to the effect that only one member (a Committee member) of the GTUC is now a member of the Government, with the status of Parliamentary Secretary.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;306.&htab;The Committee notes from the additional information communicated by the Government that a decision concerning the constitutionality and validity of the Labour (Amendment) Act has been rendered by the High Court, and that this is the subject of an appeal by the Government. The Committee requests the Government to furnish it with a copy of the decision already given by the High Court and to keep it informed of developments relating to the appeal.

&htab;307.&htab;The Committee notes with interest the outcome of the deliberations of employers' and workers' representatives concerning the draft Trade Union Recognition Bill of 1979, and in particular the proposal supported by both parties for the establishment of an independent body for certification, and representation by majority votes. It takes note of the intention of the Government to embody this in legislation to be enacted in 1987.

&htab;308.&htab;The Committee draws the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations to these legislative aspects of the case.

&htab;309.&htab;The Committee also notes with interest the information provided concerning the reduction in the number of persons holding both governmental and trade union office to an individual at parliamentary secretary level. It is of the view that this aspect of the case does not require further examination.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;310.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to appove the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee requests the Government to furnish it with a copy of the judgement of the High Court concerning the constitutionality and the validity of the Labour (Amendment) Act of 1984 and keep it informed of the outcome of the appeal it has lodged against that decision.

(b) It asks the Government to advise it of progress made with the enactment of the Trade Union Recognition Bill, and in particular the proposed provisions concerning the establishment of an independent body for certification and representation by majority votes as recommended by employers' and workers' representatives.

(c) It draws the legislative aspects of this case to the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.

Case No. 1346 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA PRESENTED BY THE FEDERATION OF MEDICAL AND SALES REPRESENTATIVES' ASSOCIATIONS OF INDIA (FMRAI)

&htab;311.&htab;The Committee examined this case at its February and November 1986 meetings when it reached interim conclusions, approved by the Governing Body at its 232nd and 234th Sessions (February-March and November 1986) [see 243rd Report, paras. 588 to 600 and 246th Report, paras. 409 to 422]. The Government sent a communication dated 12 February 1987 in connection with this case.

&htab;312.&htab;India has not ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) or the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. Previous examination of the case

&htab;313.&htab;At its meeting in November 1986, the Committee continued its examination of certain allegations of anti-union discrimination, in particular, concerning progress in appeals against 33 dismissals and physical attacks on leaders of the complainant union, in the Raptakos, Brett and Co. Ltd. undertaking since 1983. It also considered the Government's reply.

&htab;314.&htab;The Governing Body, on the Committee's recommendation, approved the interim report on this case and, in particular, the following conclusions:

(a) The Committee notes the Government's assurance that the cases of all 33 medical representatives who were dismissed from the Raptakos, Brett and Co. Ltd. undertaking allegedly because of their trade union activities are still being heard before the Bombay Labour Court; it requests the Government to inform it of the outcome of these cases and to send it a copy of the Court's decision as soon as it is handed down.

(b) The Committee notes that the Government has not yet provided a specific reply to the complainant's most recent communication giving details of alleged management-backed physical violence against its officers and members; it urges the Government to send its observations on this aspect of the case in time for the Committee's next meeting.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;315.&htab;In its communication of 12 February 1987, the Government states that the cases of the 33 dismissed medical representatives continues to be before the Bombay Labour Court for adjudication and the matter remains sub judice .

&htab;316.&htab;It adds that reports have now been received from the State Governments of Bihar and West Bengal as regards the complainant's allegations of physical attacks on members of the Federation of Medical and Sales Representatives' Association of India. According to the State Government of Bihar, in the event of physical attack the complainant union could have lodged a report with the police or magistrate but it is not clear from the complaint whether this was done. In the absence of such a complaint being lodged, action on the part of the State Government was not possible. That State Government confirmed that, in relation to the alleged harassment of union members by accusations of Communist Party affiliation, it has instituted a case under section 107 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code, which is a judicial proceeding, and that the aggrieved party has the option to move a higher court for any redress.

&htab;317.&htab;As regards the alleged July 1984 kidnapping and beating of FMRAI members at Calcutta, the State Government of West Bengal has reported that the police looked into the matter but no charge sheet could be submitted to the court due to lack of adequate evidence.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;318.&htab;The Committee notes with some concern that the dispute involving the 33 dismissals, referred for adjudication to the Bombay Labour Court in December 1985, has still not been heard, thus leaving the 33 workers concerned dismissed apparently since the events of late 1983 for reasons - according to the complainant - connected with their union membership. The Committee would emphasise, as it has done in other cases involving long periods of delay in the hearing of court cases involving freedom of association issues [see, for example, 235th Report, Cases Nos. 997, 999 and 1029 (Turkey), para. 35], that trade unionists should, like other persons, be subject to normal judicial procedure and have the right to have their cases heard without undue delay. Moreover, it draws the Government's attention to the principle, as it has done in an earlier examination of the present case, that workers should enjoy adequate protection against all acts of anti-union discrimination in respect of their employment, such as dismissal.

&htab;319.&htab;As regards the alleged physical attacks on members of the complainant union in the State of Bihar, the Committee appreciates the difficulties which might arise for a government in obtaining information in the absence of specific complaints lodged by the union with the police or the courts. It would, however, point out to the Government that given the detailed information supplied by the complainant on the incidents alleged in the present case [reproduced in paras. 414 to 417 of the Committee's 246th Report], other avenues for investigation and, if necessary, corrective action, were available. It is not clear, for example, whether the management of the company involved was contacted for its comments. The Committee has also stressed that, when disorders have occurred involving loss of human life or serious injury, the setting up of an independant judicial inquiry by the government concerned is a particularly appropriate method of fully ascertaining the facts, determining responsibilities, punishing those responsible and preventing the repetition of such actions [see, for example, 236th Report, Cases Nos. 1277 and 1288 (Colombia), para. 681]. In any case, the Committee would recall generally that trade union rights can only be exercised in a climate that is free from violence, pressure or threats of any kind against trade unionists; governments, for their part, should take the appropriate steps to ensure that this principle is respected [see 234th Report, Case No. 1237 (Brazil), para. 213].

&htab;320.&htab;Since, according to the information available, a police investigation revealed no evidence in the matter of the alleged kidnapping and beating of FMRAI members in Calcutta, the Committee considers that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.

&htab;321.&htab;The Committee observes that the case currently pending under s.107 of the Indian Criminal Procedure Code involves political affiliation, a matter which is not within its competence to examine.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;322.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee draws the Government's attention to the importance of the speedy handling of the cases involving 33 workers dismissed in 1983 which were lodged with the Bombay Labour Court in 1985 and requests it to inform the Committee of the outcome of these appeals, with a copy of the Court's judgement.

(b) It draws the Government's attention to the principle concerning the necessity for a climate that is free from violence for the exercise of trade union rights.

Case No. 1377 COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL PRESENTED BY - THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR (WCL) - THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU)

&htab;323.&htab;The complaints are contained in communications from the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), dated 5 and 20 August 1986, respectively. The Government replied in a communication dated 12 January 1987.

&htab;324.&htab;Brazil has not ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 98), but has ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainants' allegations

&htab;325.&htab;In its communication of 5 August 1986, the World Confederation of Labour (WCL) alleges that on 11 July 1986, the police brutally intervened during a strike of sugar-cane workers in the town of Leme (inland in the State of Sao Paulo), in Brazil, resulting in the death of the workers Orlando Correia and Sibely Aparecida Manoel; a further eight workers were shot and many more injured by the police. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) specified, in its communication of 20 August 1986, that the peasants on strike belonged to the Araras Rural Trade Union, that the police quelled the strike by firing shots and that trade union officials from the CNT, who sympathised with the strikers, were also injured.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;326.&htab;In its communication of 12 January 1987, the Government states that rigorous investigations are under way into the events which occurred in the town of Leme (Sao Paulo) on 11 July 1986, resulting in the death of Orlando Correia and Sibely Aparecida Manoel, injury to 18 workers and damage to several vehicles. On the very day of the events, the town's police force opened an investigation, in which the magistrate of the local courts was involved; it has not, however, yet been completed.

&htab;327.&htab;The Government encloses, as an annex, a report from the Disciplinary Adviser of the Sao Paulo State Security Police Force, which may be summarised as follows:

- several days before the events occurred, there were several incidents in the town of Leme with sugar-cane cutters, in connection with the strike declared by the Araras Rural Trade Union in the Cresciumal Factory Limited and Cresciumal farming enterprise. This strike was declared illegal by the judicial authorities and the enterprise which had claimed that it was illegal succeeded in obtaining guarantees of safety against the strike pickets for those workers who wished to continue working;

- on 11 July 1986, at 6.30 a.m., a picket stoned a bus transporting 43 workers and 3 military police, which was escorted by a military police patrol. Immediately after the bus stopped, shots were fired and general confusion prevailed, resulting in two deaths (Orlando Correia - who was passing by the scene of the events - and Sibely Aparecida Manoel - who was at a bus stop in the vicinity) and 18 injured (Antonio Quirino Lopes, Víctor Nogueira, Valdecir Donizete Rosa, Jorge Aparecido Kilian, Ademir Lirio Generoso Silva, Paulo Honório Pereira, José Carlos Ambrózio, Creusa Aparecida Barbieri Ambrózio, Paulo Afonso Duarte; the military police Winston José Tristao, Moacir Vicente Barbiero, Lidio Dal'Olio, José Aparecido Vilatol, Eleutério Martins and Floriano Martins; the federal delegates José Genoino Neto (PT) and Djalma de Souza Bom (PT), and the underground railway worker Paulo Otavio de Azevedo Junior). Several vehicles suffered material damage; - the report also refers to a series of inquiries carried out during the investigation and to a hypothesis as to the origin of the shots.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;328.&htab;The Committee notes that, according to the Government, the two deaths, the injuries suffered by 18 persons and the damage to property, which occurred in the town of Leme on 11 July 1986, took place when a strike picket stoned a bus with police protection transporting workers who had not joined the strike movement, a situation during which shots were fired and general confusion prevailed.

&htab;329.&htab;On previous occasions, whenever allegations concerning the death or injury of trade unionists or in the event of collective disputes have been sumbitted to it, the Committee has always insisted that a judicial inquiry be carried out with a view to elucidating the facts in full, determining responsibilities and punishing the guilty parties. [See, for example, 243rd Report, Case No. 1216 (Honduras), para. 432.] In this context, the Committee notes that only a police investigation (still under way) was opened concerning the events which occurred in Leme on 11 July 1986.

&htab;330.&htab;In these circumstances, the Committee deeply deplores the death of Orlando Correia and Sibely Aparecida Manoel and the physical injuries suffered and trusts that a judicial inquiry has been opened.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;331.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee deeply deplores the death of Orlando Correia and Sibely Aparecida Manoel and the physical injuries suffered during the sugar-cane workers' strike in Leme on 11 July 1986.

(b) It trusts that the Government is carrying out a judicial inquiry into these matters and requests to be kept informed of developments.

Case No. 1379 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF FIJI PRESENTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS

&htab;332.&htab;In a communication dated 5 September 1986 the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) presented a complaint against the Government of Fiji on behalf of its affiliate, the Fiji Trades Union Congress (FTUC), alleging violation of basic trade union rights.

&htab;333.&htab;The Government of Fiji replied in a communication dated 29 December 1986.

&htab;334.&htab;Fiji has not ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); it has ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

&htab;335.&htab;In its communication of 5 September 1986, the ICFTU states that the complaint concerns the imposition of a wage freeze, followed by a unilateral fixing of wages and the recent withdrawal by the Government of the recognition of the FTUC as the official representative body of trade unions and organised labour, resulting in the non-renewal of FTUC representation on tripartite bodies. The complainant states that the wage freeze was imposed for an indefinite period on 9 November 1984 as part of the Government's budget proposals for 1985 and was based on the Counter-Inflation (Remuneration) Act. It adds that the freeze was never discussed with the FTUC prior to its imposition and was in clear breach of the agreement signed in the framework of the Tripartite Forum of Fiji which was in force at the time for the period to 31 December 1984: this agreement set guide-lines at a national level on wages and salary increases and was signed on behalf of the Government by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister.

&htab;336.&htab;The complainant goes on to explain that after negotiations with the Government, the Tripartite Forum was reconvened towards the end of 1985 and wage negotiations were presided over by the Minister of Finance. In his budget address to Parliament in November 1985, that Minister announced that the wage freeze would be replaced by the outcome of the negotiations; but, in February 1986, he had, without prior consultation, unilaterally declared a ceiling of 2.25 per cent on wage increases. In the view of the complainant, this was a further breach of the Tripartite Forum agreement and meant that the Government had disregarded the trade unions' right of free collective bargaining. It points out that the FTUC opposed the 2.25 per cent ceiling and requested the Government to call a full meeting of the Tripartite Forum, and states that the Government has not so far given any positive response to this claim.

&htab;337.&htab;The complainant states further that, on the contrary, the Government (in a letter of 4 June 1986, a copy of which was attached to the complaint) informed the FTUC of the withdrawal of the recognition which it had been accorded since 1973 as the sole representative body of trade unions and organised labour.

&htab;338.&htab;In the view of the complainant, this withdrawal has serious consequences since it means that membership of FTUC representatives in important bodies (such as the Labour Advisory Board, the seven wages councils, the Fiji National Training Council, the Trade Union Advisory Council and the Fiji National Provident Fund, as well as various subcommittees appointed by these bodies) has not been renewed or will be terminated.

&htab;339.&htab;The complainant states that the Government has not challenged the continuing representativity of the FTUC, and that the only reason given in justification of this drastic action was that the officers of the FTUC have been participants in an opposing political party and that, as the bodies "must be an integral part of and not be in conflict with the policies of the Government, those whose interests are in opposition to government policies cannot be represented" on them.

&htab;340.&htab;The complainant regards this argument as untenable: although the FTUC was instrumental in the formation of the Fiji Labour Party, it cannot be regarded as a political party and has not deviated from its basic trade union role. It regards the withdrawal of recognition as highly unjustified and believes that it can only be interpreted as an attempt by the Government to undercut the effectiveness of the FTUC as the sole representative trade union centre of Fiji.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;341.&htab;In its communication of 29 December 1986, the Government provides information on the background to the wage freeze for 1985 - announced in the budget speech by the Minister of Finance on 9 November 1984. This indicates that, in discussions which took place in the Tripartite Forum and its Remuneration Guide-lines Committee from 1982 to 1984, proposals for the consideration of a wage pause and a wage freeze were put forward by government representatives and supported by employers' representatives but not by workers' representatives. A wage guide-line was nevertheless established for 1983 as a compromise. Both the Government and the employers were of the view throughout 1983 and 1984 that such guide-lines were preferable to open-ended collective bargaining which would in their view open the door to unreasonable demands on the economy; but the wide differences between these views and those of the workers' representatives which had emerged at the Remuneration Committee's meetings had led the Government to the conclusion that it had no alternative to the unilateral imposition of a wage freeze, which the Minister of Finance had announced in his 1985 budget speech on 9 November 1984.

&htab;342.&htab;Following the imposition of the freeze, negotiations concerning wages for 1985 would normally have begun at the beginning or the end of the year, but the Government had decided to convene an economic summit in February 1985 for the purpose, inter alia, of consulting a large number of political, social, religious and economic organisations on a wide range of economic issues. The Government states that the FTUC did not participate in this meeting, but attended the second such economic summit as an observer and participated actively in a third such meeting; similarly, the FTUC had not attended the first meeting of the National Economic Council on 4 November 1985, but had attended other meetings held since then. The Government expresses the view that it is the FTUC which has refused to participate in consultative machinery which has a much wider representation.

&htab;343.&htab;The Government continues with extracts from the speech of the Minister of Finance on 8 November 1985 when introducing the 1986 budget. This indicates the economic and financial considerations which had led the Government to impose the wage freeze the previous year, and the role of the National Economic Council (which had made recommendations to the Remuneration Guide-lines Committee, based on the ability to pay) and the two national economic summits in assisting with the formulation of policies. The extract concludes with the statement that the national economic summit and its executive arm, the National Economic Council, will in future be the machinery for the regular consultation on development policies between the Government and representatives of the private sector, workers, women, youth and other community organisations.

&htab;344.&htab;The Government then indicates that discussions between the representatives of government, employers and workers took place between 19 November 1985 and 27 January 1986, and that a total of 15 meetings were held between the parties. As no agreement could be reached with the FTUC, the Government decided to lift the wage freeze and impose a ceiling of 2.25 per cent on pay increases as from 1 January 1986 (with no catching up permitted for the period of the freeze, except in the case of 15 agreements which had been reached for implementation of the 1984 remuneration guide-lines, which were allowed to operate only as from 1 January 1986).

&htab;345.&htab;The Government adds that during 1985 there were also consultations between the FTUC, the Fiji Employers' Consultative Association and the Government, regarding the future of the Tripartite Forum; and that it was agreed that the Forum should continue and that the Remuneration Guide-lines Committee of the Forum should meet annually to determine national remuneration guide-lines.

&htab;346.&htab;The Government's communication then turns to the situation as reflected in the Minister of Finance's most recent budget speech, of 4 November 1986, in which it is stated that the Government will argue at the Remuneration Guide-lines Committee that the formula used previously should apply and that this would, on the basis of the improved performance of the economy, result in a wage guide-line of around 6 per cent for 1987. No catching up for the period of the freeze would, however, be allowed.

&htab;347.&htab;In further elaborating the nature of the measures to be taken, the Minister of Finance went on to announce that restrictions on remuneration increases would be lifted with effect from 1 January 1987, and that the remuneration guide-line would be in accordance with agreement reached at the Remuneration Guide-lines Committee (which would be in line with the Government's policy of preventing the "catching-up situation").

&htab;348.&htab;The Government concludes this aspect of its reply by stating that the Remuneration Guide-lines Committee met formally on seven occasions to discuss the guide-line for 1987, and that a voluntary guide-line for 1987 was agreed and signed between the parties on 18 December 1986. It adds that the stringent economic measures taken by the Government result from its responsibility for the proper management of the economy and the need to take whatever measures or action it considers necessary in the best interests of all citizens of the country. It states that the FTUC represents only about 50 per cent of the wage and salaried employees and there are others whose interests must also be considered.

&htab;349.&htab;The Government goes on to reject any allegation that it has violated basic trade union rights in the country, and claims that the freedom and rights enjoyed by the trade unions in Fiji are the envy of many of their counterparts in the world. However, trade unions cannot be above the law or have a privileged position in society.

&htab;350.&htab;On the question of withdrawal of sole recognition from the FTUC, the Government states that a judicial review of its decision in this regard has been sought in the Supreme Court of Fiji by the FTUC; and that the Committee will be informed of the decision on the matter. It goes on to point out that it has continued to appoint members of the FTUC to the various bodies as previously, after seeking nominations from the FTUC. However, in keeping with its decision to have much wider consultations, the Government also draws membership of these bodies from outside the FTUC as well since the FTUC represents only about 50 per cent of total employees.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;351.&htab;The Committee observes that there are two aspects to the allegations against the Government, namely (a) those concerning the establishment of wage levels, including the introduction of a wage freeze for 1985 and subsequent developments relating to the establishment of ceilings for wage increases for 1986 and 1987; and (b) the Government's withdrawal of sole recognition of the FTUC for the purpose of appointments to various bodies.

&htab;352.&htab;As regards the first of these, it appears from the information available that the process of fixing wage guide-lines has gone through several distinct phases, including the following: (i) until the end of 1984, the guide-lines concerning wage levels were established through the National Tripartite Forum; (ii) according to the Government, the absence of agreement by the workers' representatives to proposals supported by government and employers' representatives led to the announcement of a unilateral decision by the Government on 9 November 1984 to introduce a wage freeze; (iii) this was followed in respect of the subsequent year by the announcement of a ceiling on wage increases of 2.25 per cent on the basis of a recommendation to the Remuneration Guide-lines Committee by the first meeting of the National Economic Council in which the FTUC had not participated; in addition, in the period from 1 January 1986 onwards, no increases could be granted which involved catching up on the wages frozen by the first announcement (with certain exceptions); (iv) these restrictions were brought to an end as from 1 January 1987, guide-lines being fixed by the Remuneration Guide-lines Committee in a voluntary agreement reached on 18 December 1986.

&htab;353.&htab;From the information furnished by the Government, it is clear that the decisions on the above matters were taken by the Government for reasons of economic policy, the details of which were outlined by the Minister of Finance when announcing them in his budget speeches. It would none the less appear to the Committee that the measures adopted removed and subsequently restricted opportunities for collective bargaining. A second aspect of the matter concerns the designation of the body within which such bargaining could take place, and in particular any effect of such a determination on the role of the FTUC in the process of collective bargaining.

&htab;354.&htab;As regards the imposition by the Government of both the wage freeze and the subsequent ceiling on wage increases, the Committee would draw the attention of the Government to two principles of freedom of association to which it has made frequent reference in the past. In the first place, the Committee would recall that where intervention by the public authorities is essentially for the purpose of ensuring that the negotiating parties subordinate their interests to the national economic policy pursued by the Government, irrespective of whether they agree with that policy or not, this is not compatible with the generally accepted principle of free collective bargaining embodied in Article 4 of the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), ratified by Fiji. An aspect of the case which remains unclear is the extent to which the measures taken by the Government were introduced through legislation, and in particular the extent to which the Counter-Inflation (Remuneration) Control Act was the vehicle for their implementation. The Committee accordingly requests the Government to supply it with information on this aspect of the matter so that full consideration can be given to the extent to which the measures adopted are compatible with the above-mentioned principle.

&htab;355.&htab;The other principle to which the Committee would draw the attention of the Government is that which states that if, as part of its stabilisation policy, a government considers that wage rates cannot be settled freely through collective bargaining, such a restriction should be imposed as an exceptional measure and only to the extent that it is necessary, without exceeding a reasonable period, and that it should be accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect workers' living standards. [See Digest of Decisions and Principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body , para. 641.] The Committee would emphasise that, where considerations of economic policy result in restrictions of the kind introduced by the Government, every effort should be made to provide safeguards of the kind referred to.

&htab;356.&htab;The Committee has, however, taken note of the fact that the FTUC chose not to participate in the first meeting of the economic summit which made recommendations relating to the introduction of the ceiling on wage increases, although it has done so subsequently. In the circumstances, the Committee is of the view that this aspect of the case does not require further consideration.

&htab;357.&htab;While the Committee notes that a restriction on collective bargaining continued to exist in the form of the insistence that there should be no catching up in respect of previous periods of wage restraint, it has also noted the Government's statement relating to the removal of the restriction on wage increases with effect from 1 January 1987. It notes further that the Remuneration Guide-lines Committee, which had previously provided the opportunity for collective bargaining in a tripartite framework, has reached an agreement on voluntary guide-lines for 1987. The Committee requests the Government to furnish it with the text of the agreement signed on 18 December 1986 so that it may reach a conclusion in the light of all relevant information on the restoration of full freedom to bargain collectively.

&htab;358.&htab;There remain the allegations relating to the removal of recognition from the FTUC which it had enjoyed prior to withdrawal by the Government in a letter dated 4 June 1986. In this regard, the Committee notes that the complainants object to the withdrawal of sole recognition from the FTUC.

&htab;359.&htab;The Government indicates that its reason for withdrawing sole recognition is that the FTUC does not represent more than 50 per cent of the workers, and states that it has continued to appoint FTUC nominees to various statutory and other bodies on which it was previously represented, although other representatives have also been appointed thereto at the same time.

&htab;360.&htab;The Committee takes note of this information. It draws the attention of the Government to the principle that where, under the system in force, the most representative union enjoys preferential or exclusive bargaining rights, decisions concerning the most representative organisation should be made by virtue of objective and pre-established criteria so as to avoid any opportunities for partiality or abuse. [See ibid., paras. 239 and 623.]

&htab;361.&htab;In this regard, the Committee has noted with concern that the only grounds given for the withdrawal of exclusive recognition to the FTUC, in the Government's letter to that organisation on 4 June 1986, related to the participation of officers thereof in an opposing political party and its view that those whose interests are in opposition to government policy cannot be represented on the various bodies to which FTUC nominees had been appointed. In the opinion of the Committee, such a view is not compatible with the principles of freedom of association, and in particular with the principle expressed by the International Labour Conference in the resolution concerning the independence of the trade union movement, that governments should not attempt to transform the trade union movement into an instrument for the pursuance of political aims, nor should they attempt to interfere with the normal functions of a trade union movement because of its freely established relationship with a political party. [ibid., para. 353.] The Committee has, however, taken note of the fact that the FTUC does continue to be represented on the bodies on which it formerly enjoyed exclusive representation and expresses the hope that it will in this way be able to carry out its functions and represent the occupational interests of its members.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;362.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) It invites the Government to give effect to the principle embodied in the resolution of the International Labour Conference concerning the independence of the trade union movement which states that governments should not attempt to transform the trade union movement into an instrument for the pursuance of political aims, nor should they attempt to interfere with the normal functions of a trade union movement because of its freely established relationship with a political party. (b) It requests the Government to provide it with copies of the Counter-Inflation (Remuneration) Act and the agreement on wage guide-lines reached on 18 December 1986, so that it can examine the extent to which free collective bargaining has been restored in Fiji.

(c) It requests the Government to furnish it with information on the decision of the Supreme Court of Fiji concerning the review of the decision to withdraw exclusive representation from the Fiji Trade Union Congress.

(d) It draws the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations to aspects of the case relating to the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

Case No. 1380 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA PRESENTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL METALWORKERS' FEDERATION

&htab;363.&htab;The International Metalworkers' Federation (IMF) presented a complaint of violations of trade union rights against the Government of Malaysia in a communication dated 15 September 1986. The Government supplied its observations in a communication dated 15 January 1987.

&htab;364.&htab;Malaysia has not ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); it has ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

&htab;365.&htab;The IMF, in its communication of 15 September 1986, alleges that one of its Malaysian affiliates - the Electrical Industry Workers' Union (EIWU) - is still faced with the authorities' restrictive interpretation of the principal laws on freedom of association, and anti-union practices similar to those already examined and criticised by the Committee on Freedom of Association in Cases Nos. 879, 911 and 1022. The IMF claims that the behaviour of the Malaysian authorities in the case of two claims for recognition by the EIWU as representing employees in two factories shows that the Government has persistently refused to implement the recommendations of the Governing Body of the ILO.

&htab;366.&htab;According to the complainant, in the case of the first company, Ericsson Telecommunications SDN.BHD., the EIWU had been recognised as representing employees since 1974. In 1982 the company was restructured to meet with the requirements of the national economic plan and to secure additional contracts from the Telecoms Department without, however, any change in its production activities. The IMF states that on the assurance that the terms and conditions of employment would remain the same and recognition of the EIWU would be automatic, about 100 employees - members of the EIWU - were transferred from Ericsson Telecommunications to the new company, Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD. Subsequently, in July 1984, the EIWU's claim for recognition was disputed by the second company. In accordance with the Industrial Relations Act, continues the complainant, the dispute was referred (on 28 July 1984) to the Registrar of Trade Unions, who decided against the EIWU. An appeal to the Minister of Labour (dated 5 February 1985) was equally unsuccessful, as was an appeal to the High Court (dated 30 August 1985), the latter rejecting the appeal, however, on a legal technicality given that the EIWU should have sought a "declaration" and not a writ of "certiorari".

&htab;367.&htab;The complainant attaches to its complaint a translated copy of the Minister of Labour's rejection of the EIWU's appeal against the administrative authorities' refusal to allow it to represent workers in Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD. Dated 19 July 1985, the notice gives no reasons for the Minister's rejection of the appeal. The complainant also attaches a copy of the EIWU's appeal before the High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur (dated 30 August 1985) and which includes copies of the contracts offered to Ericsson employees concerning their re-employment with the new company, Perwira Ericsson. The letters state: "we have pleasure to offer you employment with Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD. The employment would be of the same terms and conditions as at present existing with Ericsson Telecommunications SDN.BHD. inclusive of the terms and conditions in the collective agreement of the Electrical Industry Workers' Union ..." The High Court documents also include copies of the EIWU's claim for recognition under section 9(1) of the Industrial Relations Act dated 5 July 1984, as well as the company's refusal of this claim dated 24 July 1984. The letter of refusal states:

Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD is a newly formed company having entered into their contract with the Government for the supply, installation and testing of stored programme control (SPC) public telephone exchange equipment ... When the company began its operations it recruited staff mostly from Ericsson Telecommunications SDN.BHD. This was a major part of the understanding and goodwill between the two shareholders. In fact, as can be seen from the letter of offer of employment, Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD. has employed those staff under the same terms and conditions which they had previously enjoyed ... In terms of manufacturing, sales and project implementation, the company's main business areas generally cover computerised electronics and telecommunications based product lines ... In essence then, Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD is an electronics based company established to participate in the national telecommunications development of this country. The success of our role depends on mutual co-operation of the employer and employees. As a responsible employer we are bound to cater for the welfare and needs of our employees. Thus, in keeping with general industry practice we support the overall representation by a workers' union. As to the union that will most appropriately represent the workers of this company, I would respectfully wish this matter to be referred to the appropriate authorities. Thus in response to EIWU's claim for recognition, this company would like to refer the matter to the Director-General of Industrial Relations for their [sic] advice and clarification prior to our according recognition.

&htab;368.&htab;The complainant also annexes a copy of the EIWU's memorandum of appeal to the Minister of Labour made in accordance with the provisions of section 71(A) of the Trade Unions Act 1959. The memorandum is dated 5 February 1985 and explains that given rule 3 of its Constitution covering membership scope (i.e. membership of the union shall be open to all employees ... involved in the manufacture and repair of dry cells, batteries and related articles; manufacture and repair of electrical appliances; manufacture and repair of radios and communication equipment; manufacture and repair of electrical industrial equipment; ... manufacture and repair of miscellaneous electrical apparatus) and the work carried out by Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD. (namely manufacturing, insulation and maintenance of telecommunications exchange equipment and telex exchange equipment as well as mobile telephone exchange equipment and the assembly of printed circuits boards) the employees concerned can and should be members of the EIWU. The copy of the High Court's Order, dated 16 April 1986, merely dismisses the appeal.

&htab;369.&htab;According to the complainant, the second case of failure to allow EIWU's unionisation efforts concerns the Amalgamated Parts Manufacturers SDN.BHD whose employees had been unionised by the EIWU in 1984. The EIWU's claim for recognition was rejected by the company in April 1984 and at the same time the company announced that it had taken the decision "to encourage the setting up of a House Union". According to the complainant this is clearly a violation of Convention No. 98, ratified by Malaysia. The appeals lodged by the EIWU to the Registrar of Trade Unions (dated 17 July 1984) and the Minister of Labour, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Act, failed despite the fact that the activities of the company in question are, in its opinion, within the scope of the EIWU membership.

&htab;370.&htab;The complainant attaches copies of the EIWU's unsuccessful appeal to the Minister of Labour to represent employees of the Amalgamated Parts Manufacturers SDN.BHD. The memorandum of appeal is dated 5 February 1985 and states that given the scope of the EIWU's rule 3 (i.e. manufacture and repair of miscellaneous electrical apparatus, and so on as quoted above) and the activities of the company (namely, the production of automobile harnesses or wiring devices) entitles the EIWU to recognition in respect of those employees. This is all the more so, according to the complainant, given that the Malaysian Industrial Classification of 1972 defines "miscellaneous electrical apparatus" as: the manufacture of other electrical apparatus, accessories and supplies not elsewhere classified such as ... other current carrying wiring devices; conduits and fittings; electrical insulators and insulation materials.

&htab;371.&htab;Lastly, the complainant attaches to its complaint a copy of an announcement signed by the Managing Director of Amalgamated Parts Manufacturers SDN.BHD. in which it is stated that "at the Board of Directors's meeting held on 11 April 1984, it was decided to encourage the setting up of a House Union in our company so as to comply with the declared government look east policy". Also attached is a copy of the company's letter of 25 April 1984 addressed to the EIWU stating that in view of the membership scope of the EIWU, "it is felt that your union is not the appropriate union to represent our workers".

B. The Government's reply

&htab;372.&htab;In its communication of 15 January 1987, the Government explains that trade unions in Malaysia are structured on the basis of a particular trade, occupation or industry or within similar trades, occupations or industries. It claims that this requirement of the Trade Unions Act, 1959 does not contravene Convention No. 87 which Malaysia has not ratified but notwithstanding that, it stresses that the right of workers and employers to form, join and participate in lawful activities of trade unions to protect their interests is preserved in the Malaysian Constitution and other labour laws, consistent with ILO Convention No. 98, which Malaysia has ratified. It stresses that trade unions are free to engage in collective bargaining without interference by the State save in situations affecting the security, public order and economic well-being of the nation for which the Government bears overriding responsibility in its opinion.

&htab;373.&htab;As regards the specific complaint of the EIWU, the Government states that this union is not unaware of the fact that its membership coverage rule is confined specifically to a class of workmen engaged in a certain industry and that in so far as Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD. and Amalgamated Parts Manufacturers SDN.BHD. are concerned their activities do not fall within the industry similar to those industries envisaged in the membership clause. Consequently, the EIWU is not competent to represent workmen employed by the companies concerned.

&htab;374.&htab;The Government states that nevertheless, consistent with the principles of freedom of association, the workmen of the two companies have voluntarily formed their own unions respectively: the Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Perwira Ericsson Semenanjung (Union of Employees of Perwira Ericsson Peninsula, Malaysia) and Kesatuan Pekerja-Pekerja Amalgamated Parts Manufacturers (Union of Employees in Amalgamated Parts Manufacturers). According to the Government these unions enjoy harmonious relations with their respective employers and are currently engaged in collective bargaining with a view to concluding collective agreements. The Government wishes to reiterate, in no uncertain terms, that Malaysia does not pursue anti-union practices and that it has always upheld and will continue to uphold the principles of freedom of association within the bounds of the Malaysian Constitution and the other relevant laws of the country. It states that it has been committed to and will continue to foster the growth of a responsible trade union movement in Malaysia and the very fact that the EIWU has taken court action in the case of Perwira Ericsson SDN.BHD. is ample testimony that Malaysia not only advocates the rule of law, but ensures that every person has recourse to it.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;375.&htab;The Committee notes that this complaint is similar in certain respects to three previous complaints involving the complainant organisation and its Malaysian affiliate, the EIWU, alleging restrictive interpretation by the authorities concerned of trade union recognition legislation leading to the refusal to recognise for collective bargaining purposes the EIWU's unionisation of workers in various electronics industry companies. The Committee notes that in one of the previous cases (Case No. 911) the same employer had been involved, namely Ericsson Telecommunications.

&htab;376.&htab;The Committee refers to its examination of Cases Nos. 879, 911 and 1022 [see, respectively, 177th Report, paras. 88-113 approved by the Governing Body at its 205th Session, February-March 1978; 190th Report, paras. 410-429, approved by the Governing Body at its 209th Session, February-March 1979; 202nd Report, paras. 122-142 approved by the Governing Body at its 213th Session, May-June 1980; 211th Report, paras. 515-525 approved by the Governing Body at its 218th Session, November 1981; 217th Report, paras. 379-388 approved by the Governing Body at its 220th Session, May-June 1982; and 218th Report, para. 18 approved by the Governing Body at its 221st Session, November 1982]. In these previous cases, the Committee had stated that it would be desirable for the Government to take steps to ensure that the provisions on the establishment of first-degree unions were interpreted in a less restrictive manner by the administrative authorities, especially in view of the fact that the right of workers to establish and join organisations of their own choosing is one of the basic tenets of freedom of association. It also insisted that the competent authorities should take appropriate conciliatory measures with a view to obtaining recognition by the employer of the most representative union in an undertaking.

&htab;377.&htab;In the present case - although it is not the EIWU's "registration" that has been refused, but its "recognition" which is a legal prerequisite for collective bargaining purposes in each enterprise - it can only regret that once again the authorities do not appear to have taken into account the Committee's recommendations. In effect, they continue to construe the EIWU's membership rule as limited to the electrical industry and refuse to use the discretion available in the legislation to grant recognition to the EIWU in electronics companies. The Committee recalls that its recommendations have consistently been made taking full account of the Government's repeated statements that the workers in Malaysia enjoy the right to organise and to engage in collective bargaining. Although in the present case, as in the past cases, the EIWU has been able to appeal to the High Court to quash the decision of the Minister and the Registrar of Trade Unions concerning its establishment in certain companies, the Committee notes that the High Court has consistently rejected the Union's appeals, without any substantive reasons for the rejection being given. The Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has considered that, where systems provide for the most representative trade union to have preferential or exclusive bargaining rights, it is important that the determination of the trade union in question should be based on objective and pre-established criteria, so as to avoid any opportunity for partiality or abuse. It has also been suggested that where national legislation provides for a procedure of certifying unions as exclusive bargaining agents, certain safeguards should be attached, such as: (a) the certification to be made by an independent body; (b) the representative organisation to be chosen by a majority vote of the employees in the unit concerned; (c) the right of an organisation which fails to secure a sufficiently large number of votes to ask for a new election after a stipulated period; (d) the right of any organisation other than the certificated organisation to demand a new election after a reasonable period has elapsed (otherwise a majority of the workers concerned might belong to a union which, for an unduly long period, could be prevented from organising its administration and activities with a view to fully furthering and defending the interests of its members) [op. cit., para. 295].

&htab;378.&htab;In connection with the manner in which the trade union movement is structured in Malaysia, the Committee would emphasise that the free choice of unions to which workers wish to belong should be that of the workers themselves; such free choice should not in any way be limited by an interpretation by the administrative authorities of union rules in so far as these determine the scope of their membership.

&htab;379.&htab;As regards the alleged violation of Article 2 of Convention No. 98, the Committee observes that it is not clear whether the unions set up in the two companies concerned and currently engaged in collective bargaining were of the employees' own choosing. The Committee bases this conclusion on the documents supplied by the complainant concerning the companies' stated industrial relations policy and the fact that the EIWU had been representing workers in the two companies for some time prior to its unsuccessful claims for recognition with the management. It therefore would recall that the competent authorities should, in all such cases, have the power to proceed to an objective verification of any claim by a union that it represents the majority of the workers in an undertaking, provided that such a claim appears to be plausible. If the union concerned is found to be the majority union, the authorities should take appropriate conciliatory measures to obtain the employer's recognition of that union for collective bargaining purposes [see, for example, 204th Report, Case No. 922 (India), para. 217; 218th Report, Case No. 1122 (Costa Rica), para. 327]. In the interests of ensuring harmonious employer-employee relations in the two companies concerned, the Committee invites the Government to instruct the appropriate authorities to undertake a verification vote and to respect, for recognition purposes, the result of that vote.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;380.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee requests the Government, as it has done in previous cases concerning the same recognition problem, to take steps to ensure that the provisions on the establishment and recognition of first-degree unions are not interpreted in a restrictive manner by the administrative authorities and give effect to the principle that the free choice of the unions to which workers wish to belong should be that of the workers themselves.

(b) It draws the Government's attention to the principle that workers should have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing.

(c) The Committee invites the Government to instruct the appropriate authorities to carry out a verification vote so as to clarify the representativity of unions in the two companies involved in the present case and to keep it informed of further developments in this matter.

Case No. 1381 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF ECUADOR PRESENTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU)

&htab;381.&htab;In a communication dated 22 September 1986, the ICFTU submitted a complaint of infringement of trade union rights in Ecuador. The complainant organisation provided additional information in support of its complaint in a communication of 18 November 1986.

&htab;382.&htab;The Government sent its observations in communications dated 2 and 17 October 1986 and 8 January 1987.

&htab;383.&htab;Ecuador has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise in Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

&htab;384.&htab;In its complaint, the ICFTU explains that its affiliate organisation in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian Confederation of Free Trade Union Organisations (CEOSL), organised, together with other national trade union confederations, a peaceful 24 hour strike on 17 September 1986 with a view to doubling the basic subsistence wage and condemning the Government's economic and social policy. Fifteen trade unionists were arrested on that day, including Julio Chang Crespo, Secretary-General of the CEOSL and member of the Executive Committee of the Inter-American Regional Organisation of Workers (ORIT), a regional organisation belonging to the ICFTU. The ICFTU states that it supports its affiliate organisation's claims for wage increases and the repeal of governmental economic and social measures.

&htab;385.&htab;Together with its communication of 18 November 1986, the ICFTU encloses a report from its affiliate, the CEOSL, on the causes which gave rise to the national general strike called by the Ecuadorian trade union movement and the course it took. The CEOSL explains in this document that the Government has carried out a policy aimed at giving a boost to exporters of agricultural products, banks and large undertakings at the expense of small and medium-sized enterprises, resulting in the worsening of the social and economic situation of the majority of the population. This policy has brought about, for instance, price increases in stable commodities, public services (transport, electricity, water and telephones) and medicines, the freezing of budgetary expenditure for education and an increase in unemployment and underemployment.

&htab;386.&htab;According to the CEOSL, the Government systematically infringes Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 and the right to strike. For example, it refuses to register trade union executives which have been democratically and legally elected and to approve the rules of new organisations by laying down administrative requirements not stipulated by law. The CEOSL quotes the case of several trade unions who have been confronted with such difficulties (the Ecuadorian Railway Workers Union, the Works' Council of Cubiertas and Mzov S.A., the Federation of Free Workers in the Ecuadorian Sugar Sector, the Santa Elena Agricultural Workers' Trade Union).

&htab;387.&htab;As regards collective bargaining, the CEOSL states that collective agreements are not applied either in the public or in the private sector; bargaining is obstructed and agreements negotiated with public undertakings or bodies are challenged by the Ministry of Finance. In many cases, according to the CEOSL, strikers are subjected to police repression although the strikes have been called in strict conformity with the law.

&htab;388.&htab;The CEOSL also points out that the Executive does not apply the decisions adopted by the National Congress. For instance, the Government submitted a Bill to increase wages by 2,000 sucres per month (equivalent to 13 US dollars ) accompanied by a tax programme to finance the wage increase. The Congress refused this Bill on the grounds that the increase was derisory. The Executive nevertheless, implemented this Bill, refusing to apply the Congress's decision to increase wages by 6,000 sucres per month (equivalent to 41.37 US dollars).

&htab;389.&htab;According to the CEOSL, the President of the Republic also approved an Executive Decree restricting the right to call solidarity strikes, which is contrary to Ecuadorian law. This Decree, of which the CEOSL provides a copy, limits solidarity strikes to five days, stipulating that they may not be called upon more than twice in one year by workers in the same undertaking. The CEOSL has lodged an appeal against this Decree with the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees.

&htab;390.&htab;In these circumstances, the national trade union confederations called a national strike on 17 September 1986, in which wide sectors of the economy throughout the country took part. This movement was harshly put down by the police which, according to the CEOSL, arrested about 100 workers.

&htab;391.&htab;The CEOSL headquarters were also brutally attacked by the police and the trade unionists inside were dealt blows.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;392.&htab;In its communications of 2 and 17 October 1986, the Government states that Julio Chang Crespo, mentioned in the ICFTU's complaint, was arrested on 17 September 1986 and sentenced to two-days' imprisonment for breach of the peace and not for having exercised the right to strike, which is legally recognised. The person in question was released on 19 September and, two days later, left the country to attend a trade union meeting being held in Buenos Aires.

&htab;393.&htab;The Government adds that strikes linked to industrial disputes are protected by the Ecuadorian legal system but that, on the other hand, collective work stoppages and political strikes are specifically banned by Act No. 105 adopted by the National Assembly in 1967. Under this Act, a collective work stoppage is defined as being the collective cessation of activity, the imposing of a lock-out outside the cases allowed by law, the paralysis of lines of communication and other similar anti-social occurrences. The instigators and authors of such stoppages are liable to a fine of 1,000 to 10,000 sucres and to two- to five-years' imprisonment; those taking part in the work stoppage are liable to a fine of 200 to 1,000 sucres and to three-months' to one-year's imprisonment. In its communications issued before the strike, the Government informed the population that this Act was still fully in force.

&htab;394.&htab;In the text of the sentence handed down by the Sixth Police Court on the persons arrested on 17 September 1986, it is stated that those concerned took part in demonstrations not authorised by the police, which disrupted law and order and blocked the public highway, and that they shouted protests against the Government and public officials. In accordance with section 606, paragraph 9 of the Penal Code, they were sentenced to two days' imprisonment.

&htab;395.&htab;The Government also encloses press cuttings containing statements by the Minister of Labour to the effect that the strike of 17 September was of a political nature and attempted to destabilise the regime.

&htab;396.&htab;In its communication of 8 January 1987, the Government considers that the critisisms levelled by the complainants at the economic and social policy conducted in Ecuador are merely subjective statements of an arbitrary nature and divorced from reality. Admittedly, like many developing countries, Ecuador is undergoing a crisis, but the Government is attempting to ensure that the nation overcomes it unscathed and with the least social and political consequences. It is incumbent upon the public authorities to guarantee peace in the country and uphold national law and order.

&htab;397.&htab;The Government strongly denies the allegation that, by controlling the seditious actions of 17 September, it infringed ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. It widely respects trade union rights and guarantees the exercise of these rights provided that this is lawful and moral and does not infringe legislation or disrupt law and order. The "general strike" of 17 September, wrongly described as "peaceful", was neither of a social nor trade union nature but was a seditious act: groups of rioters set up barricades in the streets and on the highways, caused fires, attacked members of the police force and private and official vehicles, damaged private property and injured individuals. The Government was prudent in the way it controlled the situation. Only several people actually instigating the disturbances or involved in violent action were arrested after being caught in the act. These agitators, who were imprisoned, were immediately released once the disturbances had ended and after serving a very short sentence of two-days' imprisonment, in accordance with the penalties for offences laid down in the Penal Code. The only reason behind all the international proceedings was therefore to prolong a meticulously organised scandal and to exaggerate the importance of incidents brought rapidly brought under control. According to the Government, even an opposition paper described the general strike as being political. Furthermore, the Government points out that the so-called "evidence" of the "repression" carried out by the Government consists of cuttings from this same opposition paper.

&htab;398.&htab;The Government quotes several articles from the National Constitution: article 78, which lays down the functions and duties of the President of the Republic, including the upholding of national law and order, the use of the police force when security and public services warrant this and the declaration of the national state of emergency; article 128, which states that the role of the police force is to uphold national sovereignty, defend the integrity and independence of the nation and to guarantee its judicial system. The Government also provides a copy of the provisions of the Penal Code pertaining to offences against national state security. The Government points out that the rights of the individual and of society are protected by Ecuadorian legislation, in particular by Title II of the Constitution, of which it provides a copy.

&htab;399.&htab;The Government adds that the State's raison d'être is closely bound up with the problem of sovereignty, considered as the right of the State to determine its own national affairs and to be a part of the international community without being subject to other States. It believes that sovereignty is absolute, indivisible, inalienable and imprescriptable. The State might accept to share the responsibilities of international co-operation, but never interference in matters which fall within the province of its self-determination.

&htab;400.&htab;The fulfilment of any ultimate goal of the State, the Government adds, presupposes the existence of a coercive power limited by standards. Amongst those ultimate goals necessary to the State is the legal goal. Referring to various authors, the Goverment declares that the State cannot give up its role of guarantor and enforcer of national law and order and the national judicial system, without relinquishing its very existence. If the State's judicial raison d'être ceased to exist, so would its social objectives and the "upholding of man's natural and imprescriptable rights". A responsible government cannot therefore fail in its duty to guarantee the supremacy of law by making prudent use of coercive measures, which this very law empowers it to do.

&htab;401.&htab;In the Government's opinion, the opposition spokesmen, by using the term "repression", want to give the impression of a tyrannical government, which is the opposite of the truth.

&htab;402.&htab;As to the specific allegations made in the present case, the Government points out that those guilty of the offences committed on 17 September 1986 received the mildest sentence possible, corresponding to a minor infraction. It points out that offences which resulted in the pulverisation of a considerable number of policemen's helmets, in the smashing of dozens of windscreens, in the hospitalisation of countless policemen and police officers, in the destruction of police property and cars might have been penalised quite differently: six-months' to three-years' imprisonment (section 131 of the Penal Code: for conspiracy to overthrow the Government, or section 132, for incitement to break the law); one- to five-years' imprisonment (section 135: for the disruption of peace amongst citizens by providing arms or encouraging them to arm themselves against each other); six-months' to two-years' imprisonment and a fine of 500 to 1,000 sucres (section 148: for the distribution by any means or disseminating abroad of propaganda or false news or information which aims at disrupting law and order or casts a doubt upon national honour); three-months' to two-years' imprisonment and a fine of 200 to 1,000 sucres (section 151: for the introduction into the country of any money or securities to be used for subversive purposes or to disrupt law and order); one- to three-months' imprisonment and a fine of 100 to 300 sucres (section 153: for the promotion, organisation or leadership of public marches or demonstrations in the street, squares or other public places without written authorisation from the competent authority); eight- to 12-years' imprisonment (section 158: for actions resulting in the destruction, damaging, disuse, interruption or paralysis of public services or industrial plants with a view to alarming the population; 12 to 16-years' imprisonment (section 158, paragraph 2: for injury caused to individuals as a result of the above-mentioned actions). The Government therefore preferred not to order the opening of a trial involving severe penalties and to have the acts of vandalism committed on 17 September 1986 judged as minor infractions.

&htab;403.&htab;The Government goes on to comment on the allegation that it creates obstacles for the approval of the rules of new organisations. As regards the Ecuadorian Railway Workers' Union, the Government explains that this case involved a review of the rules which contravened the law, in accordance with section 442 of the Labour Code. The trade union, after being notified of the refusal on 10 July 1986, submitted a new draft which was accepted by the Minister of Labour and Human Resources on 31 July 1986. On the same day, the amended rules were registered with the Department of Occupational Organisations and Statistics under the General Labour Directorate. This proves that the legitimate demands of trade union organisations are given preferential treatment since the registration formalities were carried out in one day, whereas the Labour Code provides for a time period of 30 days.

&htab;404.&htab;The Works' Council of the enterprise Cubiertas and Mzov SA submitted draft rules, a provisional list of officers and a copy of the constituent resolution which was not authenticated by the secretary of the organisation. On 15 July 1986, the authorities turned down the request, pointing out the irregularity which made it unacceptable. Until now, those concerned have not taken any further steps.

&htab;405.&htab;The Federation of Free Workers in the Ecuadorian sugar sector decided to amend its rules. However, in the amendments, there were errors of content and form. The authorities returned the draft so that these irregularities could be corrected. For instance, the head of the administrative services of the Ministry of Labour requested that the organisation should: make a distinction between associations of retired workers and workers' associations; determine which body would be competent for amending the rules (Congress or the Executive); not take upon itself duties corresponding to those of state bodies; not infringe section 443 of the Labour Code (which forbids trade unions or occupational associations to intervene in party or religious politics) and thus clarify references to "ideology" contained in the rules; comply with the provisions contained in section 443 of the Labour Code pertaining to the fixing of subscriptions; stipulate that the objectives stated must be lawful. Until now, those concerned have not made further requests concerning the registration of the new rules and it is unknown whether they have attempted to make their draft rules comply with logic and the law.

&htab;406.&htab;The draft rules submitted by the Santa Elena Agricultural Workers' Trade Union contained irregularities which were pointed out to it. Amongst other things, it intended imposing union dues on workers not belonging to the union, which is illegal. Furthermore, the provision contained in section 439 of the Labour Code on the minimum number of workers required to set up an association was not fulfilled. The draft was returned to those concerned and a reference made to the points which needed to be corrected. Until now, they have not replied to this request. The Government also provides statistics on the organisations registered from 1980 to 1985.

&htab;407.&htab;As regards Decree No. 2205 of ll September 1986 setting regulations under section 498 of the Labour Code, the Government explains that increasing use had been made of solidarity strikes to disrupt the peace of the country for primarily political purposes, which have nothing to do with trade union activities. As a result, national production has suffered considerable damage and the stability of existing work sources is seriously threatened. According to the Government, excessive recourse to these actions might further increase unemployment within the country.

&htab;408.&htab;The Government points out that the Decree has not affected in any way the right to strike of workers directly involved in labour disputes. The regulations only apply to those giving support to lawful disputes outside their own undertaking, by downing tools in enterprises not involved in the dispute.

&htab;409.&htab;Furthermore, the Decree acknowledges the right to carry out a solidarity strike. It only makes this right subject to a list of rational conditions and regulations, identical to those in force for the principal strike. A solidarity strike must be declared lawful or unlawful by the authorities. If the strike is declared unlawful, the employer is entitled to dismiss the strikers. A strike is deemed unlawful if the strikers commit acts of violence. It may only be declared by the works' council or by 50 per cent, plus one, of the persons employed in the undertaking or factory. Police must take security measures and prevent agitators and strike-breakers from entering the workplace. However, strikers may remain at the workplace. Work may not be resumed by the employment of substitute workers. The labour authorities who are aware of the principal dispute must be informed of the calling of a solidarity strike. The employer is entitled to intervene as a party in matters bound up with or resulting from the solidarity strike. Workers under the same employer may not declare a solidarity strike more than twice a year, and each action must last no longer than five consecutive days. The right to call a solidarity strike is recognised whenever its object is to support lawful strikes declared within the same province or branch of activity.

&htab;410.&htab;Finally, the Government points out that the workers have lodged an appeal against this Decree with the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees and the matter is at present pending.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;411.&htab;The allegations submitted by the complainant stem mostly from the 24-hour general strike called by Ecuadorian trade union organisations on 17 September 1986 to protest, they claim, against the Government's economic and social policy. During the demonstrations held on the day of the strike, several trade union officials were arrested and then sentenced to two-days' imprisonment. The Government declares that these penalties were justified because of the violence committed during these unauthorised demonstrations and emphasises the political and seditious nature of the strike. Furthermore, the complainant describes difficulties encountered by several trade union organisations in registering their rules or amendments to their rules and the adoption of Decree No. 2205 regulating sympathy strikes.

&htab;412.&htab;As regards the general strike, the Committee feels bound to recall that it considers strike action to be one of the means of action which should be available to workers' organistions. [See, for example, 243rd Report, Case No. 1296 (Antigua and Barbuda), para. 276.] However, although the right to strike is one of the basic rights of workers and their organisations, this is so only in so far as it constitutes a means to defend their economic and social interests: the prohibition of strikes designed to coerce a government, if they are non-occupational in character, does not constitute an infringement of freedom of association [see, for example, 127th Report, Case No. 60 (Mauritania), para. 303], and strikes of a purely political nature do not fall within the scope of the principles of freedom of association [see, for example, 153rd Report, Cases Nos. 763, 786 and 801 (Uruguay), para. 177.] The Committee has stressed that the concept of economic and social interests should not only imply obtaining better working conditions or ensuring appliance with claims of an occupational nature, but should also include seeking solutions to economic and social policy questions which are of direct concern to the workers. [See, for example, 214th Report, Case No. 1081 (Peru), para. 261.]

&htab;413.&htab;In the present case, the Committee has sought, on the basis of the information at its disposal, to determine the claims put forward by the trade union organisations in organising this 24-hour general strike. It has ascertained that these mainly comprised requests for an increase in the minimum wage, for the respect of collective agreements in force and for a change in economic policy (price increases and unemployment), all matters which are within the normal field of activity of trade union organisations. The Committee therefore considers that the strike on 17 September 1986 was legitimate and should not have been banned.

&htab;414.&htab;As concerns the repercussions of the action, i.e. the arrest and sentencing of trade unionists, the Committee notes that, according to the Government, the demonstrations organised during the strike gave rise to acts of violence such as the causing of fires, attacks on members of the police force and vehicles, etc. The Committee notes, furthermore, that the sentences handed down were relatively lenient because those concerned were sentenced to two-days' imprisonment and were able to resume their trade union activities immediately after being released.

&htab;415.&htab;The Committeee nevertheless feels bound to point out, in the light of the Government's reply, that Ecuadorian legislation provides for very severe penalties for actions of this type; in particular Decree No. 105 stipulates that organisers of a "general work stoppage" are liable to two- to five-years' imprisonment and that those who take part in the strike are liable to three months' to one-year's imprisonment. The Committee also notes that, in the present case, the Government publicly declared, even before the 24- hour general strike had begun, that this Decree was still fully in force, contrary to the information provided in 1982 to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations that it had fallen into disuse. In this respect, the Committee recalls that the Committee of Experts has been requesting the Government for several years to repeal this Decree and that, until now, there has been no favourable follow-up to its comments.

&htab;416.&htab;Concerning the Ministry of Labour's refusal to approve the rules of organisations in the process of being established or amendments to the rules of organisations already existing, the Committee notes the Government's explanations that the requests in question contained irregularities or that the rules were not in conformity with the legislation in force. The Committee also notes that, in one of the four cases cited by the complainant, the trade union amended its draft rules to comply with the request from the Ministry of Labour, which immediately registered it, and that, in the three other cases, the organisations concerned did not respond to the Ministry of Labour's refusals which set out the reasons for their non-acceptance. In this respect, the Committee notes from the 1983 observation made by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations on the application of Convention No. 87 by Ecuador that, in the case of a refusal by the Ministry of Labour, appeal is possible to the courts under sections 1, 2, 5 and 10(a) of the Administrative Tribunal Act and that the Administrative Tribunal can examine the substance of the matter. In the present case, the organisations concerned apparently failed to make use of the judicial possibilities open to them in the case of a refusal. In these circumstances, the Committee considers that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.

&htab;417.&htab;Finally, the Committee examined Decree No. 2205 regulating section 498 of the Labour Code concerning recourse to solidarity strikes. In its 1983 General Survey, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations considered that a general prohibition of solidarity strikes could lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such action provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful. [See International Labour Conference, 69th Session, 1983, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining , para. 217.]

&htab;418.&htab;In the present case, the Committee notes that Decree No. 2205 does not ban solidarity strikes but only regulates them by limiting recourse to this type of action. In the Committee's opinion, although several provisions contained in the Decree might be justified by the need to respect various procedures (notification of the strike to the labour authorities) or to guarantee security within the undertaking (the prevention of agitators and strike-breakers from entering the workplace), others, however, such as geographical or sectoral restrictions placed on solidarity strikes - which therefore exclude general strikes of this nature - or restrictions on their duration and frequency, constitute a serious obstacle to the calling of such strikes.

&htab;419.&htab;In this respect, the Committee notes that the trade union organisations have lodged an appeal against Decree No. 2205 with the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, which is at present pending.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;420.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee recalls that strikes are one of the essential means of action that should be available the workers' organisations; to this end, it requests the Government to repeal Decree No. 105 which provides for prison sentences for those organising "general collective work stoppages" and those taking part in them, and which, according to the Government, has fallen into desuetude.

(b) The Committee considers that Decree No. 2205 concerning solidarity strikes contains certain restrictions which constitute a serious obstacle to the calling of such strikes and which are incompatible with the principles of freedom of association.

(c) It requests the Government to keep it informed of the appeal lodged with the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees against Decree No. 2205 concerning solidarity strikes.

CASES IN WHICH THE COMMITTEE HAS REACHED INTERIM CONCLUSIONS Cases Nos. 1129 and 1351 COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA PRESENTED BY - THE LATIN AMERICAN CENTRAL OF WORKERS - THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR AND - THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF EMPLOYERS

&htab;421.&htab;The Committee examined Cases Nos. 1129 (presented by the Latin American Central of Workers and the World Confederation of Labour) and 1351 (presented by International Organisation of Employers) at its November 1986 meeting [see 246th Report, paras. 197 to 265, approved by the Governing Body at its 234th Session (November 1986)]. The Committee had already examined Case No. 1129 at its meetings of November 1982, February 1984 and November 1985. [See 218th Report, paras. 467 to 481; 233rd Report, paras. 236 to 242 and 317; and 241st Report, paras. 440 to 494, of November 1982, February-March 1984, and November 1985, respectively.]

&htab;422.&htab;Subsequently, the Government sent certain observations in communications dated 12 and 16 January 1987. The International Organisation of Employers sent additional information concerning Case No. 1351 in a communication of 23 January 1987.

&htab;423.&htab;Nicaragua has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. Previous examination of the cases

&htab;424.&htab;When it examined Case No. 1129 at its 1986 meeting, the Committee reached the following conclusions on the allegations then pending [see 246th Report, paras. 248 and 249]:

&htab;The Committee notes that, according to information provided by the Government, Arcadio Ortíz and Ricardo Cervantes Rivo were sentenced by the anti-Somoza people's courts for belonging to an armed counter-revolutionary organisation and for activities in support of the same organisation. The Committee regrets that the Government, in referring to the sentence handed down on the trade unionists Milton Silva Gaitán and Orlando Napoleón Molina Aguilera by the anti-Somoza people's courts did not mention the specific charges brought against them. The Committee also regrets to note that the Government failed to reply to the allegations concerning the raid on the CTN headquarters on 24 October 1985 involving destruction of its archives and concerning the arrest, sometimes accompanied by threats of death or torture, of the trade unionist Eduardo Aburto, Eric Gouzález González, Carlos Herrera, Sergio Rosa and Eugenio Membreño (in the case of the latter, the claimants had alleged his arrest on October 1985, whereas in the Government's reply, reference is made to the release of these trade unionists in March 1983) and to the searching of houses accompanied by threats and intimidation to the families of the two last-mentioned trade unionists. In these circumstances, the Committee accordingly requests the Government to provide information on these aspects of the case as a matter of urgency, as well as the sentences which have been or will be handed down in respect of the trade unionists mentioned in this paragraph.

&htab;The Committee notes that the anti-Somoza people's courts were specifically created by the decree on the state of emergency in April 1983, and recalls that it has always attached great importance to the fact that all cases, including those in which trade unionists are charged with political or common law crimes, should be tried promptly by an impartial and independent authority. The Committee requests the Government to transmit the text of the legislation establishing the anti-Somoza tribunals.

&htab;425.&htab;As regards Case No. 1351, the Committee made the following recommendations at its meeting of November 1986 on the allegations then pending [see 246th Report, para. 265(j) and (k)]: &htab;The Committee also notes that according to the Government, on 6 and 7 September 1985 no one was arrested for matters related directly with the allegations. The Committee requests the Government to indicate specifically whether the president of COSEP was placed under house arrest on 7 September 1985 ("Private Enterprise Day"), as alleged by the complainant and, if so, the reasons.

&htab;The Committee observes that Decrees Nos. 128 and 130 proclaiming a state of national emergency with the subsequent restrictions on civil and trade union freedoms should have expired at the end of October 1986. The Committee expresses the firm hope that these restrictions will not be reimposed and requests the Government to furnish information on the subject.

B. Further developments 1. &htab;The Government's replies

&htab;426.&htab;As regards Case No. 1129, the Government encloses with its communication of 12 January 1987 the text of Decree No. 1233 of 11 April 1983, which created the anti-Somoza people's courts. The Decree's preamble states, in particular, that the exceptional situation arising from the war and the crimes against humanity perpetrated by the counter-revolutionaries "require flexible interim judicial organs to judge and pass sentence on persons found guilty of these crimes against humanity, while the state of emergency persists". Sections 1 through 6 of the Decree are reproduced below:

&htab;Section 1. First and Second Instance Anti-Somoza People's Courts are hereby created and given jurisdiction over the crimes specified in sections 1 and 2 of Decree No. 1074 of 6 June 1982, and similar crimes described in the Criminal Code; the organisation, operation and jurisdiction of these courts shall be governed by the provisions of this Act.

&htab;Section 2. A first instance Anti-Somoza People's Court is hereby established in the city of Managua, with jurisdiction over the entire Republic; likewise, an Anti-Somoza People's Appeals Court is hereby established in the same city, with jurisdiction over appeals filed in connection with the decisions of the first instance court.

&htab;Section 3. Each of the courts mentioned in the previous section shall be composed of three titular members and their respective alternates, to be appointed by the National Reconstruction Government Junta; one of these will serve as president of the court. &htab;Section 4. Only adult, Nicaraguan citizens with full citizenship rights will be eligible to sit on the above-mentioned courts. The person appointed to serve as president of the court must be an attorney-at-law.

&htab;Section 5. Each court shall appoint a clerk, a process server and such other staff as the court may need.

&htab;Section 6. The crimes referred to in section 1 of this Act shall be tried in accordance with the procedures established by Decree No. 896 of 4 December 1981, except that there shall be no ordinary or extraordinary recourse against the decisions of the Appeal's Court.

&htab;427.&htab;The jurisdiction of the anti-Somoza people's courts shall extend to the crimes described in sections 1 and 2 of Decree No. 1074 of 6 July 1982, which are set out below:

&htab;Section 1. Crimes against national security shall include:

&htab;&htab;(a) actions designed to submit the nation, in whole or in part, to foreign domination, or to undermine its independence and integrity;

&htab;&htab;(b) the disclosure of political secrets or information on national security as regards the country's defence or foreign relations, or secrets whose disclosure may undermine the country's economic security;

&htab;&htab;(c) actions designed to damage plants, roads, bridges, public works or property needed for defence, with a view to undermining the nation's defensive efforts;

&htab;&htab;(d) the use of arms with a view to attacking the national Government, its agencies or employees, as well as all actions undertaken for the same purpose;

&htab;&htab;(e) any attempt to depose the local authorities or to prevent legally appointed or elected officials from assuming office;

&htab;&htab;(f) any effort to prevent the authorities from carrying out their functions freely and in compliance with administrative or judicial orders;

&htab;&htab;(g) the proposal and acceptance of, or participation in conspiracies to commit any of the crimes listed in this section, as well as complicity in the same. Persons found guilty of the crimes mentioned in subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d) of this section will be sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from five to 30 years; those found guilty of the crimes mentioned in the other subsections shall face prison sentences ranging from three to 15 years. &htab;Section 2. The authors of, accomplices in or accessories to the crime of sabotage against production centres, public service facilities, infrastructure, public or private means of transport or any other type of public or private equipment or installation will be sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from eight to ten years. &htab;The authors of, accomplices in or accessories to crimes of assault involving the use of weapons of war or the uniforms, insignias or other means of identification of the armed forces or law enforcement staff, shall likewise be sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from eight to ten years.

&htab;428.&htab;Decree No. 896 (a procedural Act for crimes against the public order and national security), dated 4 December 1981, includes the following provisions, among others:

&htab;Section 1. Ordinary courts shall have jurisdiction over the infractions of the "Act for the preservation of the public order and national security" listed in Decree No. 5 of 20 July 1979, as amended, in accordance with the procedures established in this Decree.

&htab;Section 2. The following rules shall apply to the first instance court's investigation, prosecution and punishment of crimes listed in the above-mentioned Decree:

&htab;(a) proceedings shall be opened at the request of the Government's prosecutor, who shall notify the person or persons indicted; such person or persons shall have two days in which to reply orally or in writing, personally or through their attorney. At their own request, or at any convenient time, the person or persons under indictment may make statements without being under oath;

&htab;(b) if the person or persons indicted fail to reply within two days, either personally, or through an attorney, in spite of the judge's summons, they will be considered to have entered a plea of not guilty; in the event that such person or persons have not retained counsel, the court shall appoint a public defender so that the proceedings may continue;

&htab;(c) once the period for replying to the indictment has elapsed, or once the court has appointed a public defender, the court will hear testimony within a maximum period of eight days, subject to the extensions provided for in section 7 of this Act. Thereupon, the judge will pronounce judgement within a period of three days if the person or persons indicted are in detention, or within a period of ten days if the person or persons indicted are not in detention; &htab;(d) if one or more of the persons indicted are not present, those who are absent will be tried apart from the main trial, with a view to expediting the proceedings involving those who are present. The separate proceedings for those who are absent shall be based on a copy of the corresponding indictment and a record shall be made of those failing to appear; thereupon a summons shall be issued in accordance with the provisions for summary trials contained in section 369; &htab;(e) during the first instance proceedings, which may not exceed a period of 20 days, person or persons indicted who are being detained are considered to be under legal arrest and, if found guilty, such arrest will continue until a final judgement is handed down.

&htab;Section 5. At any point during the proceedings, the judges and courts may, at the request of the Government's prosecutor, order the arrest or release on bail of the person or persons indicted.

&htab;The Government's prosecutor will be consulted with regard to collective releases on bail.

&htab;429.&htab;As regards Case No. 1351, the Government provides the following information on the state of emergency in its communication of 16 January 1987:

&htab;On 9 January 1987, the President of the Republic of Nicaragua proclaimed the Political Constitution which had been ratified by the National Assembly after public consultation and debate. On the same day, the Government published Decree No. 245 which re-established the state of emergency as a juridical means of defence in the war of the United States against Nicaragua, with a view to fighting counter-revolutionary actions and preserving the rights of Nicaraguan citizens.

&htab;The scope of the aggression facing Nicaragua was recognised by the International Court of Justice of the Hague in its historic sentence of 27 June 1986, in which it clearly and categorically condemns the Government of a certain country for its violations of such basic principles of International Common Law as abstaining from using and threatening the use of force, non-intervention and the respect for the sovereignty of States. This landmark sentence clearly states that there is no justification whatsoever for this Government to undertake such actions, which victimises the Nicaraguan people. Likewise, the sentence reflects the scope of the war of aggression that has been unleashed on the Nicaraguan people, and justifies the emergency measures which the Government of Nicaragua has taken in accordance with international standards. &htab;The judgement handed down by the International Court of Justice provides a fundamental legal foundation for the Nicaraguan positions. However, in spite of the World Court's request that the country in question cease and desist its aggression against Nicaragua, it has continued and stepped up its aggression, as evidenced by the recent decision of its President to sign a Bill that approves new funds for its mercenary forces and, what is more, provides for the training of these mercenary groups by North American military advisers and authorises the supply of all types of weapons, including airborne, land and marine means of transport. These actions constitute an interference in the Latin American world; they exacerbate the crisis to levels heretofore unknown and tend toward the generalisation or "Vietnamisation" of the conflict.

&htab;The State in question has also continued pursuing its bloody and inhumane official policy of state terrorism; several officials of its Government, including the President, have openly recognised that their avowed policy is to bring down the Government of Nicaragua. Moreover, by using an illegal veto to block the resolution of the United Nations Security Council giving effect to the World Court's judgement, this Government left Nicaragua no choice but to resort to the General Assembly of the United Nations which, on 3 November 1986, issued an historic resolution which urgently called for the complete and immediate application of the decision handed down by the International Court of Justice on 27 June 1986 respecting military and para-military activities in and against Nicaragua, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Charter.

&htab;Lastly, the Government of Nicaragua shares the hope of the Committee on Freedom of Association that the state of emergency will be lifted as soon as its underlying causes have disappeared.

2. &htab;New allegations

&htab;430.&htab;The International Organisation of Employers indicates in its communication of 23 January 1987 that the state of emergency was not lifted at the end of October. On 9 January 1987, the President of Nicaragua proclaimed the nation's new Constitution, which had been adopted by Parliament in late November 1986; in particular, the Constitution guarantees the right to strike, the right of association, assembly, habeas corpus , affiliation with political parties, and the right to receive and distribute information. Less than two hours after this proclamation, which automatically derogated Decrees Nos. 128 and 130 (which declared the state of emergency), the President of the Republic and the official radio station, "La Voz de Nicaragua", announced that the national state of emergency had been re-established by means of Decree No. 245 for a period of one year, and that 13 clauses of the new Constitution were suspended; these clauses concern the inviolability of the home, correspondence and communications (article 26); the right to express opinions in public and in private, individually or collectively, orally, in writing or by any other means (article 30); the right of movement within the country, to enter and to leave (article 31); the guarantee against arbitrary detention (article 33); the right of habeas corpus (for actions against the public order) and the constitutional guarantee for the protection of civil rights (article 45); the right of workers to establish organisations for the defence of their interests (article 49); the right of assembly without prior authorisation (article 53); the right of public demonstration (article 54); the right to specific information, and to solicit, receive and spread information and opinions, orally, in writing or by any other means (article 66); the guarantee against censorship (article 67 and 68 (second part)); and the right to strike (article 83).

&htab;431.&htab;According to the IOE, immediately prior to this new suspension of civil rights related to the exercise of trade union freedoms, the trade unions, the employers' associations and the political parties in opposition had called for the state of emergency and the restrictions to civil liberties to be limited to the troubled areas in the northern part of the country. Their request went completely unheeded and unanswered.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;432.&htab;The Committee notes that according to the pertinent legislation, the anti-Somoza people's courts are special or extraordinary tribunals which handle summary proceedings entailing a number of significant restrictions on the rights of defendants. Nevertheless, the Committee notes that according to the legislation involved, the crimes over which the anti-Somoza people's courts have jurisdiction, in principle, have no bearing on the exercise of trade union rights or activities. Noting however the contradiction on this point between the complainant and the Government, the Committee again asks the Government to supply copies of the judgements of these courts concerning the persons mentioned by the complainants. The Committee also requests the Government to reply to the allegations made in Case No. 1129.

&htab;433.&htab;As regards the declaration of the state of emergency contained in Decree No. 245 of 9 January 1987, the Committee takes note of the important motives invoked by the Government, and of the restrictions which that situation implies in the exercise of certain fundamental public freedoms and trade union rights, as noted by one of the complainant organisations. In this respect, the Committee notes that the restrictions previously examined in Cases Nos. 1317 and 1351, contrary to the Government's letter of 16 January 1987, are not limited to counter-revolutionary activities. The Committee has always refrained from expressing an opinion on the political aspects of a state of emergency [see, for example, 151st Report, Case No. 809 (Argentina), para. 199], while recommending that in the event of states of siege or emergency, as regards its relations with employers' and workers' organisations and their representatives, the Government should as far as possible rely on measures provided for in ordinary law rather than on emergency measures which are liable, by their very nature, to involve certain restrictions on fundamental rights [see, for example, 56th Report, Case No. 216 (Argentina), para. 157].

&htab;434.&htab;For its part, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has emphasised that the freedom of association Conventions do not contain any provision permitting derogation from the obligations arising under the Convention, or any suspension of their application, based on a plea that an emergency exists [see General Survey, Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining , Report III, Part IV(B), International Labour Conference, 69th Session, 1983, para. 72]. Given that the state of emergency has continued over a period of several years, entailing serious restrictions on trade union rights and public freedoms that are essential for the exercise of such rights, the Committee again expresses the firm hope that the state of emergency will be lifted in the near future. Although it recognises the existence of extremely grave circumstances in Nicaragua, the Committee considers that a return to normality in trade union life would be facilitated, in any case, by limiting the application of the state of emergency to certain geographical areas. At least, it is necessary to safeguard the exercise of specifically trade union rights such as the establishment of employers' and workers' organisations, the right to hold trade union meetings in trade union premises, and the right to strike in non-essential services.

&htab;435.&htab;Lastly, the Committee notes that the Government has not sent its observations on the allegation pending in connection with Case No. 1351.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;436.&htab;In the light of its foregoing interim conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee requests the Government to lift the state of emergency in the near future. In the meantime, it requests the Government to limit its application to certain geographical areas. In any case, it is necessary to safeguard the exercise of specifically trade union rights such as the right to organise, the right to meet on trade union premises, and the right to strike in non-essential services. (b) With a view to this, it requests the Government, in its relations with employers' and workers' organisations, to rely on measures provided for in ordinary law rather than on emergency measures.

(c) It requests the Government to send its observations and supply the information requested by the Committee during its previous examination of these cases as regards issues still pending, in particular copies of the judgements of the anti-Somoza people's courts concerning the trade unionists mentioned by the complainants.

Case No. 1309 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE PRESENTED BY - THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS (ICFTU) - THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR (WCL) - THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU) - AND OTHER TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS

&htab;437.&htab;The Committee has examined this case on several occasions, most recently at its November 1986 meeting, when it presented an interim report to the Governing Body [see 246th Report, paras. 266-312, approved by the Governing Body at its 234th Session (November 1986)].

&htab;438.&htab;Subsequently, the ILO received the following communications from the complainants: World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP): 31 October 1986, 27 January and 3 February 1987; National Federation of Unions of Textile, Clothing and Allied Workers (FENATRATEX): 20 November 1986; and Miners' Confederation of Chile: 9 December 1986. The Government transmitted observations in communications of 22 January and 11 February 1987.

&htab;439.&htab;Chile has ratified neither the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) nor the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. Previous examination of the case

&htab;440.&htab;At its November 1986 Session, the Governing Body approved various definitive conclusions reached by the Committee on certain pending allegations. The Committee also requested the Government to keep it informed of the outcome of the appeals lodged with the courts by six workers dismissed from the National Copper Corporation. Finally, the Committee had requested the Government to supply comprehensive observations on the most recent allegations presented in this case and summarised below.

&htab;441.&htab;Attached to an ICFTU communication was a report of the Centre for Trade Union Research and Assistance in which it was alleged that early in the morning of 1 May 1986, the trade union premises belonging to the Confederation of Textile and Clothing Workers had been illegally searched.

&htab;442.&htab;In its communication of 11 June 1986, the National Union of Workers of the Telephone Company of Chile stated that on 17 April 1986 it had presented a draft collective agreement to the Telephone Company in conformity with the legislation in force. The employer replied on 30 April 1986, raising objections to the draft in respect of the situation of replacement telephone operators, although the latter are not among those workers barred from collective bargaining under article 5 of Legislative Decree No. 2758. On 28 May 1986, after compulsory arbitration proceedings had been initiated, the Director of Labour issued a resolution in which it was decided to exclude from collective bargaining the situation of the 475 members of the union employed as replacement operators. The union pointed out that the persons concerned were covered by an indefinite work contract and had more than 8 years' continuous service in the undertaking. The union added that the Santiago Provincial Labour Inspector had issued on 9 May 1986 a totally contrary resolution which recognised the right of these workers to participate in collective bargaining. Lastly, the union indicated that it had submitted appeals to the courts but that the latter had not yet handed down their judgement.

&htab;443.&htab;In its communication of 9 September 1986, the ICFTU alleged that Juan Fernando Reyes, President of the "El Roto Chileno" Peasants' Federation of Curico and his family had been subjected to constant threats since 2 July 1986. On several occasions, armed and masked civilians had conducted night searches at his home and destroyed furniture and other objects. The appeal for protection submitted by his lawyers had been rejected, as, according to police sources, no warrant for arrest or order of inquiry had been issued in his case. Since then, his home had again been searched and his wife severely beaten.

&htab;444.&htab;In its communication of 9 September 1986, the FISE referred to the arrest by the security services of Mr. Guillermo Scherping, Under-Secretary of the Professional Association of Teachers of Chile. The FISE feared that his life was in danger.

&htab;445.&htab;The National Confederation of Trade Unions in Building, Wood, Building Materials and Related Activities, for its part, referred to the warrant issued for the arrest of its president, Sergio Troncoso Cisternas. The complainant organisation pointed out that Mr. Troncoso, who had already been detained on several occasions, had been sought by persons in civilian clothes on 8 September 1986, when he was in the German Democratic Republic to attend the Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions.

&htab;446.&htab;CONSTRAMET indicated that its leaders José Ramón Avello Soto and Ronaldo Muñez Moreno had been sought by the police since the day following the proclamation of the state of emergency, 8 September 1986. Furthermore, a regional secretary of the organisation, Humberto Arcos Vera, was under permanent surveillance, as were the Confederation's offices. The complainant organisation also indicated that the police authorities had prohibited meetings of several constituent unions (the Eugenio González, Morgan and Fuenzalida Unions) which were in the process of negotiation.

&htab;447.&htab;FENATRATEX referred to the dismissal of three trade union officials by the Viña dye works. It explained that these officials had been declared responsible for the fact that 30 of the 120 workers in the undertaking did not arrive for work on the protest day held on 5 September 1986, as they were without means of transport, sick or unable to leave their district which had been occupied by law enforcement agents. The undertaking then arbitrarily applied sections 15.1 and 15.4 of Legislative Decree No. 2200 which penalises unlawful acts preventing the worker from being present at his work or discharging his obligations as a worker and the direction of or active participation in any unlawful interruption or stoppage of work. The dismissals were decided without notice being given, without the right to compensation and in contravention of "trade union immunity".

&htab;448.&htab;FENATRATEX indicated that 37 workers at the San Martino textiles undertaking had had to take the risk of meeting in private houses to discuss a draft collective agreement since a consequence of the proclamation of the state of emergency was to prohibit meetings of trade unions which do not possess their own premises.

&htab;449.&htab;The Miners' Confederation alleged that several trade unionists had been dismissed for having participated in collective bargaining: in particular, the former official of the Lota Union No. 6 of the National Coal Enterprise (ENACAR), Fresia Mellado Opazo, and ten workers of Union No. 1 of Victoria de Lébu. It was alleged further that an official of ENACAR Union No. 1, Juan Carlos Salazar Sierra, had been disqualified from holding his union post and that workers at the Minero Cerro Negro undertaking, including the trade union official Rolando Chacana Ganzúa, had been arrested for purported theft of explosives. Lastly, it was alleged that, at the Agustinas de Copiapo mine, the Agustinas mining enterprise had unilaterally decided to lower salaries in 1984 and 1985 at a time when the collective agreement was in force.

&htab;450.&htab;Finally, in a joint letter several Chilean national confederations indicated that the homes of officials of the Catering Confederation and the El Surco, Manuel Caro Castro and Enrique Avendaño Atenas Peasants' Confederation had been visited by unidentified persons.

B. New allegations

&htab;451.&htab;In its communication of 31 October 1986, the WCOTP refers to acts committed against teachers and their trade union officials since proclamation of the state of emergency in the country. Thus, on 8 September 1986, Mr. Gaston Vidaurrazaga Manriquez was taken from his home and murdered. His body was found south of Santiago. Three other teacher trade union officials, Nelly Lemus, Julio Lobos and Berta Moya were threatened with death.

&htab;452.&htab;The WCOTP also refers to the detention of Guillermo Scherping Villegas, Under-General-Secretary of the Professional Association of Teachers of Chile (AGECH) (already mentioned in an earlier complaint) and of Beatriz Brikmann Scheihing, teacher, who has been in jail since 24 September 1986.

&htab;453.&htab;Lastly, the WCOTP alleges the dismissal of several teachers, including Mr. Fernando Azula, a national official of AGECH, who had previously been dismissed from educational institutions in 1983 and 1984. On 16 September 1986, an armed forces group searched his home, and he was held in custody for some time. During a visit to Spain, he had given an interview on 25 August 1986 to the newspaper "El Tiempo". On 16 September 1986, he was dismissed by Presidential Decree No. 1044 for having made that statement to the press. The WCOTP believes that his dismissal was mainly due to his trade union activities.

&htab;454.&htab;In its communication of 20 November 1986, FENATRATEX complains of the withdrawal of the legal personality of the Inter-Works Union of Workers of Textile Enterprises of Santiago Province. This measure is alleged to have been taken because the union had complained to the Minister of Labour about anomalies in the textile sector. The withdrawal of the legal personality will also entail, for the second time, the seizure of its assets, inherited by virtue of a judicial decision from the industrial union "Tejidos Musalem" (its property had been seized for the first time in 1978).

&htab;455.&htab;In its communication of 9 December 1986, the Miners' Confederation of Chile indicates that on 27 November 1986 two officials of Trade Union No. 6 of the National Coal Enterprise's Lota plant were arrested and required to open the union's office so that a search could be made. Since nothing was found, the two officials were freed. On 5 December, however, a group from the National Centre of Investigations again searched the union's office, where this time pamphlets and explosives mysteriously appeared. A union official, Julio Salazar Sierra, and one of its members, Patricio Sanhuza, were arrested.

&htab;456.&htab;In its communication of 27 January 1987, the WCOTP refers to the Minister of the Interior's adoption of an Order (No. 1766) dated 28 May 1986 and concerning the reduction of the number of teachers in municipal schools. According to the instructions contained in this order, the Minister did not intend to extend the contracts of retired teachers, or those over 65 having 40 years of service, or those having more than 30 years of service. Later on, those teachers who did not have the necessary qualifications would apparently be dismissed. According to the WCOTP, this order was used differently: working teachers who were well qualified were dismissed because of their trade union activities. The WCOTP quotes a statement made by the Superintendent of the Concepción region to the effect that "political agitation will not be tolerated in schools". It considers that there is a real danger that trade union activities will be deemed to be political agitation.

&htab;457.&htab;In support of the allegations contained in its communicatioin of 3 February 1987, the WCOTP supplies a list of 55 officials of the Professional Association of Teachers of Chile (AGECH) and of 15 officials of the Teachers' College of Chile who have been dismissed. It also supplies the breakdown, by province, of the number of dismissed teachers, which has now reached 3,835.

C. The Government's reply

&htab;458.&htab;As regards the judicial appeals lodged by six workers dismissed from the National Copper Corporation, the Government indicates that the judge at El Salvador only allowed one of these workers' appeals (that of Mr. Raúl Nuñez Tapia) and ordered his reinstatement with payment of lost wages. The other appeals were rejected because the judge considered that the dismissals had been carried out in accordance with the law. A further appeal was then lodged with the Appeals Court, but was eventually withdrawn since those concerned had reached an agreement out of court on the payment of compensation.

&htab;459.&htab;As regards the denial of the right of replacement operators of the Telephone Company of Chile to bargain collectively, the Government indicates that on 17 April 1986 the negotiating committee appointed by the governing body of the company's union of workers submitted a draft collective agreement to the company, which replied to the committee within the legal time-limit.

&htab;460.&htab;On 5 May 1986, the workers' representative submitted a complaint to the Directorate of Labour, in exercise of the right granted by law, concerning the observations made by the enterprise in its reply, in particular as regards the exclusion of replacement operators from the draft collective agreement. On examining the individual employment contracts of these employees, the Directorate of Labour noted that the contracts contained a clause prohibiting them from bargaining collectively and from participating in negotiating committees. This clause had to be taken into account by the Directorate of Labour, since any document or contract signed or concluded in accordance with the legal formalities remains fully valid so long as it has not been declared null and void by a final judgement of the courts.

&htab;461.&htab;The Government adds that administrative bodies like the Directorate of Labour are not competent to declare a contract's clause null and void. The collective bargaining exercise could thus not be the legal forum for declaring the validity or nullity of the clause in question. The replacement operators had been entitled by law to appeal to the courts within a period of 60 days from the date of their contract if they felt that the prohibition of collective bargaining it contained was not applicable to them, or to request, at any time, nullification of the clause. They had not, however, made use of those rights.

&htab;462.&htab;On 5 June 1986, the National Union of Workers of the Telephone Company of Chile lodged an appeal with the Santiago Court of Appeals against the decision of the Directorate of Labour, which it considered arbitrary and illegal. The appeal was rejected in an order dated 4 July 1986. Appeals were then submitted to the Supreme Court of Justice, which also rejected them.

&htab;463.&htab;In the Government's opinion, the decision of the Directorate of Labour was neither illegal nor arbitrary, since it was pronounced at the union's request in pursuance of section 28 of Legislative Decree No. 2758 on collective bargaining. On the contrary, it would have been arbitrary for the Directorate of Labour to disregard the effects of the clause prohibiting replacement operators from bargaining collectively. The Government also states that the Directorate of Labour's decision was not pronounced after the time-limit, for in order to be able to decide the question, it had had to request information from the negotiating parties for another decision adopted on 9 May 1986. The final decision was issued on 28 May 1986 after the information had been furnished on 22 May.

&htab;464.&htab;Regarding the alleged police searches for Mr. Sergio Troncoso Cisternas, President of the National Confederation of Trade Unions in the Building, Wood, Building Materials and Related Activities, and Messrs. José Ramón Avello Soto, Ronaldo Muñez Moreno and Humberto Arcos Vera, officials of the Metallurgy Trade Unions Confederation, the Government states that the authorities of the Ministry of the Interior have not handed down any decision which might have affected the liberty of these persons on the date indicated.

&htab;465.&htab;As for the dismissal of three trade union leaders by the Viña dye works, the Government states that their employment contracts had been terminated in accordance with section 15 of Legislative Decree No. 2200 of 1978 for having led an illegal strike on 5 September 1986. Those concerned had lodged a judicial appeal against this decision, requesting the cancellation of the dismissals and payment of the corresponding compensation.

&htab;466.&htab;As regards the difficulties encountered by workers at the San Martino textiles undertaking in meeting to discuss a collective agreement, the Government states that these workers undertook a strike from 17 November to 4 December 1986 which was before the signature of a new collective agreement between the parties, an agreement has now been fully implemented.

&htab;467.&htab;As for the dismissal of trade unionists by the National Coal Enterprise (ENACAR), the Government points out that the person referred to by the complainants, Mrs. Fresia Mellado Opazo, had not been a trade union official at the time of the collective bargaining in the Lota undertaking, that is, in September 1985. Contrary to the complainants' claims, neither was she a member of the negotiating committee. The Government explains that she had had trade union responsibilities in 1984, but the workers themselves had demanded her resignation and she had not been re-elected. According to the Government, the reasons for her dismissal were therefore not related to the collective bargaining.

&htab;468.&htab;In the Lébu undertaking of the same enterprise, the leaders of Union No. 1 had called an illegal strike on 2 and 3 July 1986. The enterprise considered that this attitude infringed the provisions of Legislative Decree No. 2756 on trade union organisations of 1979 (section 7) which prohibits trade unions from carrying out acts aimed at endangering the rights laid down in the Constitution and laws, in particular freedom of the individual and the right to work. According to the Government, in the present case there was no problem linked to the economic situation of the workers in the enterprise, and the collective bargaining procedure was not under way. The enterprise requested the courts to dissolve the trade union, relying on section 52 of Legislative Decree No. 2756 of 1979, namely, serious non-observance of legal provisions or regulations. The judge rejected the request for dissolution and the trade union is therefore still functioning. In addition, relying on section 13 of Legislative Decree No. 2200 of 1978, ENACAR, in July 1986, terminated the contracts of ten workers of the Lébu undertaking for not having correctly and responsibly carried out their functions. The workers concerned signed receipts and received the legal compensation. None of them lodged an appeal with the labour inspectorate or the courts. According to the Government, it is not correct to state that these workers were dismissed for having participated in collective bargaining because the dismissals dated from July 1986, whereas bargaining commenced in November 1986.

&htab;469.&htab;Regarding the disqualification of the official of Union No. 1 of ENACAR (Lota), the Government explains that the enterprise had requested the courts to dismiss this person. While proceedings were under way an agreement had been reached between the enterprise and the person concerned, according to which he would resign from the enterprise in return for the payment of a voluntary indemnity without prejudice to the contractual and legal compensation provided for. On 28 October 1986, Mr. Salazar irrevocably renounced his responsibilities as a trade union leader as is shown from the letters he signed in front of a notary public and which he sent to the trade union's executive and to the labour inspectorate of Coronel.

&htab;470.&htab;As regards the arrest of workers at the Minero Cerro Negro undertaking, the Government indicates that, when the undertaking noticed that explosives were missing during an inventory, it filed a complaint with the courts. They ordered the arrest of three workers of the undertaking, who were released after an inquiry and against whom no charges were laid. The persons concerned are still working in the undertaking without any problem whatsoever.

&htab;471.&htab;As regards the reduction in salaries unilaterally decided by the Agustinas mining enterprise, the Government states that the Regional Labour Directorate of Atacama had dispatched a labour inspector, who had been able to note that 42 of the 48 workers had agreed to changes in their labour contracts. These changes involved an update of their functions and a change in the remuneration structure abolishing bonuses and increasing the basic wage. There was thus no loss in the monthly amount received. When questioned, the workers concerned stated that they had voluntarily signed the changes with a view to normalising the situation of their remuneration. The president of the trade union in the undertaking stated, for his part, that there were no problems pending because the collective agreement was faithfully applied.

&htab;472.&htab;According to the Government, the death of the teacher Gaston Vidaurrazaga Manriquez was investigated by the police; according to the police report this person was kidnapped on 8 September 1986 and his body found around three hours later showing traces of gunshots and injuries caused by blunt instruments. A magistrate has been appointed to investigate the matter and the inquiry is under way. As regards the death threats made against three teachers, the Government states that the persons concerned have lodged appeals for constitutional protection with the courts.

&htab;473.&htab;Mr. Guillermo Scherping Villegas, referred to in the WCOTP and FISE complaints, was arrested in application of the provisions of the state of emergency under Supreme Decree No. 32 of 8 September 1986. On 12 September he was placed at the disposal of the Third Police Prefecture at Santiago. On 14 November the Ministry of the Interior ordered his release. According to the Government, his arrest was in no way connected to his supposed trade union activities.

&htab;474.&htab;As regards the arrest of Mrs. Beatriz Brikmann Scheihing, the Government states that she was placed at the disposal of the military prosecutor. Proceedings against her are at the investigation stage. She is accused of having committed offences punishable under section 8 of Act No. 17798 on weapons control which concerns the creation or operations of private militias, combat groups or militarily organised parties. She is held at the Teja Island detention centre and has filed an appeal with the military courts, which is being heard. The Government states that meetings had been held in her home with a view to organising subversive actions.

&htab;475.&htab;According to the Government, the dismissal of Mr. Azula Ponce, a teacher and official of AGECH, followed his earlier dismissals in 1983 and 1984 from municipal and subsidised colleges for complete disrespect of the orders of his superiors. Despite that, the Ministry of Education had re-employed him in establishments coming within its competence. The authorities had periodically met with him and had even intervened to obtain his release when he had been arrested for anti-Government activities. During a trip to Spain, he had given an interview to a newspaper during which he had supplied incorrect figures and given opinions, inappropriate for a public servant, on the Chilean educational system and on the Government. The Minister of Education considered his behaviour disloyal and contrary to public service ethics. His dismissal was confirmed by the Supreme Court with whom he had lodged an appeal. According to the Government, is is therefore not true to state that his dismissal was linked to his position as an official in a teachers' association.

&htab;476.&htab;The Government refers to each of the alleged dismissals of other teachers, indicating that these measures were a result of errors of professional ethics (refusal to obey the orders of superiors), of the use of measures incompatible with the policy of participation in schools, insufficient qualifications and professional problems.

&htab;477.&htab;As regards the complaint concerning the situation of the Inter-Works Union of Workers of Textile Enterprises of Santiago Province, the Government recalls that the transfer of assets of the trade union organisations of the textile sector which had been declared illegal in 1978 had already been examined by the Committee at its meeting of November 1986. It observes that, contrary to the situation that existed at that time, Chilean legislation no longer permits dissolution of trade unions by administrative action since the adoption of Legislative Decree No. 2756, published in the Official Gazette of 3 July 1979. Under that Decree (section 53), where a trade union is dissolved, its assets are used for the purposes specified in the statutes. Where no purpose is expressly mentioned, the President of the Republic specifies the purpose to which they are to be applied, which shall be to the advantage of a non-profitmaking body corporate, an effort being made, where possible, to ensure that they are used for the benefit of the workers living in the locality, commune, province or region where the trade union had its office.

D. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;478.&htab;As regards the dismissal of six workers by the National Copper Corporation, the Committee notes that the courts ordered the reinstatement of one of those concerned, and that the others have withdrawn their appeals from the Court of Appeal after having arrived at an agreement with the undertaking.

&htab;479.&htab;With reference to the allegations regarding the right of replacement operators of the Telephone Company of Chile to collective bargaining, the Committee takes note of the Government's explanations to the effect that the individual employment contracts of these employees prohibited them from bargaining collectively and that the Directorate of Labour was not competent to annul clauses of the contracts. The Committee also notes that those concerned did not appeal the matter to the courts that could decide on the possible nullity of such clauses. It must, however, draw the Government's attention to the fact that the right to free collective bargaining for all employees other than those acting as agents of the public authority is a basic trade union right [see, for example, 236th Report, Case No. 1206 (Peru), para. 491] and that consequently all telecommunications workers should enjoy that right. In the present case the Committee therefore considers that individual employment contracts should not contain clauses denying their holders the right to collective bargaining.

&htab;480.&htab;As regards the police searches for trade union leaders of the building and metallurgy sectors, the Committee notes that, according to the Government, no such orders were given by the Ministry of the Interior, and that the persons concerned are free.

&htab;481.&htab;The Committee notes as regards the dismissal of three trade union leaders of the Viña dye works that the persons concerned appealed against the dismissals to the courts.

&htab;482.&htab;As regards the difficulties encountered by workers at the San Martino textiles undertaking in meeting to discuss a collective agreement, the Committee notes that the Government limits itself to stating that a collective agreement was concluded in the undertaking, without referring to the alleged violations of the right of assembly. The Committee must therefore recall that the right of trade unions to organise meetings freely constitutes a basic element of freedom of association, all the more so when collective bargaining is being prepared since that is a fundamental activity of trade union organisations.

&htab;483.&htab;The Committee notes that as regards the dismissals in the coalmining sector (ENACAR company), the Committee notes that the workers concerned received the legal compensation and did not lodge appeals with the courts. Nevertheless, it observes that these dismissals were carried out after a strike had taken place, which the Government describes as illegal. In this respect, the Committee must point out that the exercise of the right to strike should not be restricted solely to industrial disputes likely to be resolved by a particular collective agreement. Workers and their organisations should be allowed to express in a broader context, if they so wish, their dissatisfaction as concerns economic and social matters affecting the interests of their members [see, for example, 181st Report, Case No. 899 (Tunisia), para. 242]. The Committee is therefore of the opinion that the dismissals which took place following strikes of this kind are acts of anti-union discrimination contrary to the principle of freedom of association.

&htab;484.&htab;As regards the disqualification of Mr. Salazar, an official of Union No. 1 of ENACAR (Lota), the Committee notes that he arrived at an agreement with the enterprise and resigned from his trade union functions in a letter signed in front of a notary public. The Committee therefore considers that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.

&htab;485.&htab;The Comittee notes that the three workers at the Minero Cerro Negro undertaking were arrested in the context of an inquiry into the theft of explosives and that they were released without having been charged. Given that these questions do not come within the domain of freedom of association, the Committee considers that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.

&htab;486.&htab;As regards the allegations concerning the reduction of salaries in the Agustinas mining enterprise, the Committee observes that the changes came about after an agreement had been signed with the workers of the enterprise with a view to changing the remuneration structure without any financial loss, and that the enterprise's collective agreement is being fully applied. In these circumstances, the Committee considers that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.

&htab;487.&htab;The Committee notes that the death of the teacher Gaston Vidaurrazaga Manriquez, mentioned in the WCOTP complaint, is the subject of a judicial inquiry.

&htab;488.&htab;As regards the arrest of the AGECH trade unionists Guillermo Scherping Villegas and Beatriz Brikmann Scheihing, the Committee observes that the former was arrested under the state of emergency provisions, then released, and that the latter is detained for violation of the Act on weapons control. The Committee regrets that, in the case of Mr. Scherping, the Government did not supply details on the specific facts which gave rise to his arrest and that, in the case of Mrs. Brikmann, it limits itself to stating that she organised subversive meetings at her home. So as to be able to decide this latter question in full knowledge of the facts, the Committee should have at its disposal more detailed information on the nature and aims of these meetings.

&htab;489.&htab;As regards the dismissals of teachers, the Committee notes that in certain cases these were based on reasons unconnected with freedom of association (insufficient qualifications, lack of discipline, professional problems). On the other hand, in the case of Mr. Azula Ponce, a national official of AGECH, the Government itself states that he was dismissed for having made statements to the press concerning the Chilean educational system. Given that this subject is within the competence of teachers' trade union organisations, the Committee would recall the provisions of the Resolution concerning trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties adopted by the International Labour Conference at its 54th Session (1970). The International Labour Conference pointed out on that occasion that freedom of opinion and expression and, in particular, the right not to be prejudiced because of one's opinions and the right to seek, receive and disseminate freely information and ideas through any means of expression, constitute civil liberties which are essential for the normal exercise of trade union rights.

&htab;490.&htab;As to the situation of the Inter-Works Union of Workers of the Textile Enterprises of Santiago Province, the Committee observes that since 1979, Chilean legislation no longer provides for the dissolution of trade unions by administrative authority. On the question of the transfer of assets, the Committee notes that the provisions now in force leave the President of the Republic wide powers to decide what is to be done with a dissolved organisation's assets. The Committee must therefore emphasise, as it has already done in the present case when examining these allegations concerning dissolved organisations in the textile sector, that the assets of such organisations should ultimately be distributed among their members or handed over to their successor organisations, i.e. organisations which pursue the aims for which the dissolved trade unions were formed and which do so in the same spirit [see 246th Report, para. 307].

&htab;491.&htab;Finally, the Committee notes that the Government had not replied to certain allegations presented in the present case, namely: the search of the premises of the Confederation of Textile and Clothing Workers and of the homes of the president of the "El Roto Chileno" Peasants' Federation and of officials of the "El Surco" Peasants' Confederation and the Catering Confederation; as well as the allegations contained in the most recent communications from the WCOTP concerning alleged dismissals for trade union activities under Order No. 1766 on the reduction of teaching posts.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;492.&htab;In the light of its foregoing interim conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations: (a) The Committee expresses its concern over the large number of complaints presented in the present case which reflect the serious difficulties confronting the Chilean trade union movement and its leaders.

(b) As regards the denial of collective bargaining rights to replacement telephone operators of the Chile Telephone Company, the Committee considers that this category of workers should enjoy the right to collective bargaining, and requests the Government to take the necessary measures to annul clauses of individual employment contracts which deny employees that right.

(c) As regards the dismissal of three trade union leaders by the Viña dye works, the Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of the outcome of the judicial appeals lodged by those concerned.

(d) As regards the difficulties encountered by workers at the San Martino textiles undertaking, the Committee requests the Government to guarantee respect for the right of trade unions to meet freely, particularly in the context of preparations for collective bargaining.

(e) As regards the dismissals in the coalmining sector, the Committee emphasises that such measures should not be taken as a punishment for strike action.

(f) The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of the outcome of the investigation into the death of the teacher Gaston Vidaurrazaga Manriquez.

(g) The Committee requests the Government to supply more detailed information on the charges brought against Mrs. Beatriz Brikmann Scheihing.

(h) As regards the dismissal of Mr. Azula Ponce, an official of AGECH, the Committee requests the Government to guarantee respect for the freedom of expression of trade union leaders, in accordance with the Resolution on trade union rights and their relation to civil liberties adopted by the International Labour Conference, and to ensure that no trade union leader is punished for having exercised this freedom of speech.

(i) As regards the situation of the Inter-Works Union of Workers of Textile Enterprises of Santiago Province, the Committee notes that the legislation grants the President of the Republic wide powers to decide on the disposal of the assets of dissolved organisations, and requests the Government to amend the legislation so as to provide for distribution of the assets among the members or for their transfer to the organisations which succeed them. (j) The Committee requests the Government to supply its observations on the search of the premises of the Confederation of Textile and Clothing Workers and of the homes of several national trade union leaders, as well as on the dismissals allegedly carried out for trade union activities in the teaching sector.

Case No. 1343 COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA PRESENTED BY - THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS - THE TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION OF COLOMBIAN WORKERS

&htab;493.&htab;The Committee on Freedom of Association first examined this case at its meeting of February 1986 and presented an interim report to the Governing Body [see 243rd Report, paras. 570-587], which approved it at its 232nd Session (February-March 1986). Having received new allegations from the complainant as well as various observations by the Government, the Committee again examined the case at its May 1986 meeting and presented another interim report [see 244th Report, paras. 357-383] to the Governing Body, which approved it at its 233rd Session (May-June 1986). Lastly, the Committee examined the case at its November 1986 meeting [see 246th Report, paras. 381-408, approved by the Governing Body at its 243rd Session (November 1986)], in particular in the light of information obtained during the direct contacts mission carried out in Colombia in July 1986.

&htab;494.&htab;Subsequently, the Government transmitted additional observations in communications of 5 and 18 November, 11 December 1986, 27 January and 3 February 1987.

&htab;495.&htab;Colombia has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. Previous examination of the case

&htab;496.&htab;When the Committee examined the case at its November 1986 meeting, it reached the following conclusions and recommendations concerning the allegations then pending [see 246th Report, para. 408]:

(a) The Committee observes that in almost all the cases alleging the assassination, kidnapping or disappearance of trade union officials and trade unionists judicial inquiries have been opened in accordance with the recommendations of the Committee made at its meetings of February and May 1986. The Committee observes, however, that the Government points out that it needs further information from the complainant organisation concerning the alleged deaths of the agrarian trade unionists Leonor Marle, Omar Vergara, Solón López and Serafín Herrera and the physician and trade union leader Gabriel Anchique Gómez and concerning the disppearance of José Jairo López Cadena. The Committee requests the complainant organisations to provide any information available to them concerning these allegations to allow the Government to be able to reply exactly to these allegations. (b) The Committee observes that according to the information provided the deaths of some trade union officials and trade unionists were not related to their trade union status or activity and that the whereabouts of some persons whose disappearance had been alleged has now been established.

(c) With regard to the other allegations concerning the assassination or disappearance of trade union officials and trade unionists (see Annex 1), the Committee notes that judicial inquiries and trials are now under way. The Committee requests the Government to keep it informed of developments in the different trials and expresses the hope that the whereabouts of the persons who have disappeared will shortly be established. The Committee requests the Government to provide information on the recent allegations concerning death threats against various trade union leaders [the complainants had referred in particular to Jorge Carrillo (CUT), Abel Rodríguez (FECODE), and Miguel Angel Castro, Gustavo Osorio and Angelino Garzón (CSTC)], and on the allegation concerning the disappearance of 70 workers of the Malaria Eradication Service in April 1985.

(d) The Committee requests the Government to inform it of developments in the trials concerning the injuries suffered by the trade unionists Meyer Rivas and Heriberto Ramirez Rengifo.

(e) The Committee awaits the observations of the Government concerning the allegations of interference in trade union activities to which it has not replied [namely: the use of tear gas by the Bogotá police against a group of workers of the Croydon undertaking who were on strike; searching of the headquarters of the Federation of Petroleum Workers (FEDEPETROL); placing of explosives by para-military groups in the headquarters of the Federation of Workers of Valle del Cauca (FEDETAV); attacks against the premises of FEDETAV in Palmira and Cali and of the Cement Trade Union of Valle in Yumbo; and the attack against the headquarters of the Trade Union of Workers of Santander (USITRAS) in Bucaramanga]. (f) The Committee requests the Government to state whether the three workers of the Vianini Entrecanales undertaking mentioned by the complainant (Messrs. Rafael Mauriao Mendoza Aguilar, Pedro Antonio Rodriguez Rojas and Pablo Emilio Leal Cruz) were in fact dismissed and if so, the reasons for the dismissals and the results of any judicial action which they have been able to undertake with a view to their reinstatement.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;497.&htab;In its communications, the Government provides the following information:

- The case concerning the crimes of the kidnapping with extortion and subsequent killing of Mr. Pedro Contreras Salcedo was opened on 9 January 1986 and, for jurisdictional reasons, was assigned on 9 March of the same year to the Fifth Higher Court of Cúcuta (North Santander) for an investigation against persons unknown. The proceedings are at the inquiry stage and it has not been possible, in spite of the efforts made, to identify anyone as responsible. At present, the case has been entrusted for 30 days to an itinerant court of criminal investigation for the taking of new evidence that may lead to a clarification of the facts.

- With regard to the death of Mr. Jaime Berrío Cardona, a trade unionist, Ernesto Tabera Rodríguez, was captured at the time the event occurred and a revolver was taken from him, but he succeeded in escaping owing to the crowd of people who helped him to do so. Despite the efforts made, it has not been possible so far to determine the whereabout of the trade unionist involved in the crime, who, as stated, escaped.

- Dionisio Hernán Calderón: The Fourth Higher Court of Cali telegraphed that the investigation continues as described in official letter No. 593 of 9 July 1986 which was brought to the attention of the ILO at the time, i.e. the examination was ordered of Heberth Peñuela (the suspect) without success in securing his appearance and, further, the Court looked for Mrs. Dalia Cárdenas, wife of Calderón, to take her statement concerning the events, but it has not been possible to locate her because "according to statements by deponents, she is in the city of Bogotá under the protection of FENALTRASE". The Government reiterates that it is impossible for the judicial authorities to clarify the events in which a person lost his life and consequently to punish those responsible for the crime if there is no co-operation on the part of those who are in possession of some information, as seems to be the case of Mrs. Cárdenas, who has not put in an appearance in the Fourth Higher Court of Cali to report what she supposedly knows. - Hernando Yate Bonilla: The Second Higher Court of Villavicencio telegraphed that the investigation to determine those responsible has again been committed to the 17th Court of Criminal Investigation of Granada (Meta) for certain procedural purposes. The Ministry is contacting the judicial authority mentioned to obtain the information required.

- Rubén Darío Castaño Jurado: The First Higher Court of Manizales reported that proceedings are continuing at the investigation stage and that it has so far not been able to secure the examination of a suspect who has been duly identified and lawfully summoned and against whom a warrant for arrest has been issued, since he did not voluntarily appear at the offices of the court. It may be noted that some headway has been made in this investigation, since the presumed perpetrator of the crime has been identified and the police authorities are taking the necessary action to determine his whereabouts and detain him.

- Rogelio Sánchez: After numerous and difficult inquiries, the Sectional Director of Criminal Investigation of Antioquia telegraphed that the death of Mr. Sánchez took place in the township of Chigorodó, that the relevant investigation was initiated by the 12th Court of Criminal Investigation and that, for reasons of jurisdiction, the case is now in the hands of the Ninth Higher Court of Medellín. Upon learning which judicial authority is responsible for the proceedings, the Ministry is communicating with it for the purpose of obtaining the necessary information for transmittal to the ILO.

- Luis Jesús Leal Guerrero and Víctor Manuel Leal: The Commander of the Fifth Army Brigade reported that the 25th Military Court of Criminal Investigation carried out the investigation into the death of these men, which occurred on 30 June 1985 on Caño Solado lane, in Tibú township, Department of North Santander, and deemed it appropriate to bring charges against trade unionists Guillermo Vargas Sánchez, Luis Alfredo Mojica Gómez, Víctor Julio Rodríguez Leal, William Castro López, Oscar Antonio Cáceres Rodríguez, Carlos Arturo Limas Rojas, Samual García, Ramon David Guerrero Supúlveda and Leonardo Francisco Caicedo. The jury unanimously found the trade unionists not guilty, but on 9 September 1986, the President of the Summary Military Tribunal did not accept the verdict and the file was referred for review to the Higher Military Tribunal, which confirmed the evidence contrary to the verdict and ordered the holding of a new trial of the same trade unionists. The jury at this trial again produced a verdict of not guilty, which was accepted by the President of the Summary Military Tribunal, and the provisional release of the men tried was ordered until the Higher Military Tribunal decides on the review to which the file was subjected. It should be stressed that the death of Messrs. Luis Jesús and Víctor Manuel Leal Geurrero will not go unpunished; this is obvious from the zeal with which military justice has proceeded to hold two trials against the presumed perpetrators of the crime in which the non-guilty verdict was repeated. In any event, the Fifth Army Brigade will duly be asked for information on the decision that is adopted by the Tribunal in connection with the verdict handed down by the second Summary Military Tribunal, held with a jury composed of persons completely different from those of the first jury. - Death of José Bertulio Quino Ubaldo: First, it is necessary to note the inaccurate identification of the person concerned by the complainant organisation in the complaint presented to the ILO, since the dead man is not José Rutelio Quintero, but José Bertulio Quino Ubaldo. Despite that inaccuracy, which very considerably hampered the search for information by the authorities for proper transmittal to the Committee on Freedom of Association, the Commander of the Fourth Army Brigade, Brigadier General Augusto Rodríguez Arango, reported that the event in which Mr. Quino lost his life occurred in the township of Apartadó and not in Turbo. He further indicated that the investigation was initiated by the 21st Military Court of Criminal Investigation on 27 June 1985 and that after one year during which it had not proved possible to link anyone responsible, it became necessary to order the case provisionally closed, as required by law, without prejudice to a further intensive search for and identification of those responsible. It is considered necessary to explain that in the parts of the country in which public order is disturbed, military criminal justice supplements the ordinary courts in expediting some procedures and in the task of investigation, activities which are duly monitored by the Office of the Attorney-General and subject to all procedural guarantees. It should also be noted, as has been done on previous occasions, that the law orders the provisional dismissal of cases after a given lapse of time during which it has not been possible to establish even a superficial link to a perpetrator, but it must also be borne in mind that this closure of the case does not imply the cessation of investigations for that purpose; on the contrary, they must be continued until a link is established and the judicial proceedings are then re-opened. This constitutes an ample legal guarantee against the possibility of the offenders going unpunished.

- Death of Jaime Quintero Cruz: The Second Higher Court of Cali (Valle) reported with regard to the proceedings which its office was conducting in connection with the death of Jaime Quintero Cruz that in view of the time that has elapsed since they were intiated, the case has been ordered provisionally closed, in compliance with the terms of section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("If no-one is charged in the investigation, such further inquiries as may be necessary and for the length of time deemed appropriate may be ordered for the complete elucidation of the authors or participants, for which purpose the assistance of the Judicial Police shall be obtained. If, however, after one year from the date of initiation of a case no-one has been ordered questioned for lack of grounds therefor, in spite of the exploration of evidence conducive to completion of the investigation, the case shall be closed by a decision stating the reasons, without prejudice to continuation of the investigation if evidence subsequently emerges to link someone and hold him for trial, so long as criminal prosecution has not lapsed"). Although the case continues in the above-mentioned court, no decisions are taken on it, nor do the time limits apply, but it remains available, immediately the investigating authorities find someone who may be the guilty party, for the re-opening of the proceedings, which may culminate in a definitive decision. - Death of Javier Sanabria Murcia: The Third Court of Criminal Investigation of Florencia (Caquetá) reported that the proceedings are still in the investigation stage and that the Attorney-General of the Nation sent special agents to that city to help in the judicial investigation, but that it has not been possible to date to identify anyone as responsible.

- Deaths of Angel Amable Arroyave Restrepo and Juan Alberto Rodas Rua: The Third Higher Court of Medellín reported that, by a court order dated 16 October 1986, the case concerning the deaths of Messrs. Arroyave and Rodas was ordered provisionally closed, one year having elapsed since the date of initiation of the case without it being possible to link anyone to it, as required by the provisions of section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

- Alleged disappearance of Gustavo Alcalde Ospina: The prosecuting attorney assigned to the armed forces reported that, despite repeated efforts to locate Mr. Alcalde Ospina, it has not been possible to determine his whereabouts or whether he is staying in the region of Urabá or somewhere else. According to the statements of some witnesses obtained by the authorities, it is possible that this man - concerning whom the Government deems it necessary again to draw attention to the fact that he ceased being a trade unionist long before his supposed disappearance (he had given up his membership in the Trade Union of the Hydroelectric Station of Anchicayá) - joined the subversive groups operating in the region mentioned and does not wish to enter an appearance - which, obviously, makes it almost impossible to locate him. Nevertheless, the prosecutor assigned to the case stated that he will communicate whatever information he manages to obtain. The Government also transmits information received from the Second Prosecuting Attorney assigned to the Judicial Police describing the inquiries and other measures that have been carried out and indicating that all efforts are continuing to determine the whereabouts of this person.

- Disappearance of Miguel Angel Díaz Martinez and Faustino López Guerra: the Second Prosecuting Attorney assigned to the Judicial Police (Human Rights), the First Criminal Circuit Court of Tunja and the Director-General of the National Police reported that despite the issue of the relevant arrest warrant to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) and the Judicial Police against Jorge Luis Barrero, sentenced in court for the crime of kidnapping in the persons of Miguel Angel Díaz Martínez and Faustino López Guerra, it has not been possible to arrest him. Although it has also not been possible to determine the whereabouts of Messrs. Díaz and López, their possible deaths have not been confirmed and the National Civil Registry indicated that their names have not been stricken as deceased. - Alleged disappearance of 70 workers of the Malaria Eradication Service (SEM): The prosecutor assigned to the armed forces reported that none of the investigations carried out so far has demonstrated the truth of the allegation that 70 workers of the SEM disappeared. The Municipal Court of Mixed Jurisdiction of Yondó (Antioquia) is dealing with criminal case No. 342 concerning the alleged disappearance of Oliverio Hernández Leal, José A. Cardona and Ignacio Soto Bedoya, while the Second Circuit Court of Mixed Jurisdiction of Arauca (Arauca) is proceeding with criminal investigation No. 2218 on the alleged disappearance of Luis Aquiles Mesa (whose case was ordered provisionally closed under section 473 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), Juan José Buendía, Manuel Fonseca, Miguel Angel Mejía, Gregorio Ernesto González and Carlos Julio Medoza. Attention must be drawn to the exaggerated nature of the complaint, since 70 workers of the Malaria Eradication Service have not disappeared and, on the contrary, criminal proceedings are taking place in which only the nine persons indicated above belonging to the service are alleged to be involved in any case of disappearance. There is nothing to show that more workers disappeared.

- Injuries suffered by Heriberto Ramírez Rengifo: The Commander of the Valle Police Department reported that, despite the refusal of the person concerned to collaborate with the authorities, the investigation is being conducted by the First Higher Court of Cartago to which the Ministry is applying for information concerning the situation.

- Alleged threats against trade union leaders: The Commander of the Bogotá Police Department reported that Messrs. Abel Rodrígues, Gustavo Osorio, Angelino Garzón, Jorge Carrillo, Braulio Herrera (a false name or alias, because his real name is Cardona) and Miguel Angel Castro did not have recourse to the judicial units of the national police to lodge a complaint concerning acts endangering their personal safety. This confirms what was stated by the Government on an earlier occasion to the effect that trade union leaders who allegedly receive threats fail to lodge a complaint with the competent authorities and thereby, apart from preventing them from making the appropriate investigation, become liable if the threats are true, for concealment of illegal acts. The Commander also indicated that at the offices or homes of Messrs. "Braulio Herrera" and Gustavo Osorio are guarded by the national police. The Government emphasises once again the lack of veracity in this accusation, because it suggests that the State does not give trade unionists adequate protection whereas the authorities are always prepared to ensure this if they are duly informed of the events affecting the trade unionists or if they request it. - Alleged attacks against USITRAS in Bucaramanga, against FEDETAV in Cali and Palmira, and against the Cement Trade Union of Valle in Yumbo: The Director-General of the National Police reported that relevant searches in the intelligence card-files of his agency showed no record of terrorist attacks in April and May 1985 against the headquarters of USITRAS in Bucaramanga (Santander) or of such acts against FEDETAV in Cali on 25 February 1985 or against the premises of the above-mentioned Federation in Palmira, or against the Cement Trade Union of Valle in Yumbo. Consequently, it is strange that the complainants should present an accusation to the effect that there were attacks against those trade union premises, when there is no record of them in the archives of the National Police, in which the occurrence of every event prejudicial to public order is always registered.

&htab;498.&htab;The Government also states that information regarding the other persons and events constituting this case will be communicated to the ILO as soon as it is received from the various authorities from which it has been requested. The Government considers it necessary to point out that the complainant organisation, namely the Trade Union Confederation of Colombian Workers (CSTC), dissolved itself, i.e. ceased to exist, on 15 November 1986 and those who had been its members up to that date formed the Unitary Central Organisation of Workers (CUT), a new and distinct organisation, recognition of whose legal personality is under consideration. Consequently, it would seem logical that the CSTC cannot continue to present against the Colombian Government allegations, the overwhelming majority of which, have proved not to conform to the truth or which refer to circumstances that are being investigated by the competent authorities, because it no longer exists as a legal entity and therefore as an internationally recognised trade union organisation.

&htab;499.&htab;With reference to the Committee's general conclusions in its last report, the Government stresses that although the country is certainly faced with a very delicate situation caused by the illegal armed activities of subversive groups which continue to sow terror in various parts of the country, especially among defenceless peasants in rural areas, and by the equally illegal, armed and loathsome activities of drug-traffickers, who have murdered a minister, a high functionary and many judges and civil servants to try and frighten the authorities fighting them, the armed forces of Colombia cannot be accused of committing irrational and improper acts of violence against individuals, because the extremely rare isolated excesses that may have occurred have been very severely punished by the courts and tribunals, which deal very harshly with actions contrary to the military honour that characterises the armed forces of Colombia as a model in Latin America of civility, republicanism and respect for democracy. In Colombia, the ill-named "paramilitary groups" are not, as the term might imply, armed groups parallel to, or tolerated or supported by, the legally constituted military forces but common criminals paid mainly by drug-traffickers to settle scores. The violent acts committed by these criminals are not aimed exclusively at trade unionists of any particular tendency, because unfortunately the whole country is a victim of the senseless acts of these criminals, and of subversives and drug-traffickers, as is shown by the deaths of the prominent and outstanding personalities mentioned above as well as of other upright and exemplary persons such as the director of the newspaper "El Espectador". As it has always done, the Government is taking all necessary measures to guarantee the rights of all inhabitants, including of course trade unionists, but, while Colombia is not one of those nations convulsed by political and social disorder, it is passing through a complex period in which the armed forces are sparing no effort in combating the three sources of attacks on the country's peace: guerillas, drug-trafficking - with a terrible combination in the form of the drug guerillas operating in the south of the country - and common criminals.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;500.&htab;The Committee takes note of the information furnished by the Government concerning developments in the proceedings undertaken in connection with the deaths of 13 trade unionists, from which it emerges that in some cases it has been possible to identify those presumed responsible. The Committee also notes that, contrary to what was indicated by the complainants, in April 1985 only nine, and not 70 workers of the Malaria Eradication Service disappeared and that proceedings concerning those cases are being pursued. The Committee observes that the investigations undertaken with regard to the disappearance of the three trade unionists mentioned in the annex to the 246th Report have not made it possible in spite of the great efforts made, to determine their whereabouts. The Committee further notes the Government's information regarding the injuries suffered by trade unionist Heriberto Ramírez Rengifo. The Committee requests the Government to continue to keep it informed of developments in proceedings relating to the death, disappearance or injuring of the trade unionists mentioned in the annex, and expresses the hope that the investigations undertaken will make it possible to determine who is responsible, punish those who are guilty and establish the whereabouts of those who have disappeared.

&htab;501.&htab;As regards the death threats allegedly made against some trade union leaders, the Committee notes that according to the Government none of those concerned lodged a complaint with the authorities and that trade union leaders at the offices or homes of Braulio Herrera and Gustavo Osorio have a guard service by the national police.

&htab;502.&htab;Lastly, the Committee observes that the complainants have not sent the details requested by the Committee concerning the alleged deaths of the agrarian trade unionists Leonor Marle, Omar Vergara, Solón López and Serafín Herrera and of the physician and trade union leader Gabriel Anchique Gómez, and concerning the disappearance of José Jairo López Cadena. The Committee also observes that the Government denies some allegations of interference in trade union activities (attacks against the premises of FEDETAV in Palmira and Cali and of the Cement Trade Union of Valle in Yumbo; and the attack against the headquarters of the Trade Union of Workers of Santander (USITRAS) in Bucaramanga), but has not sent observations concerning other allegations of interference: use of tear gas by the Bogotá police against a group of workers of the Croydon undertaking who were on strike; search of the headquarters of the Federation of Petroleum Workers (FEDEPETROL); and placing of explosives by paramilitary groups in the headquarters of the Federation of Workers of Valle del Cauca (FEDETAV). The Committee again observes that the Government has still not sent the information it had been asked for with regard to the dismissal of three workers of the Vianini Entrecanales undertaking.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;503.&htab;In the light of its foregoing interim conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee is particularly attentive to and concerned with the grave problems that exist for the exercise of trade union rights in the general climate described by the Government. In this respect, it takes note of the Government's general statements concerning the very delicate situation facing the country and its desire to safeguard the rights of the whole population, including trade union rights.

(b) The Committee requests the Government to continue to keep it informed of developments relating to the death, disappearance or injury of the trade unionists mentioned in the annex, and expresses the hope that the investigations undertaken will make it possible to determine who was responsible, punish those who are guilty and establish the whereabouts of those who have disappeared.

(c) The Committee again requests the complainants to furnish whatever information may be available to them in connection with the alleged deaths of agrarian trade unionists Leonor Marle, Omar Vergara, Solón Lopez and Serafín Herrera and of the physician and trade union leader Gabriel Anchique Gómez, and concerning the disappearance of José Jairo López Cadena, so as to enable the Government to reply with exactitude to those allegations. The Committee also requests the Government to send its observations concerning the pending allegations of interference in trade union activities. (d) The Committee again asks the Government to indicate whether the three workers of the Vianini Entrecanales enterprise mentioned by the complainants (Messrs. Rafael Mauriao Mendoza Aguilar, Pedro Antonio Rodríguez Rojas and Pablo Emilio Leal Cruz) were in fact dismissed and, if so, the reasons therefor as well as the results of any judicial proceedings that may have been instituted with a view to their reinstatement.

ANNEX List of dead, disappeared or injured trade unionists concerning whom the Committee requests the Government to inform it of developments in the relevant proceedings

Dead trade unionists

&htab;Leonel Roldán &htab;Francisco Javier Correa Muño &htab;Dionisio Hernán Calderon &htab;José Luis Ortega &htab;Oscar Salazar &htab;Hernán Yate &htab;Jaime Quintero Cruz &htab;Javier Sanabria Murcia &htab;Rubén Castaño &htab;Carmelo Gelves Ortega &htab;Rogelio Sánchez &htab;Luis Jesús Leal Guerrero &htab;Víctor Manuel Leal &htab;Eder Lascarro &htab;Celso Rojas &htab;Jesús Flores &htab;Angel Amable Arroyabe &htab;Juan Alberto Rodas &htab;Pedro Contreras &htab;Faeriel Santana &htab;Jaime Bronstein &htab;José Diomedes Cedeño &htab;Héctor Perdomo Soto &htab;José Bertulio Quino Ubaldo &htab;Jaime Berrio

Disappeared trade unionists :

&htab;Miguel Angel Díaz &htab;Faustino López &htab;Gustavo Alcalde Ospina &htab;Oliverio Hernández Leal &htab;José A. Cardona &htab;Ignacio Soto Bedoya &htab;Luis Aguilés Mesa &htab;Juan José Buendía &htab;Manuel Fonseca &htab;Miguel Angel Mejía &htab;Gregorio Ernesto Conzález &htab;Carlos Julio Mendoza

Injured trade unionists :

&htab;Meyer Rivas &htab;Heriberto Ramírez Rengifo

Case No. 1376 COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA PRESENTED BY THE UNION OF WORKERS OF THE NATIONAL COFFEE-TRADE FEDERATION OF COLOMBIA (SINTRAFEC)

&htab;504.&htab;The complaint is contained in a communication of 17 July 1986 from the Union of Workers of the National Coffee-Trade Federation of Colombia (SINTRAFEC), which sent further information in a communication of 29 August 1986. The Government replied in communications of 20 August, 8 and 21 October, 5 and 26 November, and 16 December 1986.

&htab;505.&htab;Colombia has ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87) and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. The complainant's allegations

&htab;506.&htab;The Union of Workers of the National Coffee-Trade Federation of Colombia (SINTRAFEC) alleges the dismissal of trade unionists protected by trade union immunity, without prior certification by the labour court of the existence of just cause for dismissal as required by law (section 405 of the Labour Code). The complainant organisation refers in particular to Gerardo Guerrero (dismissed in September 1985), Héctor Efrén Ramírez (dismissed in December 1984), Luis Enrique Osorio (dismissed in November 1984), Rafael Augusto Acosta (dismissed in November 1985), Ramiro Pedroza (dismissed in September 1980), who applied to the courts for reinstatement, and Marino Leonardo Rivera (dismissed in June 1986) and María Victoria Castaño, recently reinstated by court order.

&htab;507.&htab;The complainant organisation also alleges that, in spite of recognition by the Ministry of Labour, its Fusagasugá regional committee has been flagrantly ignored by the undertaking (National Coffee Federation). SINTRAFEC adds that, contrary to what was agreed, the enterprises in which the union operates have not paid it the 0.5 per cent of the dues which should be contributed by non-unionised workers who benefit from the existing collective agreement; nor have they paid a special assessment for the year 1984, which was met by the unionised workers. The unpaid amount is equivalent to US$202,020.

&htab;508.&htab;Furthermore, SINTRAFEC continues, upon the expiry of the collective agreement on 31 March 1986, the undertakings in question gave the unorganised workers a wage increase of 19 per cent as from 1 January 1986, thus worsening the situation of the unionised workers. In addition, the enterprises never consider unionised personnel for promotion and, if they happen to do so, they make it a condition to resign from the Union.

&htab;509.&htab;The complainant organisation also alleges the murder by paramilitary groups of the trade unionist Carlos Betancourt Bedoya, whose body bore signs of torture, and the disappearance of Gildardo Ortíz Cardozo and Gentil Plaza, as well as threats to various trade unionists (Hernando Alzate Montoya, Helmo Quintero Perdomo, Juan Emilio Taborda and César Augusto Aristizábel Marín). The complainant annexes an anonymous document entitled "Activities of the Union of the Federation in recent years"; most of the accusations it contains are devoid of truth, in particular those concerning participation in guerrilla activities; what it seeks is the murder of union leaders and the destruction of the union.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;510.&htab;With reference to the allegations of anti-union dismissals, the Government states that section 405 of the Substantive Labour Code provides that a worker covered by trade union immunity cannot be dismissed, or penalised in his conditions of work, or transferred to other establishments of the same enterprise or to a different town, without just cause previously certified by a labour court. If the court official fails to establish the existence of just cause, he shall refuse the permission requested by the employer to dismiss, penalise or transfer the worker (section 408 of the Code). If the worker is dismissed without the authorisation of the labour court, he has the right to bring an action for reinstatement before the same jurisdiction, which shall order reinstatement and sentence the employer to pay him, by way of compensation, the wages he failed to receive by reason of the dismissal.

&htab;511.&htab;The Government adds that the complainant organisation reported that the union official María Victoria Castaño Agudelo, who had been dismissed, had been reinstated in her employment by court order. Her situation should therefore not be a matter for complaint, since her rights have been restored by order of the labour courts, the sole competent authority for such purposes. Similarly, the organisation reported that Messrs. Gerardo Guerrero Ibagué, Héctor Efrén Ramírez, Luis Enrique Osorio, Rafael Augusto Acosta Acuña and Ramiro Pedroza Morales had applied to various labour jurisdictions for reinstatement, to which they are entitled if they are workers covered by trade union immunity who had been dismissed without prior labour court authorisation. With respect to those workers, the grounds for the complaint against the Government do not seem very clear, inasmuch as the legislation (sections 405 et seq. of the Substantive Labour Code, and sections 113 et seq. of the Procedural Labour Code) and the factual situation as shown by the applications for reinstatement pending before labour courts (which were filed in exercise of the relevant procedures guaranteed to workers by law) are a clear and manifest demonstration of the effective protection of workers' rights.

&htab;512.&htab;More specifically, with reference to two of the dismissed workers, the Government indicates that, within the framework of the Ministry of Labour's responsibility to monitor compliance with labour standards, the head of the Labour Inspection Section of the Valle Departmental Division of Labour and Social Security fined the Valle del Cauca Departmental Coffee-Trade Committee 84,057 Colombian pesos (approximately US$400) on 14 November 1986 for the dismissal of worker Gerardo Guerrero Ibagué in violation of the rules of trade union immunity. It was not demonstrated by the investigation that Mr. Héctor Efrén Ramírez had left his job owing to a decision of the undertaking to dismiss him. Both workers have initiated the relevant claims for reinstatement in the regular labour courts.

&htab;513.&htab;As regards Mr. Marino Rivera, the Government points out that he was not dismissed, as the complainant asserts, but transferred - a fact which, while also involving a violation of trade union immunity if it occurs without the permission of the labour court, is something very different from dismissal since the latter entails the complete separation of the worker from the undertaking in which he works. In connection with the administrative investigation of that transfer, the Departmental Division of Labour and Social Security had succeeded, in agreement with the undertaking, in having Marino Rivera reassigned to his normal place of work. However, as he had filed an action for reinstatement with the labour court, that agreement could not be implemented because when a matter is sub judice , i.e. when it is awaiting a decision by the judiciary, other authorities cannot take any action on the matter being studied by the judges.

&htab;514.&htab;With regard to the death of the trade unionist Carlos Betancourt Bedoya, the Government states that the Commander of the Caldas Police Department reported that all necessary efforts were being made, jointly with the 13th Criminal Investigation Court of the town of Manzanares, to identify and locate the perpetrators of the crime. According to statements so far taken from some persons, Mr. Betancourt left the locality of Samaná at 5.15 p.m. on 17 May 1986 in the company of Mr. Alejandro Montoya García, who stopped at a property he owned, and the vehicle of the dead man was subsequently seen being driven by someone else. The Government points out that the State is engaged in a struggle with common criminals, who seek to disturb the tranquillity of citizens in various regions of the country and who, under cover of anonymity and using isolated places, commit deeds such as that of which Mr. Betancourt was a victim. Nevertheless, the competent judicial authorities and the police are pursuing the investigation, on which it will report later.

&htab;515.&htab;As to the disappearance of Messrs. Gildardo Ortíz Cardozo and Gentil Plazas, the Government indicates that the Commander of the Huila Police Department reported that Mrs. Nydia Sarza Plazas told the Command of the Third Police District, headquartered in the town of Garzón (Huila), that her brother, Gentil Plazas, a teacher, and Gildardo Ortíz Cardozo, an employee of the Coffee-Trade Committee of Garzón, left their homes in the town of Suaza at 7.30 p.m. on 9 January 1986. When it became known that the men had not returned, the Commander of the Suaza police station was immediately instructed to patrol the area but they could not be found. It must be noted that there was no co-operation on the part of family members and neighbours in the investigation concerning the whereabouts of Messrs. Plaza and Ortíz. The Government adds that, simultaneously with the investigations being carried out by the police, judicial proceedings for disappearance are continuing under the responsibility of the magistrate of the Neiva District Third Criminal Court who has been asked to supply detailed information. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there appears to be no proof in the investigations under way that the disappearance of Gentil Plazas and Gildardo Ortíz Cardozo is connected with the fact that the former is a teacher or the latter a member of the Garzón Coffee-Trade Committee.

&htab;516.&htab;With regard to the threats of which Messrs. Hernando Alzate Montoya, Helmo Quintero Perdomo, Juan Emilio Taborda and César Augusto Aristizábal Marín were victims, the Government states that the Commander of the Caldas Police Department reported that Messrs. Aristizábal, Taborda and Quintero were summoned to that Command and that they stated that "since the month of March 1985 they have received anonymous telephone calls in which they are accused of being enemies of private and state enterprise and of being sowers of subversion"; they also informed the police that they had not lodged a criminal complaint concerning the matter. They further indicated that death threats had been received again by telephone and anonymously - since the callers did not identify themselves - at the central offices of the Union in the locality of Chinchiná (Caldas) and at their homes. Those telephone calls too had not been the subject of a criminal complaint to the competent authorities.

&htab;517.&htab;In connection with Mr. Hernando Alzate Montoya, the Government continues, the Commander of the Chinchiná Police Department reported that, according to the secretariat of the Union, he too had received anonymous death threats by telephone but that he also had not lodged any criminal complaints. These circumstances clearly led to the conclusion that the fact that anonymous death threats were received does not mean and it cannot apparently be proved that the National Coffee-Trade Federation, the Government or any civil or military authority, subversive groups or common criminals were the authors. In view of that and of the fact that those concerned did not lodge any criminal complaints concerning those events, which constitute a crime under penal law, it is clearly impossible for the country's authorities to commence the relevant investigations and to accord the individuals adequate protection.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;518.&htab;As regards the dismissal of trade unionists covered by trade union immunity, the Committee observes that, according to the Government, of the seven persons mentioned by the complainant organisation, one was reinstated by the labour court, another was not dismissed but transferred, and the remaining five, like the person transferred, have instituted proceedings before the judicial authorities for their reinstatement in the jobs they had held. The Committee also observes that in one of the cases of dismissal, the administrative authority fined the undertaking.

&htab;519.&htab;The Committee notes that the Labour Code provides a series of guarantees against anti-union discrimination. In particular, it provides that trade union leaders may not be dismissed or transferred without prior certification of just cause by the labour court; it also provides for judicial reinstatement in case of dismissal without authorisation by the labour court. In the present case, the Committee regrets to find that the employer carried out the transfer and dismissals in disregard of the legal obligation to go through the judicial procedure laid down in the Labour Code. In these circumstances, the Committee expresses its concern over the dismissals or transfers which took place between September 1980 and June 1986. It expresses the hope that the courts will shortly pronounce judgement, and stresses the serious consequences which such illegal measures by certain employers have on trade union activities.

&htab;520.&htab;As regards the death of trade unionist Carlos Betancourt Bedoya and the disappearance of trade unionists Gildardo Ortíz Cardozo and Gentil Plazas, the Committee takes note of the Government's statements, in particular that the competent judicial and police authorities are pursuing the relevant investigations. The Committee deeply deplores the death of trade unionist Carlos Betancourt Bedoya and the disappearance of Gildardo Ortíz Cardozo and Gentil Plazas. It requests the Government to inform it of developments in the current judicial investigations and expresses the hope that they will make it possible to determine responsibilities and punish the guilty parties.

&htab;521.&htab;As to the allegations of death threats against various trade unionists, the Committee expresses its concern and observes that they affect four leaders in the coffee sector. The Committee takes note of the Government's statement that the persons concerned informed the police that the threats in question had been made in anonymous telephone calls, and that they had not lodged a criminal complaint concerning the threats. The Committee notes that the circumstances under which the threats were made considerably impede identification of those responsible. Nevertheless, given that in the present case there have also been allegations of the death and disappearance of trade unionists, the Committee wishes to refer to the general conclusions it had expressed concerning a recent case relating to Colombia [see 246th Report, Case No. 1343, para. 408] in which it stated that all appropriate measures should be taken to guarantee that ... trade union rights can be exercised in normal conditions, with respect for basic human rights and in a climate free of violence, pressure, fear and threats of any kind.

&htab;522.&htab;Lastly, the Committee notes that the Government has not replied to the allegations relating to the non-recognition of the Fusagasugá regional committee of the complainant organisation by the undertaking in spite of the fact that it is recognised by the Ministry of Labour; to the non-payment by coffee undertakings of contributions accruing to the union under collective bargaining; or to certain actions by coffee enterprises prejudicial to unionised workers, particularly as regards wage increases.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;523.&htab;In the light of its foregoing interim conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee urges the Government to ensure that the legal protection afforded by the Labour Code against acts of anti-union discrimination prejudicial to workers covered by trade union immunity is effectively put in practice.

(b) The Committee deeply deplores the death of trade unionist Carlos Betancourt Bedoya and the disappearance of two other trade unionists and requests the Government to inform it of developments in the investigations under way. (c) The Committee requests the Government to send its observations on the allegations to which it has not replied.

Geneva, 26 February 1987. Roberto Ago, &htab;&htab;&htab; Chairman.
249th REPORT INTRODUCTION

&htab;1.&htab;The Committee on Freedom of Association, set up by the Governing Body at its 117th Session (November 1951), met at the International Labour Office, Geneva, on 23, 24 and 26 February 1987 under the chairmanship of Mr. Roberto Ago, former Chairman of the Governing Body.

&htab;2.&htab;The Committee had before it various complaints of infringements of trade union rights in Turkey presented by a number of trade union organisations (Cases Nos. 997, 999 and 1029), as well as a representation concerning the non-observance by Turkey of the Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention, 1921 (No. 11), and the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), made by the General Confederation of Trade Unions of Norway under article 24 of the Constitution of the ILO.

&htab;3.&htab;At its 234th Session (November 1986) the Governing Body adopted the interim conclusions on Cases Nos. 997, 999 and 1029 submitted to it by the Committee in its 247th Report.

&htab;4.&htab;Since then, the Government sent its observations in a communication dated 4 February 1987.

Cases Nos. 997, 999 and 1029 COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY PRESENTED BY - THE WORLD CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR, - THE WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS, - THE INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS AND SEVERAL OTHER TRADE UNION ORGANISATIONS REPRESENTATION SUBMITTED BY THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF NORWEGIAN TRADE UNIONS UNDER ARTICLE 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION, CONCERNING NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION (AGRICULTURE) CONVENTION, 1921 (No. 11), AND THE RIGHT TO ORGANISE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING CONVENTION, 1949 (No. 98) BY TURKEY

&htab;5.&htab;The Committee has been examining these cases since 1981 and has submitted its interim reports to the Governing Body, the last one in November 1986 [see 247th Report of the Committee, approved by the Governing Body at its 234th Session, November 1986].

&htab;6.&htab;The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, in a communication dated 19 January 1987, transmitted additional information in connection with the complaints. The World Confederation of Labour in a communication dated 6 February, 1987, also transmitted further comments in connection with its complaint.

&htab;7.&htab;In a communication dated 4 February 1987, the Government supplied additional information in connection with these cases.

&htab;8.&htab;Turkey has not ratified the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); it has ratified the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98).

A. Previous examination of the cases

&htab;9.&htab;In the report which it submitted to the Governing Body in November 1986 the Committee made the following recommendations:

(a) The Committee reiterates the concern it has expressed in the past over the effects on the accused trade unionists and their families of the lengthy trial in which they have been involved, and must once again urge that the proceedings be brought to a speedy conclusion.

(b) The Committee also notes that no additional information has been provided concerning the continuing inquiries into conditions in civilian prisons and into allegations of torture and ill-treatment of these prisoners, and trusts that such information will be forthcoming.

(c) The Committee notes with interest the information concerning Mr. Mustafa Aktolgali and Mr. Ozcan Keskec, in particular that their release on parole after receiving sentences of eight years' imprisonment does not involve any conditions which restrict their freedom and considers that in these circumstances this aspect of the cases does not require further consideration.

(d) The Committee notes that appeals are under way concerning the trials involving Mr. Mustafa Karadayi, Mr. Kamil Deriner and Mr. Mustafa Orhan and requests the Government to keep it informed of developments concerning the decisions of the respective appeal courts in these matters.

(e) The Committee has taken note of the detailed information furnished by the Government concerning the assets of the DISK organisation and those of its affiliated trade unions, in particular of the disclosure therein of substantial increases in the total value of the liquid assets of all but one of these. It expresses the hope that these funds as well as the other assets of the organisations involved in the trials before the Military Tribunals will continue to be administered in the interests of trade unions concerned and of their membership. It requests the Government to continue to supply information on the situation of the assets and their administration. (f) With regard to the legislative aspects of the cases, the Committee recalls that the Government has expressed its willingness to engage in tripartite discussions on matters relating to changes in legislation concerning trade unions, collective bargaining and related matters (Acts Nos. 2821 and 2822). The Committee hopes that these tripartite discussions will result in the removal of all the restrictions on trade union rights that have been noted previously by the Committee. The Committee requests the Government to supply information on the results of such tripartite discussions.

(g) The Committee again requests the Government to take appropriate steps for the repeal of transitional section 5 of Act No. 2821 which effectively deprives trade union leaders against whom no conviction has been pronounced from participating in trade union activities.

(h) The Committee draws the attention of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations to aspects of the cases concerning the application of Convention No. 98, including any which may arise from the adoption of amendments to Act No. 2822 on collective bargaining, strikes and lock-outs in June 1986.

B. Additional information supplied by complainants

&htab;10.&htab;In its communication dated 19 January 1987, the ICFTU states that, on 23 December 1986, the Military Court of Istanbul convicted 264 of the accused DISK leaders and acquitted 1,169 accused. The chairman of DISK, Mr. Abdullah Bastürk and five executive members of DISK were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. In addition, continues the ICFTU, 30 executive members of DISK were sentenced to eight years, ten months and 20 days of imprisonment and a further 18 to five years, six months and 20 days of imprisonment. The ICFTU also provides details of the prison sentences passed on other members and leaders of the organisations affiliated to DISK. It adds that the Court ordered the dissolution of DISK and 28 of its affiliated organisations and that under the Trade Union Act (section 46), this entails forfeiture of trade union funds and assets to the State. Those convicted, states the ICFTU, lose their political and civil rights and it will be impossible for them to participate again in trade union activity. Two smaller DISK affiliates, Taper-Is and Devrinci-Yapi-Is, were not dissolved. The ICFTU adds that the convicted persons will have to spend one-third of their sentences under surveillance in a place of residence chosen by the Court. The ICFTU points out that, on 30 December 1986, the DISK lawyers lodged an appeal with the Supreme Military Court and that, pending the result of the appeal, the defendants will remain free and the assets of the organisations will not be confiscated.

&htab;11.&htab;In its communication dated 6 February 1987, the WCL, referring to the verdict pronounced and the appeal lodged, protests against the verdict which, in its view, runs counter to the basic principles of freedom of association that are generally recognised in the world.

C. Additional information transmitted by the Government

&htab;12.&htab;In a communication dated 4 February 1987 the Government expresses its appreciation for the interest with which the Committee has noted the Government's determination to maintain and promote freedom of association as well as the cooperation which it has constantly demonstrated. The Government repeats that it attaches particular importance to pursuing its collaboration through constructive dialogue with the International Labour Office.

&htab;13.&htab;In connection with the trial involving the DISK and its leaders the Government states that the trial, which also involved the organisations affiliated to DISK, was concluded on 23 December 1986. According to the verdict pronounced by the Military Court No. 2 of Istanbul before which the trial was heard, 1,209 out of the 1,473 accused were acquitted and 264 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Apart from one accused person, namely Mr. Cetin Uygur who was sentenced to a total of 15 years and eight months of imprisonment (a five-year prison sentence for membership of an illegal organisation, DEV-YOL, having been added to his sentence for participation in illegal activities within the trade unions), the prison sentences handed down were of a maximum of ten years and, in the majority of cases, for lesser periods. The Court also decided to dissolve DISK and the following 28 trade union organisations affiliated to it: Türkiye Maden-Is, Banksen, Tekstil, Basin-Is, Türkiye Gida-Is, Genel-Is, Lastik-Is, Sosyal-Is, Oleyis, Baysen, Nakliyat-Is, Dev. Maden-Is, Keramik-Is, Devrimci Saglik-Is, Hürcam-Is, Petkin-Is, Yeralti Maden-Is, Asis, T. Aster-Is, Tekges-Is, Türkiye Yeni Haber-Is, Likter-Is, Tis, Devrimci Topak-Is, Sine-Sen, Deri-Is, Tümka-Is, Findik-Is. In addition, the Court decided against the dissolution of Devrimci Yapi-Is and Taper-Is, also affiliates of DISK. The sentences pronounced by the Court relating to each of the accused and to the trade union organisations concerned are also transmitted by the Government.

&htab;14.&htab;The defence lawyers have lodged an appeal against the sentences handed down against the accused as well as against the decision to dissolve the trade union organisations in question. Accordingly, adds the Government, at this stage, none of the decisions of the Court of First Instances is final. These cases are sub judice and for the time being any forecast regarding the final outcome would be mere speculation. Since the matter is still before the courts, the Government states that it must, accordingly, abstain from any comment.

&htab;15.&htab;The Government points out that, as the Committee on Freedom of Association is already aware, all the accused involved in the trial of the leaders of the DISK and its affiliated organisations have been free since August 1984 and remain free. In rendering its verdict, the Court did not take any decision to detain them and all the accused remain at liberty. It should be noted, the Government points out, that the accused have been judged not for legitimate trade union activity but for activities which constitute crimes under the Turkish Penal Code such as the organisation of demonstrations resulting in the death of numerous persons, the destruction of factories, the encouragement and provocation of various acts of violence and armed assaults, the attempt to establish the domination of one social class over others and to overthrow the fundamental economic and social order established in the country.

&htab;16.&htab;The Government adds that, as regards the assets of the DISK and its affiliated organisations whose activities were suspended, the Committee on Freedom of Association is already aware that, in conformity with the law, these assets have been placed in the hands of trustees whose responsibility it is to maintain and protect them. Since the decision of the First Instance Court concerning DISK and its affiliated organisations is not definitive, the trustees will continue to maintain the assets in question until the Court of Appeal reaches a final decision in these cases. The Government states that it will not fail to transmit information on the developments in this matter.

&htab;17.&htab;The Government states that it already informed the Committee that the Criminal Court of Ankara had, on 26 May 1986, acquitted Mr. Mustafa Karadayi and Mr. Kamil Deriner who had been accused of smuggling but that, following an appeal, the case had been transmitted to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal has not yet completed its examination of this case.

&htab;18.&htab;In addition, as regards Mr. Mustafa Orhan who, having been tried for membership of the illegal organisation THKP-C/Kurtulus, had been sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for breach of article 168/1 of the Turkish Penal Code, the Committee had already been informed that the defence lawyers had lodged an appeal. In a decision rendered on 18 November 1986 the Appeals Court upheld the appeal on the grounds of insufficient evidence.

&htab;19.&htab;The Government states that it has stressed on a number of occasions the importance which it attaches to the promotion of harmonious industrial relations through tripartite co-operation. It adds that since it transmitted its previous observations to the Committee there has not yet been a further tripartite meeting to consider the amendment of Acts Nos. 2821 and 2822 relating to trade unions, and collective bargaining, strikes and lock-outs respectively. The Government adds, however, that contact has been made with the organisations of workers and employers with a view to continuing tripartite negotiations and communications have been sent to the respective organisations of workers and employers as well as to the universities to obtain their comments and views on the legislation in force.

&htab;20.&htab;The Government concludes by stating that within the context of this policy of co-operation with the ILO it will continue to transmit to the Committee on Freedom of Association all relevant information and observations.

D. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;21.&htab;The Committee has taken note of the most recent information supplied by one of the complainant organisations (the ICFTU) and of the latest report of the Government. Essentially, these latest communications relate to the sentences passed by the Istanbul Military Court of First Instance in the trial involving the DISK and its affiliated organisations, as well as some 1,473 leaders of these organistions. The Committee notes that prison sentences ranging from between five and ten years have been pronounced in respect of some 264 of these trade union leaders (ten years in respect of Mr. Abdullah Bastürk, president of DISK and five of his executive committee) and that some 1,209 trade unionists have been acquitted. In particular, the Committee notes that, in rendering its verdict, the Court decided not to detain any of the accused and that all, therefore, are at liberty.

&htab;22.&htab;The Committee is also informed that, in addion to the above prison sentences passed on the accused, the Court dissolved the DISK Confederation and 28 of its affiliated organisations.

&htab;23.&htab;According to the information supplied by the ICFTU, and confirmed by the Government, appeals have been lodged by those convicted against these decisions to the Supreme Military Appeals Court, and that, until such an appeal has been heard, the assets of these organisations will remain in the hands of the trustees who have been administering them since these organisations were suspended from activity in 1980.

&htab;24.&htab;The Committee notes that the sentences rendered against the individual leaders of the DISK and its affiliates, although having other prejudicial consequences, do not involve any new periods of imprisonment given the previous periods of detention that they served. The Committee must express its profound regret that the DISK Confederation and 28 affiliated organisations have been dissolved. The Committee feels obliged to point out that the dissolution of a major trade union confederation such as the DISK and the majority of its affiliates (which were reputed to represent up to 500,000 workers in Turkey) because of the conviction of a number of their leaders or members cannot be justified. The Committee has previously emphasised that the application of various sanctions involving the entire membership of a union, where that union has been held responsible for industrial strife and violence, is neither fair nor in the best interests of industrial peace [see 244th Report, Case No. 1345 (Australia/Victoria), paras. 186-188]. In the present case, the Committee considers that to deprive many thousands of workers of their trade union organisations because of a judgement that illegal activities have been carried out by some leaders or members constitutes a clear violation of the principles of freedom of association. Moreover, it is the Committee's view that the dissolution of trade unions for such reasons can only contribute to creating a climate of uncertainty, if not insecurity, for the trade union movement as a whole and impede the development of labour relations in a country.

&htab;25.&htab;The Committee also expresses its profound concern that most, if not all, of those trade unionists who have now been finally acquitted have already served prison terms and have had serious charges pending against them for more than six years.

&htab;26.&htab;The Committee observes that detailed information concerning the sentences pronounced against the accused has been made available. It finds unacceptable, however, and must deplore the manner in which these sentences were pronounced, without any grounds therefor being given. This procedure does not enable the Committee to be satisfied that due process has been fully respected and it could indeed cause serious prejudice to those convicted. The Committee trusts that the Military Court will render public the grounds for its decision at an early date and that this information will be communicated to the ILO.

&htab;27.&htab;The Committee recalls that, for several years now, it has closely followed developments in the trials involving DISK, its affiliated organisations and those representatives of these organisations who were accused of crimes under the Turkish Penal Code. As a result of the co-operation which the Government of Turkey has demonstrated through the transmission of detailed reports and the acceptance of direct contacts and technical advisory missions, the Committee has been kept fully informed of the situation and has periodically reached conclusions and made recommendations, the object of which has been at all times to assist the Government and the social partners in the process of restoring a situation in which trade union rights can be exercised freely and in full conformity with ILO principles on the subject. The verdicts that have now been pronounced by the Military Court - originally set up under martial law - can only be seen as a setback in the process of the restoration of genuine freedom of association in the country. The Committee would express the firm hope that the appeal lodged by those convicted, as well as the continuing efforts of the Government, will result in the full restoration to those involved and to their organisations of the right to pursue legitimate trade union activities.

&htab;28.&htab;Within the context of the legislation concerning trade union rights in the country, the Committee had made a number of comments on the non-conformity with international principles of several provisions of Acts Nos. 2821 and 2822 adopted in 1983. It recalled at its previous meeting that the Government had given an undertaking to engage in tripartite discussions on these laws and expressed the hope that such discussions would result in the removal of all the restrictions on trade union rights that had been previously noted by the Committee. The Committee, while regretting that tripartite discussions have not yet commenced, notes, however, that the Government has now taken steps to obtain the views of the social partners and the universities on the legislation. In this connection, the Committee would point out that the most representative trade union organisation in Turkey, TURK-IS, has already made detailed observations on the legislation in question and it is known that the employers' federation, TISK, is generally in favour of maintaining the legislation as it stands. The Committee would also recall that, in addition to its own comments on the trade union legislation, the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has, on previous occasions, pointed to the lack of conformity of Act No. 2822 (on collective bargaining, strikes and lock-out) with the provisions of Convention No. 98 which Turkey has ratified. The Committee considers that a return to free and democratic trade union rights can only be favoured through the removal of the restrictions imposed by Acts Nos. 2821 and 2822 and that the rapid examination, through tripartite discussions carried out in good faith, would demonstrate a real willingness to achieve conformity with ILO standards and principles in this area.

&htab;29.&htab;As regards the other aspects of the cases on which the Committee made recommendations, the Committee notes that the charges against Mr. Mustafa Orhan have been dismissed on appeal and concludes that this aspect of the case does not require further examination.

&htab;30.&htab;The Committee also notes that the cases of Mr. Mustafa Karadayi and Mr. Kamil Deriner, who had been acquitted by the Criminal Court of Ankara on charges of smuggling, have been referred to the Court of Appeal.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;31.&htab;In the light of its foregoing interim conclusions the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations: (a) Deploring the fact that the sentences against DISK and its leaders were pronounced without any reasons therefor being given, the Committee requests the Government to transmit, as early as possible, the grounds on which the verdicts were pronounced by the Military Court in the trial of the DISK, its leaders and its affiliated organisations.

(b) The Committee urges the Government to take all steps that may be necessary and appropriate to ensure the full restoration of trade union rights to the leaders of the DISK and to their organisations.

(c) Recalling the undertaking previously given by the Government, the Committee urges the Government to engage, as rapidly as possible, in tripartite negotiations with a view to the removal of the restrictions on trade union rights contained in Acts Nos. 2821 and 2822 and referred to in previous reports of the Committee and in comments made by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. The Committee requests the Government to inform it of any initiatives it might take to give effect to the recommendations previously made by the Committee in this regard.

(d) The Committee requests the Government to supply a detailed report on such tripartite discussions so as to enable it to review the situation at its next meeting.

(e) The Committee requests the Government to inform it of the result of the appeal concerning the cases involving Mr. Mustafa Karadayi and Mr. Kamil Deriner.

(f) The Committee requests the Government to continue to supply information on the situation of the assets of DISK and its affiliates and the administration of these assets by the trustees.

(g) The Committee draws the attention of the Committee of Experts once again to the aspects of these cases involving the application of Convention No. 98 ratified by Turkey.

Geneva, 26 February 1987.&htab; Roberto Ago, &htab;&htab;&htab;&htab; Chairman.
250th REPORT INTRODUCTION

&htab;1.&htab;The Committee on Freedom of Association, set up by the Governing Body at its 117th Session (November 1951), met at the International Labour Office, Geneva, on 23, 24 and 26 February 1987 under the chairmanship of Mr. Roberto Ago, former Chairman of the Governing Body.

&htab;2.&htab;The Committee had before it a complaint of infringements of trade union rights in France presented by the Trade Unions International of Textile, Clothing, Leather and Fur Workers (Case No. 1364), as well as a representation made by the General Federation of Labour under article 24 of the Constitution of the ILO, alleging the failure of the Government of France to implement the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98) and the Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 135).

&htab;3.&htab;The Government submitted its observations in communications dated 5 August 1986 and 16 January 1987.

Case No. 1364 REPRESENTATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION MADE BY THE GENERAL FEDERATION OF LABOUR COMPLAINT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE PRESENTED BY THE TRADE UNIONS INTERNATIONAL OF TEXTILE, CLOTHING, LEATHER AND FUR WORKERS

&htab;4.&htab;In a letter dated 18 February 1986 the General Confederation of Labour (CGT), acting in accordance with article 24 of the Constitution of the ILO, made a representation alleging the failure of the Government of France to implement the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), the Workers' Representatives Convention, 1971 (No. 135) and the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 (No. 151). In two communications dated 21 May and 16 September 1986 the CGT submitted further information in support of its representation. The Trade Unions International of Textile, Clothing, Leather and Fur Workers presented their own complaint in a communication dated 1 October 1986.

&htab;5.&htab;The Officers of the Governing Body, in a report to its March 1986 Session, observed that France has ratified the first four Conventions referred to but not Convention No. 151. They also noted that, whereas the representation indicates the points in respect of which the Government of France is alleged not to have implemented Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 135, it provides no such information in respect of Convention No. 111.

&htab;6.&htab;In these circumstances, the Governing Body decided, on the recommendation of its Officers:

(a) to declare the representation made against the Government of France irreceivable in regard to Conventions Nos. 111 and 151;

(b) to declare the representation made against the Government of France receivable in regard to Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 135;

(c) to refer the representation to the Committee on Freedom of Association for its consideration.

&htab;7.&htab;The Government submitted its observations in communications dated 5 August 1986 and 16 January 1987.

A. The complainants' allegations

&htab;8.&htab;In its representation the CGT states that anti-union repression in France since 1984 has taken on extremely serious proportions. The CGT bases its allegations with respect to Conventions Nos. 87, 98 and 135 on five points relating to international commitments entered into by France: attacks on trade union rights in the private and nationalised sectors, trade union premises and means of action of trade union organisations, the rights of workers' representatives in the private and nationalised sectors, the right to bargain collectively, and the exercise of the right to strike and freedom of association.

&htab;9.&htab;According to the CGT, the infringement of trade union rights in the private and nationalised sectors constitute a violation of Articles 3, 8 and 11 of Convention No. 87 and Article 1 of Convention No. 98.

&htab;10.&htab;The CGT explains that it was encouraged by the progress that was made in legislation relating to trade union rights in 1982 and 1983 (generalisation of trade union sections, representation of small enterprises, positive redefinition of the purpose of the trade union movement, wider freedom of movement and of contacts, etc.) but that, in its view, freedom of association is still founded on elected or appointed representatives and has not been extended, with more specific rights and guarantees, to wage earners or union members.

&htab;11.&htab;The CGT sees dismissal for economic reasons as an ideal means for employers to rid themselves first and foremost of unionised workers. There have been many instances of this discriminatory practice, and the CGT considers that, when it examines requests for authorisation to dismiss workers, the labour administration is not as vigilant and firm as its legal prerogatives entitle it to be.

&htab;12.&htab;The dismissal of strikers is a common practice among employers such as the Scapie company in Bordeaux and Bègles (Gironde), which refuse outright to recognise even the most elementary trade union rights. The workers go on strike in support of their demands, and the strikers are thereupon dismissed.

&htab;13.&htab;Some employers, such as S.G. Etanchéité in Paris (40 employees), Forclum (closure of its Paris branch, 150 employees), Coignet (1,500 employees, filed for bankruptcy, set up a new company excluding the branch in which the CGT held majority representation), EGPI, Batinger and Fijon, have had no compunction about liquidating their enterprise, dissolving it or filing for bankruptcy in order to rid themselves of the trade union section.

&htab;14.&htab;The CGT considers that the dismissal of Alain Clavaud by the management of Dunlop-Montluçon (SUMITOMO group) simply for expressing his views is a blatant illustration of certain employer practices. Alain Clavaud, who described his working conditions and life as a night shiftworker on an assembly line in a newspaper, l'Humanité , that published the diary he kept of his impressions at work, is accused of having failed to observe proper discretion, a trumped-up charge that neither his job nor what he has said about it can possibly justify.

&htab;15.&htab;As regards the trade union situation in small enterprises, the CGT recalls that the principal legislative provisions designed to promote trade union membership in such places of work were based on the institution of shop stewards, joint local committees, the protection of candidates for election as trade union delegates and the requirement that elections for staff delegates be held every year, together with the posting of labour inspectorate reports on shortcomings observed in the enterprise. The CGT claims that attempts to hold elections for shop stewards failed because of the Labour Administration's restrictive interpretation of the texts. A June 1985 report by Mme Frachon, a National Assembly deputy, and the Minister of Labour himself recognise that these provisions have completely failed to improve staff representation in small enterprises, mainly because of the labour administration's inertia and the labour courts' very restrictive interpretation of the "burden of proof" as regards candidatures for elections.

&htab;16.&htab;The CGT believes that, in certain groups of enterprises pursuing a drastic anti-union strategy such as S.A. Galeries du Papier Peint, Casino, RCS (lifts) and CGEE-Alsthom, any attempt to set up trade unions, designate trade union delegates and appoint staff delegates is systematically thwarted. Moreover, it also draws attention to the highly irregular situation as regards trade union freedoms and industrial relations at Citroën, Peugeot and Talbot, where the law of the land takes second place to the law of the employers and where unionised workers and CGT staff representatives suffer unrelenting repression.

&htab;17.&htab;On the subject of trade union premises the CGT alleges that Articles 1, 2 and 3 of Convention No. 87 have been violated and that, since 1983, the local CGT unions' job centres, community centres and headquarters in several major cities have come under severe attack from the municipal authorities and have suffered enormously. Some job centres have even been quite illegally closed down, despite the fact that they had legal personality and autonomous status. Job centres, community centres and local unions have been evicted from premises they have been using regularly and peacefully for years without being offered any decent alternative accommodation that could serve their purpose. Some municipalities, claiming the right to take over premises without offering any alternative accommodation and without negotiating arrangements, have been disorganising the everyday running of the union organisations concerned. In some cases, weeks of conflict have ended in trade union organisations being obliged to accept inadequate, unsuitable premises scattered about in different buildings (whereas before they were all in one place) a long way from the local economic and administrative centre, regardless of their real representativeness and activities. Very often the CGT has been discriminated against by the municipalities. The Government has done nothing to protect or restore the rights of the CGT job centres, community centres and local interoccupational and occupational unions to be housed in suitable peaceful and satisfactory conditions, without constantly being threatened by a change in the local political majority.

&htab;18.&htab;The CGT bases its allegations on specific cases where such operations are said to have taken place. In Levallois-Perret, the mayor and municipal council illegally shut down the job centre without offering any grounds related to the public interest. The local unions were removed from the centre by force and then had to be rehoused. Although the administrative courts have found against the Levallois municipality on several occasions, it is openly refusing to comply with the verdict and the job centre, for all its legal status as a public welfare establishment, has been unable to exercise its rights. In several towns CGT local union job centres that have existed for decades, if not since the beginning of the century, have come under attack from the new municipalities that were elected in 1983: Saint-Germain-en-Laye, Chelles, Nîmes, Arles, Fréjus, Noisy-le-Grand, Aulnay-sous-Bois, Franconville, Rosny-sous-Bois, Gagny, Montfermeil, Neuilly-Plaisance, Vaison-la-Romaine, Sète.

&htab;19.&htab;According to the CGT, this crack-down on the provision of union premises free of charge is accompanied by the cancelling or drastic reduction of municipal subsidies that have been allocated from the communal budget every year since the job centres and local unions were first set up. Some municipalities have also stopped making members of the commune's administrative staff available to the centres.

&htab;20.&htab;At the Paris job centre the local municipality has initiated proceedings against the CGT, which claims to be the most representative workers' organisation, in an attempt purely and simply to strip it of its right to be represented on the centre's administrative board and thus deny it a large part of the premises and financial advantages (subsidies, jobs) to which it is entitled by virtue of its representativeness. It is being discriminated against in two ways by the City of Paris which, on the one hand, has for years been housing trade union organisations belonging to other confederations in modern premises outside the job centre and, on the other, is now attempting to allocate the only CGT departmental union in Paris a tiny share of the centre's ancient premises and to cut off its source of finance. This situation has created major difficulties in the day-to-day running of numerous occupational and local trade unions affiliated to the CGT in Paris.

&htab;21.&htab;Regarding the infringement of the rights of workers' representatives in the private and nationalised sectors, which it claims are in violation of Articles 1 and 2 of Convention No. 135, the CGT explains that a special legal procedure is necessary for an employer to dismiss elected or appointed workers' representatives; whether the reasons given are personal or economic, no workers' representative may be dismissed without prior authorisation from the labour inspector. If the dismissal is authorised, an appeal may be lodged either through administrative channels (with the relevant minister) or through judicial channels (with an administrative court).

&htab;22.&htab;In the CGT's view, internal administrative procedures do not in point of fact really guarantee workers' representatives satisfactory protection against threats of dismissal for economic or disciplinary reasons. The Minister of Labour bears some of the responsibility in this respect, both because too few officials are designated to investigate such matters and because the Ministry underestimates the extent and gravity of the employers' attack on workers' representation, and specifically on members of the CGT, the full implications of administrative decisions and their direct consequences for trade union activities in the enterprises where dismissals have been authorised.

&htab;23.&htab;The Minister's responsibility is involved because the central administration, acting directly under his orders, is not as firm as it should be in ensuring that its various services are properly vigilant. The administration and the Minister, when considering an appeal lodged through administrative channels, do not use the real powers that the law grants them to consider the protection of trade union rights from the standpoint of the general interest, without thereby jeopardising the employers' interests unduly. Moreover, when an employer lodges an appeal through judicial channels with the administrative courts, the central labour administration's examination of the case and its decision are strictly formal. Just how serious the employers' attack on CGT representation in private and nationalised enterprises is can be shown from statistics and from specific instances. According to the CGT, the employers' attempt to remove trade union leaders from their enterprises is part of a deliberate strategy.

&htab;24.&htab;Between 1978 and 1982, 10,500 elected staff representatives and trade union delegates were dismissed for economic and non-economic reasons with the authorisation of the central administration. According to the CGT's records (although no official statistics were published between 1983 and 1985), more than 5,000 dismissals were authorised in 1983 and 1984 alone, and the complainant believes that the trend accelerated in 1985. At the end of 1984, over 1,000 appeals had been lodged with the Minister, a 40 per cent increase over 1983, and the volume was up by a further 30 per cent in the first quarter of 1985.

&htab;25.&htab;The CGT draws the following conclusions from these figures. Over a period of seven years, between 1978 and 1984, nearly 20,000 protected workers' delegates were dismissed; of these 12,000 were dismissed in the space of four years, i.e. one elected CGT representative out of ten, a quite considerable figure. Yet these statistics comprise only a fraction of the union activists and officials who were actually dismissed - that is to say, those benefiting from legal protection. They show that eight out of ten dismissals took place in the context of collective dismissals for economic reasons - in which, incidentally, a very large proportion (more than proportional to the Confederation's influence) of CGT activists, members and voters, all unprotected, were involved. The CGT says it is impossible to give the exact number of trade union sections, works' committees and staff delegations that have been eliminated or decimated in this way, often losing their most dynamic members. At the local level, such measures inevitably have a dissuasive psychological impact on union activities in other enterprises. Conversely, they are bound to encourage employers further. One out of every two requests for authorisation to dismiss a protected worker (for economic or other reasons) concerns the CGT, the remainder being shared among all four other confederations and non-unionised elected representatives. Considering its representativeness, the CGT is therefore obviously being singled out. Some 68 per cent of requests for authorisation to dismiss CGT militants for economic reasons are granted by the labour inspectors. Authorisations for disciplinary reasons (one request out of two) are granted in 40 per cent of cases and, of the 60 per cent that are turned down, 40 per cent are subsequently granted by the Minister on appeal by the employers. Dismissal for so-called disciplinary reasons is therefore a very common practice and is one of the major forms of repression exercised by the employers.

&htab;26.&htab;The CGT claims that, although dismissals for economic reasons and on account of bankruptcy and reorganisation do have a financial aspect, they also invariably have anti-union overtones which in some cases obviously predominate. A partial breakdown of dismissals shows that 1,854 out of 3,146 dismissed workers belonged to the CGT, clear proof of employer discrimination against the organisation. The dismantling of Creusot-Loire is a case in point. In one Chalon-sur-Saône establishment (192 dismissals), 80 per cent of the CGT members were dismissed (65 out of 80, the entire union secretariat and eight CGT elected representatives). At Le Creusot there has been obvious discrimination among elected representatives (five CGT, two CFDT, two FO, one CGC). At Nantes the main CGT officials, including Gaston Auffray, the Secretary-General, are among the dismissed workers. The dismissal of the three CGT members has been confirmed by the Minister of Labour whereas that of the three CFDT members has been rejected. At Châteauneuf (Loire) most of the 130 dismissed workers are CGT members or supporters, including the union's three principal officials. For good measure, the management has initiated dismissal proceedings against six CGT militants for gross misconduct, which was deliberately provoked.

&htab;27.&htab;Of 24 workers dismissed at AFO Saint-Nazaire, 16 are CGT members and three former CGT delegates. At AFO Brest, 50 per cent of the 170 workers dismissed (16 per cent of the staff) were CGT elected representatives, 11 were CGT delegates and 22 were former CGT delegates. At AFO Dunkirk the 117 cases of workers being placed on retraining leave were really just postponed dismissals and concerned 104 union members and known supporters, the trade union representative, a staff delegate, the secretary and a member of the CHSCT, a member of the industrial tribunal ( tribunal des prud'hommes ) and ten former elected representatives.

&htab;28.&htab;The CGT also cites what it sees as even more obvious cases where anti-union discrimination is in fact the main reason for dismissal and has developed into what can only be described as a plot. In 1984, ECVI Bordeaux-Maisons Mallardeau ordered 30 dismissals for economic reasons (involving two CGT delegates) that were confirmed by the Minister of Labour when the CGT appealed the decision. A few months later, some of those dismissed - but not the two CGT delegates - were taken on again on fixed-term contracts. At the EGNEC-Pessac company, a Force ouvrière (FO) trade union was set up following the establishment of a CGT union in the summer of 1984. In the elections that ensued, no FO member was elected. Two "separate" companies were then created and new elections were held in which, again, no FO member was elected. Subsequently, one of the companies, in which the secretary of the CGT union was employed, filed for bankruptcy, following which - once the union leader had been dismissed - the two companies were merged. In another case, as a result of action taken by the CGT, the Derruppe-Le Bouscat (métals) company resumed operations at the beginning of 1985. None of the ten CGT elected representatives and activists was taken on, however, and unofficial negotiations took place between the CFDT, the CGC, the new employer and the public authorities to ensure that the CFDT and CGC were the most representative organisations in the new enterprise, whereas previously the CGT had held a large majority. An action committee has been set up by all the workers who have not been reinstated.

&htab;29.&htab;The CGT says that it could cite many other instances of employers resorting to dismissal for economic reasons, filing for bankruptcy, reorganising their operations and resuming activities. It refers, for example, to a document emanating from the Loire departmental labour directorate concerning an employer's request for authorisation to dismiss for economic reasons a CGT activist who was the secretary-general of the trade union section of FOP (hand tools) in Saint-Etienne, an enterprise that went into liquidation in January 1985 before being bought up by UNICUM. After recognising that there was indeed a link with the activist's trade union activities, that his dismissal was liable to undermine the existence of the trade union in the enterprise and that the dismissal could not be justified on professional grounds, the labour directorate official added: " ... in view of the fact that the employer makes the dismissal of Mr. ... an absolute condition for reviving FOP and the 23 jobs involved, I hereby authorise his dismissal". In the Bata (Dordogne) affair, which is still going on, the Minister of Labour yielded to the Canadian corporation's blackmail: either the factory with its 812 employees is closed down, or else five of the 12 CGT union officials - those picked out by the management as union leaders - are dismissed. "Saving the enterprise" thus means eliminating the trade union leadership (five workers out of 812).

&htab;30.&htab;The CGT goes on to cite the case of the secretary-general of the miners' union in the Cévennes coalfield, F. Iffernet, and that of two union officials representing Ladrecht miners, P. Baducco and Saïd Smaïl, who were dismissed by the management of the coal mine with the agreement of the general manager of Charbonnages de France and the minister concerned, the Ministry for Industrial Redeployment and Foreign Trade. This is the first time since 1952 that such serious action has been taken against union leaders in the coalmining sector. For the CGT it constitutes a serious and blatant aggression against their fundamental rights and against the exercise of freedom of association and of the right to strike and has been timed to coincide with the miners' decision, in the economic and social interest of the country, to start agitating again to defend the future of the coalfield, their jobs and their whole region which is threatened by desertification and a slow death. The management is deliberately attempting to crush the CGT and the CGT-led miners' struggle by striking at the coalfield's principal trade union leaders. According to the CGT, it has also carefully cultivated a climate of hatred against the miners in its determination to crush the union. Several court cases have been brought against the leaders of the miners in an attempt to discredit them and break their resistance. As part of the same anti-union repression, another CGT miners' delegate, A. Tassera, has also just been punished.

&htab;31.&htab;The CGT observes that there has been an unprecedented increase in disciplinary measures since 1985: a pay freeze for union activists through the introduction of individualised wage policies; a freeze on promotions; non-payment of time spent by union delegates on their trade union activities; refusal to authorise access to "defence" areas in certain enterprises (Thomson, Matra, Dassault-Aérospatiale); unjustified extension of these areas to the point of denying workers their trade union rights; isolation of activists and refusal to give them work, as in the case of M.A. Mattighello, a member of the CEF at the Selnor-Lesquire company. Thousands of CGT activists and members and workers are in fact being harassed and deprived of their rights and freedoms.

&htab;32.&htab;With respect to collective bargaining and the alleged infringements of Article 4 of Convention No. 98, the CGT, a strong supporter of collective bargaining, considers that the laws and regulations made under the Act of 13 November 1982 are discriminatory and contrary to the most elementary rules of democracy which accord the majority the right to govern and to lay down rules and regulations and that, consequently, the right of workers to bargain collectively is not respected. If, as the Declaration of Philadelphia indicates, collective bargaining is a fundamental right of the workers, then in the last and decisive phase of negotiations, namely the signing and ratifying of collective agreements, the laws and regulations in force in France completely disregard this right, the most elementary principles of democracy and the principle of non-discrimination.

&htab;33.&htab;The CGT points out in this respect that, on the workers' side, only trade union organisations recognised as representative can validly be invited to negotiate. This is in keeping both with the fact that the workers (normally represented by trade union organisations at such negotiations) are entitled to demand certain guarantees and with the principle of non-discrimination that prevails in France's pluralistic trade union system. A collective agreement applies to all workers employed in the signatory enterprises, either directly or by virtue of the employers' organisation to which the enterprises are affiliated; i.e. all workers, irrespective of the trade union organisation to which they belong and even if they are not members of any trade union. This, too, is quite in keeping with the principle of non-discrimination. However, between the bargaining stage, which must by law comply with the principles, Conventions and Recommendations of the ILO, and the implementation stage, which must likewise meet the same criteria, the agreement has to be signed for it to be valid and duly applicable; and it is here that the legal system as it operates in France disregards the workers' rights, ignores democratic process and introduces the worst possible form of discrimination by favouring the minority and according it the exorbitant right of imposing its will on the majority. The letter, the spirit and the absolutely rigid enforcement of existing rules and regulations mean that, even if a collective agreement is signed by what is considered an organisation with only extreme minority representation, it is legally binding on all workers employed in enterprises whose employers are signatories. Worse still, in so far as the substance of an industry-wide or inter-occupational agreement does not infringe existing laws and regulations, there is nothing the workers can do to prevent its being extended to non-signatory enterprises. This was confirmed by the Minister of Labour himself during a National Assembly debate when he said: "The Minister of Labour decides whether or not to extend the scope of an agreement after having analysed the legality of the text and its economic and social implications within the industry. He cannot refuse to extend the scope of an agreement on the grounds that the signatory or signatories are in a minority position, and I therefore confirm what I have just said. Any other way of proceeding would not only be illegal but would be a regression from a situation that has existed since 1982 in so far as it would call directly into question the concept of the representativeness of trade union organisations." This rule permits and perpetuates a practice that is socially unhealthy and anti-democratic. Moreover, it discriminates in this respect between the rights of workers' organisations and of employers' organisations, where an agreement that is signed by a minority employers' organisation against the will of the majority organisations is not extended but is applied (to all the workers) only in enterprises whose employers are affiliated to the minority organisation.

&htab;34.&htab;The CGT does however add that, from the formal standpoint, the French system's failure to conform to ILO principles is tempered by two provisions, though these have no practical relevance. One concerns agreements at the industry level and the other agreements at the level of the enterprise. In both cases, the provisions relate only to agreements that operate to the disadvantage of the workers and depart from the laws and regulations in force (prior authorisation having been granted for such a departure from the norm). Industry-level agreements that come under this heading are applicable only after having been extended (and there is nothing to prevent minority agreements being extended in this way), and the CGT cites a particularly characteristic example of a national chemical industry agreement on hours of work which it says was concluded in irregular circumstances and signed by only one representative organisation) that was extended against the opposition of the four other majority organisations. As to agreements at the level of the enterprises that depart from the laws and regulations in force - and in this case alone - these may be contested only within eight days of their signature and provided a written and substantiated objection is lodged by one or more organisations that together have polled over half the ballots of the registered voters in trade union elections (given the statistical ratio of voters to duly registered electors, this means in practice more than 70 per cent of those voting).

&htab;35.&htab;Concerning the right to strike, the CGT claims that this is being undermined by employers in both the private and the nationalised or public sector. In order to prevent, neutralise or shorten strikes or to limit their scope, employers are preventing workers from exercising their trade union rights and directly attacking union representatives and organisations. Their aim is to intimidate the workers, expose the strikers to public scorn and condemnation and to isolate, discredit and repress union leaders and elected staff representatives. They also directly attack the resources of trade union organisations, for example by fining them and depriving them of their means of action. To do this the employers take advantage of their economic strength, the institutional machinery and the whole battery of existing legal procedures and the mass media. In the face of this unprecedented offensive, the Government is not in the CGT's view taking the necessary steps to defend trade union freedom and the exercise of the right to strike and is not using the extensive means available to it, such as intervention by the labour administration, the definition of a judicial policy, the issuing of directives to the magistrates of the public prosecutor's office, etc. It did not, for example, respond favourably to the CGT's request that it introduce a Bill repealing the 120 year-old section 414 of the Penal Code that has been revived to justify on legal grounds the action taken by non-strikers against strikers and union delegates. In fact, employers are using non-strikers more and more often to spearhead their offensive and to initiate legal proceedings against union officials and strikers.

&htab;36.&htab;The CGT refers specifically to the use of the mass media during nation-wide or region-wide strikes to condition public opinion against the strikers, against the strike itself and, by extension, against the trade union organisation that called the strike or supports it. These campaigns are intended to distort or distract attention from the real reasons for the strike (e.g. the strike of SNCF and RATP drivers), to exercise what is nothing less than blackmail by making out that the strike is jeopardising the whole situation and future of the enterprise or of the national economy, to present the dispute as pursuing anti-national, harmful or at best selfish and baseless objectives and to present the strike systematically as illegal, to frighten public opinion or to encourage racists reactions (e.g. the Citroën dispute).

&htab;37.&htab;The CGT claims that ideological campaigns and legal battles are constantly being fought around the following themes: first, that the welfare of the enterprise must be the first consideration in any attempt to tackle the economic crisis and international competition, which means that the "freedom of the enterprise" must take precedence over the exercise of trade union freedoms and the right to strike (which is therefore assumed to be unjustified and harmful to the general interest as symbolised by the enterprise) and that the right to property must take precedence over the right to strike; second, that a strike is an illegal act or wrongful form of action that entails reprehensible behaviour - a view which is increasingly being supported by case law; third, that trade union activities must be assimilated to delinquent or violent action and that therefore, as most case law argues, the occupation of work premises is illegal and a form of delinquency. For the employers, any freedom of trade union expression that gives rise to controversy is tantamount to slander and therefore punishable by law.

&htab;38.&htab;The CGT further alleges that in a number of industries employers are introducing a "disputes management" policy with the support of a large number of specialists backed by general directives and advice tailored to each situation who, in liaison with the departmental and federal labour directorates, are implementing a veritable "plan of campaign" against strikers, union officials and staff representatives whenever a dispute arises. They are also pursuing a preventive policy known as "labour relations management".

&htab;39.&htab;The CGT claims that the employers have adopted a strategy, directed and co-ordinated by their organisations, whereby disputes are systematically taken to court. In the past, depending on the period, between 1 and 3 per cent of strikes reached the courts. Case law on strikes amounts to that which denies or prevents them. For some years now the situation has been completely reversed and strikes quite often spark off a series of lawsuits brought by the employer or even by non-strikers against the union leaders, the works union or an outside union (local union, departmental union, industrial federation) and against the strikers. Thus, throughout the dispute the employers bring preventive lawsuits to intimidate the workers, have certified reports drawn up by bailiffs so as to collect evidence for subsequent penal or civil liability suits and resort systematically to emergency procedures to obtain court orders to expel workers from premises. This is a diversionary tactic of intimidation or repression that is designed to force the trade union organisation to defend itself in lawsuits that are inevitably complex and expensive. By transferring the dispute to another level than that of the enterprises, where a solution should normally be sought through direct negotiation, it also provides the employer with a legal excuse not to negotiate.

&htab;40.&htab;For their lawsuits the employers employ the very costly services of bailiffs, who remain day and night in the enterprise during the dispute keeping a close watch on the union officials and strikers and recording their every movement so as to be able to draw up a completely one-sided report for use as evidence in subsequent lawsuits. Above all, employers have privileged access to the courts because of their technical and juridical expertise, the availability of highly operational disputes machinery, their access to computerised juridical data banks, their access to numerous specialised lawyers' offices, the possibility of writing off their legal costs as overheads, and so on. The inequality of means is considerble at every level; the costs involved alone are prohibitive for the workers and unions, whose financial resources are very limited and which are therefore often unable to bring lawsuits of their own or to engage the services of a lawyer to defend themselves.

&htab;41.&htab;The CGT points out moreover that, when labour disputes occur, associations of non-strikers are set up under the auspices of the employer that are equipped with extensive resources for propagating pro-employer views, for taking action "in defence of the enterprise" and of "the freedom to work", for presenting themselves as victims of the strikers and for taking legal action against the strikers and against the trade union delegates. They also engage in acts of provocation and organise anti-striker commandos. Whether or not these associations have any legal status, their members benefit from the employers' help, support and, in any case, understanding in the lawsuits brought by them or on behalf of their members against the trade union representatives and strikers. Although they sometimes demand the expulsion of the strikers from the work premises, their aim is more often to have the trade union representatives and strikers convicted of violating "the freedom to work" and fined accordingly.

&htab;42.&htab;The repressive measures that employers take against union leaders, elected staff representatives and strikers take two forms, according to the CGT: dismissal for disciplinary or economic reasons, whenever circumstances permit, in which case they face a long period of unemployment; or a war of attrition within the enterprise, involving harassment, lay-offs, repeated disciplinary penalties, deliberate humiliation, isolation, transfers, freezing of careers and pay, all kinds of obstacles to the exercise of their functions, and so on. In addition, countless penal and civil lawsuits are brought against them systematically in order to substantiate the idea that, if the elected representatives are being brought before courts, it is because they have committed reprehensible acts and in order to have them sentenced to fines, imprisonment, court supervision, deprivation of civil rights and the payment of substantial damages, financial penalties and legal costs. The employers invariably initiate legal proceedings against union delegates as such or as individuals and against carefully picked strikers, making sure that they pay the fines to which they have been sentenced in provisional or final court decisions and thereby placing the workers and their families in dire moral and material straits.

&htab;43.&htab;Numerous civil liability lawsuits are brought by employers and non-strikers against works unions or trade union institutions outside the enterprise (branch unions, local or departmental unions, federations, confederations). Their strategy is one of open war and is a deliberate attempt to undermine the trade union movement that has developed since the the handing down of certain decisions by the Constitutional Council and the final Court of Appeal. These have often been based on alleged damages caused by strikes, but they also extend to normal, traditional forms of trade union action that are alleged to have caused an enterprise moral or material prejudice (slander, speech-making, visits to the union or works committee premises, etc). The offensive is led by powerful national enterprises (Renault, Air France, nationalised banks) and by large private groups (Trailor, RTC, GPP, etc), as well as by a large number of small and medium-sized enterpises benefiting from the logistic support of their employers' federation.

&htab;44.&htab;The CGT further alleges that employers have enlisted the support of armed commando groups, guards with police dogs, the enterprise's middle-management staff, private militia organised along quasi-military lines and commercial security-guard companies in order to expel striking workers by the use of force and violence, without any legal authority, in the course of brutal private police operations mounted in defiance of the law. Operations such as these have taken place in the presence of the police massed around the enterprise, who have refused to intervene to stop the violence on the grounds that they have received no orders from their superior officers or have been ordered to stay out of the fray (SEV-Marchal, Ducellier, etc). In some disputes the riot police has even been brought in to create a climate of tension, to impress public opinion or to mount particulary brutal operations to expel strikers (SKF, Ducellier, Plastiques de Gien, Cacharel in Nîmes, Renault-Le Mans, etc). Finally, the CGT states that enterprises frequently resorted to outside replacement labour during disputes; it points out that the legislation that prohibits employers from replacing strikers does not apply to every possible case (subcontracting, contracts for an unspecified period, temporary work contracts that started before the dispute occurred) and that such methods are thus encouraged.

&htab;45.&htab;In conclusion, the CGT states that the steady increase in the number of violations of the most elementary rights of workers is clear proof that a veritable offensive has been launched against trade union, collective and individual rights. These are no isolated and unconnected incidents; on the contrary, there is a close link between this deliberate strategy of private and public employers and a number of government practices.

&htab;46.&htab;In a communication dated 21 May 1986, the CGT encloses a file on the dismissal of Alain Clavaud in which it points out that the trade unionist had been asked by his CGT union at Dunlop-Montluçon to answer questions put by a journalist in an interview for l'Humanité that was part of a newspaper survey of the working conditions of shiftworkers.

&htab;47.&htab;In its communication dated 16 September 1986, the CGT refers to other incidents that it considers to be in violation of trade union rights.

&htab;48.&htab;It cites the dissolution of the Lorient fire brigade decreed by the Minister of the Interior following a demonstration organised by the local CGT union on 8 October 1985 in support of a series of grievances, the most important of which concerned pay and pensions. The CGT points out that professional firemen are officially allowed to strike and to exercise their trade union rights but that they do so only with strict regard to their obligation to ensure the safety of the population. According to the CGT all eye-witness accounts and documentary evidence on film show that the police attacked the demonstrators and that the firemen, like others, were obliged to defend themselves against unjustified brutality; yet the Government denied the evidence, and claimed that it was the police that had been attacked. The firemen were also reproached for demonstrating in uniform, though no ban on doing so had ever been issued. The Government argued further that the firemen had refused to give courses in firstaid or to sit on first-aid examining boards - though this was voluntary and unpaid - and that they had refused to accept fire duty for certain theatre shows - though notice had been given well in advance so that the municipal authorities could take appropriate action. Following the order to dissolve the fire brigade, the mayor reduced the number of firemen from 92 to 76; the 16 firemen who were suspended were all members of the CGT and included all the officials of the trade union section. Only six of these (including just one official) were later taken on again, and the CGT claims that it is impossible in these circumstances to exercise the right of defence or the right to trade union representation. The officials who were suspended were found other work with the Lorient Municipality but lost a large part of their income.

&htab;49.&htab;The CGT also cites the case of the RTC enterprise of Dreux (Philips Group) where non-strikers were incited by the management and supervisors to claim damages for loss of wages from the trade union officials in the enterprise for instigating a protest strike against collective dismissals. The elected officials were accordingly ordered by the industrial tribunal of Dreux to pay jointly 400,000 francs to 350 non-strikers; as a result, mandatory deductions ranging from 600 to 2,500 francs were being made from their wages. An appeal has been lodged against this judgement but no ruling on the matter can be expected for several years.

&htab;50.&htab;The CGT refers further to the dismissal of a trade union delegate and official of the National Federation of Construction Workers employed by the Colas road building company of Caen who, as a result of an ill-chosen remark to one of his colleagues, was dismissed for gross misconduct, even though the labour inspectorate and the Ministry of Labour initially refused to authorise his dismissal.

&htab;51.&htab;At the ready-to-wear clothes company Goutille in Roanne, which at the time was in compulsory liquidation, the staff decided to recover the stock of clothing material and to place it under their own protection in order to prevent its being sold off cheaply and to get the company operating again, which they succeeded in doing. In spite of this, the Criminal Court of Rouen 28 months later condemned five workers to a suspended sentence of six months' prison and to a fine of 2,000 francs each and ordered them to reimburse the company receiver 964,975 francs. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of Lyon condemned four of the five workers to five years deprivation of their civic rights, fined one of them 2,000 francs and ordered all five workers jointly to pay 500,000 francs to the receiver.

&htab;52.&htab;Finally, like the Trade Unions International of Textile, Clothing, Leather and Fur Workers, the CGT referred in its complaint to the case of the Bata multinational enterprise's Marbot factory. In June 1985 Bata announced that it was reorganising its operations, as a result of which 150 workers, including two CGT delegates, were dismissed; authorisation to dismiss them, however, was refused by the labour inspectorate. When the Marbot factory subsequently went into liquidation, Bata had it taken over by one of its textile subsidiaries, the Compagnie Française de Textile, which then dismissed a further 300 workers, including 21 trade union delegates. Because no authorisation had been requested for their dismissal, the delegates refused to leave the factory, whereupon the company resorted to electricity cuts and lock-outs in order to set the other workers against the union delegates. Moreover, the women concerned were particularly brutally attacked by a gang, as a result of which one had to be hospitalised and was off work for several weeks. Finally, the company requested authorisation to dismiss the workers but at the same time threatened to close down the factory if authorisation was denied. The labour inspector authorised only eight of the 21 requests for dismissal, yet the 13 remaining union delegates were prevented from returning to the factory. Moreover, following an appeal by the company, the Minister of Labour authorised the dismissal of the five principal CGT officials. The remaining union delegates are still being victimised by the management: four of them have been totally isolated and the remainder ordered not to leave their place of work. In addition, the other workers have been threatened with disciplinary action if they so much as speak to them.

B. The Government's reply

&htab;53.&htab;In its reply dated 5 August 1986 the Government comments first of all on the highly polemical and general nature of the representation to the effect that anti-union repression in France since 1984 has taken on extremely serious proportions and that the attacks are directed first and foremost against the CGT, its organisations, its leaders and the workers in their struggle to defend their legitimate economic, social and occupational rights.

&htab;54.&htab;Regarding the alleged infringement of trade union rights in the private and nationalised sector, the Government observes that the CGT begins by referring to specific Articles of Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 ratified by France and then goes on to cite "the progress made in legislation relating to trade union rights in 1982-83", though regretting that "freedom of association is still founded on elected or appointed representatives and has not been extended, with more specific rights and guarantees, to wage earners or union members". According to the Government, the purpose of sections L. 122-45 and L.412-2 of the Labour Code is to protect unionised workers in regard both to their recruitment and to compliance with and the breaking of their contract of employment. Taken together these two sections render any employer who takes account of a worker's trade union membership in reaching his decision, specifically with respect to dismissal, liable to penal and civil damages. This protection has recently been broadened by the publication in 1985 of two new Acts, one of which adds "the normal exercise of the right to strike" to the provisions of sections L.122-45 (Act No. 85-772 of 25 July 1985) and the other of which declares null and void disciplinary measures that are contrary to the provisions of the said article (Act No. 85-10 of 3 January 1985). The Government considers it inaccurate to claim that only elected or delegated workers' representatives are protected and that the workers' right to join trade unions is not based on specific rights and guarantees.

&htab;55.&htab;Regarding the dismissal of strikers, the winding up of certain enterprises as a form of penalty against union sections that the employer wishes eliminate and the freedom for unionised workers to express their union and political views, the Government states that for the most part the information provided is inadequate and therefore difficult to verify. However, some of the cases cited have been checked by the central labour administration and in the Government's view are very revealing. Concerning the filing for bankruptcy of the Coignet company and the setting-up of a new company excluding the union branch in which the CGT held majority representation, for example, it is true that in the course of the liquidation of Coignet and its takeover by a new Coignet company the Paris establishment was in fact closed down. The decision, however, was a management decision that no administrative authority has the power to contest. Moreover, there is no evidence of any link between the closing down of the establishment and the existence of a majority of CGT staff representatives; on the contrary, the overall situation of the enterprise suggests that the decision was for economic reasons and non-discriminatory. The Minister of Labour, with whom an appeal was lodged against the decisions taken by the competent labour inspectors with respect to the dismissal of the staff representatives, was at pains to maintain staff representation in the company's various establishments in the Ile-de-France and refused authorisation to dismiss six delegates, three of whom were employed at the Paris branch. The enterprise was accordingly obliged to find these three workers alternative employment within the company, which shows that the labour administration's fight against discrimination has been particularly effective.

&htab;56.&htab;As to the freedom of employees to express political and trade union views, the Government asserts that the Clavaud affair is an excellent example of the biased nature of the CGT's representation. The complainant refers to the dismissal of Alain Clavaud by the management of Dunlop-Montluçon (SUMITOMO) Group following the publication in the newspaper l'Humanité of the diary kept of his impressions at work, in which he described his life as a night shiftworker on an assembly line and argued that the proper discretion that he is accused of having "failed to observe" is a trumped-up charge that neither his job nor what he has said about it can possibly justify. In fact, according to the Government, this allegation is particularly ill-timed since the case is currently before the courts and, moreover, the public prosecutor's office has meanwhile ordered that Alain Clavaud be reinstated at Dunlop pending a court decision. The Minister of Labour had in fact previously called upon the management of Dunlop to reverse its decision and, following its refusal to do so, had made it quite clear that the decision would therefore rest with the industrial tribunal ( tribunal des prud'hommes ). As stated in the injunction cited in the file supplied by the CGT in support of its representation, Alain Clavaud applied to the industrial tribunal of Montluçon on 4 February 1986 for an emergency interim ruling ( demande en référé ) that he be reinstated in his job as quickly as possible. The industrial tribunal, at a hearing on 20 February, considered that, in order to assess and establish the manifestly illegal nature of the penalty imposed on the employee, it was essential to examine the reasons given for his dismissal and to determine whether real and serious cause did not exist that rendered an interim ruling inappropriate. The industrial tribunal consequently declared itself unqualified to issue an interim ruling and ordered the parties, should they so wish, to bring the case before the tribunal for a ruling on its merits. The Court of Appeal subsequently confirmed this decision and only then did Alain Clavaud apply to the industrial tribunal of Montluçon for a ruling in accordance with the normal procedure. The tribunal met on Monday 23 June and, an attempt at conciliation having failed, heard the parties to the dispute. Alain Clavaud applied for the annulment of the decision to dismiss him, his reinstatement in his job and the reimbursement of the wages corresponding to the period during which he had been prevented from working. After deliberation, the tribunal postponed its decision until 29 September 1986.

&htab;57.&htab;The Government considers that it has done all in its power to obtain Alain Clavaud's reinstatement while respecting the principle of the independence of the court. It states that it is now for the competent authority to rule on the matter and that the CGT's complaint is premature.

&htab;58.&htab;In its communication dated 16 January 1987 the Government notes a number of new developments. The industrial tribunal on 24 November 1986 declared Alain Clavaud's dismissal null and void and ordered his employer to reinstate him or to pay him 500 francs a day from that date. Although the firm's lawyer stated that he would appeal against the judgement, the industrial tribunal has ordered its immediate enforcement and Alain Clavaud's reinstatement is therefore mandatory. Dunlop Sumitomo has also been ordered to pay Alain Clavaud compensation amounting to the wages not paid since 24 January, a symbolic franc in damages and 3,000 francs in legal costs.

&htab;59.&htab;Regarding the trade union situation in small enterprises, the Government notes the CGT's regrets that the attempts to hold elections for shop stewards should have failed "because of the labour administration's restrictive interpretation of the texts". For the Government this complaint quite obviously cannot be based on non-compliance with the international Conventions ratified by France as they contain no specific provision on the subject. It explains that French legislation provides only (section L.421-1 of the Labour Code) for the possibility of holding such elections, that hindrance of the law is a punishable offence in France (section L.481-2) and that it is for the trade unions to bring the matter to the attention of the labour inspectorate if they consider that a problem has arisen in an enterprise, whether it be large or small. Under sections L.481-2, L.482-1 and L.483-1, impeding the designation of trade union delegates, the election of staff delegates, the constitution of works committees and the regular exercise of the functions of these representative bodies is punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine.

&htab;60.&htab;Regarding the right to organise and constitute trade union sections and to set up representative institutions, the Government observes that any disputes can be settled simply by bringing the matter to the attention of the labour inspectorate. In the case of CGEE-ALSTHOM cited by the CGT, following the action taken by the CGT National Union of Trade Unions on 12 December 1984 an extensive investigation was conducted by the labour inspection services in the various CGEE-ALSTHOM establishments where infringements of freedom of association were alleged to have occurred. The investigation brought to light the existence of genuine difficulties encountered by trade union sections and representative staff institutions in the establishments at Levallois, Nanterre, Bègles and Carpiquet inter alia. The competent labour inspectors accordingly drew up a report on the various instances where the constitution or regular functioning of these bodies had been impeded. In their capacity as mediators, the labour inspectors were able to resolve a certain number of disputes, specifically in the establishment at Ivry. Moreoever, the labour inspectorate and the Minister, when requested to authorise the dismissal of staff representatives, exercised strict control over any discrimination. In 1985, the dismissal of three trade union delegates from the establishments of Carpiquet, Nanterre and Belfort was accordingly refused on appeal.

&htab;61.&htab;As to the "highly irregular situation as regards trade union freedoms and industrial relations at Citroën, Peugeot and Talbot" denounced by the CGT, the Government feels that due account must be taken of the way the labour situation and industrial relations within the PSA group have evolved since 1982. Although the labour dispute at Citroën had at the time reached a point where a mediator and court representative had had to be appointed to organise the election of staff delegates, the industrial relations situation has since returned to normal. Elections of workers' representatives, which prior to 1982 had given rise to extensive controversy, now take place without any major problem having been brought to the attention of the labour inspection services. The same applies to Talbot where, after the labour situation had gone through a difficult period in the 1960s, there is no longer any impediment to the constitution and regular functioning of representative staff institutions. In the case of Peugeot, the Government is not aware of any matter having been brought to the attention of the labour inspection services by the CGT, although a complaint by another trade union organisation in 1985 regarding the establishment at Mulhouse did lead to the Minister of Labour requesting its external services to conduct an inquiry. After establishing that the right of freedom of association was indeed being infringed, the labour inspectorate drew up an initial report against the manager of the establishment. According to the Government, although the staff representatives in certain establishments do indeed encounter problems from time to time (which are in any case investigated by the labour inspection services whenever they are drawn to their attention), there is at present no major obstacle to the functioning of representative staff institutions in any of the three enterprises. With regard to disciplinary action and, specifically, the dismissal of union members, apart from possible appeals to the labour court judge no dispute has been brought to the attention of the labour inspection services. As to the dismissal of staff representatives, on the other hand, the Minister of Labour has been called upon to rule on requests for authorisation to dismiss delegates at Citroën for economic reasons. Following an appeal concerning exclusively CGT and CFDT delegates, the Minister refused on grounds of non-discrimination to grant the request. The Government concludes by stating that the administrative authority has invariably enforced the laws and regulations respecting the constitution and regular functioning of representative staff institutions within the PSA group and that the latter has not disregarded its rights and duties with respect to dismissals.

&htab;62.&htab;On the subject of trade union premises and the means of action of trade union organisations, the Government notes that the CGT's representation refers explicitly to Articles 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Convention No. 87 and asserts that, in so far as freedom of association presupposes the existence of adequate means of action, it is being hindered. It points out that, although the said Articles provide for the right for workers and employers to establish organisations of their own choosing, to elect their representatives in full freedom and to organise their administration and activities without being "liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority", they nowhere suggest that the State or local communities should actually provide them with special facilities. The Government does, however, recognise that municipalities have traditionally offered trade union organisations certain advantages and have willingly made premises and facilities available to them free of charge and it can appreciate that the organisations should have come to take them for granted.

&htab;63.&htab;The Government is of the view that, where a change of majority in a municipality provokes a dispute, the administrative tribunal must distinguish between voie de droit (the normal legal procedure) and voie de fait (entailing a procedure designed to correct certain particularly flagrant administrative irregularities) and asserts that it has in fact done so, as can be seen from the Levallois-Perret job centre incident of which the CGT offers only an incomplete account. According to the Government, the Mayor of Levallois-Perret informed the secretary of the administrative body of the job centre, in a letter dated 22 July 1983 and by decision of the municipal council of 28 September 1983 modifying the allocation of communal assets, of the transfer of the general directorate of the municipalities's technical services to the existing premises of the job centre, without proposing any other accommodation. In the opinion of the trade unions concerned (CGT, CFDT, CGC, FO, SNI), this decision entailed purely and simply abolishing the Levallois-Perret job centre which had been created by municipal decision on 9 February 1966. Considering that there were no legal grounds for implementing the 28 September l983 decision by force, the CGT appealed to the administrative tribunal of Paris to have it revoked. In a ruling issued on 7 November 1984, the administrative tribunal ruled in the CGT's favour on the grounds that the decision to reallocate premises implied a decision to abolish the job centre, whereas no such decision had been taken by the council. Consequently, by decision of 28 March 1985 the municipal council of Levallois-Perret revoked the earlier (6 March 1966) decision to create the job centre and thus abolish the centre as such. The municipality meanwhile offered the various trade union organisations two premises in Levallois, one of which is occupied by the CGT local union of Levallois and by CFDT activists. The CGT local union has expressed its dissatisfaction with the situation, mainly because of the small size of the premises and the lack of any meeting room. The Government states, however, that since its decision of 28 March l985 the legal position of the municipal council is much better than before and that the present situation is liable to persist despite the lodging of a further appeal with the Council of State. The Government appreciates that the situation does not meet with the CGT's satisfaction but feels that, in so far as the juridical irregularity denounced by the administrative tribunal of Paris has been corrected by a new decision of the municipal council pursuant to the tribunal's ruling, it is hard to see how the present situation can be reversed other than by appeal once again to the administrative tribunal. The fact is that the CGT local union has been rehoused by the municipality and that is what counts.

&htab;64.&htab;Regarding the Paris job centre, the Government notes the CGT's allegation that the municipality has initiated proceedings "in an attempt to strip it purely and simply of its right to be represented on the centre's administrative board". While recognising that a recent order issued by the Mayor of Paris has modified the distribution of seats on the administrative board in the light of the results of the 1983 trade union election to the local family allowance board and that, as a result, the CGT has lost its traditional majority, the Government states that the decision, a prerogative of the Mayor of Paris recognised by a Decree of 3 April 1970 amended in 1978, cannot be modified by any administrative authority and that only the administrative judge is empowered to rule on the legality of the decision. No appeal has been lodged, however.

&htab;65.&htab;The Government notes that the CGT offers no evidence that other job centres have suffered unduly from the attitude or intervention of municipalities elected in 1983 and that no complaint to such effect has been brought to the notice of the labour inspectorate.

&htab;66.&htab;As to the infringement of the rights of workers' representatives in private and nationalised sectors, the Government declares that Convention No. 135 to which the CGT refers provides that "workers' representatives in the undertakings shall enjoy effective protection against any act prejudicial to them, including dismissal, based on their status or activities as a workers' representative or on union membership or participation in union activities". It explains that in practice no workers' representative can officially be dismissed, whether for personal or for economic reasons, without prior authorisation of the labour inspector. An appeal may in turn be lodged against this administrative authorisation either through administrative channels (with the relevant minister) and through judicial channels (with an administrative court). The CGT, notes the Government, claims that these internal administrative procedures "do not in point of fact really guarantee workers' representatives satisfactory protection against threats of dismissal for economic or disciplinary reasons" and argue that the Ministry of Labour bears some of the responsibility in this respect, "both because too few officials are designated to investigate such matters and because the Ministry underestimates the extent and gravity of the employers' attack on workers representation, and specifically on members of the CGT, the full implications of administrative decisions and their direct consequences for trade union activities in the enterprises where dismissals have been authorised", adding that the central administration, acting directly under the Minister's orders, "is not as firm as it should be in ensuring that its various services are properly vigilant".

&htab;67.&htab;According to the Government, this shows how in its representation the CGT is constantly switching from one line of argument to another, treating incidents that should be judged in the light of the economic or disciplinary situation of each individual worker as part and parcel of a trade union political struggle. French labour legislation contains specific provisions protecting staff representatives, whether they be staff delegates (section L.425-1), members of works committees (section L.436-1), members of safety and health committees and committees on working conditions (section L.236-11) or even candidates for election to these posts, workers who have requested the holding of elections on former members of such committees (for six months following expiry of their term of office). Trade union representatives appointed in accordance with legal provisions benefit from very similar protection (sections L.12-18 and L.437-1), as do representatives who have been elected or appointed in accordance with the provisions of an agreement. The Government goes on to explain that the fact that administrative authorisation has to be obtained to dismiss any protected person does not, however, mean that they cannot be punished or dismissed for grave misconduct or for general economic reasons. The necessary involvement of the labour inspectorate and the possibility of appealing against the decision of the labour inspector through administrative channels or through judicial channels (to the administrative authority) makes it more difficult to dismiss such people but is in no way intended to make it impossible. According to the Government, the CGT's reference to the increasing number of appeals has no great significance as an argument since the situation is probably a reflection of the growing economic crisis and of its repercussions on employment. It is only on the merits of each case that certain decisions and certain judgements can be contested - and this, according to the Government, the CGT does at considerable length - but it is not possible to accept the Confederation's overall statistical assessment. Once all the forms of appeal provided for by the law have been exhausted, one has to abide by the final judgement, unless of course some new facts justifying a review of the case should come to light. The Government explains that the administrative judge nowadays does not merely try to establish whether the accusations brought against a worker are based on fact, and whether there has been an abuse of administrative authority, an error of law or a manifest error of appreciation but also himself assesses the seriousness of the accusations brought against the worker and decides whether or not they are of sufficient gravity to justify his dismissal. If the proposed dismissal is on economic grounds, the administrative judge likewise verifies the relevance of the economic reason given. The Government concludes with the observation that 105,129 regular members of work committees were elected in 1982-83 (with roughly the same number of deputy members), that there were 44,140 trade union delegates in 1981, that a September 1985 survey showed that 308,000 workers were staff delegates and that the total number of dismissals for economic reasons was 366,173 in 1983 and 429,386 in 1984. Given these figures, the Government considers that the CGT's calculation that 10,500 elected workers' representatives and union delegates were dismissed between 1978 and 1982 (with administrative authorisation) for economic and non-economic reasons does not seem abnormally high.

&htab;68.&htab;As to the Creusot-Loire incidents cited by the CGT, the Government states that the labour inspectorate and the Minister of Labour, to whom requests were addressed for authorisation to dismiss the staff representatives of various establishments for economic reasons have examined, case by case, the exact circumstances in which each job was suppressed, the possibility of finding the worker alternative employment and the possible existence of anti-trade union discrimination. As a result of this strict control, the dismissal of some CGT delegates (at Châteauneuf, for example) has been refused. As to the decisions to authorise dismissal that have been taken after careful examination, the workers affected have exercised their rights by lodging an appeal with the administrative judge.

&htab;69.&htab;The AFO company (Saint-Nazaire, Brest, Dunkirk) has had to cut back its staff considerably during the past two years because of serious economic difficulties. For the most part, the staff representatives affected by these dismissals volunteered to leave the enterprise, either to take advantage of retraining leave or because they were offered employment elsewhere. In any case, the labour inspectors who were called upon to rule on the dismissals were not informed by the delegates of any discriminatory action that may have been taken against them.

&htab;70.&htab;At ECVI (Bordeaux), the administrative appeal that was lodged against the decision to authorise the dismissal of two staff representatives among 30 dismissed workers challenged only the genuineness of the economic reasons invoked by the company and made no reference whatsoever to any discrimination.

&htab;71.&htab;At Egnec-Pessac, following a dispute that arose after one of the two companies created in 1984 filed for bankruptcy, part of the dismissed staff was re-employed following the subsequent merger. Since the CGT union did not lodge an appeal with the public authorities in this connection, it cannot blame them for not having taken action.

&htab;72.&htab;At Derruppe Le Bouscat, the enterprise shut down operations and dismissed the entire staff after filing for bankruptcy and the administrative authority was therefore not called upon to rule on the dismissal of the staff representatives. The departmental director of labour and employment concerned is currently attempting to persuade the company that has taken over Derruppe to fulfil its commitment to take on 80 of the former employees.

&htab;73.&htab;In the case of FOP, the labour inspector, following an appeal against an initial decision not to authorise the dismissal of the CGT activist, subsequently authorised the measure in the light of the pressure brought to bear by the enterprise that was considering taking the company over. The Government recognises that this "decision of convenience" was of questionable legal validity and was duly annulled by the administrative judge (the matter was never brought before the Minister himself).

&htab;74.&htab;The Bata-Marbot Company with over 1,000 employees went into liquidation in November 1985 after the collective dismissal of an initial 110 workers, including six staff representatives, had proved insufficient. The receiver thereupon requested the labour inspectorate's authorisation to dismiss 21 staff delegates following the suppression of 227 jobs of unprotected workers. Of the 21 requests, 14 (13 of which concerned CGT delegates) were refused. On appeal, the minister authorised the dismissal of five CTG staff representatives. All in all, 337 unprotected workers were dismissed as against 18 staff representatives. The 812 employees retained comprised representatives of all the trade union organisations initially present in the enterprise, including the CGT. In the Government's view, the fact that delegates included in the request for collective dismissal were promoted is in itself enough to show that no discrimination was involved.

&htab;75.&htab;Regarding the other forms of "repression" denounced by the CGT, such as the refusal to authorise access to "defence" areas, the Government explains that the law lays down specific conditions for access to areas classified as "defence" areas for the staff representatives of enterprises engaged in national defence work. The existence of these conditions, and specifically the requirement that such visits be requested in advance or that the staff representative be accompanied by an authorised person, has always been fully accepted by all trade union organisations and the rare disputes that have been brought to the Government's attention (e.g. Matra Centre Equipement at Vélisy) have concerned a staff representative's refusal to comply with these requirements.

&htab;76.&htab;Regarding the isolation of union activists, the Government states that, in the great majority of cases where a delegate is given no work or is isolated within an enterprise, the labour inspectors are duly informed and submit an official report on the matter. Moreover, in his emergency interim ruling, the competent judge generally imposes the continuation of the contract of employment on pain of a fine. Situations such as this can therefore be remedied, as the law provides both civil and penal forms of appeal. The Government assures the Committee that the problem encountered by the member of the CEF employed by the Selnor-Lesquire company has now been settled.

&htab;77.&htab;As to the creation of "special sections" at Ratheau (La Courneuve), a labour inspector acting on information received from a union delegate visited the establishment where he reported the existence of a "disciplinary" workshop. Following his report, the three union delegates assigned to it left the workshop where considerable tension had developed.

&htab;78.&htab;With regard to negotiating rights, the Government points out that the Act of 30 November 1982 containing new provisions respecting collective bargaining lays down the procedure for the voluntary negotiation of collective agreements. It describes inter alia the procedure for extending agreements, whereby the provisions of a sectoral, occupational or inter-occupational agreement may be made binding on all employees and employers falling within the scope of the agreement, by order of the Minister of Labour, after a substantiated opinion has been expressed by the National Collective Bargaining Committee (section L.133-8 of the Labour Code). The Labour Code states (section L.133-11):

Where an objection is lodged in the manner prescribed in the first paragraph of this section [i.e., if the text has not been signed by all the most representative organisations concerned], the minister responsible for labour may once again consult the Committee on the basis of a report specifying the scope of the provisions to which objection has been taken and the consequences of a possible extension. The minister responsible for labour may decide in favour of an extension after considering the new opinion expressed by the Committee.

&htab;79.&htab;Concerning the opportunity for a minority representative organisation to sign validly a collective agreement against the express wishes of the majority representative organisations, the international texts referred to by the CGT set out a general principle of open discussion and co-operation on an equal footing (Declaration of Philadelphia and ILO Constitution). Convention No. 98 (Article 4) and Recommendation No. 91 (Paragraph 1(1)) stipulate that national laws or regulations must contain provisions appropriate to the implementation of the principle of collective bargaining. As to the status of the signatories, Recommendation No. 91 states that the workers' organisations parties to an agreement must be representative. By the Act of 30 November 1982, French legislation implements these broad principles. The provisions adopted are perfectly compatible with Convention No. 98 and Recommendation No. 91 whose very general wording makes no reference to the majority representation or otherwise of any representative workers' organisation that may be party to an agreement.

&htab;80.&htab;Regarding the extension of collective agreements concluded by minority representative organisations, Recommendation No. 91 stipulates that each country may determine the measures to be taken to extend the application of all or certain stipulations of a collective agreement to all the employers and workers included within the industrial and territorial scope of the agreement (paragraph 5(1)). French legislation not only implements the principle, which is merely suggested in the Recommendation, but has adopted provisions to ensure that it is applied in accordance with the international text. The consultation of all the workers' representatives is a legal requirement and a collective agreement can be extended only if it has been signed by a representative workers' organisation. According to the Government, the example cited by the CGT of an agreement signed in the chemical sector on 25 March 1982 and extended by order of the Minister of Labour against the express wishes of the majority of the trade union organisations cannot therefore be invoked in support of a representation before the ILO.

&htab;81.&htab;As to the CGT's allegation of discrimination between workers' organisations and employers' organisations, the Government points out that, just as an agreement signed by a representative workers' organisation can be extended in spite of the opposition of the majority of the representative trade union organisations within the scope of the agreement, so an agreement signed by a representative employers' organisation may be extended despite the opposition of other professional organisations, provided of course they are all representative of the same sector. The CGT's assertion that this implies discrimination between employers' and workers' organisations is therefore inaccurate. French legislation merely applies the general principle of extension as laid down in Paragraph 5(1) of Recommendation No. 91, i.e. that extension is possible within the industrial and territorial scope of the agreement.

&htab;82.&htab;In the case of enterprise-level agreements that depart from the laws or regulations in force, the Government confirms that such agreements may be contested only within eight days of their signature and provided a written and substantiated objection is lodged by one or more organisations that together have polled over half the ballots of the registered voters in trade union elections (section L.132-26 of the Labour Code). The purpose of this provision is both to facilitate the adoption of enterprise-level agreements between employers' and workers' organisations and to prevent agreements that depart from the laws or regulations in force from being concluded without sufficient justification. Since workers' organisations often take different if not opposing stands, the legislature has chosen to encourage even minimal consensus as far as possible, in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned international Convention.

&htab;83.&htab;Concerning the alleged repression of the right to strike and of freedom of association, the Government states that the CGT's reference to Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 is somewhat surprising as they contain no allusion to the right to strike which is not even cited. The CGT considers that the right to strike is inseparable from freedom of association. This, however, is not the view of the Court of Appeal which has stated on several occasions that the right to strike is an individual right and that the trade union does not act as the strikers' principal but has a separate legal status from that of its members. The Preamble of the French Constitution of 1946, which the 1958 Constitution cites, recognises the right to strike but also its limitations, since it stipulates that the right to strike must be exercised within the framework of the laws that govern it. The Council of State has added to this that recognition of the right to strike cannot have the effect of denying the limitations by which this right, like any other, must be bound in order to avoid abuse or its being exercised in defiance of public order. In the absence of any legal regulations on the subject, case law has established the boundary between what is legitimate and what is not.

&htab;84.&htab;The Government recognises, however, that the CGT's comments warrant a reply inasmuch as the protection of trade union freedoms comprises the protection of the right to strike of workers, and particularly unionised workers.

&htab;85.&htab;The Government notes that the CGT makes a general attack on employers whom it accuses of taking advantage of "their economic strength, the institutional machinery and whole battery of existing legal procedures and the mass media". It claims that the Government is not taking any action to prevent this and, for example, refuses to "respond favourably to the CGT's request that it introduce a Bill repealing the 120-year-old section 414 of the Penal Code that has been revived to justify on legal grounds the action taken by non-strikers against strikers and union delegates", adding that "employers are using non-strikers more and more often to spearhead their offensive and to initiate legal proceedings against union officials and strikers".

&htab;86.&htab;Regarding the archaic nature of section 414 of the Penal Code, which punishes the abuse of the right to strike whereby freedom to work is impeded by bringing pressure to bear on non-strikers, the Government recalls that the section has been amended and rejuvenated by a much more recent Act of 29 December 1956.

&htab;87.&htab;As to the claim that employers have adopted a strategy "whereby disputes are systematically taken to court", the Government replies that the whole purpose of labour legislation is to substitute the legal channels of conciliation or court arbitration for a trial of strength. The widespread and systematic use of penal and civil proceedings by employers merely suggests that trade unions sometimes lose the initiative in labour disputes. Moreover, if employers make sure that the fines imposed in provisional or final court decisions are indeed paid, it is merely by virtue of the perfectly clear principle that court rulings must be complied with (save for the immunity of trade union assets from attachment). Yet the CGT takes up the trade union cry against the now frequent tendency of company managers to initiate civil liability proceedings in order to obtain a court ruling against strikers or against the union organisations that have called a strike. When in the course of the strike a worker or trade union commits an illicit act, he or it may be made to pay damages. Thus, in a ruling of 6 March 1959, the High Court of Le Mans upheld the liability of the CGT union at Renault in Le Mans for having organised a go-slow strike, which case-law has invariably declared to be illegal. Inasmuch as the right to strike is not a trade union right, a trade union cannot assume the responsibility of calling an illegal strike without committing an offence. The court therefore did not uphold the claim of the trade union against which civil proceedings were being brought that the suit brought against them constituted an infringement of freedom of association or a form of discrimination. The Government notes, however, that the immunity of trade union assets from attachment that was introduced in the Labour Code by Act of 12 March 1920 (section L.411-12) is only partial and that the Court of Appeal (Criminal Chamber, 24 January 1978 RMVR) dismissed the trade union's argument that the suit brought against it was an abuse of the law because its assets were immune. The court considered that the immunity from attachment was not absolute and that the legal provision invoked, in so far as it related only to means of enforcement, could not have the effect of exempting trade unions from civil liability.

&htab;88.&htab;Furthermore, the Constitutional Council considered in a ruling of 22 October 1982 that it was not possible to deny persons who have suffered damages the right to initiate legal proceedings or seek redress without violating the principle of equality. In its subsequent rulings (Social Chamber - CGT union at the Trailor factory of Lunéville, 9 November 1982), the Court of Appeal considered that trade unions should be deemed liable for events in which they have actually participated if the events constitute a penal offence or cannot be ascribed to the normal exercise of the right to strike.

&htab;89.&htab;Concerning the various complaints voiced by the CGT, the Government states that it has no authority over the mass media, that the radio and television service in France is supervised by an independent commission, that the press is free and that the concentration of newspaper groups is restricted by law. It is up to the trade union organisations themselves to bring their demands and claims to the notice of the public.

&htab;90.&htab;As to the alleged ideological campaign being waged by employer circles within the framework of the law in order to ensure that the "freedom of enterprise" takes precedence in their attempts to tackle the economic crisis and international competition, the Government states that any trade union organisations that consider themselves slandered are entitled to a right of reply in the written or spoken press and to initiate legal proceedings. If a public opinion campaign sometimes tends to assimilate a strike to an illegal act or wrongful form of action and if that view "is increasingly being supported by case law", then it is for the union organisations to make a clear distinction between the strike - i.e. the collective and concerted withholding of labour in pursuit of specific occupational demands - which is protected by the Constitution, by the law of the country and by case law, on the one hand, and, on the other, the illegal acts by which it is sometimes accompanied (serious offences, criminal acts, assault, illegal confinement) and which can incur the penal or civil liability of the workers. As to the occupation of work premises, case law makes a distinction between occupation which is restricted to the working hours in certain parts of an enterprise and does not prevent non-strikers from working and occupation outside normal working hours which does, the latter constituting a serious offence and, possibly, a violation of the right of ownership and of the non-strikers' freedom to work. This often, but not always, leads to an expulsion order. Since 1974, especially, the case law that has developed from the ordinances issued by the President of the High Court of Bobigny, following amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1971 and 1973, reflects the determination of judges called upon to make emergency interim rulings to take into account the objectives of the strikers by appointing an expert to bring the employer to the negotiating table, no expulsion order being issued until the judge has examined the expert's report. Execution of the court expulsion order, moreover, is not automatic, as the administrative authority is required to assess the prevailing circumstances and is empowered to refuse the use of police force so long as it deems that a threat to law and order exists, as stipulated in a ruling of the Council of State (Saint-Charles cardboard factory, 1938). The administrative authority can therefore choose not to take action, even though the State may thereby incur a liability.

&htab;91.&htab;Regarding the introduction by employers of a "disputes management" policy and of the preventive policy known as "labour relations management", the Government states that there is nothing illegal in this provided it does not go outside the law.

&htab;92.&htab;The Government feels that employers cannot be blamed for "taking disputes systematically to court" since the whole purpose of labour law is to substitute legal channels for direct action in labour disputes, the ground rules are the same for all the social partners and it is up to them to use those legal channels to their best advantage.

&htab;93.&htab;The Government recognises that there may be some inequality in financial and other resources between workers and employers but this does not in any way stem from the law itself. Case law even goes so far as to ban lock-outs, which are legal only in the event of force majeure or redundancy for technical reasons. In the particular case referred to, there is no "symmetry" between a strike and a lock-out and both statute law and case law tend in fact to favour the workers rather than the employers.

&htab;94.&htab;With regard to the creation of associations of non-strikers in the course of labour disputes, the Government explains that these are perfectly legal. Though a civil court action brought by an employer for infringement of the freedom to work may be irreceivable, it may be quite valid if brought by workers - whether or not in association - who are prevented by the strikers from continuing their work. Moreover, any strikers who are victims of illegal or punishable acts committed by a body formed by an association or by any physical person has access to the normal legal channels and, inter alia, is entitled to appeal to the competent judicial authority.

&htab;95.&htab;As to the allegation that employers resort to lawsuits systematically, the Government recalls that trade union leaders and elected staff representatives are protected by a special procedure against dismissal, for which the authorisation of the labour inspectorate is required, and that the possibility exists of lodging an appeal against the decision of the labour inspectorate either through administrative or through judicial channels. It is in any case not true to say that penal and civil lawsuits are brought systematically as there are in fact only a few dozen court decisions per year relating to civil liability in respect of a strike. In 85 per cent of the cases, any fines that are payable as the result of a lawsuit are never actually collected.

&htab;96.&htab;The Government observes that it has already referred to the 1982 decisions of the Constitutional Council and Court of Appeal upholding the civil liability suits brought by employers and non-strikers against works unions and trade union bodies outside the enterprise in which a serious offence or infringement of penal law is involved. It points out that the CGT - like any other legal entity or physical person in a State of law - must abide by those decisions, which do not conflict with any international Convention ratified by France but are directed at abuses of the law in accordance with a jurisprudence that has been quite consistent in this regard.

&htab;97.&htab;With respect to the intervention or lack of intervention of the administration in collective disputes, the Government observes that the decision to use the police to enforce a court decision such as an expulsion order or to restore law and order is left to the discretion of the prefect, under the supervision of the administrative judge. The circumstances in which police are or are not involved may indeed give rise to an appeal to the administrative courts. In the particular cases cited by the GCT, the police forces intervened in the following circumstances:

- At SKF the May and June 1984 incidents were provoked by demonstrators, most of whom were not employed by the enterprise, in an attempt to reoccupy by force premises that had previously been evacuated peacefully by the police on 28 May 1984, in compliance with an expulsion order issued by the President of the High Court of Créteil. - At the Cacharel factory in Saint-Christol-les-Alès the police intervened without incident on 25 May 1985 to evacuate the factory premises, pursuant to a court decision of 2 May 1985.

- As to the 8 October 1985 dispute at the Renault factory in Le Mans, contrary to the CGT's statement in its representation the police were not called in as the local prefect chose to allow a stay of execution of an expulsion order that was issued on 11 October in order to permit negotiations between the parties to the dispute. As a result of these negotiations, a draft agreement was eventually signed and an immediate return to work took place on 15 October.

&htab;98.&htab;Finally, the Government states that the allegation that employers have been encouraged to replace strikers by outside workers - mainly temporary workers - is untrue. Even prior to Ordinance No. 82-131 of 6 February 1982, case law had restricted the possibility of replacing strikers by temporary workers recruited before the dispute by prohibiting their assignment to tasks other than those stipulated in their contract of employment (decision of principle issued by the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Appeal on 2 December 1980). The 1982 Ordinance, like the Act of 25 July 1985 (section L.124-2-3-1), reinforced the earlier ban by stipulating that temporary workers may not be called upon to replace a worker whose contract of employment has been suspended as a result of a collective labour dispute in the employing establishment. On the other hand, the replacement of strikers by employees of a subcontracting enterprise or by workers on a fixed-term contract is quite legal.

&htab;99.&htab;In its communication dated 16 January 1987 the Government submits its observations on the additional information communicated by the CGT and on the complaint presented by the Trade Unions International of Textile, Clothing, Leather and Fur Workers.

&htab;100.&htab;Regarding the dissolution of the Lorient fire brigade, the Government states that the decision was taken as a result of a whole series of breakdowns in operations that showed that the brigade was no longer in a position, under normal circumstances, to serve the nine communes for which it is responsible. Between 1980 and 1983 both senior and junior firemen refused to obey orders, went on "administrative strike" as soon as their chief entered the fire station, distributed hostile leaflets, put up signs around the station demanding his resignation, etc. When a new chief was appointed in 1983, there seemed every reason to expect the Lorient fire brigade to begin operating normally again, especially as new recruits were taken on, the living quarters were modernised and a much improved system of working hours was introduced. Yet from 1984 onwards the chief came up against new difficulties: refusal to obey orders, refusal to organise courses in first-aid, refusal to sit on departmental first-aid examining boards, refusal to take part in manoeuvres ordered by the higher authority, refusal to accept fire duty for certain theatre shows. Finally, trade union representatives of the first-aid centre of Lorient called on professional firemen in the departments of the west of France to hold a demonstration on the occasion of a visit by the President of the Republic on 8 October 1985; the meeting point for the demonstrators was the first-aid centre. The firemen completely ignored the solemn warning by the Director of Public Safety that people in uniform are expected to behave in a dignified and discreet manner. Ignoring police orders, the demonstrating firemen attempted to break through safety barriers that had been set up all along the route of the presidential cortege. They then confronted the police with iron bars, firing distress flares straight at them and throwing various projectiles. As a result of this inadmissible state of affairs, which was covered live by television and thus seriously undermined the honour of the fire-fighting service, reinforcements had to be called in to restore order. The firemen's violence and fury - which no longer had anything to do with the right to demonstrate that the Government has always guaranteed - was such that 30 members of the police force were wounded, including four who were so seriously hurt that they were unable to return to work for more than 10 days.

&htab;101.&htab;In the Government's view this kind of behaviour, which has been going on in various forms for many years, is incompatible with the operation of a public service that is responsible for insuring the safety of people and assets; it was therefore necessary to dissolve the fire brigade, which could quite honestly be considered to have broken down completely.

&htab;102.&htab;The decision to dissolve the brigade was taken by the Minister of the Interior at the suggestion of the Prefect of the Morbihan department and in the light of the deliberations of the intercommunal public utilities board for the Lorient area on 11 October 1985 calling for its dissolution. The Government emphasises that the decision is not a disciplinary measure; the professional firemen of the former brigade are still employed by the commune and all those who have not been taken on in the new brigade have been offered alternative employment.

&htab;103.&htab;Regarding the RTC affair in Dreux, the Government repeats the point made in its previous communication that, under section 1382 of the Civil Code, any employee or trade union found guilty of committing an unlawful act (such as infringing the right to work) in the course of a strike may be ordered to pay the corresponding damages, and it is abundantly clear from the wording of the judgement handed down by the administrative tribunal of Dreux, which was presided over by a judge with a casting vote and which issued its definitive ruling on 19 September 1985, that the defendants were guilty of violating the right to work, inasmuch as the strikers against whom proceedings had been initiated had prevented non-strikers from entering the factory and goods from entering or leaving and inasmuch as the representatives against whom proceedings had been brought did not seriously deny that they had impaired the freedom of movement of persons and goods. Given that the convicted employees have committed a crime, that the non-strikers have suffered a loss and that there is a causal relationship between the two, the legality of the judgement can hardly be contested from the juridical standpoint.

&htab;104.&htab;The Government adds that only recently the Constitutional Court was called upon to examine an Act limiting the possibilities of initiating legal proceedings against employees in order to claim damages as a result of a collective dispute except in the case of damages caused by a criminal offence, and in 1982 it annulled the disputed section of the Act, considering that the legislature could not deny the right of certain persons who have suffered a loss to seek redress. The relevant legal principles as they relate to French law have thus been clarified in considerable detail.

&htab;105.&htab;In the case under consideration, the infringement of the right to work, the impairment of the free movement of persons and goods and the civil liability of those convicted are all attested by the very wording that appears in the judgement handed down by the industrial tribunal. An appeal has been lodged against the judgement and it now remains for the highest judicial authority to rule on the matter.

&htab;106.&htab;With regard to the dispute between Mr. Morlier and the Colas company, the sequence of events set out by the CGT does not call for any particular comment by the Government: on 10 November 1981 and 15 November 1984 the labour inspectorate, which had been requested on a number of occasions by the Colas company to authorise the dismissal of Mr. Morlier, a trade union delegate and elected staff representative, on account of his use of insulting language to another employee, refused to give its authorisation. On an appeal submitted through administrative channels, the Minister of Labour confirmed the labour inspectorate's decision on 3 May 1985.

&htab;107.&htab;In two judgements handed down on 3 July 1984 and 4 February 1986 the Administrative Tribunal of Caen, which was called upon to rule on these successive decisions, annulled the decisions taken by the administrative authority on the grounds that the alleged facts, which were not contested, constituted a fault of sufficient gravity to justify dismissal, that the dismissal did not stem from the normal exercise of Mr. Morlier's official mandates and, finally, that no motive of general interest relating to the maintenance of staff representation or public order could be invoked.

&htab;108.&htab;Independently of one another, the CGT and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment lodged an appeal against this judgement with the Council of State. This procedure, however, does not have the effect of suspending execution of the judgement and, consequently, when the question of enforcing the judgement handed down by the Administrative Tribunal on 4 February 1986 was brought once again before the labour inspectorate by the Colas company, the labour inspector had no alternative but to authorise Mr. Morliers' dismissal on 16 June 1986 by virtue of the res judicata .

&htab;109.&htab;Meanwhile, the CGT and Mr. Morlier had officially requested the Council of State to order a stay of execution of the judgement handed down by the Administrative Tribunal. In a decision handed down on 19 November 1986, the Council of State upheld the request and ordered a stay of execution of the judgement and the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, with whom an appeal submitted through official channels was lodged against the 16 June 1986 decision of the labour inspector, annulled that decision and denied authorisation to dismiss Mr. Morlier on 1 December 1986. In accordance with sections l.412-19, l.425-3 and l.436-3 of the Labour Code, this decision of the administrative authority is immediately enforceable. Mr. Morlier is at liberty now to resort to an emergency procedure for bringing the matter before the industrial tribunal. Moreover, if it refused to reinstate Mr. Morlier, the Colas company is liable to criminal proceedings that may be initiated by the person concerned, the trade union organisation or the labour inspector.

&htab;110.&htab;Concerning the "Goutille affair", the Government states that the company went into liquidation on 31 May 1982 following the resignation of the managing director on 1 May 1982 and the appointment of a provisional administrator. As soon as the company's liquidation was announced, the staff occupied the enterprise and, in order to start operating again as a workers' production co-operative, took the totally illegal step of recovering part of the company stock in Mulhouse. The stock, however, had been sold by Goutille before it went into liquidation and therefore no longer belonged to the company. On 28 July 1982 the Commercial Court of Roanne authorised the company receiver to set a price for the transfer of the assets of the former Goutille company to the new co-operative company "Création Goutille". The judgement of the Commercial Court, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeal of Lyons which declared it to be null and void.

&htab;111.&htab;Meanwhile, the receiver had lodged a complaint with the Public Prosecutor of Roanne concerning the theft of 1,346 pieces of material belonging to Goutille. Part of this material was sold and part used for making up dresses and other articles of clothing, all of which was quite irregular since the co-operative had no legal existence. On 27 November 1984 the Correctional Court of Roanne convicted of theft five Goutille employees who had taken the clothing material in Mulhouse. On appeal, the Court of Appeal of Lyons confirmed the judgement of the Roanne tribunal but reduced the sentences imposed on the five employees. At the same time it ordered them jointly to pay the receiver 500,000 francs in damages to compensate for the use of the stolen pieces of material.

&htab;112.&htab;The labour administration has nothing to do with the difficulties that the five who were convicted employees have encountered with the court and has never placed any obstacle in the way of a resumption of operations by the new company. The complaint to the Roanne tribunal was submitted by the receiver, without consulting the Departmental Directorate of Labour and Employment. Furthermore, the accusations concerning the manner in which the difficulties encountered by the employees were treated and concerning the decisions taken with respect both to the constitution and subsequent setting aside of the new company and to the criminal sentences handed down on the employees concerned are a matter for the courts of law, which have acted in due conformity with French law and quite independently of the executive authorities and, specifically, of the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment. It would thus seem quite clear, on the one hand, that the labour administration has nothing to do with the difficulties that the employees have encountered with the tribunals and, on the other, that the activities regarding which legal proceedings were initiated had no connection with their trade union activities.

&htab;113.&htab;With respect to the Bata-Marbot affair, the Government, supplementing the information contained in its previous communication, states that in spite of cuts in staff the enterprise was obliged to declare itself bankrupt on 31 October 1985 and went into compulsory liquidation on 4 November 1985. On 8 November 1985 the receivers responsible for its provisional administration received an offer from the Campagnie Française de Textile (CFT) which proposed to take over the management of Marbot under a rental arrangement whereby it would retain only 812 employees. In a judgement handed down on 14 November 1985 the Commercial Tribunal of Périgueux authorised the rental arrangement with the CFT and, on the same day, the receivers dismissed 227 persons for economic reasons, in accordance with the legal provisions in force (section L.321-7 of the Labour Code). Each of these persons was at liberty to contest his dismissal before the relevant industrial tribunal.

&htab;114.&htab;At the same time the receivers responsible for the company's provisional administration submitted a request to the labour inspector for authorisation to dismiss 21 protected employees, after consultation with officials of the Departmental Directorate of Labour and Employment of Dordogne. In a decision handed down on 17 December 1985, the labour inspector refused to authorise the dismissal of 13 of the protected employees and authorised that of eight others. On 20 December 1985 Marbot SA lodged an appeal through administrative channels against the refusal to authorise dismissal in 13 cases. In a decision handed down on 9 January 1986, the appeal was declared irreceivable on the grounds that the managing director and receivers of Marbot SA were no longer empowered to contest the decisions of the labour inspector and that the contracts of employment that were in force on 14 November 1985 had been transferred to the CFT, which was taking over from Marbot. On 9 January 1986 the CFT lodged an appeal through administrative channels against the decisions of 17 December 1986; the appeal concerned only ten of the employees whose dismissal had been refused. In a decision handed down on 17 January 1986, the appeal was rejected in respect of five of the employees, whose dismissal was again refused, and accepted in respect of the five others, whose dismissal was now authorised. The latter then lodged an appeal with the Administrative Tribunal of Bordeaux to have the latest decision cancelled; this appeal is still under review.

&htab;115.&htab;The Government observes that Marbots' request for authorisation was initially refused on the grounds that, although it still existed under company law, it was no longer the employer of the persons concerned when it lodged its appeal through administrative channels. Considering it a matter of urgency because of the company's economic situation and the rapidly worsening labour relations climate, as the request submitted by the CGT itself shows, the Minister of Labour on receiving the request immediately asked the Regional Director of Labour and Employment to investigate the matter or make appropriate arrangements as rapidly as possible. In the course of his investigations the Departmental Director of Labour and Employment of Dordogne spoke with the staff representatives concerned on 16 January 1986. As permitted by the law, the latter were assisted by the General Secretary of the CGT departmental trade union. The administrative authority therefore cannot in any way be accused of not having conducted a thorough investigation of the appeal lodged by the CFT after having heard the arguments on both sides.

&htab;116.&htab;In authorising certain dismissals, the Minister of Labour, by virtue of his administrative powers under the law, took into consideration the following points of which the interested parties were notified in the relevant decisions: the genuineness of the economic reasons underlying the dismissal procedure cannot seriously be contested; the number of posts suppressed in the space of a few months and the declaration of bankruptcy reflect the economic and financial difficulties of the company; it is out of the question either to maintain the staff representatives in their present jobs or to find them alternative employment; the grounds for dismissal do not stem from the mandates held by the employees concerned.

&htab;117.&htab;As to the alleged infringement of freedom of association in this company, the Government observes that the labour inspector twice drew up an official report; on 28 November 1985 to the effect that, in the absence of the reinstatement of the staff representatives, the exercise of their functions had been hindered; on 27 May 1986 to the effect that, in so far as the employer had failed to convene the monthly meetings of the staff delegates, the functioning of that institution had been hindered. The reports were sent to the judicial authority for appropriate legal action. In accordance with normal procedure, the State Prosecutor ordered a hearing for the persons whose responsibility might be involved. Matters are following their normal course.

&htab;118.&htab;The incidents cited in the complaint submitted by the Trade Unions International of Textile, Clothing, Leather and Fur Workers concerning the brutality suffered by Mrs. Parade, though regretable, do not come within the purvue of labour law but must be investigated and dealt with within the framework of the general legislation applicable to the inflicting of bodily harm. Through her lawyer, Mrs. Parade has in fact filed a complaint and instituted civil proceedings before the senior examining judge of the Court of Périgueux. It remains now for the examining judge and the courts to determine the guilty parties, impose any penalty that may be provided for by the Penal Code and compensate Mrs. Parade for the prejudice sustained.

C. The Committee's conclusions

&htab;119.&htab;The representation made by the CGT is based on the allegation that anti-union repression in France since 1984 has taken on extremely serious proportions. In support of its position, the complainant introduces five sets of allegations that the Committee will examine in turn: infringement of trade union rights in the private and nationalised sectors, suppression of facilities previously granted to trade union organisations in the form of trade union premises and means of action, infringement of the rights of workers' representatives, infringement of the right to bargain collectively, and repression of the right to strike.

I. Infringement of trade union rights in the private and nationalised sectors

&htab;120.&htab;The GCT alleges first of all that dismissal for economic reasons is an ideal means for employers to rid themselves first and foremost of unionised workers and cites examples of employers closing down their enterprise or filing for bankruptcy, in order to eliminate the trade union section by excluding those sectors where the CGT is in a majority position when the enterprise resumes operation. The Government, on the other hand, observes that the Labour Code provides for protection against dismissal for trade union activities and that this protection has been reinforced by legislation adopted in 1985.

&htab;121.&htab;The Committee notes in particular that, where the Government has been able to verify some of the facts, there is no evidence of any link between the closure of an enterprise and the presence of a majority CGT staff representation in the establishment.

&htab;122.&htab;It is also apparent from the detailed explanation given by the Government and the examples offered in support of its position (Coignet, Citroën, Carpiquet and Bata-Marbot, inter alia) that the Ministry of Labour has, whenever documented cases of an infringement of trade union rights have been brought to its attention, endeavoured to enforce the relevant laws and regulations and has refused authorisation to dismiss staff delegates.

&htab;123.&htab;Bearing in mind, therefore, that legislation does exist that provides for penalties and civil remedies against any employer who commits acts of anti-union discrimination, and in the light of the Government's explanations regarding the steps taken by the Ministry of Labour to protect the exercise of trade union rights, the Committee considers that this aspect of the representation does not call for further examination.

&htab;124.&htab;In its representation, the CGT highlights the Alain Clavaud affair and the dismissal of this trade unionist by the management of Dunlop-Montluçon following the publication by the newspaper l'Humanité of a diary of his impressions at work. The Committee notes with interest that the industrial tribunal has ordered Alain Clavauds' reinstatement or the payment to him of 500 francs for each day's delay.

&htab;125.&htab;The CGT also alleges that employers, particularly in small enterprises, infringed the right to organise and establish trade union sections and to set up representative staff institutions. The Government points out that, under the Labour Code, any impediment to the exercise of these rights is punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine and that disputes over such matters can be settled by bringing them to the attention of the labour inspectorate. The Government cites instances - at CGEE-Alsthom and in the PSA group, for instance - where disputes of this nature have indeed been settled as a result of action taken by the labour inspectorate.

&htab;126.&htab;On this point, considering that both the legislation and the practice observed by the Ministry of Labour constitute genuine guarantees for the protection of trade union rights, the Committee considers that this aspect of the representation does not call for further examination.

II. Suppression of facilities previously granted to trade union organisations in the form of trade union premises and means of action

&htab;127.&htab;The allegations concerning this aspect of the case refer to the eviction of the trade unions from the premises they were occupying in several towns, and notably in Levallois-Perret where the mayor has closed down the job centre. According to the complainant, following the 1983 municipal elections, the mayors of these towns withdrew the job centre facilities and the trade union premises that they had previously made available to the CGT and cancelled or reduced municipal subsidies. In Paris, most of the union premises and facilities that the municipality had previously granted the CGT as most representative organisation at the Paris job centre have been withdrawn. The Government has replied specifically to the two allegations on which the complainant has provided detailed information, those relating to the municipalities of Levallois-Perret and Paris. In the first case, the job centre has in fact been closed down but other premises - that the CGT considers too small - have been made available to the union organisations. Moreover, an appeal has been lodged with the Council of State. In the case of the Paris job centre, the Government recognises that the recent order issued by the mayor has modified the distribution of seats on the centre's administrative body in the light of the results of the 1983 trade union election to the local family allowance board and that as a result the CGT has lost its majority, but it also points out that no appeal has been lodged with the administrative authority against the decision. As to the other allegations, no complaint has been brought to the notice of the labour inspectorate.

&htab;128.&htab;The Committee notes the information received. As the Government points out in its reply, it is quite clear that Convention No. 87 does not require the State or local community to provide trade union organisations with special facilities and, consequently, the incidents referred to by the CGT cannot be looked upon as a violation of the Convention. The fact remains, however, that a decision to restrict or prohibit the use of premises that have been made available to trade unions for a long time was bound to have unfortunate consequences for those organisations.

&htab;129.&htab;As to the change in the distribution of seats on the Paris job centre's administrative body, the Committee notes that it is the outcome of trade union elections and therefore considers that this aspect of the representation does not call for further examination.

III. Infringement of the rights of workers' representatives

&htab;130.&htab;The allegations under this heading refer to the dismissal for economic or non-economic reasons, with administrative authorisation, of over 15,000 workers' representatives between 1978 and 1985. The Government has replied that French labour legislation contains specific provisions protecting staff representatives and even candidates for election to these posts, workers who have requested the holding of elections and former members of committees set up within the enterprise. The Government considers, however, that the fact that administrative authorisation has to be obtained to dismiss any protected person does not mean that they cannot be dismissed for grave misconduct or for general economic reasons. It believes that the increasing number of appeals is a reflection of the growing economic crisis and of its repercussions on employment and it asserts that, in the event of an appeal, the administrative judge assesses the seriousness of the accusations brought against the worker and decides whether or not they are of sufficient gravity to justify his dismissal. The Government cites a number of cases where authorisation to dismiss CGT delegates has been refused either directly by the labour inspectorate (Creusot-Loire, Bata) or by the administrative judge (FOP).

&htab;131.&htab;Regarding other forms of repression, and specifically the alleged refusal to authorise access to "defence areas", the Government confirms that the law lays down specific conditions for access to such areas for the staff representatives of enterprises engaged in national defence work but states that trade union organisations normally accept the fact. Where trade union activists have been isolated or suffered discrimination, the situation has been remedied by the labour inspectorate or labour courts.

&htab;132.&htab;In the case of the dissolution of the Lorient fire brigade by the Ministry of the Interior as a result of which CGT trade union members and officials were first suspended and then found alternative employment, it is apparent from the complainants' own statements that the firemen concerned had refused on a number of occasions to carry out duties that were essential to ensure the safety of persons. In the view of the Committee, such an attitude is outside the scope of legitimate trade union activities and the steps taken to remedy the situation cannot be looked upon as acts of anti-union discrimination.

&htab;133.&htab;Nevertheless, it is apparent from the Government's reply that the rights of workers' representatives have indeed been infringed in a number of cases but that, in so far as specific instances have been brought to the attention of the administrative judges or authorities, the situation has been remedied. The fact remains, in the view of the Committee, that, since the economic crisis is liable to be used as a pretext for anti-trade union reprisals, governments must normally be particularly vigilant in ensuring that workers' representatives are protected.

&htab;134.&htab;The Committee accordingly draws the Government's attention to the Workers' Representatives Recommendation, 1971 (No. 143) which mentions various measures that might be taken with a view to the effective protection of workers' representatives. These might include measures such as laying upon the employer the burden of proving that the decision to dismiss or penalise the worker was actually justified, and the recognition of a priority to be given to workers' representatives with regard to their retention in employment in case of reduction of the workforce.

IV. Infringement of the right to bargain collectively

&htab;135.&htab;The CGT criticises the fact that ministers are empowered to extend collective agreements even though they may not have been signed by the majority of the representative trade union organisations. The Government explains that extension orders are issued by the Ministry of Labour after a substantiated opinion has been expressed by the National Collective Bargaining Committee and that, where the text has not been signed by all the most representative organisations concerned, the Minister of Labour may consult the committee again. Extension of an agreement is possible only where it has been signed by a representative workers' organisation.

&htab;136.&htab;In previous cases, the Committee has considered that the extension of an agreement to an entire sector of activity contrary to the views of the organisation representing most of the workers in a category covered by the extended agreement is liable to limit the right of free collective bargaining of that majority organisation and that this system makes it possible to extend agreements containing provisions which result in a worsening of conditions of work of the category of workers concerned. [See, inter alia, 217th Report, Case No. 1087 (Portugal), para. 223.]

&htab;137.&htab;However, in the case under consideration the Committee observes that the legislation does contain certain protective clauses, since extension presupposes that the National Collective Bargaining Committee has been consulted and that a representative workers' organisation has signed the text. Under these circumstances, and since the legislation sets objective criteria for determining the representativeness of trade union organisations, the Committee considers that this aspect of the representation does not call for further examination.

V. Repression of the right to strike

&htab;138.&htab;The allegations referred to the infringement of the right to strike principally by means of excessive recourse to legal proceedings by nationalised and private enterprises, the expulsion of strikers and the use of subcontracting or temporary workers to replace strikers.

&htab;139.&htab;The Government, noting that Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 contain no allusion to the right to strike, points out that the right is recognised in the Preamble of the French Constitution, which stipulates that it must be exercised within the framework of the laws that govern it. The Council of State has added to this that the right to strike, like any other right, must be limited in order to avoid abuse or its being exercised in defiance of public order. Moreover, in a November 1982 ruling on a case cited by the CGT, the Court of Appeal has stated that trade unions should be deemed liable for events in which they have actually participated if the events constitute a penal offence or cannot be ascribed to the normal exercise of the right to strike.

&htab;140.&htab;As it has emphasised on numerous occasions, the Committee considers the right to strike to be a legitimate means of defending the workers' interests. [See 244th Report, Case No. 1270 (Brazil), para. 225.] The Committee must therefore consider whether the alleged facts constitute an undue restriction of the exercise of the right to strike.

&htab;141.&htab;The Committee notes that, where strikers or trade unions have been convicted by the courts in connection with strikes referred to by the complainant organisation, it has been for illegal acts such as assault, illegal confinement, criminal offences, impairment of movement of persons and goods, etc. Similarly, the expulsion of strikers occupying a place of work has taken place only under certain guarantees and where their presence is an obstacle to the work of non-strikers. Since it deems strike action to be legitimate only when exercised peacefully and without intimidation or physical constraint, the Committee considers that this aspect of the representation does not call for further examination.

&htab;142.&htab;As to the replacement of strikers by temporary workers, the Committee notes that under the Act of 25 July 1985 employees of temporary work agencies may not be called in. The Committee also observes that, by an Ordinance of 11 August 1986, the fixed term work contract cannot have as its objective the replacement of a wage earner whose employment contract has been suspended following a collective labour dispute. It therefore considers that this aspect of the case does not call for further examination.

The Committee's recommendations

&htab;143.&htab;In the light of its foregoing conclusions, the Committee invites the Governing Body to approve the following recommendations:

(a) Regarding the suppression of facilities previously granted to trade union organisations in the form of trade union premises and means of action, although the alleged facts do not constitute a violation of the Convention the Committee calls upon the competent authorities, in order to avoid detrimental consequences for trade union organisations, to endeavour, whenever it is not possible to allow such organisations to continue using their premises, to offer alternative solutions so that they can continue operating normally.

(b) Regarding the infringement of the rights of workers' representatives, the Committee, while noting that the judicial or administrative authorities have remedied such situations as have been brought to their notice, calls upon the Government to pay due attention to the provisions of the Workers' Representatives Recommendation, 1971 (No. 143), that relate to the means of ensuring effective protection of workers' representatives.

Geneva, 26 February 1987.&htab;Roberto Ago, &htab;&htab;&htab;&htab; Chairman.